the contribution of paṇḍitarāja jagannātha to sanskrit poetics

Vol. II

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF PAṆḌITARĀJA JAGANNĀTHA TO SANSKRIT POETICS

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Chapter Sixth

ALAṄKĀRAS

Alaṅkāras have been given a very prominent place ever since the science of poetics was originated and developed, though the concept and the importance of Alaṅkāras had undergone many changes in different periods. The attention of the rhetorician was distracted for some time from Alaṅkāras with the advent of the Dhvani-theory and the vehement arguments that were advanced for and against the Dhvani, though the Dhvanikāra himself tries to fix a proper place for Alaṅkāras in his system. But a new impetus has been given to the system of Alaṅkāras by great writers like Ruyyaka, AD. and PR. who, while accepting the Dhvani theory, assign a proper place and definite scope to the Alaṅkāras in their valuable works. The importance that has been attached to the Alaṅkāras is quite evident from the fact that there are hundreds of works written solely on Alaṅkāras, including the one by Ruyyaka (Alaṅkārasarvasva), which is generally believed as the basis for all the later works dealing with Alaṅkāras. Three-fourths of the present work of PR. also deal with the Alaṅkāras, where we find the clear-cut definition of Alaṅkāras with proper adjudgement of their scope and purpose.

The word 'Alaṅkāra' anticipates the existence of an 'Alaṅkārya', without which the Alaṅkāra loses its significance. There has been a great divergence of opinion as to the nature of the Alaṅkārya. According to the old Ālaṅkārikas Kāvya is the Alaṅkārya and thus Kāvya being Śabdārtha-rūpa, Śabda is the Alaṅkārya of the Śabdālaṅkāras and Artha of Arthālaṅkāras (Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha (Comm., p. 2).

But with the advent of the Dhvani-theory the conception of Alaṅkārya has undergone a great change, and according to the Dhvanikāra, the Vyaṅgyārtha is the Alaṅkārya of Alaṅkāras (Dhvanyāloka p. 197). Abhinavagupta goes one step further and declares that Rasa is the Alaṅkārya of the Alaṅkāras. (Locana pp. 197-8). The same view has been expressed by Mammaṭa also (KP. p. 385).

But PR. in accordance with his definition of Kāvya, where he does not accept Rasa alone as the soul of poetry, accepts any Ramaṇīyārtha, whether it is the Rasa, Vastu or Alaṅkāra as the Alaṅkārya of Alaṅkāras. Accordingly he states : "अथस्य प्रागभिहितलक्षणस्य काव्यात्मनो व्यङ्ग्यस्य रमणीयताप्रयोजका: अलङ्कारा निरूप्यन्ते" (RG. p. 204).

Here PR. uses the word 'Vyaṅgya' in the general sense of 'Rasālaṅkāra-vastu-rūpa-vyaṅgya' but not Rasa alone. Thus the purpose of Alaṅkāras according to him, is to bring in charm to the Vyaṅgyārtha.

In fact, the Alaṅkārya need not necessarily be Vyaṅgyārtha alone, according to PR. and that is why we see him classifying Upamā into five varieties as the Upaskāraka of Rasa, Vyaṅgyālaṅkāra, Vyaṅgyavastu, Vācyālaṅkāra, or Vācyavastu (RG. p. 226). In view of this statement, the above sentence "Athāsya prāgabhihitalakṣaṇasya" etc., should be understood as Vastu-svarūpa-kathana, that when there is Vyaṅgya, the Alaṅkāra would increase its charm.

As to the origin of the name 'Alaṅkāra', J. Gonda feels that the original meaning of this word was "making suitable, equal to, a match for, fit, invigorating, adding strength to, making such as required for, putting a thing out in such a way that it answers its purpose etc.," and therefore, it was originally used, according to him, to mean "magical objects that are to strengthen a person or a thing, amulets and the like". Thus he implies to say that this word might have been used in poetics also in similar sense in the ancient times, because, perhaps, Alaṅkāra adds strength to a poem for the

effective fulfilment of its purpose, i.e., poetic expression. But ultimately he states that this primitive sense might not have been intended even by the old rhetoricians when they had used this word, in poetics ('Remarks on Similes in Sanskrit Literature', p. 1.). Whatever might be the primitive sense of this word, even old writers like Bharata appear to have used this word only on the analogy of the Alaṅkāra of a man, as in the case of 'Guṇas' and 'Lakśaṇas' etc.

But what is the general nature of Alaṅkāras according to PR. ? Of course PR. does not talk about it at the beginning of this chapter, but he states at one or two places that the peculiar charm resulting from the Pratibhā of a poet is the Svarūpa of an Alaṅkāra and in this regard his views are identical with those of Jayaratha.

"अलङ्काराणां परस्पर विच्छेदस्य वैलक्षण्यस्य हेतुभूता जन्यतासंसर्गेण काव्यनिष्ठा कविप्रतिभा तज्जन्यत्वप्रयुक्ता चमत्कारिता वा विच्छित्ति :"

(RG. p. 528)

"वैचित्र्यात्मनो विच्छित्तिविशेषस्याभावात् । सा हि जन्यतासंसर्गेण कविप्रतिभाविशेषः ; तन्निर्मितत्वप्रयुक्तश्चमत्कृतिविशेषो वेति उक्तम्"

(RG. p. 633)

"कविप्रतिभात्मकस्य विच्छित्तिविशेषात्मकस्य अलङ्कारात्मकत्वेनोक्तत्वात् ।" (Vimarśinī, p. 181)

After briefly stating the general purpose of Alaṅkāras, PR. takes up seventy-one Alaṅkāras and defines each of them with proper illustrations, which are generally followed by elaborate discussions which are seldom to be found in any extant works of his predecessors. First he takes up Upamā. As was rightly pointed out by Rudraṭa, Upamā is one of the

Note :—In order to have a better understanding of PR.'s definition of each Alaṅkāra, it is attempted, in the following pages to show, before examining PR.'s views, the definitions, given by Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka whose opinions on Alaṅkāras are generally accepted as the authority. And it is these authors whom PR. tries to criticise or defend in many places.

four Alaṅkāras each of which is the fountain-head of many Alaṅkāras, the other three being 'Vāstavaṁ', 'Atiśaya' and 'Śleṣa' (Kāvyālaṅkāra, VII. 9). The importance of Upamā is expressed in a poetical way by Appayyadīkṣita by comparing it with a beautiful acrtress assuming different roles (CM. p. 6). PR., instead of saying that Upamā is the source of many Alaṅkāras, states in his characteristic way, that the Upamā underlies many Alaṅkāras which is, of course, another way of saying the same thing (RG. p. 195).

UPAMĀLAṄKĀRA. According to Mammaṭa "similarity is the Upamā when there is Bheda."[1] Pradīpa feels (p. 439) that 'Alaṅkāratve sati' is to be added in the Lakṣaṇa because mere Sādharmya cannot be accepted as Upamā. Ruyyaka defines Upamā as "the Sādharmya between the Upamāna and the Upameya when both Bheda and Abheda are equally involved."[2]

PR.'s definition of Upamā is as follows:—"The charming resemblance beautifying the Vākyārtha is the Upamālaṅkāra."[3] While being very simple this definition of PR. brings home the importance of the Camatkāra in the Upamā. After explaining how the addition of the adjective 'Sundara' is helpful in avoiding Ativyāpti in Ananvaya, Vyatireka, and Rūpaka, etc. PR. states that Pratīpālaṅkāra and the Upameyopamā also come under Upamā only (RG. p. 205).

But Nāgeśa contends, on the authority of the Navyas (GM. p. 205) that the Camatkāra in the above Alaṅkāras is the result of some other factors but not the Sādṛśya and so they are beyond the scope of Upamālaṅkāra. Here it can only be said that the arguments which are mainly based on such

1. "साधर्म्यमुपमा भेदे ।" (KP. p. 438)

2. "उपमानोपमेययोः साधर्म्ये भेदाभेदतुल्यत्वे उपमा ।" (AS. p. 31)

3. "सादृश्यं सुन्दरं वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकं उपमालङ्कृतिः ।" (RG. p. 204)

things like 'Camatkāra' belong to the category of "much can be said on either side". Moreover, PR. is particular in stating that there is Upamāniṣpatti in both these Alaṅkāras also as in Upamā, and this contention appears to be quite correct. There may be slight difference also in their nature, which perhaps, makes PR. also mention those two figures separately, though reluctantly.

Now the question arises, whether Upamā can be accepted in places where the 'Upamāna' is only a creation of the poet's imagination, and thus has no real existence, as in:—

"त्वयि कोपो ममाभाति सुधांशाविव पावकः।"
"स्तनाभोगे पतन् भाति कपोलात् कुटिलोलकः।
शशाङ्कबिम्बतो मेरौ लम्बमान इवोरगः॥" (RG. pp. 205-6)

The reason for this doubt is that the very 'Upamāna' being an improbable thing, where is the question of Camatkāra? But PR. says that the source of Camatkāra need not necessarily be a real thing, because pleasure can be derived even from an imaginary thing. Therefore, Upamā can be accepted in the above examples.

After explaining the Upamālaṅkāra by giving a suitable example, PR. proceeds to examine the definition of Upamā as given by AD. in Citramīmāṁsā, which is as follows :—

"उपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तिमत् सादृश्यवर्णनमदुष्टं अव्यङ्ग्यमुपमालङ्कारः।"
"स्वनिषेधापर्यवसायि सादृश्यवर्णनं वा तथाभूतं तथा।"

(RG. p. 29)

This is the 'Arthānuvāda' of AD.'s definition. Thus according to AD., "Upamā is the express description of resemblance, free from defects and resulting in the fulfilment of similarity"; or, "Upamā is the express description of resemblance which does not result in negation and is free from defects". PR. criticises these two definitions on the following ground. Varṇana being the use of peculiar words, or in the form of peculiar cognition (Vilakṣaṇa-jñāna), it cannot be the Vācya of the words; and so the adjective Avyaṅgya is without

any purpose, because such Varṇana can never be a Vyaṅgya. The above objection may by answered by taking 'Sādṛśya-varṇana' to mean 'Varṇana-viṣayībhūta-sādṛśya', but PR. says that there will be Ativyāpti of this Lakṣaṇa in 'यथा गौस्तथा गवय:' and 'कल्पोपसर्जने च तुल्यम्' (Aṣṭādhyāyi 1.2.57) etc., because the Sādrśya is 'Varṇana-viṣayībhūta' in the above instances also. It may be argued, in order to meet the objection that mere mention of similarity cannot be Upamā unless there is Camatkāra in the Sādṛśya which alone is meant by Sādṛśya-varṇana, but where is, then, the need of the Viśeṣaṇa "Upamiti-kriyāniṣpatti" because Camatkāra anticipates the existence of such Niṣpatti without which there can be no Camatkāra at all. Similarly the adjective "Niṣedhāparyavasāyi", in the second definition, can be omitted, for, its purpose, the avoidance of Ativyāpti in Vyatireka is fullfiled by the word 'Camatkāra', because in Vyatireka, the Sādṛśya-niṣedha' but not the Sādṛśya, is Camatkāraka. Again PR. shows another Ativyāpti of this definition. Here is being given the definition of Upamā as Alaṅkāra which by Yogārtha means the 'embellishment of something else' (अलङ्करोति इति अलङ्कार). Therefore, the Upamā in places like "Stanābhoge patan bhāti" etc., where there is no other thing to be embellished, cannot be called Alaṅkāra in the strict sense of the word. But your definition (Upamiti-kriyā-niṣpatti mat-sādṛśya-varṇanaṁ) includes this also under Upamālaṅkāra which is, therefore, an instance of Ativyāpti. Now it cannot be argued, that the definition is meant to include any Upamā, whether it is Alaṅkāra or not, because in such case, where is the need for the adjective 'Avyaṅgyaṁ' when there is nothing wrong in including the Vyṅgyopamā also ? It is also not correct to say that there is no Upamā at all in 'Stanābhoge' etc., on the ground that the Upamāna is Asambhāvya. If it were to be the case, there would be no scope for Kavikalpitopamā.

It is interesting to note that there is a self-contradiction in PR.'s views here. As was shown above, he establishes that there is Upamālaṅkāra in the verse quoted above, though the Upamāna is Asambhāvya. But when we apply his own

argument "नह्यत्रोपमानसादृश्यादुपमास्वरूपादस्ति कश्चिदतिरिक्तो वाक्यार्थः येनोपमा तमलङ्कुर्यात्" (RG. p. 212).

this verse cannot come under his definition at all where he purposefully adds the adjective 'Vākyārthopaskārakam'. If Dīkṣita's definition includes this verse also under Upamālaṅkāra, he should all the more welcome it, because he accepts Upamālaṅkāra in it. Any justification by applying 'Brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa-nyāya' or 'Petikābharaṇa-nyāya' etc., holds good in the case of AD.'s definition also.

That is why Alaṅkārakaustubha criticises the stand taken by PR. and says that there is no need to accept Upamā in 'Stanābhoge' etc.; it is only an instance of Utprekṣā. Kavi-kalpitopamā can have its scope where the Upamāna is well-known and its employment as the Upamāna is done for the first time by the poet as in the case of Udgarbha-hūṇa-taruṇi" etc. Alaṅkārakaustubha recognises the incongruity in the contention of PR. as explained above and states that if the Vākyārtha alone is to be accepted as the Alaṅkārya, your own example "Vibhāti vadanaṁ tasyāḥ" etc., cannot be taken as an instance of Upamā because there is no Vākyārtha to be embellished (Alaṅkārakaustubha pp. 25-26). Therefore, he says even if Upamā were to be accepted in 'Stanābhoge' etc., the sādṛśya gives Utkarṣa to the Upameya, though not to any Vākyārtha and Mukha etc., being the Vibhāva, its Utkarṣa results in Rasotkarṣa. In this connection Viśveśvara-paṇḍita quotes Nyāyapañcānana who maintains that Upamā arises where some Utkarṣa is maintained in the Upameya on account of Sādṛśaya with some other thing (AK. p. 26).

One thing should be noted here. There may be some self-contradiction in PR.'s arguments as exemplified above. But his contention that the Alaṅkāra should be the Alaṅkāra of some Alaṅkārya seems to be correct, even according to the old writers. Even Nyāyapañcānana's definition does not prevent us from accepting that the Upamālaṅkāra as a whole (but not the Sādṛśya involved in it) should embellish something else.

By way of showing another defect in AD.'s definition PR. says that the word 'Sādṛśya' is superfluous, because by saying 'उपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तिमत् वर्णनमुपमा' it will be understood that it is the Varṇana of Sādṛśya only which alone is helpful in Upamiti-kriyā-niṣpatti.

Next PR. refutes the definition given by Vidyānātha (Pratāparudrīyam VII. 1.) saying that there is Ativyāpti in Vyatirekālaṅkāra, where there is Sādṛśya mentioned for negation. Similarly the definition of Upamā : –

"उपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरर्थयोर्द्वयोः ।
हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमेत्युच्यते काव्यवेदिभिः ।" (RG. p. 213)

as given by some old writers is found incorrect because the simple definition "Hṛdyaṁ sādharmyaṁ upamā" itself is sufficient and all the other words are sperfluous.

Mammaṭa's definition (KP. p. 438) also is found defective by PR. because of its Ativyāpti in Vyatirekālaṅkāra. This Ativyāpti may be avoided by saying that the Sādharmya should be complete in itself (without resulting in its negation). But, then, the use of the word 'Bhede' will be superfluous which is intended to avoid Ananvaya, because this can be achieved by the above explanation of Sādharmya. Moreover, the definition given in the context of a Kāvyalaṅkāra should be such as to be applied to Kāvyālaṅkāra only, and where is the meaning in giving a definition in a most general way to be equally applied to all kinds of Upamās, Laukika, Alaukika, Pradhāna, Apradhāna, Vācya and Vyaṅgya etc.? Therefore, Mammaṭa's definition of Upamā cannot be called a definition in the strict sense of the word. All the defects as shown in Mammaṭa's definition are applicable to the definition given by Alaṅkārasarvasva also (AS. p. 31).

The same Ativyāpti in Vyatireka is to be found in the definition of Alaṅkāraratnākara also, which runs as follows:—

"प्रसिद्धगुणेनोपमानेन अप्रसिद्धगुणस्योपमेयस्य सादृश्यमुपमा ।"

(AR. p. 16)

Moreover, there is Ayvāpti of this Lakṣaṇa in an Upamā, which is based on Śleṣa, because the Dharma which is only in the form of Śabda is the invention of the poet but not well-known (Prasiddha).

After examining the definitions of Upamā given by other writers, PR. first attempts a classification of this figure according to the Prācīnas. Accordingly he mentions six varieties of Pūrṇopamā and, depending on Mammaṭa, he enumerates nineteen varieties of Luptopamā which, in the words of AD. (Citramīmāṁsā p. 31) are mere grammatical peculiarities and are thus of little value to the Ālaṅkārikas. PR. also appears endorsing the views of AD. when he says that these varieties are being enumerated by him only because they are mentioned by old writers.[1] The twenty five varieties of Upamā as enumerated by PR. are as follows :

पूर्णोपमा—(a) श्रौती—(1) वाक्यगता (2) समासगता (3) तद्धितगता (b) आर्थी—(4) वाक्यगता (5) समासगता (6) तद्धितगता

लुप्तोपमा—(a) उपमानलुप्ता—(1) वाक्यगता (2) समासगता (b) धर्मलुप्ता—(3) श्रौती समासगता (4) आर्थी समासगता (5) श्रौती वाक्यगता (6) आर्थी वाक्यगता (7) आर्थी तद्धितगता (c) वाचक-लुप्ता—(8) समासगता (9) कर्मक्यल्गता (10) आधारक्यज्गता (11) क्यङ्गता (12) कर्मणमुलगता (13) कर्तृणमुल्गता (d) धर्मोपमान-लुप्ता—(14) वाक्यगता (15) समासगता (e) वाचकधर्मलुप्ता—(16) क्विब्गता (17) समासगता (f) (18) वाचकोपमेयलुप्ता (g) धर्मोप-मानवाचकलुप्ता ।

PR. explains all these varieties by giving suitable examples also. Almost all the Ālaṅkārikas take it as an instance of Upamāna-luptā where something is described as peerless and PR. also gives similar examples for it :—

"यस्यतुलामधिरोहति लोकोत्तरवर्णपरिमलोदागरैः ।
कुसुमकुलतिलक चम्पक न वयं तं जातु जानीमः ॥" (RG. p. 215)

1. RG. p. 219 Udbhata appears to be the first writer to introduce the varieties based an grammatical peculiarities (Kāvyālaṅkarsārasaṇgraha I. 15-21).

But these Ālaṅkārikas seem to have engaged themselves in increasing the number of the varieties of Luptopamā by adding the Upamānaluptā also with no proper consideration whether such Upamānaluptā can be called Upamā at all, because where is the question of its being Upamālaṅkāra when there is no Sādharmya described ? Certainly the negation of Sādhrmya cannot constitute Upamālaṅkāra. Otherwise why not Vyatirekālaṅkāra also be accepted as one of the varieties of Upamālaṅkāra ? These considerations must have weighed with PR., when he raises the question after showing the above verse as an example of Upamānaluptā that how can it be called Upamā when there is no Sādṛśya-paryavasāna. But he also is led away by the opinion of old writers and states that by saying "Na vayaṁ taṁ jātu jānīmaḥ", it is indicated ultimately that though we, not being omnicients, are not able to find a comparable thing, there will certainly be such thing somewhere or other. This reply is not at all convincing and is against the poet's implied desire to maintain the greatness of the object in hand (Upameya).

Nāgeśa in his Pradīpoddyota (KP.p. 448) gives the same reply and maintains that there is no need of accepting a separate Alaṅkāra like Asama as was done by Alaṅkāra-ratnākarakāra. But even if so much of implied meaning is ascribed to the statements, it may be an instance of Upamādh-vani but not Upamālaṅkāra, or it is better to accept it as an instance of some different Alaṅkāra and reduce the number of Luptomās to seventeen.

After enumerating the twentyfive varieties of Upamā, PR. adds some varieties of Luptopamā stating that they were acceptable to some old writers ; thus the total number of Upamā is increased to thirtytwo. While dealing with the varieties of Vācakaluptā, PR. gives the following verse as an example where words formed of कर्मार्थकक्यच्, आधारार्थकक्यच्, and अधिकरणार्थकक्यङ् are used:—

"मलयानिलमनलीयति मणि भवने काननीयति क्षणतः ।
विरहेण विकलहृदया निर्जल मीनायते महिला" ।।

(RG., p. 217)

There he explains how 'Analīyati', 'Kānanīyati' and 'Nirjalamīnāyate' are to be taken as the instances of Vācakaluptā.

Now he states that they were taken as the instance of Vācakaluptā, only according to the old writers, and that they should, in fact, be taken as the places of Dharmalopa also. It may be argued that there in no Dharmalopa, because the 'Ācāra' which is expressed by the 'Kyac' etc., is there as the Sādhāraṇadharma. But PR. says that 'Ācāra' expressed in such a general way cannot be taken as Upmā-Prayojaka unless there is some kind of particularity in it. This is clear from the fact that we don't find the Upamāniṣpatti when it is simply said "त्रिविष्टपं तत् खलु भारतायते", without adding further "सुपर्वभिः शोभितमन्तराश्रितैः" which alone can supply the Sādhāraṇadharma, based on Śleṣa. Even in places like 'नारीयते सपत्नसेना', the qualities like cowardice are to be understood as the Sādhāraṇadharma involved in Ācāra. Moreover, if such things as Ācāra are accepted as Sādhāraṇadharma, even sentences like "मुखरूपमिदं वस्तु प्रफुल्लमिव पङ्कजम्" would be the instance of Pūrṇopamā because the 'Vastutva' can be taken as the Sādhāraṇadharma in the absence of such Dharmas like Manoharatva. Therefore, PR. contends, the places of Karmādhārakyac and Kyaṅ should be taken as the instances of Vācakadharmaluptā but not Vācakaluptā alone.

In this context, PR. criticises the views of AD. who accepts Dharmaluptopamā in 'पटुपटुर्देवदत्तः' etc., where, as he contends, the Dvirbhāva is effected in the sense of Sādṛśya according to "प्रकारे गुणवचनस्य" (Aṣṭādhāyī, 8.1.12) is of the opinion that this should come under Vācakadharmaluptā, because on the authority of Kaiyaṭa, the Dvirbhāva is only indicative but not expressive of Sādṛśya and so there is absence of the Vācaka also.

Here Nāgeśa tries to vindicate AD. saying that Vācakaluptopamā can be accepted only where there is no Sādṛśyabodhaka whether it conveys the Sādṛśya by Vācakatva or

Dyotakatva and so this (Paṭupaṭuḥ etc.), cannot be called Vācakaluptā because there is the Dvirbhāva conveying the Sadṛśya. It is inevitable to accept this principle, Nāgeśa contends, or else "Candra iva mukhaṁ" will have to be accepted as the instance of Vācakaluptā because the 'Iva' etc., are taken, by some scholars, as only the Dyotakas but not Vācakas of Sādṛśya.

But this reply of Nāgeśa will not be of any consequence to PR. who appears, as will be seen presently, to be in favour of accepting the 'Ivādi' as Vācaka only. Any way the objections of PR. are not binding on AD. even, because he may safely follow the view that the 'Ivādi' is only Dyotaka.

Realising this point, Nāgeśa cites another instance 'चन्द्रसुहृत् मुखम्' where there is neither the Dyotaka nor Vācaka of the Sādṛśya but only the Sadṛśa-vācaka which indirectly conveys the Sādṛśya also. In order to see that these are not called Vācakaluptās, 'Vācakaluptā' should simply be understood 'Bodhakaluptā' only, in which case PR.'s objection will be without ground.

Viśveśvara, while raising similiar objection (as the one raised by Nāgeśa), says at the end, that whether this is Dharmaluptā or Dharmavācakaluptā, no Nyūnatādoṣa (omission) can be ascribed to Mammaṭa because it comes under Samāsagatā, enumerated by him. (AK. p. 107). But it is not known how 'Paṭu-paṭuḥ' can be called Samāsa in the strict sense of the word ?

In the context of Vācaka-dharma-luptopamā, AD. quotes the following verse :—

"नृणां यं सेवमानानां संसारोप्यवपर्वति ।
तं जगत्यभजन् मर्त्यः चञ्चा चन्द्रकलाधरम् ।".

Here he explains that the 'Kvibanta', "Apavargati" and the 'Kananta', "Cañcā" are the instances of Vācaka-dharma-lopa. But PR. objects to accepting Dharmalopa in 'Cañcā' because the 'Candra-kalā-dhara-bhajana-rāhitya' is there mentioned as the Sādhāraṇadharma. After one or two minor

arguments he condescends to accept Sādhāraṇa-dharma-lopa, when it is insisted by the Pūrvapakṣin that 'Candra-kalā-dhara-bhajana-rāhitya' is intended to be applied to Upameya only where as the 'Svātma-hitākaraṇa' is to be taken as the Sādhāraṇa-dharma (RG. p. 252).

Though he appears conceding graciously, PR. knows the weakness of his argument in taking Candra-kaladhara-bhajana-rāhitya as the Sādharaṇadharma ; because it cannot be applied to the scare-crow at all according to the well-known dictum 'सम्भवयभिचाराभ्यां स्याद्विशेषणमर्थवत्', and there is no meaning in negating the Candrakalā-dhara-bhajana of a scare-crow, which it can never have at all. Similarly even the 'Svātma-hitā-karaṇaṁ' cannot be taken as Sādhāraṇadharma in the strict sense of the word but only such qualities as Vyarthatva are better to be accepted as the Sādhāraṇadharmas. For example when it is said 'गुरूपदेशमश्रृण्वन् अयं गार्दभसदृशः' the speaker does not intend the 'Gurūpadeśāśravaṇa' as the Sādhāraṇadharma but only the Mūḍhatva etc., which are common to both the ass and the man and which results in Gurūpadeśāśravaṇa in case of the latter. Therefore, even this criticism of AD. need not be taken seriously.

Viśveśvara quotes, in his own words, the views, perhaps, of PR. with approval under the heading 'Anye tu'. But at the end of the argument he writes :—साधारणश्च धर्मः स्वात्महिताकरणमिति तु शपथमातम् चन्द्र इव मुखं रमणीयमित्यत्रापि धर्मान्तर-प्रयुक्तसादृश्यं विवक्षितमिति शपथस्यापि सम्भवात् धर्मलोपापत्तेः इत्याहुः।"

(AK. p. 134)

Whereas PR. ends his arguments without showing "Candra iva mukhaṁ ramaṇīyaṁ" as the counter argument (RG. p. 252).

This difference indicates two alternatives : either Viśveśvara is quoting some other author holding similar views as those of PR., or he might have seen a different version of Rasagaṅgādhara. It is not possible to believe that Viśveśvara himself has intorduced this example, because he clearly says that these are the views of 'Anye'.

PR. shows one grammatical defect in the usage of 'Purataḥ' *in the sense of 'Puraḥ'* in the verse quoted by AD.[1] But Nāgeśa while pointing out that the word is grammatically correct also shows the usage of 'Purataḥ' by Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti in "इयञ्चतेन्या पुरतो विडम्बना" and "पश्यामि तामित इतः पुरतश्च पश्चात्" respectively. (GMP. p. 226).

PR. classified Upamā broadly into five varieties on the basis of the difference of the Upaskārya (that which is to be embellished), i.e., Rasa, Vyaṇgyālaṅkāra, Vyaṅgyavastu, Vācyālaṅkāra and Vācyavastu and this classification is perhaps the creation of his own fertile brain. He explains all these five varieties with suitable examples.

After explaining these five varieties, PR. raises a question : how the Alaṅkāra which has to embellish something else, can be Alaṅkārya at all. But he states that the Alaṅkara can also be Alaṅkārya on two occasions : (1) Firstly, when it is being suggested like Rasādi and (2) secondly, even when it is expressed, it is Pradhāna. Here he gives a beautiful example. An ear-ring displayed for sale in a jeweller's box being itself Pradhāna, is to be decorated by another ornament like gem ; While both of them will be the Alaṅkāras, one directly and another indirectly when put on by a lady. Similarly a Rūpaka etc., may be the Alaṅkārya of another Alaṅkāra, but both of them will be the Alaṅkāras of Rasa etc., when it is present there. Thus PR. appears not to have any objection in accepting that an Alaṅkāra can have its existence even though it does not actually embellish anything. But the only important point is, its Alaṅkāratva is only Aupacārika, because it cannot be called Alaṅkāra in the strict sense of the word.

As explained above, some Prāchīnas accept twenty-four varieties of Upamā, whereas according to others their number

1. "रूपयौवनलावण्यस्पृहणीयतराकृतिः ।
पुरतोहरिणाक्षीणामेष पुष्पायुधीयति ।।" (Citramīmāṁsā p. 27)

is thirtytwo. Now by multiplying the above varieties by these five varieties, the total number of the Upamās will be 125 and 160 respectively.

Again PR. classifies Upamā into five varieties on the basis of the different varieties of the Samānadharma. The Samānadharma may at times, be (1) Anugāmin i.e. applicable equally to the Upamāna and Upameya, (2) Bimbapratibimbabhāvarūpa, (3) having the Bimbapratibimbabhāva mixed with Vastu-prati-vastu-bhāva, (4) ascribed (Upacarita) though not really existing or (5) only in the form of words. He also explains all these varieties with suitable illustrations.

After explaining some varieties of Upamā where there is the mixture of two or three varieties of the Sādhāraṇadharma mentioned above, PR. states that the Upamā can be Vācya or Laksya or Vyaṅgya. He cites a verse (RGP. 235) where the word 'Sodara' is used to convey the sense of 'Sadṛśa' by Lakṣaṇā and states that the words like 'Pratibhaṭa' 'Pratimalla' etc., belong to this categoty. Next, he gives the verse :—

"अद्वितीयं रुचात्मानं मत्वा किं चन्द्र हृष्यसि ।
भूमण्डलमिदं मूढ केन वा विनिभालितम् ॥" (RG. p. 237)

as an instance of Vyaṅgyopamā where it is suggested that the face of the speaker's beloved is like the moon.

Now PR. clearly states that there is nothing wrong in accepting Upamā as Alaṅkāra even when it is being suggested ; because there is no Virodha between Vyaṅgyatva and Alaṅkāratva, the real Virodha being only between Alaṅkāratva and Pradhānatva, for, the Alaṅkāra is always Apradhāna being the Upaskāraka of something else. Therefore, he contends, that AD. is wrong in adding the Avyaṅgyatvaviśeṣaṇa, in the definition of Upamā. Thus according to him even a Vyaṅgyālaṅkāra can be called Alaṅkāra as long as there is something else which is Alaṅkārya.

In this context, PR. criticises the further classification of Upamā (CM. p. 32) into three more varieties: Sva-vaicitryamātra-viśrānta, Uktārthopapādanpara and Vyaṅgya-pradhāna

(Upamā where its own charm is important, Upamā which justifies a statement made already and the Upamā where the Vyaṅgyārtha is important). For the first two varieties, he gives "Sa cchinnamūlah" etc., and "Anantaratnaprabhavasya" etc., as examples. Now PR. contends that this classification is not complete as it does not include the Upamā in " नयने शिशिरीकरोतु मे शरदिन्दुप्रतिमं मुखं तव " etc. (RG p. 238) which is the Upaskāraka of the Vācyavastu. When so much care has been taken to exclude the Vyaṅgyopamā from the scope of Upamālaṅkāra, it is absurd, PR. says, to include the Pradhānopamā ('Sva-vaicitya-mātra-viśrāntopamā'), under the Upamālaṅkāra which cannot be called Alaṅkāra in the strict sense of the word. Further he states that there is no Upamā in 'Anantaratna' etc. For the instance of the Moon is given by way of amplification of the general statement that one single blemish becomes insignificant among so many good qualities. It can be an instance of Udāharaṇālaṅkāra but not of Upamā because there can be no Upamānopameyabhāva between two things having Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva.

As usual, Nāgeśa tries to vindicate AD. and answers all the three objections raised by PR. In answer to the first objection, he rightly points out that "Nayene śiśirīkarotu me" comes under the second variety, Uktārthopapādana-para, because the cooling is being justified by Śaradindūpamiti. In reply to the second objection Nāgeśa says that Upamā in general sense, but not as an Alaṅkāra, is under discussion and so AD. is right in mentioning the variety of Upamā, 'Sva-vaicitriya-mātra-viśrānta'. But as is rightly pointed out by PR. AD.'s attention is concentrated on defining and illustrating the Upamā as Alaṅkāra only, though at times he does not use the word Alaṅkāra just for the sake of Lāghava. Moreover, if he deals with Upamā only generally, he has to mention the Vyaṅgyopamā also as one of the varieties and its absence will have to be considered as an omission. Therefore, Nāgeśa's zeal to criticise PR. rather than to defend AD. appears to have overweighed with his judgement.

Again Nāgeśa tries to meet the third objection saying that there is no need to accept Udāharaṇa as a separate Alaṅkāra in "Anantaratna" etc., because Upamā is possible even when there is Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva, in view of the difference in the Upameyatāvacchedaka and Upamānatāvacchedaka. In this connection he gives the example of :—

"द्वारं द्वारमटन् भिक्षुः शिक्षते न तु याचते ।
"अदत्त्वा मादृशो मा भूः दत्त्वा त्वं त्वादृशो भव ।" (GMP. p. 239)

where the same Dharmin is, by general consent, taken as both Upamāna and Upameya, because of the Avacchedaka-bheda.

Nāgeśa's contention does not seem to be beyond question even here. PR. contends that there can be no Upamānopameyabhāva between two things where there is Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva. When he wants to meet this objection, Nāgeśa has to show only such place were the Upamānopameyabhāva is co-existing with the Sāmānayaviśeṣabhāva. Here in the example shown by Nāgeśa, there is no Sāmānya-viśesa-bhāva at all. In fact it is not clear how Upamālaṅkāra can be accepted even in "Tvaṁ tvādṛśo bhava", because we don't find the Avacchedaka-bheda which is said to have been existing here by Nāgeśa. Alaṅkāra-Kaustubha maintains some kind of Avacchedakabheda, the difference in time, in the above verse.

"तथा च 'एतत्कालोत्तरकालवृत्तिस्त्वम् एतत्कालीनत्वसदृशो भव' इत्यर्थः।
अन्यथा एकस्मिन्नेव काले तत्सादृश्यविधाने सिद्धसाधनतापत्तेः ।"
(AK. p. 14)

This is a farfetched explanation which may, at the most, lead us to accept a semblance of Upamāna in it but not a complete, clear-cut one. In fact, Upamā is not at all intended by saying "Tvaṁ tvādṛśo bhava", but the real intention of the speaker is to say that "you continue as you are, without becoming like me or somebody else." After all PR. appears to be quite right, in saying that there can be no Upamānopameyabhāva where there is Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva, because we do not come across such expressions as 'जन्तुरिव गच्छति गौः or

'गौरिव गच्छति जन्तु:'. Moreover, there is no Samānadharma in "Ekohi doṣo" etc., and Nimajjana cannat be taken as one, without reference to the Guṇas and Kiraṇas etc. Therefore there is no point in accepting Upamālaṅkāra in "Anantaratnaprabhavasya" etc. Strangely enough, Nāgeśā who tries, here, to prove the existence of Upamā accepts Saṅkara of Arthāntaranyāsa (in "Anantaratnaprabhavasya" etc.,) in Uddyota (Pradtpoddyota. p. 516).

By way of criticising another contention of AD. that Bimbapratibimbabhāva etc., of the Sādhāraṇadharma cannot be found in the Luptopamā (Dharmaluptopamā) because it is inevitable, in such cases, to accept its (of the Sādhāraṇadharma) Anugāmitā, PR. says that there is no rule that Bimbapratibimbabhāva should be always expressed in words. It can be either expressed or implied and the expressed Bimbapratibimbabhāva is called Śrauta whereas the implied one is called Ārtha. In support of his contention he gives an instance of Dharmaluptopamā where there is Bimbapratibimbabhāva (but not Anugāmitā) in the Sādhāraṇadharma:—

"मलय इव जगति पाण्डु: वल्मीक इवाधिधरणि धृतराष्ट्र: ।"

(RG. p. 239)

Here there is no Anugāmidharma between the Malaya and Pāṇḍu and between Valmīka and Dhṛtarāṣṭra though there is Upamā between them. But the Bimbapratibimbabhāva is implied between the Sandal trees and the Pāṇḍavas, and between the snakes and the Kauravas (who are also implied).

Next PR. mentions eight more varieties of Upamā as in the case of Rūpaka. These are 'Kevala-niravayavā', 'Mālā-rūpa-niravayavā', 'Samasta-vastu-viṣaya-sāvayavā', 'Ekadeśa-vivarti-sāvayavā', 'Kevala-śliṣṭa-parmparitā', 'Mālārūpa-śliṣṭa-paramparitā', 'Kevala-śuddha-paramparitā', and 'Mālārūpa-śuddha-paramparitā'.

AD. appears to be the first man to mention the varieties like the ones mentioned above, (CM. p. 60) though the possibility of such varieties is indicated by writers like Mammaṭa (KP. p. 455) and Jayaratha : (Vimarśini p. 37).

PR. gives the following two verses as the examples of Kevala-śliṣṭa-paramparitā, and Mālā-rūpa-śliṣṭa-paramparitā respectively :—

"नगरान्तर्महीन्द्रस्य महेन्द्रमहितश्रिय : ।
सुरालये खलु क्षीबा देवा इव विरेजिरे" ॥
"महीभृतां खलु गणे रत्नसानुरिव स्थितः ।
त्वं काव्ये वसुधाधीश वृषपर्वेव राजसे "॥ (RG. pp. 242-3)

In the first verse, the Upamānopameyabhāva between the two meanings expressed by 'Surālaya' by Śleṣa, is responsible for the same between Kṣības and Devas. Similarly the Upamānopameybhāva between the king and Ratnasānu etc., is the result of the Upamānopameyabhāva between the Padārthas conveyed by 'Mahī-bhṛtāṁ' etc., by Śleṣa. PR. justifies the Upamānopameyabhāva on the following ground. In the place of Śleṣa, Abhedādhayavasāna between the things conveyed by one word is accepted ; similarly Sādṛśya between them can also be accepted because they are conveyed by the same word.

Viśveśvara, after explaining the Śliṣṭa-paramparita etc., says (AK. p. 148) that though they have been shown by him on the authority of Rasagaṅgādhara and Citramīmāṁsā etc., there can be no Upamā between the things conveyd by one word ; because the very fact that they are conveyed by a single word, may result in their Abhedādhyavasāna, but not in Bhedajñāna which is the requisite condition for Upamā. At last he says that there may be Mānasa-sādṛśya-jñāna but not Śābda jñāna. It may be observed in this connection that the fact that there is the possibility of Abhedādhyavasāna, because two things are conveyed by a single word, cannot establish the absence of Bheda-jñāna. After all, Abhedādhya-

vasāna means the ascription of Abheda between those where there is Bheda. Therefore, the objection of Viśveśvara does not seem to be based on firm ground.

After explaining the other varieties also with suitable illustrations, PR. gives examples for the Raśanopamā also in its three varieties, Dharma-bheda, Dharmaikya and Dharma-luptā. He concludes the enumeration of the varieties of Upamā by saying that when these varieties are multiplied with the varieties mentioned at the beginning they become innumerable.

Like many other writers, PR. also says that the Upamā which is mainly suggested by a Vākya cannot be called Alaṅkāra, because itself being Pradhāna, it does not embellish anything else. But even this is called Alaṅkāra by general usage ; and this is justified by old writers by applying the Brāhmṇa-śramaṇa-nyāya, i.e., though one ceases to be a Brahmin after his conversion into Buddhism, he is still called Brāhmaṇaśramaṇa by old habit, like our modern Harijan-christian. Similarly, though the Alaṅkāra ceases to be Alaṅkāra when it is the Pradhāna-vyaṅgya, still it is called Alaṅkāra. In fact, as Candrikā (Part II, p. 305) rightly points out, the nyāya cannot be applied in the present case. The Śramaṇa in the above Nyāya, was a Brahmin at least for some time before his conversion. But the particular so-called Upamālaṅkāra was never an Alaṅkāra to deserve such appellation afterwards. Perhaps this has prompted PR. to find out another justification for this general practice. He says that such Pradhāna-vyaṅgyopamā also is called Alaṅkāra just like an ornament in the jeweller's show-case which was never used as Alaṅkāra, and still called as one (RG. p. 245). Ofcourse PR. is not the first person to give this justification, because we find it indicated already by Udbhaṭa (KSS. P. 2). PR.'s sense of discrimination lies in selecting the analogy of Mañjūṣādi-gatālaṅkāra, in preference to the Brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa-nyāya.

After discussing the varieties of Upamā with such thoroughness, not to be found in any work of his predecessors, PR. proceeds to examine their Śābdabodha, which he introduces in Alaṅkāraśāstra for the first time,[1] to be vigorously pursued by some later writers like Viśveśvarapaṇḍita, the author of Alaṅkārakaustubha.

There is divergence of views among the Śāstrakāras as to the nature of Sādṛśya. The Naiyāyikas believe that the Sādṛśya in 'मुखं चन्द्र इव' etc., is nothing but the Samānadharma which is in the form of Saundarya, existing in the moon and the face and therefore it (Sādṛśya) is not an independent Padārtha. (Tarkasaṅgraha Sarvasva. p. 51). But according to the Mīmāṁsakas (Candrikā, Part II. p. 310) the Samānadharma referred to above, is the Sādhaka (establisher) of Sādṛśya but not identical with Sādṛśya itself and therefore it is an independent Padārtha. Now taking the second view into consideration,[2] PR. tries to find out the Śābdabodha in the Upamāsthalas. First, he takes up Samāsagatopamā like 'Aravinda-sundaraṁ.' According to the well-known rule "निपातातिरिक्तनामार्थयोरभेदेनान्वयः", Abhedānvaya is to be

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1. It is true that PR. introduces the Śābdabodha-prakriyā which itself is a unique contribution of Sanskrit to the literary world, into the sphere of Alaṅkāraśāstra for the first time. But this is a hair-splitting discussion more suited to the Śāstras like Nyāya than to the delicate Śāstras like poetics. This Śāstra has gained nothing by the introduction of this Prakriyā. It can only show that difficult discussions can find place in this Śāstra also.

2. As can be judged from what he writes in Tulayayogitāprakaraṇa (RG. p. 423) PR. does not seem to be praticular whether Sādṛśya is an independent Padārtha as is acceptable to Ālaṅkārikas, or Sādhāraṇadharma-rūpa. That is why he shows the Śābda-bodha according to both the views.

accepted between 'Aravinda' and 'Sundara' which would result in the Śābdabodha 'अरविन्दाभिन्नं सुन्दरम्'. But such Bodha is prevented because in that case the word 'Sundara', being Viśeṣaṇa, should have Pūrvanipāta according to 'विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम्' 'उपसर्जनं पूर्वम्' (Aṣṭādhyāyī. 2.1.57 and 2.2.30) and so the Samāsa would have been 'Sundarāravindam'. Therefore the word 'Aravinda' conveys by Lakṣaṇā the meaning 'Aravinda-nirūpita-sādṛśya-prayojaka' while 'Sundara' means 'Saundaryavat'. Again there will be effected the Abhedānvya between the 'Aravinda-nirūpita-sādṛśya-prayojaka' and the partial meaning 'Saundarya' of 'Sundara'. Thus the resultant Śābdabodha will be "अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकाभिन्नसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नं मुखम्" etc. Here Lakṣaṇā is accepted to convey the meaning 'Aravinda-nirūpita-sādṛśya-prayojaka' but not Sādṛśya only, because in the latter case, the Anvaya between the Sādṛśya and the Saundarya has to be accepted by Prayojakatā-sambandha which is again against the rule नामार्थयोरभेदेनान्वयः. It may be objected, how can the Padārtha (Lakṣyārtha) have Anvaya with one part of the Padārtha (Padārthaikadeśa) i.e., 'Saundarya' because it is against the general rule "पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वेति न पदार्थैकदेशेन". But PR. maintains that this kind of partial Anvaya is inevitable as in cases like 'देवदत्तस्य नप्ता' where 'Devadattasya' is to be combined with one part of the 'Naptṛ-padārtha', i.e., 'Putra' of 'Putra-putraḥ'.

According to some Śāstrakāras, evidently the Vaiyākaraṇas, thers is no need of accepting any Lakṣaṇā or violating any rule in having Śābdabodha from the Samāsas like 'Aravinda-sundaram'. The Samāsa itself has got the Śakti to convey the Viśiṣṭārtha according to their well-known rule : "समासे खलु भिन्नैव शक्तिःपङ्कजशब्दवत्"।

(Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, p. 215)

There are some Śāstrakāras who accept Lakṣaṇā in the word 'Aravinda' to convey the whole meaning 'अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकाभिन्नसौन्दर्यवदभिन्न' etc., while the 'Sundara' is only a Tātparya-grāhaka, i.e., helpful in under-

standing the intended sense. There is no trouble about the Anvaya in this method also.

All these three kinds of Śābda-bodha are objected to by Viśveśvarapaṇḍita (AK. p. 81). He contends that 'Aravinda-sundaram' is an instance of Luptopamā by general consent. But if 'Aravinda' conveys by Lakṣaṇā the sense 'अरविन्द-निरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजक' etc., the word 'Aravinda' itself is to be taken as 'Vācaka' whether by Śakti or Lakṣaṇā. How can it, then, be called Vācaka-luptā ? In support of this contention, he cites the words of Mammaṭa, written in a different context as an authority. While showing 'मृगनयना हरते मुनेर्मनः' as an example of Vācaka-dharmopamāna-luptā, Mammaṭa says that it should be taken as such, only when the Samāsa and Upamānalopa etc., are effected according to 'Saptamyupamānapada' etc., and thereby he indicates that if 'Nayana' itself conveys, by Lakṣaṇā, as accepted by Kaiyaṭa and others, 'Mṛga-nayana- sadṛśā' it cannot be called Upamāna-luptā because the Upamāna is expressed by 'Nayana'. In this connection, Viśvesvara shows the example of 'Aravindavat sundaram' where PR. accepts that 'Vati' Pratyaya which originally means 'Sādṛśyavat', conveys by Lakṣaṇā, 'Sādṛśya' only. Now, Viśveśvara contends, if 'Aravindasundaraṁ' is accepted as an instance of Vācaka-luptopamā though 'Aravinda', by Lakṣaṇā, means 'Arvinda-nirūpita-sādṛśya-pryojaka', 'Aravindavat sundaram' also will have to be accepted as a Vācaka-luptopamā, because 'Vati' pratyaya expresses Sādṛśya, only by Lakṣaṇā but not by Abhidhā. But it is not accepted as Vācakaluptā either by old writers or by PR. himself. Therefore, Viśveśvara concludes, that all the three procedures of Śābdabodha cannot be accepted. According to him the Smaraṇa of the particle 'Iva' which is dropped (Lupta) in the Samāsa, expresses Sādṛśya and there is no need of having Lakṣaṇā in any word (AK.p. 82). It may be mentioned here in justification of PR.'s stand that the suffix 'Vati' expresses Sādṛśya by Abhidhā at least as a Viśeṣaṇa (in the Sādṛśyavat) and thus there is no possibility of calling it Vācakaluptā and the same cannot be the case in 'Aravinda-sundaram' where 'Iva' or any such word is not to be found.

After examining the Śābdabodha of the Samāsagatopamā PR. takes up the Śābdabodha of the Vyasta-vākya-gatopamā. He takes the sentence "अरविन्दमिवसुन्दरं (मुखम्)". Here 'Iva' expresses Sādṛśya. The Anvaya between 'Aravinda' and the 'Sādṛśya' is effected by Nirūpitatva-saṁsarga. Thus the meaning of 'Aravindamiva' is 'Aravinda-nirūpita-sādṛśya'. Now the 'Sādṛśya' will have Anvaya with the Sundara-padārthaikdeśa, i.e., 'Saundarya' by the Prayojakatā-sambandha. Thus the resultant Śābdabodha is "अरविन्दनिरूपित-सादृश्यप्रयोजकसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नम्" etc.

The Śābdabodha of the Dharmalupta-vākyagatopamā like 'Aravindaṁ iva (mukham)' etc., is like this : The Anvaya between the 'Aravinda' and 'Sādṛśya' expressed by 'Iva' is effected by Nirūpitatva-Saṁbandha and the 'Sādṛśya' in its turn, is associated with the 'Mukha' etc., by Svarūpa-saṁbandha and thus the Śābda-bodha is "अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यवत् मुखम्".

After showing the Śābdabodha in the above sentences, PR. clears off an implied doubt in the following words :— "निपातजन्योपस्थितिप्रयोज्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतानिपातजन्योपस्थिति-प्रयोज्यविशेष्यतान्यतरभिन्नविशेष्यतासंसर्गेण नामार्थप्रकारकबोध एव विशेष्यतया विभक्तिजन्योपस्थितेः हेतुत्वात् इवार्थस्य नञर्थस्येव भेदसंसर्गेण नामार्थविशेष्यत्वे विशेषणत्वे च न दोषः"। (RG. p. 247)

To put it in simple non-technical language, the general idea of the above passage is as follows : As can be seen from Śābdabodha of 'अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरम् and 'अरविन्दमिव' as explained above, there are used Bheda-sambandhas, Nirūpitatva, Prayojakatva and Svarūpa which are other than Abheda-sambandha. But there is a rule that Bheda-sambandha can be had only when the Viśeṣyatā is expressed by Vibhakti-pratyaya like Ṣaṣṭhī, and therefore Abheda-sambandha alone should be used in other cases. Thus the above Śābda-bodhas cannot be held correct, because the Viśeṣyatā here, being conveyed by Nāmas and the Nipātas (but not by Vibhakti-pratyaya), there should be Abhedānvaya only. This objection

is met by introducing an amendment to the general rule. According to the general rule Bhedānvaya between the Prātipadikārthas can be had only when the Viśeṣyatā is expressed by a Vibhakti. Now this rule will be restricted to the Artha expressed by Prātipadikas, other than Nipātas and so there will be nothing wrong in accepting Bheda-saṁbandha between the Prātipadikārtha and Nipātārtha. This amendment has to be accepted not only to safe-guard the above Śābda-bodhas, but also to justify the Śābda-bodha in places like 'घटो न पटः', Here the Anvaya between the Paṭa and the Nañartha is effected by Pratiyogitāsaṁbandha, and that between the Nañartha and Ghaṭa is by Svarūpasaṁbandha and thus the Śābda-bodha is "पटप्रतियोगिकभेदवान् घटः" . This Śābda-bodha also would have been incorrect but for the restriction to the general rule.

Next PR. shows the Śābdabodha of 'अरविन्दमिव भाति (मुखम्)'. As explained, 'Aravindamiva' conveys the meaning 'Aravinda-nirūpita-sādṛśyaṁ'. This Sādṛśya is associated (Anvita) with the Bhā-dhātvartha (i.e. Jñāna) by Prakāratā-saṁbandha and the Jñāna in its turn is associated with the Mukhādi by Viśeṣyatā-saṁbandha. Thus the resultant Śābda-bodha is "अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रकारकज्ञानविशेष्यीभूतं (मुखम्)"। If the word 'Saundaryeṇa' is added to the above example the Śābda-bodha will be like this. The Prayojyatva expressed by the Tṛtīyā is associated with the Dhātvartha, i.e., Bhāna or the Sādṛśya. Thus "सौन्दर्यप्रयोज्यारविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रकारकधी-विशेष्य" will be the Śābda-bodha.

Viśveśvara objects (AK. p. 83) to this Bodha also on the following ground. He evolves a Kāryakāraṇabhāva to guide the Sādṛśyānvaya in the following words : "सादृश्यनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन सादृश्यान्वयबोधं प्रति तदनुयोग्युपस्थापकपदजन्योपस्थितित्वेन हेतुता", which put in simple words, means that Sādṛśya can have Anvaya only with a Pada which conveys its Anuyogin. Thus he says that the Sādṛśya cannot have Anvaya with the Dhātvartha, i.e., 'Bhāna', but only with the 'Mukha' which is its (of Sādṛśya) Anuyogin.

Thus he accepts 'अरविन्दसदृशं मुखं ज्ञानविषयः' etc., as the Śābda-bodha of "Aravindam iva bhāti". He raises a similar objection in the case of the Śābda-bodha of 'अरविन्दतुल्यो भाति' also (Ibid. p. 88).

The Śābda-bodha of 'गज इव गच्छति' and 'पिक इव रौति' is as follows: The word 'Gaja' conveys, by Lakṣanā the sense of 'Gajagamana' and similarly 'Pika' expresses 'Pika-rava'. The root 'Gam' in 'Gacchati' expresses 'Gamana' and the 'Tiṅ' expresses 'Kṛti'. Similarly the root 'Ru' in 'Rauti' expresses 'Ravaṇa' and Tiṅ expresses 'Kṛti'. The Kṛti expressed by the Tiṅ has Anvaya with Devadattādi by Svarūpasaṁbandha. Thus their final Śābda-bodha is गजगमनसदृशगमनानुकूलकृतिमान् (देवदत्तः) and पिकरवणसदृशरवणानुकूलकृतिमान् (देवदत्तः) respectively.

Here PR. raises a question and examines if the above Bodha in "Gaja iva gacchati" etc., is possible. In "Ghaṭo na paśyati", there is the possibility of an undesirable Śābda-bodha. The sense expressed by the Nipāta 'Na' is Abhāva and it gets Anvaya with the 'Ghaṭa' by Pratiyogitā-saṁbandha and thus the meaning will be Ghaṭa-pratiyogikābhāva. Now if the Abhāva were to be associated with the Dṛś-dhātvartha the resultant Bodha would be: "घटप्रतियोगिकाभावकर्मकदर्शनानुकूलकृतिमान्" which is not desirable. In order to prevent such Bodha, a general rule is evolved which runs as follows: According to the above rule, in a Śābda-bodna effected with Viśeṣyatā-saṁbandha where the Dhātvartha is made Viśeṣya, it is required that the cognition of Vibhaktyartha by Viśeṣyatā-saṁbandha should be there as Kāraṇa; in other words, only some Vibhaktyartha can be Viśeṣaṇa in a Dhātvartha and mere Prātipadikārtha cannot be the Viśeṣaṇa in it. Now this rule prevents the undesirable Śābda-bodha, because the Abhāva being expressed by a Nipāta-rūpa-prātipadika, i.e., 'Na' but not by any Vibhakti, it cannot have Anvaya with the Dhātvartha. Coming to the present examples, it can be seen that the Sādṛśya expressed by 'Iva' cannot have Anvaya with the Dhātvartha but only with the

Gamanādi-Kartṛ. Thus the Śābda-bodha should be 'Gaja-sadṛśābhinnaḥ gamana-kartā' and 'Pika-sadṛśābhinnaḥ ravaṇa-kartā' etc., but not as shown above.

The above objection is met by PR. on the following grounds. This is an undisputed fact that there is a vast difference between the meanings that are conveyed by the sentence "गज इव यः पुरुषः स गच्छति" and "पुरुषो यः स गज इव गच्छति" because in the latter sentence the Sādṛśya in the Gamana is clearly understood as Vidheya, whereas in the former, only Gamana is Vidheya with reference to the Gaja-sadṛśa-puruṣa; in other words, the Sādṛśya is only Uddeśya-koṭi-gata. If this clear difference is to be maintained we cannot have the above Śābda-bodha in "Gaja iva gacchati" where the Sādṛśya in the Gamana is not clearly shown as Vidheya. Moreover, according to this method, the Śābda-bodha of even the sentences like "वनं गज इव गृहं देवदत्तो गच्छति" where 'Vana' and 'Gṛha' etc., are added by Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva, will be 'गमनकर्ता देवदत्तः गजसदृशः' without including the Karmakārakas, 'Vana' and 'Gṛha'. This will be the case not only of the Karmakārakas but also other Kārakas as in 'वृक्षात् कपिरिव प्रासादात् मनुजः अवतरति'. Therefore, PR. concludes, it is better to accept the Śābda-bodha as "गजनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकगमनाश्रयाभिन्नः" in "गज इव गच्छति".

It is to be noted here that this Śābda-bodha is slightly different from the one shown earlier by PR. himself. Earlier by accepting Lakṣaṇā in the Upamānavācakapada (Gaja) the Śābda-bodha has been given as 'गजादिगमनादिसदृशगमनानुकूलकृतिमान्". But by giving a different Śābda-bodha now, PR. indicates that the required Bodha can be had even without accepting Lakṣaṇā. But he hastens to add that when some Kārakas are included in the sentence to maintain Bimba-pratibimbabhāva it is inevitable to accept Lakṣaṇā. For example, in places like 'वनं गज इव देवदत्तो गृहं गच्छति' the word 'Gaja' conveys by Lakṣaṇā 'Gaja-kartṛka-gamana' and the resultant Śābda-bodha would be "वनकर्मकगजकर्तृकगमनसदृशगृहकर्मकगमनानुकूलकृतिमान् देवदत्तः". Now, the Pūrvapakśin says,

that the Anvaya of Sādṛśya with the Dhātvartha will be against the rule "Dhātvartha-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita" etc., referred to above. But PR. says that the rule is unacceptable because it would prevent the direct Anvaya between the sense, conveyed by words like 'Tūṣṇīm', 'Ārāt, 'Pṛthak' etc., and the Dhātvartha, which is commonly known. The inconvenience in "Ghaṭo na pasyati' etc., can be got over by accepting a special Pratibandhakatva to the Nañartha in affecting such Anvaya-bodha.

PR's. views are criticised by Nāgeśa by advancing following arguments. It is not correct to say that Kārakas like 'Vana' and 'Raṇa' cannot find a place in the Śābda-bodha. Because the Śābda-bodha of "वनं गज इव रणभूमिं शूरो गच्छति" can be as "वनकर्मकगमनानुकूलकृतिमद्गजसदृशः समरभूमिकर्मकगमनानुकूलकृतिमान् शूरः" etc., which includes the Kārakas also. Here the 'Iva' conveys as Sādhāraṇa-dharma, the Gamana where 'Vana' and 'Samara-bhūmi' which are balanced in a Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva, become Viśeṣaṇa. Now the problem is in showing the difference between the Vākyārthas of "गज इव यः स पुरुषः गच्छति" and "यः पुरुषः स गज इव गच्छति" Even here, Nāgeśa contends, there is no trouble, because 'Iva' in the first sentence shows 'Śūratvādi' as the Sādhāraṇa-dharma whereas, in the second one, it indicates 'Gamana' as the Sādhāraṇa-dharma. Thus the difference in the Śābda-bodha of these two Sentences consists in the difference of the Sādhāraṇa-dharma but not in its Vidheyatva or otherwise. After all what is the meaning of the Sādṛśya being Vidheya? When something is conveyed as the Samānadharma by Ivādi, it is called Vidheya. Thus, though the Sādṛśya between the Gaja and Devadattādi is conveyed in "Gaja iva gacchati" Gamana being the Sādhāraṇa-dharma, can be called Vidheya. If it is desired that there should be direct Upamānopameya-bhāva between the actions (Kriyās), one has to give up the procedure of Bodha accepted by Naiyāyikas and adopt that of the Vaiyākaraṇas who accepted such Upamānopameya-bhāva. If it is felt that the rule "सकृदुच्चरितः शब्दः सकृदेवार्थं गमयति नासकृत्" does not allow such Upamānopameya-bhāva, then

'Gacchati' etc., may be repeated (Āvṛtta) and associated with both the words 'Gaja' and 'Puruṣa', or Lakṣaṇā may be accepted in Upamāpada to convey the Sva-kartṛka-kriyā. Thus Nāgeśa justifies the Śābda-bodha-prakāra of the Śiromaṇi and others against the views of PR.

Viśveśvara (AK. pp. 97-98), does not accept the Anvaya of the Śādṛśya with the Dhātvartha on the strength of the rule mentioned above, i.e., प्रकारतया सादृश्यान्वयबोधं प्रति तदनुयोग्युपस्थापकपदजन्योपस्थितित्वेन हेतुत्वम्' and so the Bodha in "Gaja iva gacchati," according to him is 'गजप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यवान पुरुषः गमनानुकूलकृतिमान्'. After a long discussion over this point he condescends to accept the views of PR. in the case of "Gaja iva gacchati" but concludes by saying that such concession is not possible in the case of "Aravindamiva bhāti", because 'Gamana' involved in 'Gacchati' may be the Sādṛśyāśraya whereas the 'Bhāna', is not Sādṛśyāśraya.

Viśveśvara quotes (AK. p. 98-99) in this connection, the views of the Vedic commentators who are favourable in accepting Upamānopameya-bhāva between the objects compared rather than their actions. He quotes the Ṛk मृगो न भीमः. Here Viśveśvara says that Yāska and others compare Indra with Simha but not Indra's āgamana with that of the Simha.

The Śābda-bodha in अरविन्दतुल्यो भाति' is like this. 'Tulya' by Lakṣaṇā, expresses 'Tulyatva-prakāraka' which will have Abhedānvaya in the Dhātvartha, i.e., 'Jñāna. Thus the Śābda-bodha is : "अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रकारकाभिन्नज्ञानविशेषः"

Now it may be objected that 'Tulya' being Kriyāviśeṣaṇa, should be in Neuter gender. But PR. says that the rule "क्रियाविशेषणानां क्लीबतेष्यते' is applicable only in the already existing cases like 'स्तोकं पचति' etc., because the grammar generally deals with what is already in vogue. According to some Śāstrakāras, PR. says, the Dhātu itself conveys the whole meaning while the 'Aravindatulya' is Tātparya-grāhaka.

The Śābda-bodha of 'अरविन्दवत् सुन्दरम्' is llke this. The suffix 'Vati' added according to the Sutra 'तेन तुल्यं क्रियाचेद्वतिः' (Aṣṭādhyāyī 5.1.115) originally means 'Sadṛśa', i.e., Sādṛśya-vat. But it conveys only Sādṛśya by Lakṣaṇā which gets Anvaya with 'Sundaratva' part of the 'Sundarapadārtha.' Thus the resultant Śābdabodha would be as that of "Aravindam iva sundram" as "अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नम्. The only difference between these Bodhas is that while the former one is arrived at with the help of Lakṣaṇā (and is called Ārthī) the one in the latter, is arrived at by Śakti itself (and is called Śrautī).

Nāgeśa again points out, rightly, that there can be no similar Śābda-bodha in 'Aravindavat sundram' and 'Aravindamiva sundaram' because the suffix 'Vati' is added to express the Tulyatva of Kriyā only. That is why in cases like 'Brāhmaṇavat adhīte', Bhāṣyakāra states, Nāgeśa contends, that the word 'Brāhmaṇa' conveys by Lakṣaṇā 'Brāhmaṇakartṛkādhyayana' with which is compared the Adhyayana of Devadattādi. Therefore, it cannot express the Tulyatva of Saundarya which is not a Kriyā. Accordingly, in "Aravindavat sundaraṁ mukham" the 'Bhavati' Kriyā is to be understood (Adhyāhārya). The word 'Aravinda' conveys by Lakṣaṇā 'Sundarāravindabhavana'. Thus the Śābda-bodha will be "सुन्दरारविन्दभवनसदृशं सुन्दरमुखभवनम्". Later on the Sādṛśya between the Aravinda and Mukha based on Saundarya is indicated by Vyañjanā. Similarly the Śābda-bodha in "Aravindavat mukham" is "Aravinda-bhavana-Sadṛśaṁ mukha-bhavanam". Thus Nāgeśa says (GMP. p. 251) that the Śābda-bodha, explained by PR. is against Bhāṣyakāra.

The Śābda-bodha in 'Aravindavat Mukham' will be 'Aravinda-nirūpita-sādṛśya-vadabhinnam' according to PR. Here 'Vati' conveys the 'Śādṛśyavat'. Aravinda has the Anvaya with the part of the Vati-pratyayārtha, i.e., Sādṛśya by Nirūpitatva and thus the above-mentioned Śābda-bodha is the result.

Now PR. examines the Śābda-bodha in 'अरविन्दवत् सौन्दर्यमस्य'. Here the suffix 'Vati' which is added according to the sūtra 'तत्र तस्येव,' (Aṣṭādhyāyī 5.1.116), expresses Sādṛśya. 'Aravinda' conveys 'Aravinda-samaveta-saundarya' by Lakṣaṇā. 'Asya' means 'Mukhādeḥ'. The Anvaya between the 'Aravinda-samaveta-saundarya' and the Vatipratyayārtha, i.e., Sādṛśya is effected by Nirūpitatva-sambandha; and that between the Sadṛśya and the Upameya-gata-saundarya by Adhikaraṇatā-sambandha. Thus the resultant Śābda-bodha is : "अरविन्दसमवेतसौन्दर्यनिरूपितसादृश्याधिकरणमेतन्मुखादिसम्बद्धसौन्दर्यम्" । Thus the directly expressed Sādṛśya is only between the two Saundaryas, the Saundarya of Aravinda and that of Mukha. This Sādṛśya between the Saundaryas indirectly indicates the Śādṛśya between the Aravinda and Mukha also by Vyañjanā.

Nāgeśa criticises PR. here also. He says that there is no need of accepting Lakṣaṇā in 'Aravinda' to convey 'Aravinda-samaveta-saundarya'. The suffix 'Vati' which is Sādṛśyārthaka should be understood to mean Sādṛśya-prayojaka by Lakṣaṇā. Thus there can be had a simple Śābda-bodha as 'अरविन्दसादृश्यप्रयोजकमेतत्सम्बन्धिसादृश्यम्. As was rightly pointed out by Candrikā (Part II. p. 330), when it is inevitable to accept Lakṣaṇā, better accept is as shown by PR. Nāgeśa's method directly expresses Sādṛśya between the Aravinda and Mukha whereas PR. favours direct Sādṛśya between the two Saundaryas and indirect Sādṛśya between the Aravinda and Mukha. This seems to be more according to the Anubhava because in "Aravindavat saundaryam asya" we understand that the Sādṛśya that is expressed is between the saundaryas only.

In "Aravindena tulyam", the Tṛtīyā after 'Aravinda' expresses Nirūpitatava which has Anvaya with the Sādṛśya, part of the Tulyapadārtha. Thus the Śābda-bodha is 'अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्याश्रयाभिन्नं मुखादिकम् ।

In "Saundaryeṇa aravindena tulyam", the Tṛtīyā in 'Saundaryeṇa', conveys Prayojyatva and the Śābda-bodha will be अरविन्दनिरूपितसौन्दर्यप्रयोज्यसादृश्यवदभिन्नं मुखादि" ।

The Śābda-bodha-prakāra in "Aravindam ānanaṁ ca samam" is like this. According to the general rule of Abhedasambandha, the Śābda-bodha will be "सादृश्यवदभिन्नं ग्राननम् अरविन्दञ्च" by the Śabda Śakti. Next the Vyañjanā would suggest the similarity with each other (Paraspara-nirūpita-sādṛśya) whereby Mukha is known as Sadṛśa with Aravinda and Aravinda with Mukha. Even if the Vyañjanā is not acceptable, such similarity will be understood by the later Mānasika-jñāna. If Prasiddhi is to be taken as the guiding factor, the Sādṛśya, existing in the face may be taken as Aravinda-nirūpita ; because Aravinda is the thing well-known as Upamāna.

PR. next examines the procedure of finding the Śābda-bodha in a place of Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva. The following verse is taken as an instanee :

'कोमलातपशोणाभ्रसन्ध्याकालसहोदरः ।
कुङ्कुमालेपनो भाति काषायवसनो यतिः" । (RG. p. 207)

First there will be a Śābda-bodha by the power of Abhidhā as "कुङ्कुमालेपकषायवसनविशिष्टः यति : कोमलातपशोणाभ्रविशिष्टसन्ध्याकालसदृशाभिन्नः. Next, the question arises, what is the factor that is responsible for the Sādṛśya between the Yati and Sandhyākāla ? Now the 'Komalātapa' and 'Śoṇābhra', the adjectives of Upamāna and the 'Kuṅkumālepa' and 'Kāṣāyavasana' the adjectives of Upameya, which are balanced in Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva will be cognised as the Sādhāraṇa-dharmas responsible for the Sādṛśya.

If the reading of the second half of the above verse is changed as : "कुङ्कुमालेपकाषायवसनाभ्यामयं यतिः" the Tṛtīyā indicates Prayojyatva which has Anvaya with Sādṛśya which is part of the Lakṣyārtha of 'Sahodaraḥ' ; thus the Śābda-bodha will be "कुङ्कुमालेपकाषायवसनप्रयोज्यं यत् कोमलातपशोणाभ्रसन्ध्याकालप्रतियोगिकं सादृश्यं तद्वदभिन्न : यतिः". Here also the 'Kuṅkumālepa' and 'Vasana' though pertaining to the Yati only, can be taken as responsible for the Sādṛśya (Sādṛśya-

prayojaka) because they are identified with the 'Komalātapa' and 'Śoṇābhra'.

PR. has, so far, examined the Śābda-bodha-prakāra of fourteen instances taking Sādṛśya as an independent (Atirikta) Padārtha. Now he examines a few instances taking it as identical with Samānadharma. In 'अरविन्दसुन्दरं वदनम्' 'Aravinda' conveys, by Lakṣaṇā, 'Aravinda-vṛtti-samāna-dharma' which will be associated (Anvita) with the 'Sundaratva', the partial meaning of 'Sundara'. Thus the Śābda-bodha is 'अरविन्दवृत्तिसमानधर्माभिन्नसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नं वदनम्'.

In अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरम्, 'Iva' expresses Samānadharma and the Anvaya between the 'Aravinda' and the Samānadharma is effected by Ādheyatā-saṁsarga. Now the Śābda-bodha is "अरविन्दनिष्ठसमानधर्माभिन्नसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नं (वदनादि)".

In 'सौन्दर्येण अरविन्देन समम्,' Tṛtīyā in 'Aravindena' conveys Nirūpitatva which has Anvaya with the Sādṛśya, the partial meaning of 'Sama'. The Tṛtīyā in 'Saundaryeṇa' conveys Abheda which is associated with the Sādṛśya (there are other instances where Tṛtīyā is Abhedārthaka. For example in 'Dhānyena dhanavān' the Tṛtīyā is Abhedārthaka and helps the Śābda-bodha 'Dhānyābhinna-dhanavān'). Now the Śābda-bodha is "सौन्दर्याभिन्नं यदरविन्दनिरूपितं सादृश्यं तद्वदभिन्नम्"।

In places of Luptopamā like निर्जलमीनायते महिला' the suffix 'Kyaṅ' expresses Ācāra which is the Sādhāraṇadharma. 'Nirjala-mīna' conveys, by Lakṣaṇā, the meaning of 'Nirjala-mīna-nirūpita-sādṛśya'. In case the Sādṛśya is considered as a Bhinnapadārtha, the Anvaya between the Nirjala-mīna-nirūpita-sādṛśya and Ācāra will be by Prayojakatā-saṁsarga and it will be by Abhedasaṁsarga, if the Sādṛśya is taken as Samānadharmarūpa. Thus the resultant Śābda-bodha is as follows :— 'निर्जलमीननिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजक (or अभिन्न) समान-धर्माश्रयीभूता नायिका' and thus the Pratyayārtha is shown as Viśeṣaṇa whereas the Upameyapadārtha is Viśeṣya.

The Ācāra that is expressed by the suffix 'Kyac' in 'मलयानिल-मनलीयति' etc., is to be understood as Kriyārūpa but not

Dharmamātra as in the case of 'Kyaṅ', and this Kriyā appears in the Śābda-bodha as Viśeṣaṇa. Thus the Śābda-bodha is "अनलनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजिका (or अभिन्ना) मलयानिलकर्मिका या क्रिया तदनुकूलकृतिमती नायिका." The Śābda-bodha in तिलोत्तमीयन्ती' is 'तिलोत्तमानिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजिका (or अभिन्ना) या आत्मकर्मिका क्रिया तदनुकूलकृतिमती' etc.

At the end of this section dealing with Śābda-bodha in Upamā-sthalas, PR. presents two views regarding the way in which the Nipātas like 'Iva' convey their meaning. The Vaiyākaraṇas maintain that the Ivādi-nipātas like the Upasargas, are the Dyotakas (Indicators) of the meaning. The Upasarga cannot be taken as Vācaka. In such cases, as 'उपास्यते गुरुः' and 'अनुभूयते सुखम्' the Sevana and Anubhava being expressed by the Upsargas, 'Upa' and 'Anu', they cannot be considered to be the Dhātvartha and the 'Guru' and 'Sukha' cannot be called Karma which is defined as Dhatvartha-phalāśraya (the place of the result of the action expressed by a Dhātu). Thus ths 'Guru' and 'Sukha' cannot be expressed by the Lakāra which is Karmārthaka and consequently there can be no Prathamā-vibhakti in 'Guru' and 'Sukha' which can be had only when the Karmatva is Abhihita by the Lakāra, because the Sutra 'कर्मणि द्वितीया' (Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.3.2) which is in the Adhikāra of 'अनभिहिते' (2.3.1.) postulates that the Dvitīyā can be had only when the Karma is not expressed by Lakāra etc., and ultimately Prathamā would be added taking into consideration only the Prātipadikārtha according to the Sūtra 'प्रातिपदिकार्थलिङ्गपरिमाणवचनमात्रे प्रथमा' (2.3.46). Therefore it is necessary to accept that the Upasarga is only a Dyotaka but not Vācaka. On the analogy of the Upasargas, other Nipātas like 'Iva' also should be accepted as Dyotakas.

This view of Vaiyākaraṇas is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. They contend that it may be the case with Upasargas in view of the above difficulty. But the same need not be accepted in the case of Ivādi also where there is no such difficulty. The Anumāna :—"इवादयः द्योतका एव न वाचकाः

निपातत्वात् उपसर्गवत्' is baseless because the Hetu 'Nipātatvāt' is Aprayojaka. If Nipātatva is to be taken as a sound Hetu, it can also be said that all the Avyayas are Dyotakas, because of their being Avyaya (Avyayatvāt).

But Nāgeśa tries to vindicate the views of Vaiyākaraṇas. He shows an instance 'साक्षात्क्रियते दयिता'. Here 'Sākṣāt' is a Nipāta. If Nipāta itself is to convey the meaning Sākśātkāra, all the inconvenience as shown in 'Upāsyate guruḥ' crops up here also. Therefore, he feels that all the Nipātas should be taken as Dyotakas only. Needless to add that the Naiyāyikas can have their own say by simply using their well-known weapon 'तद्भिन्नत्वं विशेषणम्'.

After dealing with the procedure of Śābda-bodha which is not to be found in any other previous work of poetics with so much of elaboration, PR. proceeds to deal with the Upamādoṣas.

Upamādoṣas are dealt with by old writers like Bhāmaha (KA. p. 46), Daṇḍin (K. Ādarśa. p. 96), and Mammaṭa (KP. p. 590) also. AD. mentions (CM. pp. 35-41) six Doṣas, Nyūnatva, Adhikatva, Liṅga-bheda, Vacana-bheda, Asādṛśya and Asaṁbhava. Evidently he follows the list that is given by Bhāmaha (KA. II-39), of course, omitting Viparyaya.

But PR., as is the practice with him, while following some of the views of his predecessors, discusses the Upamā-doṣas with such thoroughness that we do not find anything more to be included in the list. First he lays down as the general principle, that whatever reduces the Camatkāra in the Upamā should be considered as the Upamādoṣa (RG. p. 255). Next he gives a list of such defects.

The absence of poetical convention, the disparity between the Upamāna and Upameya by Jāti, quantity, Gender and Number, the disparity between the Dharmas of Upamāna and Upameya balanced in a Bimbapratibimba-bhāva, the difference of Kāla, Person, and the Tense etc. He explains this exhaustive list of Upamā-doṣas with suitable illustrations.

While explaining the disparity in time as applied to the Upamāna and Upameya he gives the following examples :—

"रराज राजराजस्य राजहंसः करस्थितः ।
हस्तनक्षत्रसंयुक्त इव पूर्णो निशाकरः" ॥

"रणाङ्गणे रावणवैरिणो विभोः द्वाराः समन्ताद्दलिता विरेजिरे ।
निदाघमध्यन्दिनवर्तिनोऽम्बरे सहस्रभानोः प्रखराः करा इव" ॥

"आगतः पतिरितीरितं जनैः शृण्वती चकितमेत्य देहलीम् ।
कौमुदीव शिशिरीकरिष्यते लोचने मम कदा मृगेक्षणा" ॥

(RG. p. 257)

In the first two verses the verbs 'Rarāja' and 'Virejire' in Past Tense are applicable to the Rājahaṁsa and the Saras, but they cannot be applied to the full-Moon and the Sun's rays, which are shining even today. Likewise 'Śiśirīkariṣyate' in the third verse may be applicable to the Mṛgekśaṇā but not to the Upamāna, i.e., Kaumudī which is always performing the Śiśirīkaraṇa. Therefore, PR. feels that there is incongruity in the use of the Tense in these verses.

Nāgeśa observes, here, that there is nothing wrong in maintaing the Moon etc., which are ever existing, as the Upamāna by Bhūtakālādyavaccheda, though they continue to exist now also. Therefore, he gives "त्यक्षामि वैदेहसुतां पुरस्तात् समुद्रनेमिं पितुराज्ञयेव", as the appropriate example for the Kālabheda, which was given in Citramīmāṁsā (p. 36). Candrikā (Part II. p. 346), while accepting Nāgeśa's objection in the first two Ślokas, tries to justify PR. in the third verse. But the argument does not seem to have much strength.

In fact, the Kālabheda need not be given so much importance as an Upamā-doṣa. Upamā can be well-appreciated if the Sādhāraṇadharma etc., are well-maintained, even if there is Kālabheda. Even in "Tyakśyāmi Vaideha-sutām" etc., one can very easily understand "यथा अहं समुद्रनेमिम् अत्यजं तथा वैदेहसुतां त्यक्ष्यामि", and thus the Kālabheda-kleśa can be easily got over. If Kālabheda were to be considered as a

serious defect, why not Deśa-bheda also, just to increase the number of Doṣas? If Deśa-bheda is not a serious defect, Kāla-bheda also may be taken as such ; and that is why, as rightly pointed out by AD. (CM. p. 40) we see many great poets like Kālidāsa unmindful of this Kāla-bheda-doṣa. Viśveśvara appears sharing this view when he writes that a sentence like "युधिष्ठिर इवायं सत्यं वदति" where there is Kāla·bheda-kṛta-doṣa, can be understood as 'यथा युधिष्ठिरः सत्यमवादीत् तथायं सत्यं वदति'. In support of this repetition of the verb he cites the instance of Niruktakāra and Mahābhāṣya (AK. p. 159).

As the foregoing pages go to prove, PR.'s treatment of Upamā is exhaustive and elaborate with clear exposition and scientific analysis. He appears to be the first man to introduce the method of Śābda-bodha in Alaṅkāraśāstra. Though many of the Bodhas as given by him are questioned by later writers they can be justified by following one school or the other, because all the Śāstrakāras are not unanimous regarding the method of Śābda-bodha.

Upameyopamālaṅkāra

While accepting Upameyopamā as coming under Upamā, PR. defines it in his own usual way in clear terms :

"तृतीयसदृशव्यवच्छेदबुद्धिफलकवर्णनविषयीभूतं परस्परमुपमानोपमेय-
भावपन्नयोः अर्थयोः सादृश्यं सुन्दरम् उपमा".

The charming resemblance which is described as existing between two things having Upamānopameya-bhāva with each other, and which results in saying that there is no third object to be compared with, is called Upameyopamā. Thus, in accordance with his contention that Upameyopamā also is part of Upamā, PR. maintains that Sundara-sādṛśya is the important factor in Upameyopamā also. After explaining the purpose of the different Viśeṣaṇas, he gives the following verse as an example of Upameyopamā :—

"कौमुदीव भवती बिभाति मे कातराक्षि भवतीव कौमुदी ।
अम्बुजेन तुलितं विलोचनं लोचनेन च तवाम्बुजं समम् ॥

Nāgeśa rightly, points out a defect in this verse. The use of different Upamā-vācaka-padas, 'Tulita' and 'Samam' in the

later half is objectionable according to the author himself who is going to explain the 'Kvip kyaṅādi vailakṣaṇya'as one of the Doṣas of Upameyopamālaṅkāra. This is a fine example of how a man cannot, at times, follow the rules laid down by himself, which we generally come across in many fields. In fact PR., after explaining some of the Doṣas like 'Kvip kyaṅādi bheda', makes a general statement that such use of different Vācakapadas etc., may be taken as Doṣa only if it is Sahṛdayodvejaka (RG. p. 270). Evidently he feels that this Bheda is not as repulsive as the Kvip-Kyaṅādi-bheda or the Śrautyārthī-kṛta-bheda and he appears to be justified in thinking so.

After explaining the varieties of Upameyopamā based on the difference of Dharma, Anugāmitva, Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpannatva, Upacaritatva, Śābdatva, Vācyatva and Vyaṅgyatva etc., with suitable illustrations PR. makes a general statement that almost all the varieties of Upamā, like Pūrṇā and Luptā, etc., can be found in the Upameyopamā also.

One important point which is mentioned by PR., after the Vimarśinīkāra (RG. p. 264, Vimarśinī p. 39) is that Upameyopamā can find a place even where there is no Vākya-bheda clear, but is implied. Thus he illustrates :—

"अभिरामतासदनमम्बुजानने नयनद्वयं जनमनोहरं तव ।
इयति प्रपञ्चविषयेऽपि वैधसे तुलनामुदञ्चति परस्परात्मना' ।

Here the one sentence "Tulanāmudañcati" indicates two sentences : "इदं नयनमेतेन तुलनामुदञ्चति, एतच्च नयनम् अनेन तुलनामुदञ्चति" . Thus the above verse also is instance of Upameyopamā.

Now PR. proceeds to examine the definitions of other Ālaṅkārikas. First he takes up the one given by AD.

"अन्योन्येनोपमा बोध्या व्यक्त्यावृत्त्यन्तरेण वा ।।
एकधर्माश्रया या स्यात् सोपमेयोपमा मता ।।

(CM. p. 45)

This definition suffers from Ativyāpti in the following verse where there is Anyonyopamā expressed by Śakti between two things the Ahaṁpadārtha (Taruṇī) and the Latā, based on Tanutva-rūpa-sādhāraṇa-dharma.

"अहं लतायाः सदृशीत्यिखर्वं गौराङ्गि गर्वं न कदापि यायाः ।
गवेषणेनालमिहापरेषामेषापितुल्या तव तावदस्ति ॥"

(RG. p. 266)

It may be contended that this also may be brought under the scope of Upameyopamā. But PR. says that it cannot be taken as an instance of Upameyopamā because there is no Tṛtīyasadṛśa-vyavaccheda, which is the soul of Upameyopamā. For the phrase 'Gaveṣaṇena alam' clearly indicates that there is the possibility of finding other similar objects on searching for them. If 'Tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda-phalakatva' also is added as the Viśeṣaṇa of Upamāna to avoid this Ativyāpti, PR. says, there is no need of other Viśeṣaṇas like 'Eka-dharmāśraya' etc., because their purpose (avoiding Ativyāpti in 'Bhuvastalamiva vyoma' etc.) is fulfilled by this Viśeṣaṇa itself.

Viśveśvara thinks (AK. p. 178) that the Ativyāpti in "Ahaṁ latāyāḥ sadṛśī" etc., can be avoided by simply saying that the Upamā in the Upameyopamā should be Vidheya ; and the Upamā in 'Aham latāyāḥ' etc., is only Uddeśya. But even Viśvesvara appears to be in favour of accepting Tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda as the Phala. In such case that itself helps us in avoiding this Ativyāpti and so where is the need of finding this new method for this purpose ?

PR. raises another objection over a minute point in the definition of AD. AD. says that Upamā should be conveyed only by one Vṛtti, either by Śakti or Vyakti. But PR. says that this leads to Asaṁbhava because in "खमिव जलं जलमिव खम्" while 'Kha' and 'Jala' are having Anvaya with Sādṛśya, their Pratiyogitā (Sādṛśya-prtiyogitā) being a saṁsarga, is not conveyed by Vṛtti, according to the general rule that the Saṁsarga of the Padārthas which are expressed by Vṛtti, cannot be expressed by the Vṛtti itself. (RG. p. 267). The

Saṁsarga is understood with the help of Ākāṇkṣā and as such there is no need to accept Vṛtti to express it (Saṁsarga). Moreover, if Saṁsarga were to be Vṛtti-vedya it would appear in Śābda-bodha as a Prakāra, i.e., Viśeṣaṇa, like all the other Padārthas. Now coming to the point on hand, it should be accepted that the Pratiyogitva and Anuyogitva in "Khamiva jalam jalamiva kham" etc., is cognised only by Saṁsarga-maryādā and is not conveyed either by Śakti or by Vyañjanā. When the Pratiyogitva is not Vṛtti-vedya the Pratiyogitva-viśiṣṭopamā also cannot be called Vṛtti-vedya according to the well-known dictum "विशेषणाभावे विशिष्टाभाव:." Therefore the Viśeṣaṇa, 'Ekavṛtti-vedyatva' is not at all applicable in the above example and hence Asaṁbhavadoṣa.

Needless to say there is so much of hair-splitting in the arguments advanced by PR. That is why Nāgeśa rightly points out that what is meant here by 'Eka-vṛtti-mātra-vedyatva' is that it should not be conveyed by two Vṛttis (Vṛtti-dvaya-vedyatvābhāva) or that it should be included somehow or other, in a cognition that is caused by the Eka-vṛtti- mātra. According to either of the explanations the Avyāpti in 'Khamiva jalam' etc., can be averted (GMP. p. 267). Similar reply to this objection is given by Viśveśvara also (AK. p. 178).

In fact, it is unfair on part of PR. to ignore the Lakṣaṇa which is intended by Dīkṣita as the final one, and is almost similar to the one that is given by himself, and criticise the earlier Lakṣaṇa which is not actually meant to be the final even by Dīkṣita himself. Dīkṣita presents his final Lakṣaṇa of Upameyopamā in the following words : "वदन्तु उपमेयोपमात्वप्रयोजकं लक्षणम्; अनुगतानतिप्रसक्तलक्षणन्तु :

"सदृशस्य तृतीयस्य व्यवच्छेदाय यद् भवेत् ।
अन्योन्येनोपमेयत्वं सोपमेयोपमा मता ।।" (CM. p. 46)

Next PR. criticises the Lakṣaṇa of Alaṅkārasarvasva which is as follows :

"द्वयो: पर्यायेण तस्मिन् उपमेयोपमा ; तच्छब्देनोपमानोपमेयत्व-प्रत्यवमर्श:". (AS. p. 39)

His main objection to this Lakṣaṇa is that it suffers from Ativyāpti in the absence of the Viśeṣaṇa 'तृतीयसदृशव्यवच्छेदप्रयोजनकत्व' in it. In places like :—

"सविता विधवति विधुरपि सवितरति दिनन्ति यामिन्यः ।
यामिनयन्ति दिनानि च सुखदुःखवशीकृते मनसि ॥"

where there is mutual Upamānopameyatva between two things the definition is applicable and hence the Ativyāpti-doṣa; because they cannot be taken as the instances of Upameyopamā, in the absence of Tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda. If, in order to avoid this Ativyāpti the above Viśeṣaṇa is added, it results in PR.'s Lakṣaṇa.

Viśveśvara (AK. p. 178) meets this Ativyāpti with the following argument. Tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda can be effected when only one Samānadharma is maintained in both the Upamās. But in the verse "Savitā vidhavati" etc., there is no such Samānadharmaikya, because in 'Savitā vidhavati' the Samānadharma is Sukhapradatva whereas in "Vidhurapi savitarati" it is Duḥkha-pradatva. Thus 'Ekadharmakatva' viśeṣaṇa itself can avert Ativyāpti in 'Savitā vidhavati' etc.

Viśveśvara's argument, though intriguing, takes us nowhere. What is meant even by PR. is that this verse should not be taken as an instance of Upameyopamā because there is no Tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda. If Tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda-phalakatva etc., is to be included in the Lakṣaṇa, there can be no question of Ativyāpti at all even according to PR. Now Viśveśvara adds the 'Ekadharama-nimittaktva' Viśeṣaṇa, only assuming the Tṛitīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda as the Phala. Once this assumption is made, there can be no Ativyāpti; whether it is on account of the implied Eka-dharma-nimittakatva-viseṣaṇa or some other reason. Tṛtīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda can be suggested only when the Samāna dharma in both the Upamās is Anugāmin as in "शिव इव गुरुर्गरीयान् गुरुरिव सोयं सदाशिवोपि तथा" (RG. p. 263) or when it is Bimba pratibimba-bhāvāpanna as applicable to both the Upamās as in :—

"रमणीयस्तबकयुता विलसितवक्षोजयुगलशालिन्यः ।
लतिका इव ता वनिता वनिता इव रेजिरे लतिकाः ॥"

(RG. p. 263)

This cannot be had when the Samāna-dharma in the one case is Anugāmin and in another Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna. For instance in :—

"रजोभिःस्यन्दनोद्धूतैः गजैश्च घनसन्निभैः ।
भुवस्तलमिव व्योम कुर्वन् व्योमेव भूतलम् ॥" (RV. IV)

the Rajas in the first Upamā is an Anugāmi-dharma, whereas in the second Upamā the Gajas and Ghanas are the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna-sādhāraṇa-dharma. On this ground, PR. criticises the views of Vimarśinīkāra who feels that there is Anya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda in the above verse also which therefore is an example of Upameyopamā according to him.

Here Viśveśvara tries (AK. p. 179) to uphold the views of Vimarśinīkāra and says that Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva can be accepted between the Rajas on the ground, and elephant-like-clouds in the sky and so the Sādhāraṇa-dharma in both the Upamās is Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna only. But this explanation is clearly against the spirit of the verse ; because the Ghana-sannibha-gajas are mentioned as responsible for making the earth appear as the sky without any reference to the dust.

After criticising the views of the author of Ratnākara (p. 12) who wrongly takes "Savitā vidhavati" etc., as an example of Upameyopamā, contrary to his own statement, PR. reminds us of the general rule that Upameyopamā also, like all the Alaṅkāras, can be called Alaṅkāra only when it embellishes something else. Otherwise it is Sva-vaicitrya-mātra-paryavasita.

PR. concludes the discussion on Upameyopamā after stating that all the Doṣas of Upamā can be taken as the Doṣas of this figure also and mentioning a few more Doṣas specially appilcable to this figure alone.

Ananvayālaṅkāra[1]

PR. defines Ananvaya in the following words :—

"द्वितीयसदृशव्यवच्छेदफलकवर्णनविषयीभूतं यदेकोपमानोपमेयकं सादृश्यं तदनन्वयः" (RG. p. 270).

Unlike in the case of Upamā and Upameyopamā, he omits the adjective 'Sundaram' of 'Sādṛśyam'. Evidently he feels that there is no possibility of Camatkāra in the Sādṛśya involved in Ananvayālaṅkāra. And therefore, as can be seen from his Lakṣaṇa, he lays stress on Dvitīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda, like Vimarśinīkāra (p. 38). That is why his criticism of the definitions of other writers is mainly based on this principle.

Comparison of one thing with itself in its relation with different times (Bhinna-kālāvaccheda) or in its association with different things which act as Sādhāraṇa-dharma by Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva, cannot be the instance of Ananvaya, because in such cases, there can be no Dvitīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda, which is the life of Ananvaya. This point PR. explains by showing two examples.

After explaining Ananvaya with the help of two examples where the Sādhāraṇa-dharma is expressed and where it is implied PR. attempts its classification. First it is classified into two varieties. (1) Pūrṇa and (2) Lupta. Pūrṇa is of six kinds like the Pūrṇopamā. Among the Lupta varieties of Ananvaya, Dharma-lupta also can have all the five varieties as mentioned in the case of Upamā. Next, PR. explains with examples the Vācakaluptānanvaya of Kyaṅ, Samāsa, Karmārthaka-ṇamul etc., and says that Vācaka-lopa by Kartṛ-ṇamul etc., can be shown in Ananvaya also. Next he explains the Dharma-vācakobhaya-lupta and Vācaka-dharmopamāna-lupta with proper illustrations. Lastly he remarks that some

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1. Ananvaya is dealt with by the old writers like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, immediately after Upamā, but PR. mentions this Alaṅkāra after dealing with Upameyopamā. Perhaps he feels it proper to deal with Upameyopamā immediately after Upamā, because according to him, Upameyopamā is, in fact, part of Upamā itself.

of the varieties of Luptomamā like the Śuddhopamāna-luptā are not possible in Ananvaya and are not also charming.

PR. gives an instance of Mālopamā where the Nirupamatva, resulting from Ananvaya is given as the Sādhāraṇadharma :—

"अम्बरत्यम्बरं यद्वत् समुद्रोऽपि समुद्रति ।
विक्रमार्कमहीपाल तथा त्वं विक्रमार्कसि ॥" (RG. p. 273)

Here the similarity in Ambara, Samudra and Vikramāditya is the Absence of Upamānāntara.

Now PR. proceeds to examine the views of Alaṅkārāratnākara. Ratnākara accepts three varieties of Ananvaya. The first, where the Upameya itself is described as Upamāna ; the second, where one part of Upameya is taken as Upamāna and the third, where the Upameya is described as Upamāna on account of the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna-sādhāraṇadharma which is taken as the differentiating factor. The following are the examples of the three varieties of Ananvaya as explained by Ratnākara :—

"युद्धेऽर्जुनोऽर्जुन इव प्रथितप्रतापः ।"
"एतावति प्रपञ्चे सुन्दरमहिलासहस्रभरितेऽपि ।
अनुहरति सुभग तस्या वामार्धं दक्षिणार्धेन ॥"
"गन्धेन सिन्धुरधुरन्धरवक्त्रमैत्री-
मैरावणप्रभृतयोऽपि न शिक्षितास्ते ।
तत्त्वं कथं त्रिनयनाचलरत्नभित्ति
स्वीयप्रतिच्छविषु यूथपतित्वमेषि ॥" (RG. p. 273-4)

In all these varieties Śobhākara feels that Upamānānatara-niṣedha is present as an important principle.

(A. Ratnākara. p. 11)

PR. while accepting Upamānānatara-pratiṣedha as an important principle in Ananvaya, says that this alone cannot be taken as the deciding factor. For, in that case there will be Ativyāpti in "Stanābhoge patan bhāti" etc., where there is Upamānāntara-niṣedha implied. Therefore the one and the

same thing being the Upameya and Upamāna also should be there in Ananvaya (RG. p. 275). Now in the second example, the Vāmārdha is given as the Upamāna and Dakṣiṇārdha as the Upameya and thus there is no identity between the Upameya and Upamāna and there is no incongruity in such Upamānopameya-bhāva as indicated by the name 'Ananvaya'. Moreover, there is no Dvitīya-sādṛśa-vyavaccheda even in the second example because Vāmārdha is said to be the second object to be compared with the Upameya, i.e., Dakṣinārdha. It may be argued that this Upamanopameya-bhāva suggests that the lady of the present context is peerless ; but she is not at all relevent either as Upameya or Upamāna. Thus, as judged on the strength of both the Viśeṣaṇas (Dvitīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda and Ekasyaiva Upamānopameyatā) the second example cannot come under the Ananvayālaṅkāra but it is only an instance of Upamālaṅkāra.

In this criticism of the views of Alaṅkāratatanākara PR. appears to be following Vimarśinīkāra (Vimarśinī p. 39), with the only difference that he does not talk about the third example "Gandhena sindhura" etc., where as PR. clearly states, there can be no Ananvaya even in this verse, because the elephant is compared with its own reflections.

In the present verse (Etāvati prapañce) Alaṅkārasarvasvakāra, as quoted by PR. accepts Ananvayadhvani, if not Ananvayālaṅkāra. But PR. refutes even Ananvayadhvani here, on the same ground as mentioned above ; that there is no Upamānopameyabhāva of one and the same object. There may be Upamāniṣedha as regards the damsel, but the damsel is not taken as Upameya here. It may be argued that once the Upamānāntaraniṣedha regarding the damsel is accepted it is implied that there is also the Sādṛśya-pratīti in a thing taken both as Upameya and Upamāna (Abhinnopamānopameyaka-sādṛśya-pratīti-pūrvakatvam) as the condition precedent ; in other words it may be contended that the suggestion of the damsel's peerlessness is the result of the preceding comparison of the damsel with the damsel herself. But PR. says that there is no such rule that the Upamānāntaraniṣedha of a thing should invariably be preceded by

its comparison with itself, because this rule is not found in Kalpitopamā as in "Stanābhoge patan" etc., Yadyarthakalpitātiśayokti as in "Rākāyām akalaṅkam" etc., (KP. p. 493) and in the Asamālaṅkāra-dhvani as in "Mayi tvadupamāvidhau" (RG. p. 280) where there is Upamānāntara-niṣedha. Therefore, PR. says, there is not the slightest scope for Ananvaya, either Vācya or Vyaṅgya, in "Etāvati prapañce" etc.

Though PR. quotes these views as the views of Ruyyaka, they are not to be found in the Alaṅkārasarvasva as it is available to us now. Perhaps he is quoting the views of Vimarśinīkāra. But even Vimarśinīkāra's words are not exactly the same as quoted here by PR. The whole passage of Vimarśinī wherefrom PR. appears to have been quoting the above views is as follows :—

"इत्ति अमे तुम्मि जए सुन्दरमहिला सहस्सभरि अम्मि ।
अणुहरइ णवर तिस्सा वामाद्धं दाहिणस्स" ॥

इत्यादौ चानन्वयोदाहरणत्वं न वाच्यम् । अत्रान्यार्धेनान्यार्धस्योपमीयमानत्वेनोपमाया अभिधीयमानत्वात् । अस्यह्युपमानान्तरनिषेधपर्यवसाय्यभिधीयमानमेकस्यैवोपमानोपमेयत्वं स्वरूपम् । न च तदत्र शब्देनाभिधीयते अपितु व्यज्यते इति प्रतीयमानतैव युक्तेति न वाच्यत्वमस्येति वाच्यम् एवं ह्यलङ्कारध्वनेर्विषयापहारःस्यात् ॥" (Vimarśinī p. 39)

As can be seen from the above extract, PR.'s is only an Arthatonuvāda of Vimarśinī. But though we gather from the above passage with the help of one or two sentences[1] that follow the same that Vimarśinī is in favour of accepting Ananvayadhvani in the present verse, we cannot get the same meaning from the passage as quoted briefly by PR. unless some change in it is effected.

This criticism of the views of Alaṅkāraratnākarakāra and Alaṅkārasarvasvakāra by PR., is quoted with approval by Viśveśvara. (AK. p. 175).

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1. "एवं 'गन्धेन सिन्धुरधुरन्धर'....यदि नाम चैतत् प्रतीयते तदप्यस्य प्रतीयमानत्वं स्यात् न वाच्यत्वम् ।" Vimarśinī p. 39.

Nāgeśa writes in this connection, in a mood of ridicule:— "तद्वामार्धं दक्षिणार्धमनुहरतीत्युच्यतां 'सोऽनुहरतीति व्यङ्ग्यमिति-भावः। एवञ्चास्य हीत्यादिना किमुच्यते तद्विचार्यं सहृदयैः। ईदृशव्यङ्ग्य व्यञ्जने उपायाभाव इत्यपि कश्चित्" (GMP. p. 275). The needless brevity obscures this passage. Perhaps what is meant by Nāgeśa is this. "When saying that there is Ananvaya-vyaṅgya in the above verse, Alaṅkārasarvasvakāra (or Vimarśinīkāra) must be of the opinion that while Upamā as "Vāmārdhaṁ dakṣinārdham anuharati" is Vācya, Ananvaya as "Vāmārdhaṁ vāmārdham anuharati" is Vyṅagya. And therefore all that is written by PR. about the damsel's Anupamatva as being Vyaṅgya is irrelevant, and according to somebody (Kaścit) there is no possibility of such vyaṅgya even.

But Nāgeśa's criticism appears to be without basis. Because PR. also anticipates the Ananvaya-vyaṅgya in the form as shown above and he refutes the same at the beginning by indicating that there is no scope for such Vyaṅgyatva at all. Next he anticipates further arguments about the second Vyaṅgya, the Nirupamatva of the damsel, and the Ananvaya thought to be preceding it. This contention also he refutes by advancing strong arguments as explained above. Thus we don't find any irrelevance on the part of PR.

Perhaps the passage of Nāgeśa is corrupted. The correct reading must be "तद्वामार्धं दक्षिणार्धमनुहरतीत्युच्यमाने (or त्युक्ते) साऽनुहरतीतिव्यङ्ग्यमिति भावः" Thus Nageśa states that PR.'s contention that Sarvasvakāra or Vimarśinīkāra maintains Ananvayadhvani between Vāmārdha and Dakṣiṇārdha themselves, (which he tries to criticise by writing 'Asya hi' etc.) is baseless, because the Vyṅgyākāra is "Tām sā anuharati" as intended by the above authors. He also feels it absurd even to think of the Vyaṅgyākāra that "Vāmardham vāmārdham anuharati" etc., as was done by PR.

It should be noted, in fairness to PR. that when a vague statement is made by Pūrvapakṣin, it is the duty of the Siddhāntin to examine all the aspects, some of which may appear quite absurd, and refute them, and therefore PR.

here, examines two alternatives of Vyaṅgyānanvaya-rūpas, one connected with the Ardhas and the other with the damsel, and he refutes both of them with strong arguments which are not at all met by his critic, Nāgeśa.

Next, PR. criticises, by advancing almost similar arguments, the contention of AD. who accepts Ananvaya-vyaṅgya in :-

"अद्य या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते ।
कालेनैषा भवेत् प्रीतिः तवैवागमनात् पुनः ॥ (CM. p. 30)

He concludes his discussion on Ananvaya after quoting two verses of his own illustration of Ananvaya-dhvani.

Asamālaṅkāra

This Alaṅkāra is not found in the works of many of the old writers like Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and Vidyānātha, Among the predecessors of PR., Śobhākaramitra, the author of Alaṅkāraratnākara appears to be the only important writer to treat this figure. He defines Asamālaṅkāra as "Impossibility of Upamāna", and gives the following verse as the example :-

"ढुण्ढुलायमानो मरिष्यसि कण्टककलितानि केतकिवनानि ।
मालतीकुसुमसदृशं भ्रमर भ्रमन्नपि न प्राप्स्यसि ॥"

(A. Ratnākara p. 11)

By saying 'Mālatī-kusuma-sadṛśam na prāpsyasi' it is indicated that it is impossible to get any flower similar to the Mālatīpuṣpa; hence it is an instance of Asama. Śobhākaramitra distinguishes Asama form Luptopamā on the ground that Asama is based upon the impossibility of the Upamāna whereas the Upamānaluptā is based on its nonavailability.

PR.'s treatment of Asama is almost based on that of Alaṅkāra-ratnākara, with the slight dfference of one or two clarifications here and there. He defines it as "सर्वथैवोपमानिषेधोऽसमाख्योऽलङ्कारः" (R.G. p. 278). He states that though the 'Sarvathaivopamā-niṣedha, is Vyaṅgya in the Ananvayālaṅkāra, it is not given the name of Asama as in the case of

Rūpaka and Dīpaka which are not called Upamā though it is underlying them. It is given an independent name (Asama) only when such Upamāniṣedha is Vācya. After explaining it with suitable examples of his own he distinguishes it from Upamānaluptā on the same ground as shown by Ratnākara.

PR. finds fault with the example given by Ratnākara on the ground that it does not convey the Atyantābhāva of the Mālatī kusuma-sadṛśa and so should be taken as an instance of Upamāna-luptopamā. This is only a matter of interpretation and it does not involve any fundamental principle ; for, 'Na prāpsyasi' can be understood "you will not get because such a thing is impossible".

PR's contention is questioned by Viśveśvara on an entirely different ground. He states on the authority of Kāvyapradīpa, that in places like "Candrasamaṁ mukham" and 'Candra iva mukham' etc., 'Candra' itself is the Upamāna and such rules as "इवादिपदानां उपमानपदोत्तरमेव प्रयोगः" and "इवादिपदानां यदुत्तरं प्रयोगः तस्यैवोपमानताधीः" etc., are clear proofs for taking the word associated with ivādi, as the Upamāna. Therefore, 'Dhundhulanto' etc., cannot be taken as an instance of Upamānaluptā because 'Mālatī' in "Mālatī-kusuma-sadṛśam" itself is the Upamāna clearly mentioned (AK. p. 112, 115).

Next PR. introduces a brief discussion as to the need of accepting Ananvaya as an independent Alaṅkāra. First he raises the question ; where is the necessity of accepting Ananvayālaṅkāra when it can be explained away as the Dhavani of Asamālaṅkāra ? But he poses a counter argument; where is the need of accepting Dīpaka and Rūpaka as independent Alaṅkāras when they can be explained away as the Dhvani of Upamā ? It may be argued to maintain some difference in these two cases that Upamā suggested in Dīpakādi is subordinate, and so Guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, whereas the suggested Asama, in Ananvaya, is Pradhāna and so Vyaṅgya, and so these two cases cannot be treated on a par with each other. But PR. maintains that this difference in the status

of the Vyaṅgya cannot stand in our way, in accepting Ananvaya as an independent Alaṅkāra. Because there are Alaṅkāras like Paryāyokta and the Sādṛśyamūlāprastuta-praśaṁsā etc, where the Vyaṅgya is the pradhāna and which are yet considered to be Alaṅkāras. Moreover, while having 'Asama' as the Vyaṅgya, Ananvaya has got its own charasteristics, Svasādṛśya, as Vācya. Thus PR. establishes that 'Asama' while being Vācya is Asamālaṅkāra and while Vyaṅgya is Ananvayālaṅkāra.

Viśveśvara is not in favour of accepting Asama as a separate Alaṅkāra, which according to him, comes under the Ananvaya Dhvani. In other words, in all cases of the so-called Asama, like "Bhūmī-nātha-Śahābadīna" etc., we can accept the Ananvayālaṅkāra-dhvani. Otherwise all the suggested Ālaṅkāras like Upamā will have to be accepted as separate Alaṅkāras. He states further that Ananvaya cannot be avoided by accepting Asama, because the scope of the former is wider than that of the latter (AK. p. 174).

Viśveśvara's arguments appear to have been advanced just to criticise PR's views. It is against the common experience to think that there will be the suggestion of Ananvaya whenever there is the description of Nirupamatva. For example when it is said that Śahābuddīn is without comparison, we do not immediately understand that he should be compared with himself unless we are purposefully reminded of it by an Ālaṅkārika sitting by our side. Therefore there is nothing wrong in accepting Asama as an independent Alaṅkāra, because there is Camatkāra in such description of peerlessness, and Camatkāra is the soul of Alaṅkāra. But the only thing desirable is, that while accepting Asama as an Alaṅkāra, the Upamānalupta should be brought under its scope without accepting it as a variety of Upamālaṅkāra, for, as explained in the previous pages, when the Upamāna is negated in the Upamānalupta there is no Sādṛśya-niṣpatti which is the fundamental principle of Upamālaṅkāra.

After giving an example for Asama-dhvani, PR. states that Asama may result either from negating the Upamāna or the Upamā. He closes the discussion on this Alaṅkāra by stating that it can also have some varieties like Pūrṇa and Lupta etc.

Udāharaṇam

Udāharaṇam also is not found in old writers. Alaṅkāra-ratnākara appears to be the extant important old work to treat this Alaṅkāra systematically which has been given a difinite shape and scope by PR.

It is defined by Śobhākaramitra as "सामान्योद्दिष्टानामेकस्य निदर्शनमुदाहरणम्" (A. Ratnākara, p. 12). (Udāharaṇam is the figure of speech where one particular thing out of things generally mentioned, is taken by way of illustration). He gives "Ananta-ratna-prabhavasya" etc., as an instance of Udāharaṇa. Next he examines if it is possible to include this in Upamā and says that it cannot be done so because the Aṅka itself, mentioned in the above verse, is a Doṣa ; Doṣa being the Sāmānya and the Aṅka the Viśeṣa. Moreover, Sādṛśya, which is the life of Upamā is not intended to be conveyed here. By way of example he says that it is like giving Udāharaṇas to explain clearly the meaning of the Vyākaraṇasūtra:—"अतएव यथा व्याकरणादौ सूत्रार्थहृदयङ्गमीकरणायोदाहरणोपादानं तथैवेह सामान्याभिहितस्य विशेषनिदर्शनमिति प्रतीतिविशदीकरणार्थमित्युक्तम्."

(A. Ratnākara, p. 13).

PR. defines Udāharaṇa on similar lines as "सामान्येन निरूपितस्यार्थस्य सुखप्रतिपत्तये तदेकदेशं निरूप्य तयोरवयवावयविभाव उच्यमान उदाहरणम्" (RG.p. 281). "The expression of Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva, after the mention of a Viśeṣa in order to get the clear understanding of the general statement is Udāharaṇa". The difference between Arthāntaranyāsa and Udāharaṇa is that the Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva in the former is not expressed in words whereas it is expressed in the latter. The words 'Iva', 'Yathā' etc., though expressive of Sādṛśya originally, convey

by Lakṣaṇā, the Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva. He gives the following verse as an example of Udāharaṇa :--

"अमितगुणोऽपि पदार्थो दोषेणैकेन निन्दितो भवति ।
निखिलरसायनराजो गन्धेनोग्रेण लशुन इव ॥" (RG. p. 282)

Like Śobhākaramitra, PR. also states that there can be no Upamānopameyabhāva here, because there is Sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva between the Amita-guṇa-padārtha and Laśuna. Here he presents a strong argument against accepting Upamānopameyabhāva in the places of Udāharaṇa. If Upamā were to be accepted here, he contends, the words like 'Sadṛśa' also could have been used in the place of Ivādi-padas.

(RG. p. 282)

It is interesting to note, that PR. also gives the same example of Vyākaraṇasūtra with slight modification. While taking about 'Udāharaṇa' in the Upamāprakaraṇa, in connection with the criticism of AD's views on the verse 'Anantaratna' etc., he writes :- "सामान्याद्विशेषस्य भेदाभावेन उपमितिक्रियाया अनिष्पत्त्या उपमालङ्कृतेरत्रानवतारात् उदाहरणालङ्कारोऽयमतिरिक्तः यथा 'इको यणचि' इति वाक्यार्थस्य सामान्यस्य विज्ञानाय दध्युदकमित्यत्र उदकोकारे दधीकारस्य य इति वाक्यान्तरेण तद्विशेष उदाह्रियते तद्वदत्रापीति तत्प्रसङ्गे विवेचयिष्यामः" (RG. p. 239).

After giving a few more examples, PR. explains the difference in the Śābda-bodha when 'Udāharaṇa' is expressed by words like 'Iva' and 'Yathā' and by words like 'Nidarśana' and 'Dṛṣṭānta' etc. The use of Ivādi padas gives importance (Viśeṣyatva) to the Sāmānyārtha and makes the sentence (conveying the Sāmānya as Viśeṣya) as one. But Viśeṣārtha is understood as Viśeṣya when 'Nidarśana' and 'Dṛṣṭānta' etc., are used and there will be Vākyabheda. This he explains by way of showing the different Śābda-bodhas in "Amita-guṇopi" etc., and the verse "Upakārameva tanute vipadgataḥ sadguṇo nitarām. Mūrchām gato mṛto vā nidarśanam pāradotra rasaḥ" (RG. p. 252) containing the word 'Nidarśanam'. According to the Vaiyākaraṇas the Śābda-bodha in "Amita-guṇah" etc., where 'Iva' is used, is "निखिलरसायनराजलशुनकर्तृको-

ग्रगन्धहेतुकनिन्दाविषयीभवनावयवकाभिन्नममितगुणपदार्थकर्तृकैकदोषहेतुक-निन्दाविषयीभवनम्."

The Śābda-bodha according to the Naiyāyikas is: "उग्रगन्धहेतुकनिन्दाविषयीभवनाश्रयनिखिलरसायनराजलशुनावयवकाभिन्न: एकदोषहेतुकनिन्दाविषयीभवनाश्रयाभिन्नश्च अमितगुणपदार्थ:." Thus according to the two types of Bodha where the Ākhyātārtha and the Prathamārtha are taken as the Viśeṣya respectively, the Sāmānyartha is shown as the Pradhāna by being Viśeṣya and the Viśeṣārtha as the Viśeṣana ; and there is also the Padaika-Vākyatā.

The Śābda-bodha in "Upakārameva tanute" etc., where there is the use of words like 'Nidarśanam' and 'Dṛṣṭāntaḥ' etc., is as follows:—"विपद्गताभिन्नसद्गुणकर्तृका उपकारानुकूला क्रिया इति पूर्ववाक्यार्थे मूर्छा गतो मृतो वा पारद:एकदेश:" This is according to the Vaiyākaraṇas. The Bodha according to the Naiyāyikas is:— "विपद्गताभिन्न: सद्गुण: उपकारानुकूलकृतिमान् इति अर्थे मूर्छा गतो मृतो वा पारद:निदर्शनं (अवयव:)." Thus in both of these Śābda-bodhas, the Viśeṣārtha (i.e., the Pārada-ghaṭita-vākyārtha) is shown as the Viśeṣya and there are two separate sentences. Thus PR. clearly explains the difference in the Śābda-bodha in different places of Udāharaṇālaṅkāra.

Candrāloka accepts a separate Alaṅkāra by name 'Vikasvara' which is defined as the mention of Viśeṣa, Sāmānya and Viśeṣa in an order. (Kuvalayānanda, p. 134) AD. gives the verse "Anantaratna-prabhavasya" etc., as an instance of Vikasvara in Kuvalayānanda. But PR. does not see any need of accepting a new Alaṅkāra and therefore he takes the verse 'Anantaratna' etc., and another such verse as the instances of Udāharaṇa combined with Arthāntaranyāsa.

But what is the difference between Udāharaṇa and Arthāntaranyāsa ? PR. explains that there is the use of Ivādi-śabdas, indicative of Avayavāvayavi-bhāva in the Udāharaṇālaṅkāra and it is absent in Arthāntaranyāsa. Again the Kriyā which is Vidheya as related to both the Sāmānya and

Viśeṣa is the same in Udāharaṇa, whereas it is different in Arthāntaranyāsa. For example, the 'Upakāra-karaṇa' in the example "Upakārameva tanute" etc., is applicable to both the Sadguṇa and the Pārada. But if the second half is changed as "मूर्छां गतो मृतो वा रोगानपहरति पारदःसकलान्", it will be an instance of Arthāntaranyāsa, because the Kriyā as related to the Sadguṇa (i.e., Upakāra-karaṇa) is different from the Kriyā, i.e., Roganivāraṇa, mentioned as related to Pārada.

PR. concludes his discussion by stating the views of the Prācīnas who are in favour of including this figure in Upamā. That PR. is in favour of treating it as an independent Alaṅkāra, is evident from the fact that he refutes the views of AD. (accepting Upamā in the above verse) in Upamā-prakaraṇa and introduces such an elaborate discussion to determine the nature and scope of Udāharaṇa. From what we have seen above, the acceptance of Udāharaṇa as an independent Alaṅkāra appears to be quite justified.

Smaraṇālaṅkāra

Mammaṭa defines Smaraṇa as :—"यथानुभवमर्थस्य दृष्टे तत्सदृशे स्मृतिः स्मरणम्" (KP. p. 563). Smaraṇa is the recollection of a thing as it was once experienced previously, on seeing a similar object. It is defined by Ruyyaka as :—"सदृशानुभवाद् वस्त्वन्तरस्मृतिः स्मरणम्" (AS. p. 40). (Smaraṇa is recollection of another object on the direct cognition (Anubhava) of a similar object). He adds that the remembered thing also should be a similar object (AS. p. 40). Viśvanātha states on the authority of Rāghavānanda Mahāpātra, that the Smṛti may be the result of the recognition of dissimilarity also as in the following verse :—

शिरीषमृद्वी गिरिषु प्रपेदे यदा यदा दुःखशतानि सीता ।
तदा तदाऽस्याः सदनेषु सौख्यलक्षाणि दध्यौ गलदश्रु रामः ॥

(SD. p. 22)

PR. while defining Smaraṇa, tries to avoid some of the defects which are found in the old definitions. He defines it as :—"सादृश्यज्ञानोद्बुद्धं संस्कारप्रयोज्यं स्मरणं स्मरणालङ्कारः"

(RG. p. 286). (Smaraṇālaṅkāra is the recollection resulting from the Saṁskāra kindled by the cognition of Sādṛśya).

After illustrating the definition with the help of two examples, he explains why 'Saṁskāra-prayojya' is used instead of 'Saṁskāra-janyam'. If 'Janyatva' were to be used instead of 'Prayojyatva', the definition would include only such things which are directly recollected on seeing a similar object but not the things recollected indirectly. For example in the following verse, it would not be possible to accept Smaraṇālaṅkāra :-

"एकीभवत्प्रलयकालपयोधिकल्पमालोक्य संगरगतं कुरुवीरसैन्यम् ।
सस्मार तल्पमहिपुङ्गवकायकान्तं निद्राञ्च योगकलितां भगवान् मुकुन्दः।
(RG. p. 287)

Here Pralaya-payodhi is recollected on seeing the vast army which is the Sadṛśa, and so far there is Smaraṇālaṅkāra-dhvani. On account of the recollection of the Payodhi there arose the recollection of Śeṣatalpa etc., and this recollection is not the result of Sadṛśa-darśana, because it is caused by the Smaraṇa of the Payodhi. Therefore by using 'Prayojyatva' instead of 'Janyatva' it is made possible to include this recollection also and take this as an instance of Smaraṇālaṅkāra.

Recollection caused by any thing other than Sādṛśya-jñāna cannot be taken as Smaraṇa ; this point, as accepted by all the Ālaṅkārikas, is explained by PR. also with proper examples.

Next PR. criticises the definition given by AD. and also the discussion that was introduced by him after the definition. AD. defines the Smaraṇālaṅkāra thus :—

"स्मृतिः सादृश्यमूला या वस्त्वन्तरसमाश्रया ।
स्मरणालङ्कृतिः सा स्यादव्यङ्ग्यत्वविशेषिता ॥" (CM. p. 143)

PR. mainly objects to the use of the words "Vastvantara-samāśrayā" and 'Avyaṅgyatva-viśeṣitā' in the above Lakṣaṇa—the first word as without any purpose and the second as unwanted, because there is no Virodha between Alaṅkāratva

and Vyangyatva. While explaining the purpose of 'Sādṛśya-mūlā' AD. remarks incidentally that the following verse contained Preyolaṅkāra :—

"अत्युच्चाः परितः स्फुरन्ति गिरयः स्फारास्तथाम्भोधय-
स्तानेतानपि बिभ्रती किमपि न श्रान्तासि तुभ्यं नमः ।
आश्चर्येण मुहुर्मुहुः स्तुतिमिति प्रस्तौमि यावद् भुव-
स्तावद् बिभ्रदिमां स्मृतस्तव भुजो वाचस्ततो मुद्रिताः ॥"(CM. p. 145)

Here A.D. Writes : "अत्र स्तूयमानभूसम्बन्धिनो भूभृतः[1] स्मृतिः न सादृश्यमूलेति नात्र स्मरणालङ्कारः । किन्तु स्मृतेः सञ्चारिभावस्य भूभृद्विषयकरतिभावाङ्गत्वात् प्रेयोलङ्कार :" (CM. p. 148). In this connection, it is rightly pointed out by PR. that Smṛti in the above verse, being Vācya, cannot be called 'Bhāva' and therefore there can be no Preyolaṅkāra, because it can be accepted only when one Bhāva is shown as the Aṅga of another Bhāva etc. Further he shows how AD.'s statement here, is against what is written by himself in Kuvalayānanda, where he clearly states that the Preyolaṅkāra arises when the Nirvedādi-bhāva, suggested by Vibhāvas etc., is shown as the Aṅga of something else. PR. does not have any objection to accept Preyolaṅkāra in the above verse on a different ground as shown by Mammaṭa (KP. p. 192). There is Preyolaṅkāra because the Bhū-viṣayaka-rati is described as the Aṅga of the Rājaviṣayakarati.

PR. is not in favour of accepting primariness of Smaraṇa in the verse :—"सौमित्रे ननु सेव्यतां तरुतलं चण्डांशुरुज्जृम्भते
चण्डांशोर्निशि का कथा रघुपते चन्द्रोऽयमुन्मीलति ।
वत्सैतद्विदितं कथं नु भवता धत्ते कुरङ्गं यतः
क्वासि प्रेयसि हा कुरङ्गनयने चन्द्रानने जानकि" ॥ (CM. p. 51)

as was thought by AD., because he says that the Vipralambha being mainly suggested, the Smaraṇa is only an Alaṅkāra of the same.

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1. Quoted in RG. p 290. The reading in Citramīmāṁsā is "Bhūbhṛdbhujasya" which seems correct Citramīmāṁsā p. 51.

Nāgeśa's attempt to vindicate AD. in accepting Smaraṇa-Prādhānya in the above verse, and in adding the word 'Vastvantara' in the Lakṣaṇa. is without strong ground. He contends that if simply it is said that "Sādṛśya-mūlā-smṛtih smaraṇam" it can include only the Sadṛśa-vastu, because the word 'Sādṛśya', being a 'Niyata-sambandhika', it can suggest to our mind at the first instance only the Sadṛśa-vastu, whereas we want to include any Sambandhin in general. Therefore, he says, it is necessary to include 'Vastvantara', in the Lakṣaṇa. Needless to say that Nāgeśa indulges here, in hair-splitting argument. But if, we press such logic further, it can be argued that 'Sadṛśa-vastu' is recollected, because it is a Niyata-sambandhin. Therefore the 'Vastvantara' is introduced in the definition to understand that only a thing, other than the Sadṛśa-vastu should be recollected in Smaraṇālaṅkāra, and thus the Sadṛśa-vastu smaraṇa cannot be an instance of this figure. Therefore PR.'s stand appears to be justified.

As shown above, all the writers including Ruyyaka and Śobhākaramitra define Smaraṇa by using the word 'Sadṛśānubhava' in the Lakṣaṇa. Anubhava being a Pratyakṣa-jñāna, these Lakṣaṇas can include only such Smaraṇa as is caused by the Saṁskāra kindled by pratyakṣa-jñāna of a similar object. They do not include the Smaraṇa, if caused by the Saṁskāra kindled by Smṛti of a similar thing. Therefore, PR. syas, that the word 'Jñāna' should be used in the Lakṣaṇa which means both the Anubhava and Smṛti. Thus the Avyāpti in the following verse where the Smaraṇa of something through the Smṛti of another thing is described, can be avoided :—

"सन्त्येवास्मिन् जगति बहवः पक्षिणो रम्यरूपाः
तेषां मध्ये मम तु महती वासना चातकेषु ।
यैरध्यक्षैरथ निजसखं नीरदं स्मारयद्भिः
स्मृत्यारूढं भवति किमपि ब्रह्म कृष्णाभिधानम् ॥" (RG. p. 293)

Here Cātaka reminds one of the cloud, and the recollection of the cloud is responsible for the recollection of Śrīkṛṣṇa. The use of 'Anubhava' in the Lakṣaṇa would make it impossible to accept Smaraṇālaṅkāra in this verse.

After explaining the Smaraṇa-dhvani with the help of two examples, PR. states that almost all the doṣas of Upamā are applicable to Smaraṇa, because the Sādṛśya is implied in this figure also. The Sādhāraṇa-dharma in Smaraṇa also may be Anugāmin, Bimba-pratibimbā-bhāvāpanna or Upacarita. After showing two examples for the first two varieties, he explains the Upacarita-dharma with the help of two examples :—

"क्वचिदपि कार्ये मृदुलं क्वापि च कठिनं विलोक्य हृदयं ते ।
को न स्मरति नराधिप नवनीतं किञ्च शतकोटिम् ।।" and
"अगाधं परितः पूर्णमालोक्य स महार्णवम् ।
हृदयं रामभद्रस्य सस्मार पवनात्मजः ।।" (RG. p. 296)

In the first verse, Mārdava and Kāṭhinya are ascribed to Hṛdaya and in the second verse Agādhatva is ascribed to Rāma's Hṛdaya. There is slight difference, as explained by PR. in the two examples. In the first verse, the Sādṛśya with the recollected things, Navanīta and Śatakoṭi (Navanītādi-pratiyogika-sādṛśya) is effected in the cognised Hṛdaya (Anubhūyamāna-hṛdaya) because their qualities are ascribed to it. But in the second verse, the Sādṛsya with the cognised ocean (Anubhūyamāna-samudra-pratiyogika-sādṛśya) is effected in the recollected Hṛdaya, because the quality of the ocean is ascribed to the Hṛdaya. This is possible because the Sādṛśya is Ubhayaniṣtha, i.e., associated with both the Upameya and Upamāna (RG. p. 296). Perhaps this point of difference is suggested to PR. by such distinction explained in Vimarśinī (p. 41). PR. concludes this topic of Smaraṇālaṅkāra after giving an example where the Sādṛśya is based on Kevala-śabda.

Rūpakālaṅkāra

Mammaṭa defines Rūpaka as "Abheda between the Upamāna and Upameya"; "तद्रूपकमभेदो य उपमानोपमेययोः". This Abheda he explains, as resulting from close resemblance (KP. p 464). He classifies Rūpaka into eight varieties.

"Rūpaka arises" according to Ruyyaka, "when there is āropa, with Abheda assuming importance and when the Āropa-viṣaya, i.e., Upameya is not concealed. (श्रभेदप्राधान्ये श्रारोपे श्रारोपविषयानपह्नवे रूपकम् (AS. p. 43). He quotes with approval, the statement of Daṇḍin "उपमैव तिरोभूतभेदा रूपकमुच्यते (Kāvyādarśa II-66), and this indicates that Rūpaka involves only the Upamānāropa. But Vimarśinīkāra says (p. 44) on the strength of Ruyyaka's remarks while commenting on the verse "Amṛta-Kalaśaḥ Śobhā-rāśiḥ" etc., that he is in favour of accepting Kāryādyāropa also coming under Rūpaka. Accepting the principle of Upamānopameyabhāva, involved in the Rūpakālaṅkāra, Vimarśinīkāra (p. 44) classifies the Sādhāraṇa-dharma as Anugata, Śuddha-sāmānya-rūpa and Bimbapratibimba-bhāvāpanna. Ruyyaka also accepts eight varieties of Rūpakālaṅkāra.

Let us now examine PR's definition of Rūpaka. First he gives a definition applicable to both the Alaṅkāra-bhūta-rūpaka and Analaṅkāra-bhūta rūpaka : "उपमेयतावच्छेदकपुरस्कारेणोपमेये शब्दान्निश्चीयमानमुपमानतादात्म्यं रूपकम्" (RG. p. 297). "The positive identity, brought about by Śabda, of the Upamāna with the Upameya, which is presented in its distinct form as Upameya is Rūpaka." When the adjective 'Upaskārakatva' is added to the same definition it will be exclusively applicable to the Alaṅkāra-bhūta-rūpaka.

After explaining the purpose of the different Viśeṣaṇas PR. states, on the authority of writers like Daṇḍin and Mammaṭa, that Sādṛśya is the underlying principle in Rūpakālaṅkāra also, and therefore "Sukham manoramā rāmāḥ" etc., cannot come under the scope of Rūpaka. In this context he criticises the views of Śobhakara who belives that the balancing of two different things against each other constitutes Rūpaka whether there is Sādṛśya or some other Sambandha (A. Ratnākara. p. 32). PR. says, there is Ativyāpti of this definition in Apahnuti where there is balancing of two things. Secondly, if Sādṛśya were not to be accepted as the important

principle involved in Rūpaka, why should you accept it in the case of Smaraṇālaṅkāra ? Because even the Smṛti caused by Cintā etc., can be taken as the case of Smaraṇālaṅkāra.

But this argument of PR. does not seem to be quite convincing for, Smaraṇa and Rūpaka being two different figures, where is the point in judging the merits and demerits of the one on the analogy of the other ? Sādṛśya may be the commonly found important principle in Rūpaka ; but we do not find any thing wrong in accepting in certain places, other Sambandhas also like Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva etc.

PR. next proceeds to examine the definition found in Citramīmāṁsā, which runs as follows : —

"बिम्बाविशिष्टे निर्दिष्टे विषये यद्यनिह्नुते ।
उपरञ्जकतामेति विषयी रूपकं तदा ॥" (p. 66)

A.D. is not in favour of accepting Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in Rūpaka. According to him the following verse can be taken as an instance of Nidarśanā but not of Rūpaka because there is Bimba-Pratibimba-bhāva involved in it.

"त्वत्पादनखरत्नानां यदलक्तकमार्जनम् ।
इदं श्रीखण्डलेपेन पाण्डुरीकरणं विधोः ॥" (CM. p. 53)

But PR. does not find any difference in Āropa involved in the above verse, and in phrases like "Mukham candraḥ", excepting the fact that the Āropa in the former is Vākyārtha-gata and in the latter Padārtha-gata. Therefore he accepts Rūpaka in the above verse. In this connection he says, that not only AD. but also his authority, Ruyyaka, is wrong in accepting Nidarśanā in the above verse when there is a clear case for Rūpaka. He cites Vimarśinīkāra as an authority in accepting Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in Rūpaka also. Thus, "Bimbāviśiṣṭe" in the Lakṣaṇa, he declares, is wrong.

Viśveśvara, who is not in favour of accepting Vākyārtha-rūpaka as a variety of Rūpaka, takes the above verse as an

instance of Nidarśanā only (AK. pp. 204-5). As for the Bimbapratibimba-bhāva, Viśveśvara is of the opinion that AD.'s stand, as explained in Kuvalayānanda, is correct. In Kuvalayānanda (pp. 59-60) it is mentioned that in places like "Jyotsnā-bhasma-cchuraṇadhavalā"[1] etc., where there appears Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva existing, the Viśeṣanas will first have Āropa, and the Viśeṣyas will have it later, and thus there is no need of accepting Abhedāropa between the Viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭas. Therefore there is no Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in Rūpaka.

Now one question arises. There may be no need of accepting Viśiṣṭāropa in places where the Viśeṣaṇas and the Viśeṣyas are mentioned separately as in the case of the verse referred to above. But how can it be explained away in cases like "Kandarpa-dvipa-karṇa-kambu" etc., where some Viśeṣaṇas are mentioned as applicable only to the Upameya and some only to the Upamāna ? Viśveśvara gives a far-fetched answer to this question. He says, it is true that there is Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in the following verse as explained by Vimarśinī.

"कन्दर्पद्विपकर्णकम्बु मलिनैर्दानाम्बुभिर्लाञ्छितं
संलग्नाञ्जनपुञ्जकालिमकलं गण्डोपधानं रतेः ।
व्योमानोकहपुष्पगुच्छमलिभिःसंछाद्यमानोदरं
पश्यैतच्छशिनः सुधासहचरं बिम्बं कलङ्काङ्कितम् ॥"

But there is direct Vastu-prativastu-bhāva between Aṅkitatva and Lāñchitatva. Bimbapratibimbabhāva exists only between the Kalaṅka and Dānajala etc., which are Viśeṣaṇarūpa

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1. "ज्योस्नाभस्मच्छुरणधवला बिभ्रती तारकास्थी-
न्यन्तर्धानव्यसनरसिका रात्रिकापालिकीयम् ।
द्वीपाद्द्वीपं भ्रमति दधती चन्द्रमुद्रा कपाले
न्यस्तं सिद्धाञ्जनपरिमलं लाञ्छनस्यच्छलेन ॥"

(Vimarśinī p. 44)

in Ankitatva and Lāñchitatva repectively. Thus there is no direct Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva between the Viṣaya and the Viṣayin. Therefore, Viśveśvara contends, there is no need of accepting Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in Rūpaka directly.

Needless to add, Viśveśvara's argument is hair-splitting. Whether it is directly connected with the Viṣaya and Viṣayin or not when there is Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva, either as associated with Vastu-prativastu-bhāva or independent of it, it should be accepted as existing. It is not impossible to find an example where Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva alone will have to be accepted. For instance, if we simply say without the words 'Lānchitam' and 'Aṅkitam' etc. "सकलङ्कमिदं शशिबिम्बं दानाम्बुस्निग्धकन्दर्पद्विपकर्णकम्बु etc., there is Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva with no association with Vastu-prativastu-bhāva. Therefore Vimarśinīkāra and PR. appear to be correct in accepting Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in Rūpakālaṅkāra also.

Further PR criticises the use of the word 'Nirdiṣṭa' as useless. This word may be understood in two ways. It may mean "when it (Viṣaya) is expressed by word in one form or the other" or "when it is expressed in its capacity as Upameya (Upameyatāvacchedakarūpa)." The first interpretation may result in Ativyāpti ; because in places of Atiśayokti like "सुन्दरं कमलं भाति लतायामिदमद्भुतम्" the face is expressed by 'Sundaram', and 'Idam'. Now the second alternative may have to be accepted. Thus the word 'Nirdiṣṭe' itself which means 'उपमेयतावच्छेदकरूपेण बोधिते' averts the Ativyāpti in Apahnuti ; because the Upameya being negatived, there is no mention of Viṣaya in Upameyatāvacchedaka-rūpa ; and thus the word 'Anihnute' becomes useless. Again there is no mention of the Viṣaya in Bhrāntimān in Upameyatāvacchedaka-rūpa because the Viṣaya here is completely covered by some defect ; and thus, there in no scope for Ativyāpti of this definition in the above Alaṅkāra. Thus, where is the need of qualifying the Tādrūpya-niścaya-jñāna as the 'Āhārya' to avoid the Ativyāpti in Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra ? Moreover, this definition suffers from Ativyāpti in "नायं सुधांशुः किं तर्हि सुधांशुः प्रेयसीमुखम्"

which is accepted as an instance of one of the varicties of Apahnuti, (by AD.) because there is clear mention of the Viṣaya (Preyasīmukha) in Upameyatāvacchedakarūpa. Thus PR. finds the definition of Rūpaka given by AD. as defective, just as the one criticised by him in his Citramīmāṁsā.

Fortunately for AD., we find two able supporters, rather defenders, of his views; in Nāgeśa, in almost all the places, and Viśveśvara, in the present case. Nāgeśa feels that the use of the word 'Anihnute' is essential to avoid Ativyāpti in Apahnava because the Viṣaya is being mentioned there, no matter even if for the sake of its negation. It may be argued, how can such reference for negation be considered as Nirdeśa at all ? But Nāgeśa contends that the use of 'Anihnute', makes us understand (by Anyathānupapatti), that any kind of reference can be taken as 'Nirdeśa' (GMP. p. 303).

Needless to say it is like attempting to read so much of meaning in a word of a Pāṇini's Sūtra or of Patañjali's statement; even where such interpretations are not attempted without some specific purpose, like solving some Padaprayogas. Viśveśvara (AK. p. 205) also gives the same answer without raising further argument. Regarding the charge of superfluousness of the word 'Āhārya' in the explanation Viśveśvara accepts it as such. But Nāgeśa says that it is only the explanation of the meaning arrived at from the word Nirdiṣte (GMP. p. 303).

In reply to the Ativyāpti-doṣa in 'Nāyam sudhāṁśuḥ' etc., Nāgeśa says (GMP. p. 303) that there is nothing wrong in accepting it as a separate Alaṅkāra even if there is a slight admixture of Rūpaka in it as in the case of Upameyopamā where there is Upamā, but which is, even then, accepted as a separate Alaṅkāra.

Viśveśvara meets this Ativyāpti in a different way. He says that "Nāyaṁ sudhāṁśuḥ" etc., is not intended to convey Āropa of the Candrābheda in Mukha. What is intended here

is that the word 'Sudhāṁśu' should not be used to mean the Moon but to mean the face. When the Sudhāṁśutva of the well-known Moon itself is negated where is scope for ascribing it to the face ?

"तथाहि तत्र प्रसिद्धचन्द्रे सुधांशुत्वनिषेधान्मुखे प्रसिद्धचन्द्राभेदो नारोप्यते; बाधात् । किन्तु सुधांशुपदवाच्यत्वं चन्द्रे निषिद्ध्य मुखमेव सुधांशुपदवाच्यमित्येव बोध्यते, 'इन्द्रो मरुत्वान् मघवा' इत्यादिवत् ।"

(AK. p. 205)

What is meant by Viśveśvara is not clear, Perhaps he contends that when the very existence of the 'Sudhāṁśu' is negated where is the question of superimposing it on the face ? Therefore according to him, "Sudhāṁśuḥ preyasī-mukham" should be understood as 'Sudhāṁśu' and 'Preyasī-mukha' being synonymous.

But this is a peculiar argument. The above sentence does not deny the very existence of Sudhāṁśu. What is conveyed by this sentence is that the object yonder is not the well-known Moon but the Priyā-mukha is the Moon. Therefore it cannot be denied that there is Āropa. Moreover, Viśveśvara's argument is against the views of AD. himself whom he wants to defend ; because AD. accepts Candratvāropa in the Mukha. "अन्यत्र वर्णनीये वस्तुनि तस्य धर्मस्यारोपार्थः स पर्यस्तापह्नुतिः । यथा चन्द्रे चन्द्रत्वनिह्नवः वर्णनीये मुखे तदारोपार्थः ।"

(Kuvalayānanda, p. 27)

Next PR. examines the definition given by Mammaṭa. He says this definition "तद्रूपकमभेदो य उपमानोपमेययोः" suffers from Ativyāpti in Apahnuti and Utprekṣā unless it is understood as "उपमेयतावच्छेदकपुरस्कारेण उपमानतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नाभेदनिश्चयः" which would ultimately result in accepting his Lakṣaṇa.

Following writers like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha, PR. first classifies Rūpaka into eight varieties and explains all of them with suitable examples. The names of these varieties are as

follows : (a) सावयवरूपक : (1) समस्तवस्तुविषय, (2) एकदेशविवर्ति; (b) निरवयवरूपक : (3) केवल, (4) मालारूपक, (c) परम्परितरूपक, (5) केवलश्लिष्ट, (6) मालाश्लिष्ट, (7) केवलशुद्ध, (8) मालाशुद्ध.

In reply to the objection of some writers who think that Sāvayavarūpaka being a group of many Rūpakas, cannot form a separate variety, PR. says that there is nothing wrong in accepting it as a separate variety because there is a peculiar charm in such a group of Rūpakas. Just as one single pearl is taken as an Alaṅkāra, the group of such pearls also can be taken as one Alaṅkāra. Thus he feels it incorrect to refuse the Sāvayava as a variety of Rūpaka on the analogy of the herd of cows which should not be counted along with the individual cows like Kapilā etc., (as one of the varieties of cows) (RG. p. 308).

Though Mālārūpaka and Sāvayavarūpaka consist of a group of Rūpakas they differ from each other, PR. explains, by the fact that in Mālārūpaka, there are many Rūpakas independent of each other but with only one Viṣaya whereas reverse is the case in Sāvayava.

What is the difference between the Sāvayavarūpaka and Paramparitarūpaka, because in both these varieties one Rūpaka depends upon another? PR. explains the difference like this :—In Sāvayava, Āropa does not necessarily require the other Rūpaka because it is possible on account of even such Sādṛśya which is invented by the poet. But in Paramparita the Āropa cannot take place unless there is another Rūpaka to support it. According to some writers, PR. says, the difference between them consists in the fact that the Sāvayava contains many Āropas whereas Paramparita contains only two. PR. does not seem to be in favour of the second explanation, because the first one itself holds good.

PR. envisages the possibility of another variety of Rūpaka where many Viṣayas are mentioned to be matched with only one Viṣayin as in the following verse :—

"काव्यं सुधा रसज्ञानां कामिनां कामिनी सुधा ।
धनं सुधा सलोभानां शान्तिः संन्यासिनां सुधा ॥" (RG. p. 311)

But he declines to give it the importance of being a separate variety because there is no special Camatkāra in it. The same idea is expressed in Alaṅkāraratnākara citing a similar verse :—

"तृणं कान्ता विरक्तस्य तृणं शूरस्य जीवितम् ।
तत्त्वज्ञस्य तृणं शास्त्रं निःस्पृहस्य तृणं तपः ॥"

(A. Ratnākara, p. 33)

Next PR. introduces a discussion as to the way in which one Rūpaka supports another in the Śliṣṭaparamparita-rūpaka. The following verse has given an instance of this variety :—

"कमलावासकासारः क्षमाधृतिफणीश्वरः ।
अयं कुवलयस्येन्दुः आनन्दयति मानवान् ॥" (RG. p. 309).

Here it is explained that 'Kamalāvāsa,' 'Kṣamādhṛti' and 'Kuvalaya' being Śliṣṭapadas there is Āropa of the one meaning on the other which justifies the Kāsārādyāropa on the king. Now PR. raises the question how can such Āropa of one meaning on the other be brought about at all; because the Śleṣa indicates only Abheda between the 'Lakṣmīnivāsa' and 'Padmanivāsa' etc., and not Āropa which requires separate mention of the Viṣaya. And such Abheda between the 'Lakṣmīnivāsa' etc., would lead to the Abheda between the king and the Kāsāra according to the well-known saying 'यत्सम्बन्धिनि यत्सम्बन्ध्यभेदः तस्मिन् तदभेदः", i.e., the identity of the qualities associated with two things results in the identity of the things themselves. Thus we donot find Āropa here either between the Lakṣmīnivāsa and Padmanivāsa or between the king and Kāsāra through the first Āropa; and so how we can accept the Paramparita-rūpaka based on Śleṣa ? PR. while accepting the above contention, explains the possibility of Āropa between the Lakṣmīnivāsa etc., at the second instance, through the

Mānasa-bodha, after the cognition of the pure identity (Śuddhābheda).

Nāgeśa contends that there is no need of any such lateral Mānasabodha as accepted by PR. He gives an altogether different explanation to meet the above objection. In "Gāmbhīryeṇa samudraḥ ayam" the Samudratvāropa on the king is made possible because the Gāmbhīrya as applicable to both the king and Samudra in different ways, is mentioned by one single word which acts as the Sādhāraṇadharma between them. Here there is no Āropa between the Gāmbhīrya, pertaining to the king and the Gāmbhīrya pertaining to the ocean. There is only Abheda between them resulting from their being mentioned by one word (Ekaśabdopāttatva). The same method can be adopted in the present case also whether it is mentioned by separated words (Vyastapadas) or in a compound, i.e., "Kamalāvāsena ayaṁ rājā kāsāraḥ" or "Kamalāvāsa-kāsāraḥ" etc.. Thus the Abhedādhyavasāna in 'Kamalāvāsa' makes it Sādhāraṇadharma which leads to the Rūpaka, based on the Kāsāratvāropa on the king; because there is no rule that Āropa alone can make a thing as Sādhāraṇa Dharma. Thus the Samarthaka-rūpaka (Kamalāvāsa etc.,) cannot be called as Rūpaka in the strict sense of the word. It is only a Lākṣaṇika-prayoga, because there is only Abhedādhyavasāna but not Āropa in it. That this is a Lākṣaṇika-prayoga is inevitable to accept even if the Āropa is taken as the result of the lateral Mānasika-bodha. This explanation facilitates, Nāgeśa claims, to avoid the inconvenience in some other places. Thus there is no Anyonyāśraya in "Kāruṇyakusumākāśaḥ khalaḥ" etc., because the Abheda between Kāruṇya and Kusuma acts as the Sādhāraṇadharma and makes the Khalākāśa-rūpaka possible. Again there is no scope for the Pūrvapakṣa at all, in "Saujanya-candrikā-candraḥ" etc., which is going to be raised and answered by PR. in the passage beginning with "Syādetat".

Nāgeśa's argument seems to be convincing but for the

fact that there is no scope for Rūpaka in 'Kamalāvāsa' etc., on account of the complete absence of Āropa, whereas it is possible in the theory of PR. at least by being based on the lateral Mānasikajñāna. The main problem with PR. is not in finding the Sādhāraṇadharma for the second rūpaka, but the explanation of Āropa in the first Rūpaka (i.e., Śliṣṭasthala) which alone can make it Rūpaka. Moreover, Nāgeśa does not seem to have any objection in accepting Upamā in 'Surālaya' in the verse :— "नगरान्तर्महीन्द्रस्य महेन्द्रमहितश्रियः सुरालये खलु क्षीबा देवा इव विरेजिरे" (RG. p. 242), given as an instance of Śliṣṭa-paramparitopamā. Similarly 'Kamalāvāsa' can be understood as an instance of Rūpaka in its real sense, helping another Rūpaka. It may be contended just for the sake of argument that Abheda can be accepted even in 'Surālaya' etc., which will be useful as the Sādhāraṇadharma in Devatvāropa of the Kṣības. But then it will be meaningless to call this Upamā as Paramparitā in the absence of Upamā in 'Surālaya. Therefore PR.'s arguments do not seem to be altogether purposeless.

When it is said that, in Paramparitarūpaka, one Rūpaka is the supporter of the second Rūpaka, it may be questioned : how can Āropa be effected without Sādhāraṇadharma which is said to be its basis ? PR.'s reply to this question is as follows. In "Saujanya-candrikā-candro rājā" first the 'Candrikātva' is being ascribed to Saujanya (on account of the implied Sādṛśya between them), and this will be helpful as the Sādhāraṇadharma for the Candratvāropa on the king. Thus the first Rūpaka serves as a kind of Sādhāraṇadharma for the second Rūpaka.

Now PR. introduces an important discussion as to the Samarthya-samarthaka-bhāva of the Rūpakas in 'Saujanya' candrikā-candro rājā" etc., which has ultimately got some bearing on other Samāsagata-Rūpakas also. "Saujanya-candrikā Candraḥ" is said to be an instance of Paramparita-rūpaka, because the Candrābheda of the king is considered to

have been based on the Candrikābheda of the Saujanya. But now the Pūrvapakṣin contends that 'Saujanya-candrikā' being a Karmadhārayasamāsa, Saujanya as a Viśeṣaṇa, is having connection with Candrikā, by Abhedasaṁsarga. Thus it is understood that Candrikā is having Saujanyābheda but not that Saujanya is having Candrābheda. Now how can this support the Rūpaka resulting in the Candrikābheda of the king ? Because the Candrikā of the Candra (Candra-sambandhi-candrikā) appears as having Abheda with the Saujanya of Rājan (Rājasambandhi-Saujanyābheda) and so it may lead to the Abheda of the king with Candra according to the saying "यत्सम्बन्धिनि यत्सम्बन्ध्यभेदः तस्मिन् तदभेदः". It may be argued that if Candrikā is accepted as having Saujanyābheda, it is understood that Saujanya is having the Candrābheda also. This may be correct in other Pratyakṣajñānas, where the Sāmagrī is different as 'Saujanyabhinna- candrikā', 'Candrikābhinnaṁ saujanyam' etc. Same is the case in all the instances of Samāsagata-śuddha-paramparitarūpakas. Thus 'Saujanya-candrikā' and 'Śaśipuṇḍarīkam', etc., are to be called as Saujanya-rūpaka and this reverses all the Rūpaka-siddhāntas explained previously.

PR. answers this question like this. It is generally accepted in the Rūpakasthala, that the relation (Anvaya) of a Viśeṣaṇa with the Viśeṣya is maintained through Abhedasaṁsarga. But there is no rule that this Abhedasaṁsarga should be Sva (Viśeṣaṇa) Pratiyogika only. Both the Sva-pratiyogikābheda and Svānuyogikābheda can be accepted as the Saṁsarga. Thus in places of Vākyagata-rūpaka as in 'Mukhaṁ-candraḥ' etc., the Bodha is "चन्द्रप्रतियोगिकाभेदवत् मुखम्" where Candra appears as Viśeṣaṇa and Mukha as the Viśeṣya. But in the place of Samāsaga-rūpaka as in 'Mukhacandraḥ' Bodha is "मुखानुयोगिकाभेदप्रतियोगी चन्द्रः", where Mukha appears as the Viśeṣaṇa and Candra as Viśeṣya. Thus in both these places. there may be change in the Viśeṣya-bhāva, because in the first

Bodha, Candra is Viśeṣaṇa and Mukha is Viśeṣya whereas in the second Bodha their position is reversed, Mukha being Viśeṣaṇa and Candra viśeṣya. But in both the cases Pratiyogitva rests with Candra only and thus the Upamānatva of Candra is well-maintained. But the only difference between Vākyagata-rūpaka and Samāsagata-rūpaka is that the Abheda in the former is Anuyogitvamukha because the Anuyogin (Mukha) appears as Viśeṣya; and the latter Pratiyogitva-mukha, because the Pratiyogin (Candra) appears as the Viśeṣya. Thus the Rūpaka in the former is Vidheya and in the latter it is Uddeśya. Therefore, in 'Saujanya-candrikā' etc., Saujanya appears as having Candrikābheda which maintains Candrābheda in the king. In the same way all the Doṣas that are raised by the Pūrva-pakṣin can be answered in all the Rūpakasthalas.

It is not clear whether this reply is given by PR. himself or he reproduces the opinions of some of his predecessors because he begins this answer with the words 'Atra vadanti'.

But Nāgeśa sees no need of this explanation. He gives three different views which maintain the Candrādi-rūpaka both in Vākya and Samāsa. He quotes the following view under the heading 'Anye tu'. According to this view even in Samāsagata-rūpakasthala like 'Mukhacandra', though, at first, the Mukhābheda of Candra is expressed, Candrābheda also will be understood ultimately; because if Candra is identical with Mukha, Mukha also is identical with Candra. Thus if the Candra-rūpaka in the Vyasta-vākya is considered to be Śābda (directly expressed by Śabda) in 'Mukham-candraḥ' etc., it is Ārtha (understood through the Artha) in the Samāsasthala. In fact, the so-called Mukhābheda is accepted only for the convenience of the application of the Samāsaśāstra (Pāṇini. 2-1-57) but, the same being not intended by the poet, it cannot be named as Mukha-rūpaka because Candra-rūpaka only is intended to be conveyed by him. Next Nāgeśa shows another

justification according to some other scholars. The Samāsa in 'Mukha-candraḥ', and 'Puṇḍarīka-śaśī' etc., can be taken as formed according to the rule "मयूरव्यंसकादयश्च"(2.1.72) where the Pūrva-padārtha is Pradhāna on the authority of Bhāṣyakāra. Thus the meaning will be 'Candrābhinnaṁ mukham' and 'Śaśya-bhinna-puṇḍarikam', Thus even in Samāsa, the Candrādirūpaka may be maintained as Vācya. There is another view, which, on the authority of the general definition of Rūpaka by Mammaṭa, "तद्रूपकमभेदो य उपमानोपमेययोः" believes that either the Candraniṣṭhābheda or the Candra-pratiyogikābheda can be accepted as Rūpaka. Or the definition of Rūpaka may be understood as the Uparañjana of the Upameya with the Pratiyogitā of the Upamānagatābheda. Thus even when we understand 'Mukhaṁ-candraḥ' as "Mukha-pratiyogikābhedavān-candraḥ" etc., the definition of Rūpaka is applicable because there is the Uparañjana of the Upameya (i.e., the Mukha is coloured) by the pratiyogitā with reference to the Upamānābheda. Thus by quoting many such views Nāgeśa indicates that there is no use of the explanation, as given by PR.

But one thing should be noted here. Even though Nāgeśa gives the above views for justifying the Candra-rūpaka etc., he does not try to point out any defect in PR.'s explanation, and therefore Nāgeśa can only make us think that PR.'s explanation also is one of the many, which may be optionally accepted, but need not be rejected altogether.

While Nāgeśa is satisfied by showing some more explantions, by the side of the one given by PR., Viśveśvara severely criticises PR.'s views as quite untenable. Viśveśvara mainly objects to the statement of PR. "स्वप्रतियोगिकाभेद एव विशेषणसंसर्गो न तु स्वानुयोगिकाभेद इति तु दुराग्रहः", (i.e, that there is no such rule that only the Abheda which is having Viśeṣaṇa as the Pratiyogin can be the Saṁsarga but not the Abheda having Viśeṣaṇa as Anuyogin). Viśveśvara contends that not only the

Abheda-saṁsarga but all the Saṁsargas are Viśeṣaṇa-pratiyogikas but not Viśeṣya-pratiyogikas as can be seen in "Nīlo ghaṭaḥ" etc., which produce Viśeṣaṇa (Nīla) Prakārakābheda-Saṁsargakaviśeṣya jñāna. This is the case not only in Śābda-jñānas, but in other Jñānas also. For instance, the Saṁsarga in 'Parvato-vahnimān' appears as Vahni-Pratiyogika (Viśeṣaṇa-pratiyogika) and Parvatānuyogika. Moreover, PR.'s stand is against the established Siddhānta[1] which defines Viśeṣaṇa as Saṁsarga-pratiyogin and Viśeṣya as the Anuyogin. Viśveśvara contends further that there is no need of accepting the Śābdabodha which is 'Saujanya-viśeṣyakābheda-saṁsargaka-candrikā-prakāraka, because even the Mānasika-bodha of this type is capable of supporting the Candrābheda of the king. It may be contended that only the Śābda-bodha but not Mānasa-bodha can be the Samānārthaka of Candrābheda. But Viśveśvara says that the Śābda-bodha "Saundarya-niṣṭhābheda-pratiyoginī-candrikā" has to be accepted as the Samarthaka, but we cannot have such Bodha at the first instance because the Pratiyogitva which is other than the Śabdārtha or their Saṁsarga cannot be included in the Śābda-bodha Therefore, the first Śābda-bodha will be only as Saujanyābhinna-candrikā, and the Bodha "Saujanya-niṣṭhābheda-pratiyoginī-candrikā" is, for all practical purposes, only a secondary Bodha like the Mānasika-bodha. Therefore, it is better to accept the Mānasikābheda itself as the Samarthaka of Candrābheda.

Moreover, in places of Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva, in spite of the fact that there is no direct cognition of Abheda between the different Dharmas, only the lateral Mānasika-bodha of such

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1. "यत्तु दुराग्रहमात्रमेतदिति तदेव दुराग्रहः । भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वं प्रकारत्वं भासमानवैशिष्ट्यानुयोगित्वञ्च विशेष्यत्वमिति सिद्धान्तात् ।"

Alaṅkārakaustubha, p. 224.

But this mere statement cannot be a reply to PR. who questions the validity of such Siddhānta itself.

Abheda makes the Sādhāraṇadharmas useful for maintaining the Upamālaṅkāra. Similarly, in "तं जगत्यभजन् मर्त्यः चञ्चाचन्द्रकलाधरम्" the 'चन्द्रमौलिभजनराहित्य', which cannot have Śābdānvaya with Cañcā is accepted as having connections with Cañcā through Mānasika-jñāna and thus is accepted as the Sādhāraṇadharma. When such Mānasikabodha itself can help us in understanding Candrābheda in the king, there is no point in insisting that there should be only Śābda-bodha : "अत्र तु शाब्दस्यैव सौजन्ये चन्द्रिकाभेदारोपस्य चन्द्रारोपसमर्थकत्वमिति दुराग्रहो नातीव भवतो हितहेतुः".

(Alaṅkārakaustubha, p. 227.)

Viśveśvara also feels like Nāgeśa that Candrikābheda in Saujanya can be accepted because it is Samāna-Vṛtti-vedya. (Ibid.)

In spite of all that is said above, it should be noted in fairness to PR. that he also knows that even Mānasika-bodha may, at time, be accepted for maintaining other Rūpakas. But his main attempt is to see that Candrikāropa can be maintained by direct Śābda-bodha itself without resorting to the secondary Mānasikabodha which is only an Agatikagati. As is evident from the discussion PR.'s theory does not involve any serious Śāstra-virodha and therefore can be accepted as one of the explanations along with those given by Nāgeśa and Viśveśvarapaṇḍita.

Next PR. states that the Rūpakas in the Paramparitarūpaka which support each other may involve either Anukūlatva or Pratikūlatva. He cites 'Prācīsandhyā'[1] etc., as an example

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1. प्राचीसन्ध्यासमुद्यन्महिमदिनमणेर्मानमाणिक्यकान्ति-
ज्वालामालाकराला कवलितजगतः क्रोधकालानलस्य ।
आज्ञा कान्तापदाम्भोरुहतलविगलन्मञ्जुलाक्षारसानां
क्षोणीन्दो सङ्गरे ते लसति नयनयोरुद्भटा शोणिमश्रीः ॥"

RG. p. 310

of the former and the verse 'Ānanda-mṛgadāvāgniḥ' etc.,[1] as the example of the latter. He also gives another verse as an instance of Paramparita-rūpaka involving Prātikūlya.

"कारुण्यकुसुमाकाशः शान्तिशैत्यहुताशनः ।
यशःसौरभ्यलशुनः पिशुनः केन वर्ण्यते ।।" RG. p. 316.

This kind of Rūpaka is mentioned in Alaṅkāraratnākara (p.35) and Alaṅkārasarvasva also (p. 49).

After giving one more example of Paramparita-rūpaka where a word of Viparīta-lakṣaṇā is used, PR. proceeds to discuss about the Vākyārtha-rūpaka (RG. p. 316). When there is Āropa of one Vākyārtha on the other, that is an instance of Vākyārtha-rūpaka. He explains it with the help of the following example—

"आत्मनोऽस्य तपोदानैर्निर्मलीकरणं हि यत् ।
क्षालनं भास्करस्येदं सारसैः सलिलोत्करैः ।।" (RG. p. 317)

Here the cleaning of the soul with the help of penance and charity is described as identical with the washing of the Sun with the water of a pond; and thus there is the ascription of one Vākyārtha on the other. There is also Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva between the penance and charity on the one hand and the water of the pond on the other; and there is Rūpaka implied between these things also; which acts as an Aṅga to the main Viśiṣṭa-Rūpaka.

Next he proceeds to criticise the views of AD. who, PR. says, is led away by the opinion of a sham rhetorician and thinks that in Rūpaka, there is no Bimbapratibimba-bhāva which alone is responsible for Vākyārtha-rūpaka. Here PR. talks of a well-known general rule that wherever Upamā is accepted on account of the presence of Ivādi-śabdas, there

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1. "आनन्दमृगदावाग्निः शीलशाखिमदद्विपः ।
ज्ञानदीपमहावायुः अयं खलसमागमः ।।"

RG. p. 316

is to be accepted Rūpaka when the Ivādi-śabdas are absent because there will be Āropa of the one on the other (RG. p.317). Therefore, if one is prepared to accept Upamā in "त्वयि कोपो महीपाल सुधांशाविव पावक:" on account of the use of Iva-śabda, he will have to accept Rūpaka, on omitting 'Iva', and once Rūpaka is accepted in places as the above, it goes without saying that the acceptance of Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva also in Rūpaka is inevitable. This PR. concludes by giving one more example for Vākyārtha-rūpaka.

Before PR., Śobhākaramitra deals with Vākyārtha-rūpaka in Alaṅkāraratnākara (p. 37). As he believes that the Rūpaka can be based on not only Sādṛśya but on other Sambandha also, he classifies Vākyārtha-rūpaka into a few more varieties like Śābda-vākyārtha-rūpaka, Ārtha-vākyārtha-rūpaka etc., and explains all these varieties by giving suitable examples.

Viśveśvara, after restating the views of PR. as expressed by him while criticising AD.'s definition of Rūpaka and his opinion about the existence of Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in it, advances a few arguments against accepting Vākyārtha-rūpaka and the existence of Bimba-pratibimbabhāva in rūpaka which is the basis of Vākyārtha-rūpaka. Before proceeding to examine his arguments let us see how PR. maintains the difference between the Vākyārtha-rūpaka and Nidsarśanā.

Following the views of Sarvasvakāra. AD. takes the verse :—

"त्वत्पादनखरत्नानां यदलक्तकमार्जनम् ।
इदं श्रीखण्डलेपेन पाण्डुरीकरणं विधो:" ।। (CM. p. 53)

as an instance of Nidarśanā. But on the basis of the general principle 'उपमैव तिरोभूतभेदा रूपकमुच्यते" PR. accepts Rūpaka in the above verse, because it would have become an instance of Upamā in the presence of words like 'yathā' (expressive of Upamā). He names it Vākyārtha-rūpaka because the Viśiṣṭārthas are involved in the Abheda conveyed in this Rūpaka.

The main difference between the Vākyārtha-rūpaka and the Nidarśanā is that the Abheda in the former is Śrauta (directly expressed) and it is Ārtha (indirectly conveyed) in the latter. Again, there is Uddeśya-Vidheya-bhāva with reference to the Abheda, in the Rūpaka and it is absent in Nidarśanā. Moreover, Abhedāropa is the life of Rūpaka whereas it is not the case with Nidarśanā, as is evident from some of its instances in 'इन्दुशोभां वहत्यास्यम्' etc. Thus PR. takes the above verse as an instance of Vākyārtha-rūpaka in that there is a direct expression of Abheda between one Vākyārtha and the other. He is inclined to accept Nidarśanā if the same verse is read with a slight clange as :—

"त्वत्पादनखरत्नानि यो रञ्जयति यावकैः ।
इन्दुं चन्दनलेपेन पाण्डुरीकुरुते हि सः ॥ (RG., p. 30')

Here the Abheda between the Yāvaka-rañjana and Candana-lepa is not conveyed directly, but implied through the express Abheda between the subjects of the two actions. But though the Kriyābheda is conveyed indirectly it is more important (Pradhāna) than the directly expressed Kartṛ-abheda and thus it is an instance of Nidarśanā. As explained above there is no Uddeśya-vidheya in the Abheda involved in Nidarśanā and as such it is immaterial whether the Yāvaka-rañjanābheda is taken as existing in Candanalepa or Candana-lepābheda as existing in Yāvakarañjana. But in the first reading of the above verse which contains Rūpaka, Candana-lepābheda is ascribed to the Yāvakarañjana and there is no question of Yāvaka-rañjanābheda being ascribed to Candana-lepana. Thus PR. shows two distinctly different places for Vākyārtha-rūpaka and Nidarśanā with no scope for any confusion.

First of all, Viśveśvara finds fault with the example of Vākyārtha-rūpaka given by PR. He says that as is accepted by PR. himself, there should be Upamānopameyabhāva in

every Rūpaka-sthala. But we cannot find such Upamānopameya-bhāva in the verse :—"Ātmanosya" etc. (RG. p. 317); because there is no difference between Nirmalīkaraṇa and Kṣālana and as such they cannot have Upamānopameya-bhāva. It may be argued that there is much difference between the Śauca as produced by Tapodānādi and the Śauca by water. But, Viśveśvara contends, when there is Bheda only in the Viśiṣṭas but not in the Viśeṣya the result is that the Bheda is only in the Viśeṣaṇa (AK. p. 230). Thus he feels the Abheda of these two Śaucas does not allow the Upamānopameya-bhāva between them because it (Upamānopameya-bhāva) implies Bheda also.

It is to be pointed out here, that the Viśiṣṭabheda may ultimately result in Viśeṣaṇa-bheda only, in the absence of Viśeṣya-bheda. But whatever may be the ultimate result of the analysis, it cannot be denied that the Viśiṣṭas are different from each other and so much of difference is sufficient for maintaining the Upamānopameya-bhāva. Viśveśara himself accepts such Aupādhika-bheda as the sufficient factor for Upamānopameya-bhāva when he says, in the Upamā-prakaraṇa:—"त्वं तादृशो भव इत्यत्र कालादिकृतभेदविवक्षया तदभावात्" etc. (AK. p. 14). Again, he does not seem to have any objection to accepting Upamā in "उपाददे तस्य सहस्ररश्मि:" etc., on the basis of the difference between "दुकूलविशिष्टपरमेश्वरत्व (उपमेयतावच्छेदक) and गङ्गाविशिष्टपरमेश्वरत्व (उपमानतावच्छेदक) (AK. p. 13). It is not clear why he should now object to the acceptance of Upamānopameya-bhāva in PR.'s verse.

Further Viśveśvara states that there is no scope for Rūpaka in the verse "Tvatpāda-nakha-ratnānāṁ" etc., because it will be against its intended meaning. The meaning that is intended by the poet here is that the nails being red by nature, there is no use of applying lac to them. This sense cannot be conveyed by taking it as an instance of Rūpaka and by accepting the Bodha implying Abheda as "मलक्तककरण कत्वन्नखकर्मक-

मार्जनं चन्दनकरणकचन्द्रकर्मकपाण्डुरीकरणाभिन्नम्" etc. Moreover, Mārjana, as it is intended to be the object of negation, cannot be accepted as Upameya. Thus the absence of Yāvaka in Nakhaśobhā by Janyatā-sambandha and the absence of Candana-lepa in Candra-Pāṇḍuratva by the same sambandha, are the two things which are intended to be conveyed here, but not an Abheda. Therefore, Viśveśvara takes it as an example of Nidarśanā only. In this connection he states that the Upamāna-vākyārtha, the Abheda-pratiyogin in the Nidarśanā, is invariably an improbable thing (Aprasiddhārtha) as in "यद्दातुः सौम्यता सेयं पूर्णेन्दोरकलङ्कता".

In spite of all that is said, we do not find any reason why Rūpaka cannot be accepted in the above verse. Even if the Yāvaka-vaiyarthya is accepted as the intended meaning, why it cannot be understood after the Rūpakālaṅkārīyābheda-bodha? There is no rule that it can be understood only through the Nidarśanālaṅkārīyābheda-bodha, because it is accepted by Viśveśvara himself, in a different place though impliedly, that the principle that "the Upamānavākyārtha of Nidarśanā is invariably Aprasiddha, cannot hold good in all cases : 'ननु नायं नियमः (निदर्शनायाम् अभेदप्रतियोगिनः वाक्यार्थस्य अप्रसिद्धत्वनियमः)......इत्यादौ तदभावादिति चेत्, किं ततः ? नह्यभेदारोप-मात्रेण रूपकालङ्कारत्वं निर्वहतीत्युक्तत्वात्". AK. p. 232.

The next argument of Viśveśvara is directed against the modified reading of the verse "Tvatpāda-nakha-ratnāni" etc. He says that Rūpaka should be accepted in this place because there is Abhedāropa between the subjects (Kartṛ). But this is a point of little consequence; for PR. never denied Rūpaka between the two subjects. What he wanted to convey is that of the two figures, Rūpaka and Nidarśanā, implied by Artha, Nidarśanā appears to be more important as can be judged by the purport of the whole verse.

After advancing one or two more arguments of very little importance, Viśveśvara finds fault with the statement of PR. that the Upamānābheda in the Upameya is an important factor in Rūpaka whereas Nidarśanā consists of Abheda-sāmānya, whether it is Upameya-niṣṭhopamānābheda or Upamāna-niṣṭhopameyābheda. If this were to be the case, Viśveśvara contends, you cannot accept Rūpaka between the things having Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in the Viśiṣṭarūpaka because their Abheda being Ārtha, it can be either Upamāna-pratiyogin or Upamānānuyogin. The same is the case in Samāsagata-rūpaka where according to Viśveśvara the Śabda is only Upamānānuyogika (AK. p. 235).

Both objections can be ruled out by PR; because in the former case even if it is an Ārthāropa he would accept according to his own theory, the Upamānapratiyogikābheda only and, he had explained in the Samāsagata-rūpaka also, how it can be taken as Upamānapratiyogikābheda. Thus we do not find much of weight in the arguments of Viśveśvara.

Next PR. proceeds to examine the Śābda-bodha in the Rūpakasthala. First, he gives the views of the Prācīnas. According to them the Upamānavācaka-pada conveys by Sāropa-lakṣaṇā the Upamānagata-guṇavat and the same will have Anvaya with the Viṣaya by Abhedasaṁsarga. Thus in 'Mukhaṁ candraḥ', 'Candraḥ' conveys 'Candragata-guṇavat', which has Anvaya with 'Mukha' by Abheda-sambandha and the resultant Śābda-bodha will be "Candravṛtti-guṇavadabhinnaṁ-mukham." It may be argued, what then, is the difference between 'Mukhaṁ candraḥ' and 'Candra-sadṛśaṁ-mukham', an Upamā-sthala, for, the resultant Bodha in both the places is the same though there is Vṛtti-bheda; Lakṣaṇā in the first case, and Abhidhā in the second one ? But the Prācīnas maintain that the difference between them consists in the Abheda-bodha resulting from Vyañjanā in the Lakṣaṇā-sthala because of the general rule that all the Lakṣaṇās excepting the Nirūḍha-

lakṣaṇā have Prayojana, and the Abheda-bodha is the Prayojana here. And this Abheda-bodha being the result of Vyañjanā, it cannot be obstructed by Bādha-buddhi because Vyañjanā-jñāna-janyatva is included in the Bādha-buddhi-pratibadhyatvāvacchedaka-dala. This is the theory of the Prācīnas.

Next, PR. mentions the views of the Navyas. The Navyas do not find any need of accepting Lakṣaṇā in the Rūpaka-sthaḷa. The Śābda-bodha from 'Mukhaṁ candraḥ' is "Candrābhinnaṁ-mukham", according to the general rule 'नामार्थयोरभेदेनान्वयः'. This Abheda itself is considered to be the Prayojana by the Prācīnas. If it can be brought about by Abhidhā itself, where is the necessity for accepting Lakṣaṇā ? the Navīnas contend. 'Mukhacandra' is called Upamita-samāsa when the Samāsa is effected according to the sūtra, "उपमितं व्याघ्रादिभिः सामान्याप्रयोगे" (2.1.56), taking it as an instance of Upamālaṅkāraprakaraṇa effected by "विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम्" (2.1.57) when it is the place of Rūpakālaṅkāra. Lakṣaṇā is accepted in the Upamitasamāsa as explained in the Upamālaṅkāraprakaraṇa. If Lakṣaṇā is to be accepted in the Rūpaka-sthala also, it is contended by he Navyas, there will be no basis to consider one as Upamā and the other as Rūpaka. Moreover, in places like "मुखं न चन्द्रसदृशं अपि तु चन्द्र एव" etc., where there is a mixture of the Sādṛśya and its negation, it will not be possible to have the cognition of Sādṛśya because it is expressly negated. This defect can be avoided by the Navyas because it amounts to say that "मुखं न चन्द्रसदृशं अपि तु चन्द्राभिन्नम्". Similar incongruity can be found in "देवदत्तमुखं चन्द्र एव, यज्ञदत्तमुखं तु न चन्द्रः, अपि तु चन्द्रसदृशम्" etc., because the Nāmārtha will have Anvaya with the "Candra-sadṛśa" conveyed by Lakṣaṇā according to the prācīnas by the word Candra and thus the Bodha would be "यज्ञदत्तमुखं न चन्द्रसदृशम्; अपि तु चन्द्रसदृशम्"

etc. It is not correct to contend that Nāmārtha can have Anvaya with the Abheda which is Prayojana of the Lakṣaṇā because, where is the Abheda-jñāna at the time of this Śābdabodha preceding such Prayojanajñāna. Therefore, the Navīnas contend, Abhedajñāna is brought about by Abhidhā only without any need for Lakṣaṇā.

It may be argued that how can such Abheda-jñāna be brought about when there is the Bādha-jñāna ? But, it can be effected because it is considered to be Āhārya-jñāna and it can not be obstructed by 'Bādha-jñāna'. If it is contended that only a Pratyakṣa-jñāna can be Āhārya but not the Śābda-jñāna, then Śābdānyatva also can safely be in the Bādha-niścaya-pratibadhyatāvacchedaka-koṭi. In other words, Bādha-niścaya cannot obstruct Śābda-jñāna. It may be contended that this is against the common experience that there is no Śābda-bodha in the presence of the Bādha-niścaya. But PR. says that there is nothing wrong in having Śābda-jñāna even where there is 'Bādha-niścaya', but the only thing is, the Śābda-jñāna may not lead to the Tadvattā-jñāna. Even this is the result not of Bādha-niścaya but of the absence of Yogyatā which is thus defined : "पदार्थे तत्र तद्वत्ता योग्यता परिकीर्तिता" (Muktāvalī. p. 420). At times, the Āhārya-yogyatā-jñāna can produce such Tadvattā-jñāna, even in the presence of Bādha-niścaya. Thus there is nothing wrong in accepting Abheda-bodha in Rūpaka-sthala by Abhidhā itself.

Here Nāgeśa finds no need of accepting Yogyatā-jñāna as the Hetu of the Śābda-bodha. He contends that the Bādha-niścaya cannot prevent Śābda-bodha, but it can prevent only the Pravṛtti of the hearer. That is why a man on hearing such statements as "वह्निना सिञ्चति" etc., laughs at the speaker, because he had the Śābda-bodha from the above sentence. It cannot be said that he laughs at him even without having the Śābda-bodha; because we cannot expect the same reaction

fro m a person of West India on hearing such words uttered in Tamil. Thus Nāgeśa feels that Bādha-niścaya can prevent not the Śābda-bodha but only the Pravṛtti from it, and that there is no need of introducing the Yogyatā-jñāna etc., for this purpose (GMP., p. 320).

PR. advances another argument against the views of the Prācīnas. It is not correct to say that the Sādṛśya-jñāna results in the Abheda-jñāna because two things need not necessarily be identical with each other only because they are having some common qualities. For example, the Ghaṭa and Paṭa, having Dravyatva in common, are quite different from each other having the two distinct features, viz., Ghaṭatva and Paṭatva. But Abheda-jñāna can result in Sādṛśya-jñāna, i.e., Samānadharmatva-jñāna as in the case of "Gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣaḥ" etc., where the Pravāha-bheda-jñāna brings about the cognition of the Śaitya and Pāvanatva etc., as existing in Ghoṣa. Thus PR. is in favour of accepting the views of the Navīnas in preference to those of the Prācīnas.

Now PR. examines Śābda-bodha-prakāra in places where the Sādhāraṇa-dharma is mentioned separately in instrumental cases as in "गाम्भीर्येण समुद्रोऽयं सौन्दर्येण च मन्मथ:", etc. There is not much inconvenience in finding the Anvaya of the Tṛtiyānta-pāda according to the theory of the Śābda-bodha of the Prācīnas. Prayojyatā or Abheda will be taken as the Tṛtīyārtha which will have Anvaya with Sādṛśya, the Ekadeśa of the Lakṣyamāṇārtha. Thus the resultant Śābda-bodha will be 'गाम्भीर्यप्रयोज्यसमुद्रसादृश्यवदभिन्नोऽयम्' or 'गाम्भीर्याभिन्नसमुद्रवृत्तिधर्मवदभिन्नोऽयम्'.

Even according to the Navyas who accept Abhedānvaya between the Upameyavācaka and Upamāna-vācaka without Lakṣaṇā, the Tṛtīyārtha in the above sentences is Prayojyatā only and thus the Śābda-bodha is "गाम्भीर्यप्रयोज्यसमुद्राभिन्न": and "सौन्दर्यप्रयोज्यमन्मथाभिन्न:" etc. But how the Samudra and

Manmatha are the Prayojyas of gāmbhīrya and saundarya is explained by PR. like this. The Mukha and Candra etc., are the mere mental creations of the poet and so all the things that are to be found in a Kāvya are only the result of Antaḥkaraṇa-pariṇāma. Therefore, their existence depends upon the existence of the Sādhāraṇa-dharmas etc., because the creation of the former is effected only on seeing the latter. Thus, they can be called as the Gāmbhīryādi-sādhāraṇa-dharma-prayojyas. PR. tries to give another explanation. As in the case of 'Vahnimān-dhūmāt' etc., where the Pañcamī is taken to mean "ज्ञानजन्यज्ञानप्रकारत्व", so also the Tṛtīyā in the present context conveys the same meaning (ज्ञानजन्यज्ञानप्रकारत्व). The Śābda-bodha in Vahnimān-dhūmāt etc., is "धूमज्ञानजन्यप्रकारवह्निमद-भिन्नः पर्वतः". Similarly the Śābda-bodha in "गाम्भीर्येण समुद्रः" etc., will be "गाम्भीर्यज्ञानजन्यज्ञानप्रकारसमुद्राभिन्नः अयम्" and "सौन्दर्यज्ञानजन्यज्ञानप्रकारकमन्मथाभिन्नोऽयं" etc.

Next PR. explains with the help of examples that the Abheda involved in Rūpaka is cognised as Saṁsarga in some places where there is Sāmānādhikaraṇya between the Viṣaya and Viṣayin as in Mukhaṁ-candraḥ etc. It is cognised as Viśeṣya in others.

He also explains that the Sādhāraṇa-Dharma in Rūpaka can also be Anugāmin, Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna, Upacarita or Kevala-śabda-rūpa as in the case of Upamālaṅkāra. At times it can also be implied. After explaining all these varieties with the help of suitable examples, he mentions a new variety of Rūpaka which he calls 'Hetu-rūpaka'. It is so named because the 'Kevala-śabdātmaka-Sādhāraṇa-dharma' is mentioned as the reason for the Āropa involved in the Rūpaka. The following verse is given by way of example :—"पञ्चशाखः प्रभो यस्ते शाखा सुरतरोरसौ। अन्यथानेन पूर्यन्ते कथं सर्वमनोरथाः ॥"

RG. p. 325) where the Sarva-manoratha-pūraṇa is given as the reason for the 'Surataru-śākhātvāropa'.

PR. next deals with the Rūpaka-dhvani and explains it with the help of a few illustrations. After concluding the discussion about varieties of Rūpaka he criticises Ānandavardhana who accepts Rūpaka in the folllwing verse :—

"प्राप्तश्रीरेष कस्मात् पुनरपि मयि तं मन्थखेदं विदध्या-
न्निद्रामप्यस्य पूर्वामनलसमनसो नैव सम्भावयामि ।
सेतुं बध्नाति भूयः किमिति च सकलद्वीपनाथानुयातः
त्वय्यायाते विकल्पानिति दधत इवाभाति कम्पः पयोधेः ॥"

(Dhvanyāloka. pp. 261-2)

Ānandavardhana takes it as an instance of Rūpaka-dhvani because the Viṣṇu-tādātmya of the king is suggested through the three actions, described here as are thought of by Samudra. But PR. is in favour of accepting Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra-Dhvani in this verse on the following ground. There is Kampa in the Samudra. This Kampa is described here as the result of Samudra's taking the king as identical with Viṣṇu. Āhārya-Tādātmya-jñāna is involved in Rūpaka whereas Anāhārya-tādātmya-jñāna is involved in Bhrāntimad. Now the question is whether the Viṣṇu-tādātmya-jñāna is Āhārya or Anāhārya. If it were to be Āhārya it cannot produce Kampa because the intentional cognition of a serpent on a rope does not produce fear and trembling etc. Here it is described as producing Kampa in Samudra. Therefore, this Tādātmya-jñāna can be accepted only as Abheda-jñāna a source of Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra. So far as the poet is concerned it may be Āhārya-jñānạ, but it cannot be the case with Samudra because it produces Kampa in him. Here Kampana-jnāna is intended to be the Pradhāna-vākyārtha because this alone maintains the greatness of the king which is the main

topic dealt with by the poet. Therefore, PR. contends rightly that this verse should be taken as an instance of Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra but not of Rūpaka-dhvani.

PR. concludes this section dealing with Rūpaka after referring to some Doṣas like Kavi-samaya-virodha, possible in Rūpaka.

Pariṇāmālaṅkāra

Mammaṭa does not mention Pariṇamā as a separate figure. Pariṇāma is defined by Ruyyaka as "आरोप्यमाणस्य प्रकृतोपयोगित्वे परिणामः (AS; p. 51) "Pariṇāma arises when the thing that is being ascribed is useful in (a particular) present context" He explains it further "आरोप्यमाणं रूपके प्रकृतोपयोगित्वाभावात् प्रकृतोपरञ्जकत्वे नैव केवलेनान्वयं भजते । परिणामे तु प्रकृतात्मतया आरोप्यमाणस्योपयोग इति प्रकृतमारोप्यमाणरूपेण परिणमति."

(AS; p. 52)

Here, Ruyyaka tries to differentiate Pariṇāma from Rūpaka, in that the Āropyamāṇa in the latter is useful for the Prakṛta, whereas, it is not the case with the former, where the Upameya is simply coloured by the superimposed object.

As is rightly pointed out by P. V. Kane (SD., p. 126) Rūyyaka appears to be confused as to the exact nature of Pariṇāma. First, he says "परिणामे तु प्रकृतात्मतया आरोप्यमाणस्योपयोगः" which indicates that the Āropyamāṇa appears more in the from of Āropaviṣaya. 'Prakṛtātmatayā' is explained by Jayaratha as 'Prakṛtāṅgatayā'(Vimarśinī. p. 51). Again Ruyyaka remarks "प्रकृतम् आरोप्यमाणरूपत्वेन परिणमति" which indicates

importance of the Āropyamāṇa[1]. Even Jayaratha does not make the position clear but simply says that the important principle, involved in Pariṇāma as against the other figures like Rūpaka, is the Prakṛtopayogitva. (Vimarśinī. p. 51). But this confusion is removed to some extent by Ruyyaka by explaining the significance of Pariṇāma on the analogy of Samāsokti, where the Āropyamāṇa is described as Prakṛtopayogin by being Āropa-viṣayātman (AS. p. 52).

Viśvanātha defines Pariṇāma in the follwoing verse :—

"विषयात्मतयारोप्य प्रकृतार्थोपयोगिनि ।
परिणामो भवेत्तुल्यातुल्याधिकरणो यतः ॥ (SD.p. 25)

He further adds :—"आरोप्यमाणस्यारोपविषयात्मतया परिणामात् परिणामः". Thus he lays emphasis on the Āropyāmāṇa being Āropaviṣayātmaka.

Vidyānātha[2] appears to be the first Ālaṅkārika to give a much more definite shape to Pariṇāma to be followed by writers like AD. and PR.

Śobhākaramitra understands Pariṇāma as consisting of Upameya[2] assuming the form of Upamāna for being useful in a work of present context (A. Ratnākara. p. 39). He finds fault with the analogy of Samāsokti, introduced by Ruyyaka, because he contends that, Samasokti-sthala, then, shall have to be an instance of Pariṇāma when the Viṣayin also is mentioned,

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1. Vidyādhara takes clue from this latter statement of Ruyyaka and defines Pariṇāma accordingly. "तं परिणामं द्विविधं कथयन्त्यारोप्यमाणरूपतया । परिणमति यद् विषयः प्रस्तुतकार्योपयोगाय ।" —Ekāvalī, p. 220.

2. "आरोप्यमाणमारोपविषयात्मतया स्थितम् ।
प्रकृतस्योपयोगित्वे परिणाम उदाहृतः ॥" Pratāparudrīyam.

whereas, actually it should be considered as Rūpaka in such cases (A. Ratnākara. p. 40).

Thus we find two different views as to the nature of Pariṇāma, one view taking viṣaya as being prakṛtārhopayogin by becoming Upamānarūpa and the other view taking Upamāna as Prakṛtārthopayogin only through assuming Upameya-tādātmya. This second view is favoured by AD. and PR. and needless to say that the theory as explained by PR. is, as is usual with him, more clear with no scope for doubt and this clarity can be seen in AD.'s exposition also. But only Ruyyaka, as seen above, leaves us in a bit of confusion.

PR.'s definition of Pariṇāma is as follows :—विषयी यत्र विषयात्मतयैव प्रकृतोपयोगी न स्वातन्त्र्येण सः परिणामः" (RG. p. 329). "Pariṇāma arises when the Viṣayin (Upamāna) is useful in fulfilling the work of the present context by assuming Tādātmya with the Viṣaya (Upameya) but not independently."

Nāgeśa has the following remarks to make in this context. He says that Rūpaka and Parināma can be distinguished from each other by defining the former as Upamāna-pratiyogi-kābheda. Thus, he feels the word 'Prakṛta-kāryopayogin' is superfluous, and is only being included to convey the meaning Upameya-pratiyogikābheda (GMP. p. 329).

One thing is to be noted here. The word 'Prkṛtopayogi' may suggest that the Abheda involved in Pariṇāma is Upameya-pratiyogika; but mere mention of the word Upameya-pratiyo-gikābheda cannot suggest that there is Prakṛtopayogitva which, as explained above by Vimarśinīkāra, is the important principle in Pariṇāma. Because as explained by Nāgeśa himself in the same context (in the case of Rūpaka),[1] the Upameya-pratiyogi-kābheda can be Udāsīna without being Prakṛta-kāryopayogin. Thus in the absence of Samāna-vyāpti between the Upameya-

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1. "एवञ्च यत्रोपमानस्य स्वात्मनैव प्रकृतकार्योपयोगः यत्र चोदासीनता तत्र रूपकमेव।" GMP. pp. 329-30.

pratiyogikābhedatva and prakṛta-kāryopayogitva, it may not be correct to say that the use of the word 'Prakṛta-kāryopayogin' is superfluous.

Next, PR. explains the figure with the help of suitable examples. The following verse is given as an example of Samānādhikaraṇa-pariṇāmālaṅkāra, contained in a Vākya :—

"अपारे संसारे विषमविषयारण्यसरणौ
मम भ्रामं भ्रामं विगलितविरामं जडमतेः ।
परिश्रान्तस्यायं तरणितनयातीरनिलयः
समन्तात् सन्तापं हरिनवतमालस्तिरयतु" ।। (RG. p. 330)

Here the 'Hari-nava-tamāla' is capable of removing the Tāpa caused by Saṁsāra, more on account of the Tamāla's being identical with Hari who alone can alleviate all the troubles. Therefore, it is an instance of Pariṇāma. The following verse is again given as an instance of Samāsa-gata-pariṇāma :—

"महर्षेर्व्यासपुत्रस्य श्रावंश्रावं वचःसुधाम् ।
अभिमन्युसुतो राजा परां मुदमवाप्तवान् ।।" (RG. p. 330)

In this verse Sudhā can have proper Anvaya with 'Śravaṇa', only by having Tādātmya with Vacas.

अहीनचन्द्रा लसताननेन ज्योत्स्नावती चापि शुचिस्मितेन ।
एषा हि योषा सितपक्षदोषा तोषाय केषां न महीतले स्यात् ।।"
(RG. p. 330)

is given as an instance of Vyadhikaraṇa-pariṇāma. This verse contains three Pariṇāmas, the first two being the Aṅgas of the third and so this is also called Sāvayava-pariṇāma. The first two are Vyadhikaraṇa-pariṇāmas and the last Samānādhikaraṇa.

After explaining the Pariṇāma thus, with suitable examples, PR. takes up the examples given in Citramīmāṁsā, for criticism. He explains how the two verses "Tārānāyaka-

śekharāya"[1] etc., and "Dvirbhāvaḥ puṣpa-ketoḥ"[2] etc., cannot be taken as the example of Pariṇāma because they are of Rūpaka only.

As Nāgeśa rightly points out, these verses are given by Dīkṣita only as the examples of Vyadhikaraṇarūpaka, after discussing about the Vyadhikaraṇa-pariṇāma, under sentence "इदं वैयधिकरण्यं रूपकेऽपि दृश्यते" (CM. p. 67). Thus, all that is written here by PR. is baseless.

PR. might have read the passage without noticing the above sentence. It is also possible that after seeing this criticism by PR. some of the admirers of Dīkṣita might have added the above sentence at the beginning of these two verses. This doubt is all the more intensified, because Nāgeśa tries, in opposition to the viwes of PR., to prove the existence of Pariṇāma in the first śloka and says that because of the same reason the second verse also is given as the correct example of Vyadhikaraṇa-rūpaka. If Nāgeśa is satisfied that the first verse can serve as an example of Pariṇāma, it may not be incorrect to think that Dīkṣita has taken the second verse also as an instance of Pariṇāma. Because the determination of an Alaṅkāra in some verses, after all, depends more on the interpretation than on

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1. "तारानायकशेखराय जगदाधाराय धाराधर-
च्छायाधारककन्धराय गिरिजासङ्गैकशृङ्गारिणे ।
नद्या शेखरिणे दृशा तिलकिने नारायणेनास्त्रिणे
नागैः कङ्कणिने नगेन गृहिणे नाथाय सेयं नतिः ॥"
Citramīmāṁasā, p. 67.

2. "द्विर्भावः पुष्पकेतोर्विबुधविटपिनां पौनरुक्त्यं विकल्प-
श्चिन्तारत्नस्य वीप्सा तपनतनुभुवो वासवस्य द्विरुक्तिः ।
द्वैतं देवस्य दैत्याधिपमथनकलाकेलिकारस्य कुर्वन्
आनन्दं कोविदानां जगति विजयते श्रीनृसिंहक्षितीन्द्रः ॥"
Ibid. p. 67.

the principle. Otherwise we cannot expect such a careful observer as PR. to miss the line shown above.

Next PR. criticises the example given by Ruyyaka. First, he questions what is meant by 'Prakṛtopayoga' in Ruyyaka's definition. He shows two alternatives, 'Prakṛtakāryopayoga' and 'prakṛta-viṣayātmatayā upayoga'. After dismissing the first alternative, he is prepared to accept the second one, but he finds fault with the example of Vyadhikarṇapariṇāma :—

"अथ पक्त्रिमतामुपेयिवद्भिः सरसैर्वक्त्रपथार्पितैर्वचोभिः ।
क्षितिभर्तुरुपायनं चकार प्रथमं तत्परतस्तुरङ्गमाद्यैः ॥"

Here there is Upāyanatvāropa on Vacas. Now PR. says that the Viṣayin (Upamāna) is more useful in the context of a king than the Viṣaya (vacas); therefore in the absence of the Prakṛta-viṣayātmatayā upayoga, it cannot be taken as as instance of Pariṇāma.

Nāgeśa's attempt to justify Ruyyaka's example appears without strong basis. He appears to have mistaken that there is Upāyanatvāropa on Turaṅgamādi also. What is meant by the poet in the above verse is that they first offered the king the present of good words and then the presents consisting of horses etc. The Turaṅgamādi itself being a present (Upāyana), there is no question of Upāyanatvāropa on them. In fact, Sarvasvakāra does not have the clear conception of the nature of Pariṇāma as is shown above and this confusion can be seen in the examples selected by him and their explanations.

PR. next talks of the views of 'Kecit', who do not accept Pariṇāma as a separate Alaṅkāra. According to them this is a variety of Rūpaka which may be divided into two varieties Aropyamāṇa-pariṇāma and Viṣaya-pariṇāma according to the Prakṛtopayogitā of the Viṣayin and Viṣaya respectively. This theory is based on Mammaṭa's definition of Rūpaka which is given in most general terms "तद्रूपकमभेदो य उपमानोपमेययोः".

This may be intreperted as "विषयितावच्छेदकपुरस्कारेण निश्चीयमान-विषयत्वं or "विषयतावच्छेदकपुरस्कारेण निश्चीयमानविषयित्वम्" of which the first is taken as the definition of Rūpaka and the second as that of Pariṇāma by others. It is not known who is the first exponent of this theory, but whoever it may be, he might have had the clue for this theory from the silence of Mammaṭa about Pariṇāma.

It is evident that this theory is not acceptable to PR. who is in favour of accepting Pariṇāma as an independent Alaṅkāra. As Nāgeśa points out,[1] the use of words like 'Kecit' and 'Vadanti' etc., indicates his dislike for this theory.

It is interesting to note that the same Nāgeśa who appears not to be having any objection to accept Pariṇāma as an independent Alaṅkāra, refutes it in the Uddyota[2] on very slender ground that there is no charm in accepting Vadana-tādātmya in the moon.

Viśveśvara does not accept Pariṇāma as a separate alaṅkāra. He quotes with approval the views quoted by PR. as shown above, under the heading Kecit. He also shows[3] the objection as given by Nāgeśa in Uddyota, for accepting this figure. It is not clear who is quoting whose views or whether both of them have adopted the views of a third person.

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1. "केचिद्वदन्तीभ्यामरुचिः सूचिता । चमत्कृतिनिदानत्वेनालङ्कारभेद इति सिद्धान्तनात् अन्यत्रेवात्रापि भेद एवोचितः ।"

GMP. p. 334.

2. "यत्तु आरोप्यमाणो यत्र विषयात्मतयैव प्रकृतकार्योपयोगी न स्वात-न्त्र्येण स परिणाम......इति दाक्षिणात्याः (Perhaps a reference to Dīkṣita and Panditarāja) तन्न, इन्दौ वदनतादात्म्यप्रतीतेः वर्णनीयमुखाद्यनुत्कर्षकत्वेनालङ्कारत्वाभावादिति दिक् ।"

Uddyota (KP.) p. 465.

3. "चन्द्रादौ मुखादितादात्म्यापत्त्या वर्णनीयमुखादेरनुत्कर्षेण परिणा-मस्यालङ्कारत्वासम्भवात् ।।" AK. p. 162.

The main objection as raised by AD., accepting Upamita-samāsa in 'Dṛgabjena' in "प्रसन्नेन दृगब्जेन वीक्षते हरिणेक्षणा'" is the mention of the Sādhāraṇa-dharma, i.e., 'Prasannatva' because, according to "उपमितं व्याघ्रादिभिः सामान्याप्रयोगे" (Aṣṭādhyāyī, 2.1.56) 'Upamita-samāsa' can be had only when the Sādhāraṇadharma is not mentioned. Therefore he explains it as an instance of Pariṇāma (CM. p. 65). But Viśveśvara quotes 'Nyāyapañcānanādayaḥ' as accepting Upamita-samāsa even in this place. They contend, that Prasannatva is not at all intended as the Sādhāraṇa-dharma. Only Ramaṇīyatva is the Sādhāraṇa-dharma here which is not mentioned and so the above Sūtra can be applied here also as in the case of "भाष्याब्धिः क्वातिगम्भीरः" (Kaiyaṭa. MBP. p. 1). Thus there is no need of accepting Pariṇāma here. Similarly, Viśveśvara tries to explain away in a different way, all the three examples of Pariṇāma given by PR. The first and second "Maharṣer-Vyāsaśiṣyasya" and 'Apāre saṁsāre' etc., he takes as the instances of Upamā because there is nothing wrong in accepting Upamitasamāsa in "Vacaḥsudhām" and "Harinavatamālaḥ" in the absence of Samānadharma. Again in the third verse 'Ahīnacandrā' etc., he accepts Rūpakālaṅkāra by understanding "Sitapakṣa-doṣā-yoṣā" as "Śukla-pakṣa-rātryabhinnā yoṣā" (AK. p. 163).

Next PR. attempts to find out the Śābda-bodha-prakāra in some places of Parīṇāmālaṅkāra almost on the same lines followed in Rūpakālaṅkāra.

Before proceeding to give his own example for Pariṇāmadhvani, PR. criticises the criticism by AD. of the example given by Vidyādhara :—

"नरसिंह धरानाथ के वयं तव वर्णने ।
अपि राजानमाक्रम्य यशो यस्य विजृम्भते ॥" (Ekāvalī, p. 110)

Here there is the Superimposition of the suggested king on the

Moon expressed by the word 'Rājānam'. Here AD. objects to call it as Pariṇāmadhvani because, as he contends, the Viṣayin, i.e., the king himself is having connection with the Ākramaṇa-kriyā without the need of Tādātmya with the Viṣaya, i.e., the Moon. But according to PR., Vijṛmbhaṇa means the attainment of unrivalled supremacy on account of brightness etc., therefore the Viṣayin can have connection with the Kriyā only through the Moon, and so this can be accepted as Pariṇāma-dhvani. Thus while AD. indicates the possibility of Rūpaka-dhvani, PR. accepts it as an instance of Pariṇāma-dhvani.

But Nāgeśa takes a different view. Both the words 'Rājan and 'Jṛmbhate' are Anekārthas. Therefore in the absence of Śakti-saṅkoca, we can accept Śleṣa as in the case of "Sarvado mādhavaḥ pātu" etc., and thus there is no question of the Dhvani of the Nṛparūpārtha or Pariṇāma. This argument is equally against the views of both AD. and PR. Therefore he tries to support the views of AD. by advancing the following argument. He says :—Even if Āropa is to be accepted there is no rule that candra is the Viṣaya and the Nṛpa is Viṣayin. Thus if Candra is taken as the Viṣayin it will not be possible to accept it as pariṇāma-dhvani.

Here Nāgeśa does not seem to be quite correct. Because in the context of the description of spreading of the fame (Yaśas) which is generally compared with the moon-light the word 'Rājan' should naturally mean the Moon only at the first instance and thus make it the Viṣaya.

Viśveśvara also finds no possibility of Dhvani in the above verse. He contends that the word 'Rājan' being an Ubhayārthaka-śabda, there will be accepted Abhedānvaya between the king and the Moon as in 'Vidvanmānasa' etc.. and so there is no question of Dhvani. Thus, he says, the dispute between Citramīmāṁsā and Rasagaṅgādhara, as to its correctness, is baseless (AK. p. 163-64). On the same ground

he refutes (p. 164) the example of Pariṇāmadhvani given by PR. also.[1]

PR. criticises the example of Pariṇāma-dhvani given by AD.

"चिराद्विषहसे तापं चित्त चिन्तां परित्यज ।
नन्वस्ति शीतलः शौरेः पादाब्जनखचन्द्रमाः" ॥ (CM. p. 61).

Here, PR. says, Pariṇāma consists of two factors, one is Prakṛtkāryopayogitva; the other is Viṣaya-Tādrūpya. Now in the above verse Prkṛtārthopayogitā might have been suggested. But it cannot be considered as an instance of Pariṇāma-dhvani because the second factor, i. e., Viṣaya-tādrūpya is not being suggested but expressed.

Even here Viśveśvara criticises PR. He says (AK. p. 164) that there is nothing wrong in accepting the Alaṅkāra as Vyaṅgya even when one part of it happens to be Vācya "एकदेशस्य वाच्यत्वेप्यलङ्कारस्य व्यङ्ग्यत्वानपायात्" (AK. p. 166). For this he cites some commentators of Mammaṭa like Caṇḍīdāsa as the authority who are in favour of accepting Vyatireka-dhvani in the verse[2] "Dhanyāsi" etc., though one part of it is not Vyaṅgya.

PR. concludes his treatment of Pariṇāmālaṅkāra after giving two of his own examples of Pariṇāma-dhvani, one Artha-śakti-mūla, and the other Śabda-śakti-mūla and after making an Atideśa of all the Doṣas of Rūpakas into this figure also.

Sasandehālaṇkāra

Vāmana, Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha call this figure 'Sandeha'. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Mammaṭa

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1. "पान्थ मन्दमते किं वा सन्तापमनुविन्दसि ।
पयोधरं समाशास्स्व येन शान्तिमवाप्नुयाः ॥" RG. p. 339.

2. 'धन्यासि या कथयसि प्रियसङ्गमेपि विश्रब्धचाटुशतकानि रतान्तरेषु ।
नीवीं प्रति प्रणिहिते तु करे प्रियेण सख्यः शपामि यदि किञ्चिदपि स्मरामि ॥"
KP. p. 141.

call it 'Sasandeha'. PR. follows the latter group. Mammaṭa's definition of Sandeha, like many of his definitions, is very brief: ससन्देहस्तु भेदोक्तौ तदनुक्तौ च संशयः." Bheda is explained as Vaidharmya by Pradīpa. (KP. p. 461)

According to Ruyyaka, (विषयस्य सन्दिह्यमानत्वे सन्देहः। तेन प्रकृताप्रकृतगतत्वेन कविप्रतिभोत्थापिते सन्देहे सन्देहालङ्कारः), the doubt raised by the fancy of the poet in relation to the Viṣaya and the Viṣayin; gives rise to the figure "Sandeha". It is classified into three varieties Śuddha, Niścayagarbha, and Niścayānta (AS. p. 53). Sandeha also is based on Sādṛśya. Therefore, Jayaratha explains that Samānadharma can be Anugāmin, Vastu-prativastu-bhāvāpanna or Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna (Vimarśinī. p. 54). Both Sāmānādhikaraṇya and Vaiyadhikaraṇya between the Viṣaya and Viṣayin are possible, in Sandehālaṅkāra also.

Śobhākara appears to be the only important writer who believes that Sandeha and Bhrāntimat need not be based on Sādṛśya alone. (A. Ratnākara. p. 45).

PR.'s definition of this figure is based on the definitions of old writers like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka. He defines it in clear terms as (सादृश्यमूला भासमानविरोधका समबला नानाकोटचवगाहिनी धी रमणीया ससन्देहालङ्कृतिः) "beautiful cognition comprising of many alternatives of equal strength, based on similarity and with a mixture of incongruity" (RG. p. 340). After explaining the purpose of the different Padas in the definition, he gives another definition[1], because, perhaps, he is not satisfied with the phrase 'Bhāsamāna-virodha', in the first definition. Like Sarvasvakāra he also classifies this figure into three groups, Śuddha, Niścayagarbha and Niścayānta and explains all varieties with suitable examples.

1. "सादृश्यहेतुका निश्चयसम्भावनान्यतरभिन्ना धी रमणीया संशयालङ्कृतिः।" RG. p. 341.

On the basis of the statement" केचित्त्वध्यवसानाश्रयत्वेन सन्देहप्रकारमाहुः" of Sarvasva, Jayaratha maintains (Vimarśinī. p. 53) that the Sandeha can be based on Adhyavasāna also. This point he explains with the help of a few examples where the Svarūpa, Hetu, and Phala are described as the object of Saṁśaya. One of the examples is as follows –

"एतत्तर्कय कैरवक्लमहरे शृङ्गारदीक्षा गुरौ
दिक्कान्ता मुकुरे चकोरसुहृदि प्रौढे तुषारत्विषि ।
कर्पूरैः किमपूरि किं मलयजैरालेपि किं पारदैः
अक्षालि स्फटिकोपलैः किमघटि द्यावापृथिव्योर्वपुः ।।"

He also explains the Adhyavasāna involved in this Saṁśayālaṅkāra in the following words :—"अत्र कौमुदीधवलिम्नः कर्पूरपूरणादिनाऽध्यवसितत्वाद् अध्यवसायमूलत्वम्" (Vimarśinī. p. 55).

Thus in effect, Sasandeha, according to Vimarśinīkāra, is Āropa-mūla and Adhyavasāna-mūla; in other words, Rūpakāśrita and Atiśayoktyāliṅgita.

Now PR. examines the possibility of such Adhyavasāna-mūla Saṁśaya. He composes an almost similar example where Adhyavasāna is involved."

"सिन्दूरैः परिपूरितं किमथवा लाक्षारसैः क्षालितं
लिप्तं वा किमु कुङ्कुमद्रवभरैरेतन्महीमण्डलम् ।
सन्देहं जनयन्नृणामिति परित्रातत्रिलोकस्त्विषां
व्रातः प्रातरुपातनोतु भवतां भव्यानि भासां निधेः ।।" (RG. p. 342)[1]

There are two Saṁśayas contained in this verse. In the first one the Jaganmaṇḍala is the Dharmin and the Sindūraparipūritattva, and Lākṣārasakṣālitatva etc., are the different alternatives (Koṭis) in it. It is undisputed that this Saṁśaya is Āropamūla only. Then comes the second Saṁśaya which is suggested here and which is also the supporter of the first

1. It is not clear whether this verse is PR's own or by any old poet. Viśveśvara's statement indicates that it is by some old poet (AK. p, 201).

Vācyasaṁśaya. In this the Sūrya-kiraṇas are taken as the Dharmin and the Sindūra-rajas and Lākṣārasa etc., are taken as the alternatives (Koṭis) and the form of this Saṁśaya will be "किमिमे सूर्यकिरणाः, सिन्दूररजः, लाक्षारसः, उताहो कुङ्कुमद्रवः ?" Thus Vyaṅgya-saṁśaya is considered to be Adhyavasāna-mūla because the 'Kiraṇaiḥ' etc., are in Tṛtīyā and "Tviṣām-vrātaḥ" is in Prathamā and Āropa can be accepted only when there is 'Sāmānādhikaraṇya' between the Viṣaya and Viṣayin. Thus the words 'Sindūraiḥ' etc., will convey the Dharmin (Viṣaya), i. e., Kiraṇavrāta, by Lakṣaṇā, and so this is considered to be an instance of Adhyavasānamūla Saṁśayālaṅkāra.

Now PR. contends that there is no need of accepting Adhyavasāna-mūlatva of the second Saṁśaya also. The rule that Āropa requires Sāmānādhikaraṇya is applicable only in the case of Vācyasthala; and therefore there is nothing wrong in accepting that the second Saṁśaya (Vyaṅgya) is also Āropa-mūla.

Viśveśvara (AK., pp. 201-202) tries to maintain that there is Adhyavasāna but not Āropa in the second Saṁśaya. In spite of the fact that the Samāna-vibhaktikatva of the Viṣaya and Viṣayin is not required by the Āropa in Vyañjanā-sthala, he feels that Adhyavasāna can be explained on a different ground. The cognition of the Dharmin in the second Saṁśaya is not through the cognition of the Viṣayatāvacchedaka, i. e., Sūrya-kiranatva etc., because in that case there will be no scope for Saṁśaya at all; for, the Sūrya-kiraṇa is recognised correctly as Sūryakiraṇa only. Therefore one has to accept that the Dharmi-jñāna is only Idantva-prakāraka (i. e., "Idaṁ sindūra-rajo vā, lākṣā-raso vā" etc.,) and thus it is to be accepted that there is Adhyavasāna involved in it.

Next PR. criticises the views of AD. who thinks that there are many Dharmins like Candra in the verse :—

"अस्याः सर्गविधौ प्रजापतिरभूच्चन्द्रो नु कान्तिप्रदः
शृङ्गारैकरसः स्वयं नु मदनो मासो नु पुष्पाकरः ।
वेदाभ्यासजडः कथं स विषयव्यावृत्तकौतूहलो
निर्मातुं प्रभवेन्मनोहरमिदं रूपं पुराणो मुनिः ॥" (CM., p. 73)

with only one Koṭi, i.e., 'Sraṣṭṛtva'. PR. explains correctly that in the above verse, Prajāpati is the one Dharmin and Candratva, Madanatva, etc., are the different Koṭis and so the general definition of Saṁśaya "भासमानविरोधकः समबलः नानाकोटयवगाही ज्ञानविशेषः संशयः" is applicable here also.

After showing an example where Saṁśaya is explained as Lakṣya, PR. gives the following verse as an instance of Saṁśaya-dhvani :—

"तीरे तरुण्या वदनं सहासं नीरे सरोजञ्च मिलद्द्विकासम् ।
आलोक्य धावत्युभयत्र मुग्धा मरन्दलुब्धालिकिशोरमाला ॥"

(RG., p. 345).

Viśveśvara thinks that the above verse cannot be taken as an instance of Vyaṅgya-saṁśaya, because the use of the 'Mugdhā' (innocent) makes the Saṁśaya vācya only AK., (p. 202).

This seems to be criticism for the sake of criticism only, for if such is the case, why 'Mugdhā', even the words 'Dhāvati' and 'Ubhayatra' can be taken as expressive of Saṁśaya. Therefore it is not correct to say that Saṁśaya is Vācya, unless such words as 'Sandeha' 'Saṁśaya' etc. are used. If it is further insisted, we may take the word 'Mugdhā' here to mean 'beautiful' according to the same 'Nighaṇṭu' quoted by Viśveśvara, (Mugdhaḥ sundara-mūḍhayoḥ).

AD. gives the following verse as an example of Saṁśaya-dhvani.

"काञ्चित् काञ्चनगौराङ्गीं वीक्ष्य साक्षादिव श्रियम् ।
वरदः संशयापन्नो वक्षःस्थलमवैक्षत ॥" (CM., p. 74)

In this connection, he writes that it can be accepted as an instance of Sandeha-dhvani though the Sandeha is partially expressed by the "Saṁśayāpannaḥ" because the real main Saṁśaya is suggested by the phrase "Vakṣasthalamavaikṣata". He cites the verse :—

दर्पणे च परिभोगदर्शिनी पृष्ठतः प्रणयिनो निषेदुषः ।
प्रेक्ष्य बिम्बमुपबिम्बमात्मनः कानि कानि न चकार लज्जया ॥"
(Kumārasaṁbhava, VIII. 11)

as an example in this connection, where, as he contends, Lajjā is considered as Vyaṅgya though it is expressed by the word Lajjayā.

PR. feels all this as quite ridiculous. He maintains that even the slightest touch of Vācyatva does not allow a thing to be called Vyaṅgya. In this connection he quotes extensively from Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta (RG., p. 348). This view of PR. is quoted by Viśveśvara with approval (AK., p. 202).

Like Jayaratha, PR. also explains the possibility of many varieties in the nature of Samāna-dharma :— "अस्मिश्च संशये नानाकोटिषु क्वचिदेक एव समानो धर्मः क्वचित् पृथक् । सोऽपि क्वचिदनुगामी, क्वचिद्बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावापन्नः क्वचिदनिर्दिष्टः क्वचिन्निर्दिष्टः" (RG., p. 349). He explains all these varieties with suitable illustrations.

In order to falsify the contention of some writers that only the Anugāmi-dharma can be Lupta but not the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna, he gives us a peculiar verse. :—

"इदमुदधेरुदरं वा नयनं वात्रेरुतेश्वरस्य मनः ।
दशरथगृहे तदानीमेवं संशेरते स्म कवयोपि ।।" (RG., p. 350)

After explaining the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva involved in this verse, he adds "एतेनानुगाम्येव धर्मः लुप्तः सम्भवति न तु बिम्बितः इति वदन्तः परास्ताः (RG., p. 351). It is not clear against whom these remarks are directed.

PR. mentions two more varieties of Saṁśaya, Āhārya-saṁśaya and Anāhārya-saṁśaya. The Saṁśaya which is described by the poet as existing in others is Anāhārya, excepting in the case of those who are, omniscients like the sage Vaśiṣṭha; and the Saṁśaya which is described as entertained by the poet himself is Āhārya.

PR. concludes his discussion on Saṁśaya with the mention of one more variety Paramparita-saṁśaya which is so named on account of the Paramparitatva of the Rūpakas involved in it.

Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra

Mammaṭa's definition of Bhrāntimān "भ्रान्तिमानन्यसंवित्तत्तुल्यदर्शने" is explained by Pradīpa thus :—प्राकरणिकस्याप्राकरणिकतुल्यस्य दर्शने सति यदप्राकरणिकत्वेन ज्ञानं स भ्रान्तिमानित्यर्थः"

(KP., pp. 564-5).

"The cognition of a different object (on seeing another object) on account of similarity is called Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra" (AS., p. 55) according to Ruyyaka. While explaining this definition, Jayaratha lays (Vimarśinī p. 56) much stress on the point that Bhrāntimān is based only on Sādṛśya but not on Āropa or any other cause, and that any such Bhrānti cannot be the instance of Bhrāntimān. Thus he criticised the views of Alaṅkāraratnākara (pp. 52-53) by quoting all the verses which are taken by it, as the instance of Bhrantiman though not based on Sādṛśya. Jayaratha further

explains (Vimarśinī, p. 57) that this figure being based on Sādṛśya, the Sādhāraṇa-dharma involved in it may be of three varieties : Anugāmin, Śuddha, and Bimbapratibimba-bhāvāpanna.

PR. gives the definition of Bhrāntimān in unambiguous words. "The charming undoubted identification, on account of close similarity, of one object with another, which is not wanton (Anāhārya), is called Bhrānti. The words conveying this kind of Bhrānti are Bhrāntimad. Though Bhrānti alone is the Alaṅkāra, it is called Bhrantimad by Upacāra (as in the case of 'Sasandeha')" (RG., p. 353).

After explaining the purpose of the different Viśeṣaṇas in the definition, he states (RG., p. 354) that such Niścaya which constitutes the Bhrāntimān should be understood as only one; thus the Ativyāpti in Ullekha which consists of many such niścayas is to be avoided.

After explaining an example of Bhrāntimān which can be taken as an instance of Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra-dhvani also by some modification, PR. proceeds to examine the definition of AD.

"कविसम्मतसादृश्याद्विषये विहितात्मनि ।
आरोप्यमाणानुभवः यत्र स भ्रान्तिमान् मतः ॥ (CM., p. 75)

The main objection raised against this definition is that this suffers from Ativyāpti in Sasandeha, and Ullekha consisting of a group of Bhrāntis. It may be contended that this cannot be called as ativyāpti of the Lakśaṇa in the strict sense of the word, (so far as Ullekha is concerned) because it is only a mixture of Bhrānti and Ullekha. But PR. says that still there is the defect of Ativyāpti because the Lakṣaṇa which has to strictly confine itself to only Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra, is extending its scope to Ullekha also. In this connection he gives the analogy of the mixture of milk and water. Even when milk and water are mixed with each other and are formed into one content, if one is asked to give the definition of water or milk

he should give such definitions which do not overlap each other.

This Ativyāpti in Ullekhālaṅkāra can be avoided if it is said, like PR., that "Lakṣaṇe cātraikatvaṁ vivakṣitam". But Nāgeśa presents two views in support of AD. (GMP., p. 355). The first view contends that there is Saṅkīrṇatva of Bhrāntimad and Ullekha in the above verse and that there is nothing wrong in accepting it so. Just as the Bhūtatva and Mūrtatva which have got their own distinct scope in different objects and get combined in one object, so also the Ullekhatva and Bhrāntitva which have their distinct scope in "Narair-varagatipradā" etc., and "Kanakadrava" etc., respectively, may be combined in one place.

It is not clear what exactly is meant by this first view. If it is an attempt to prove that there can be Saṅkīrṇatva between Bhrāntimad and Ullekha in a particular place, it is unnecessary, because this is not disputed even by PR. The analogy of 'Bhūtatvamūrtatvayoriva' makes it all the more unintelligible. The Sāṅkarya between Bhūtatva is shown as a reason for not accepting either the Bhūtatva or the Mūrtatva as a Jāti (Dinakarī, p. 78). Here we are not going to maintain Jātitva in Ullekhatva or Bhrāntitva and so why this analogy is given is not clear.

The second view contends that Ativyāpti of Ullekha Lakṣaṇa in the Apahnuti can be shown in the verse :—

'वनितेति वदन्त्येतां लोकाः सर्वे वदन्तु ते ।
यूनां परिणता सेयं तपस्येति मतं मम ॥" (RG., p.360)

where it is accepted that there is Saṅkīrṇatva of Apahnuti and Ullekha. On the strength of this argument it is contended that it is inevitable to have Ativyāpti of the definition of one Alaṅkāra in the other, in places of Sāṅkarya. Even this argument does not seem to be correct. Broadly speaking, the concealment of an object after the explicit negation of its real nature is an

instance of Apahnuti and looking at an object in different forms is Ullekha.

Now there is no overlapping of the definition of Ullekha, which is not concerned with concealment, in Apahnuti, and vice versa, and so where is the Ativyāpti of the Lakṣaṇas in the above verse? But the position is entirely different in the case of "कमलमिति चञ्चरीकाश्चन्द्र इति चकोरास्त्वन्मुखमनुधावन्ति" (RG., p. 355) etc. Here, shorn of 'Bhrānti', there is no Ullekha at all. In the verse 'Vaniteti' etc., the Apahnuti may be helpful to Ullekha but it is not identical with it as in the present case. That is why PR.'s use of the word "Bhrānti-samudāyātmani" is significant and it indicates that the Ūllekha, in the above place, is only a group of Bhrāntis. Such being the case the Bhrāntilakṣaṇa will have Ativyāpti in such Ullekha and it can be avoided by adding Ekatva in the Niścaya as explained above.

Viśveśvara (AK., p. 389) is not in favour of adding "Ekatva" to the definition, as he thinks that the places as the above can be taken as the instances of Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra only. He contends that Ullekha arises only when the cognitions of many persons involving different Dharmas are described. Thus he criticises PR. and also AD. who takes "चन्द्र इति चकोरा: कमलमिति चञ्चरीकास्त्वन्मुखमभिधावन्ति etc., as an instance of Ullekha.

Viśveśvara appears to be correct because when the main principle consists of Bhrānti only, whether the Bhrānti is one in number or more than one, it should be understood as Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra only and should not be treated as a separate Alaṅkāra.

Next PR. examines the verse "Śiñjānairmañjarīti[1]" etc.

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1. शिञ्जानैर्मञ्जरीति स्तनकलशयुगं चुम्बितं चञ्चरीकैः
तत्त्रासोल्लासलीला: किसलयमनसा पाणय: कीरदष्टा: ।
तल्लोपायालपन्त्य: पिकनिनदधिया ताडिता: काकलोकैः
इत्थं चोलेन्द्रसिंह त्वदरिमृगदृशां नाप्यरण्यं शरण्यम्" ।।
Citramīmāṁsā, p. 76.

given by AD. as an instance of one variety of Bhrāntimān. With his fine sense of propriety and the keenness of the observation he points out so many defects in this verse, which, he implies to say, ought not to have been selected by AD. only because it contains Bhrāntimadalaṅkāra.

Viśveśvara (AK., p. 390) tries his best to explain away the defects pointed out by PR. and on seeing what is said by him, one will naturally come to the conclusion that it is absurd to apply the wooden principles of Nyāya to the literary appreciation. The defects pointed out by PR. cannot be answered satisfactorily.

Next, PR. examines the definition of Sarvasvakāra. He points out some Ativyāpti-doṣas in it. If it is attempted to avoid the defects by adding some more Viśeṣaṇas, it would ultimately result, PR. contends, in arriving at his own definition. In this connection he says that 'Anāhāryatva' is to be added as the Viśeṣaṇa of Niścaya to avoid Ativyāpti in Atiśayokti, where the Vastvantaraniścaya is only Āhārya.

Nāgeśa (GMP., p. 357) feels that the Abhedajñāna involved in Atiśayokti also is Anāhārya and as such the addition of this word cannot avoid the ativyāpti. But it is not known how far Nāgeśa's statement "तस्याम् (अतिशयोक्तौ) अनाहार्याभेदज्ञानस्यैव सर्वसम्मतत्वात्" is having the unanimous approval because, as can be judged from the examples of Atiśayokti, the Abhedajñāna appears as Āhārya only, as in the case of Rūpaka, with the only difference that Viṣaya also is mentiond in the latter.

PR. concludes his discussion on Bhrāntimān, after mentioning, like Vimarśinīkāra, that there can be three possibilities of the of nature of Sādhāraṇa-dharma : Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva, Śuddhatva, and Anugāmitva.

Ullekha

Mammaṭa feels that this figure can be included under other Alaṅkāras like Bhrānti, Apahnuti, and Atiśayokti etc.,

wherever there is Sāṅkarya with those Alaṅkāras, without accepting an independent existence for it.

"Ullekha arises when a thing is taken in different forms on account of different reasons", this is how Ruyyaka defines this figure (AS., p.58). These reasons he enumerates by quoting the verse from Īśvarapratyabhijñā :—

यथारुचि यथार्थित्वं यथाव्युत्पत्ति भिद्यते ।
आभासो व्यर्थं एकस्मिन् अनुसन्धानसाधिते ।। (AS., p.59)

He also mentions the possibility of 'Sāṅkarya' of Ullekha with other Alaṅkāras like Rūpaka, Atiśayokti, Śleṣa etc. That Ullekha may be on account of Grahītṛ-bheda or Viṣaya-bheda, has also been mentioned by him (AS., p.61). Vimarśini states that there can be further classification of Ullekha into three more varieties on the basis of the difference of Ullekhyamāṇa, i.e., Svarūpa, Phala, and Hetu (Vimarśinī, p. 62).

It is interesting to note that Nāgeśa, who does not seem to have any objection to accept Ullekha as a separate Alaṅkāra as can be seen from his commentary Gurumarmaprakāśa, rejects it in Uddyota (p. 493).

We find a fine discussion on Ullekha in Citramīmāṁsā which has been further developed by PR. According to PR. the first variety of "Ullekha arises when the same object is understood in different ways by different people on account of different reasons" (RG., p.358). After explaining the purpose of the different words, he illustrates the figure with suitable examples. Next, he says that Ullekha can either be Śuddha or Saṅkīrṇa, i.e., mixed with other Alaṅkāra.

Now he finds an occasion to criticise AD. To avoid the Ativyāpti in an 'Apahnutisthala'[1] AD. proposes that the word 'निषेधास्पृष्ट' should be added in the Lakṣaṇa. But PR. rightly points out that there is no such need, because Ullekha

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1. कान्त्या चन्द्रं विदुः केचित् सौरभेणाम्बुजं परे ।
वक्त्रं तव वयं ब्रूमः तपसैक्यं गतं द्वयम् ।। CM., p. 78.

in that particular instance can be taken as having Sāṅkarya with Apahnuti, for Saṅkara in Ullekha is acceptable to AD. himself as explained in Citramīmāṁsā (p. 81).

Like Vimarśinīkāra, PR. also mentions three varieties of Ullekha, Svarūpollekha, Phalollekha and Hetūllekha. Next PR. defines the second variety of Ullekha (RG., p. 361). The same thing can be perceived in different ways even by a single person on account of the difference of the associates of the same, like the Viṣaya, Āśraya and Samānādhikaraṇa etc., and this is taken as the second variety of Ullekha. This second type of Ullekha too, is said to be having the subdivisions of Śuddhatva and Saṅkīrṇatva and many of these varieties are explained with suitable examples.

Before giving the examples for the Dhvani of the two varieties of Ullekha, PR. explains the subtle differnce contained in them. "यं महाविष्णुरिति वैष्णवाः, शिव इति शैवाः, यज्ञपुरुष इति याज्ञिकाः, स्वभाव इति लोकायतिकाः, ब्रह्मेत्यौपनिषदा वदन्ति सोऽयमादिपुरुषो हरिः" (RG., p. 364), etc., is the example of the first Ullekha because the same object is seen by many people in different ways. Here the group of cognitions having the Mahāviṣṇutva etc. as their Prakāras constitute the Alaṅkāra. "Yaḥ śiṣṭeṣu sadayaḥ, duṣṭeṣu karālaḥ" etc., (RG., p. 364) is the example of the second Ullekha because the same man is seen in different aspects by the same person. Here the group of such aspects constitutes the Alaṅkāra because this itself is the source of Camatkāra without taking its cognition into account. That is why, PR. contends, the first Ullekha is defined as "Ekasya vastunaḥ-Anekaprakāratva."

But this is a very subtle differentiation which cannot be established on strong ground; because even in the first Ullekha it can be said that the group of the Prakāradharmas themselves are the source of Camatkāra and vice versa. This is the reason why PR. himself does not seem to have attached much importance to this minute difference and gives, in the name

of others, a definition comprehensive of both the varieties where the Prakārasamudāya is given importance (RG., p.364).

Apahnuti

Mammaṭa's definition of Apahnuti is as follows: प्रकृतं यन्निषिद्ध्यान्यत् साध्यते सा त्वपह्नुतिः" and this is explained further as "उपमेयमसत्यं कृत्वोपमानं सत्यतया यत्र स्थाप्येत सा त्वपह्नुतिः" (KP., p. 474). Thus Mammaṭa appears to be in favour of accepting Upamānopameyabhāva as involved in Apahnuti also.

But Nāgeśa, in Uddyota (p. 473), on the authority of Mammaṭa's own remarks (KP., p. 145) made while explaining a verse 'Keśeṣu balā' as an example of Vastunā-Alaṅkāra-dhvaniḥ, understands the 'Prakṛta' in the definition as any thing of relevance (but not as Upameya only). Thus according to him "किञ्चिदपह्नुत्य कस्यचित् प्रदर्शनमित्येव लक्षणम्."

It is defined by Alaṅkārasarvasva "विषयस्यापह्नवेऽपह्नुतिः' (AS., p. 63), and this is explained by Jayaratha "विषयस्यापह्नवे विषयिणोऽन्यस्य विधिरित्यर्थः" (Vimarśinī. p. 68). In this connection Jayaratha states that it is not correct to accept (as was done by Ratnākara, p. 42) to accept Apahnuti in the verse : "नाविषं विषमित्याहुर्ब्रह्मस्वं विषमुच्यते । विषमेकाकिनं हन्ति ब्रह्मस्वन्तु ससन्ततिम्" because the same Viṣaya which is negated at the first instance is being superimposed on something else, without bringing in any new Viṣayin. It may be taken only as an instance of Rūpaka implying strong superimposition (Vimarśinī, p. 63).

Apahnava may be based according to him, (Vimarśinī, p.67) either on Sādṛśya or Sambandhāntara. There is 'Trayī gatiḥ', i.e., Anugāmitā, Śuddha-Sāmānya-rūptava and Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva. According to him, Apahnuti may not be only Āropa-garbhā but Adhyavasāna-garbhā also (Vimarśinī, pp. 67-68). Sāhityadarpaṇa defines two varieties of

Apahnava; one following Mammaṭa, and the other following Daṇḍin and others (SD., p. 28; P.V. Kane [SD.] p. 136).

Now coming to PR. we can see that he follows mainly the definition of Mammaṭa (not as explained by Nāgeśa, but as explained by Mammaṭa himself). His definition is as follows :—"उपमेयतावच्छेदकनिषेधसामानाधिकरण्येनारोप्यमाणमुपमानतादात्म्यमपह्नुतिः (RG., p. 366); i.e., "Apahnuti is the superimposition of the identity (Tādātmya) of the Upamāna on the Upameya while negating the Upameyatāvacchedaka." After explaining the difference between Rūpaka and Apahnuti which is mainly based on the negation of the Viṣaya, PR. gives two verses which can be taken as the examples for Sāvayavāpahnuti, Niravayavāpahnuti and Hetvapahnuti. The first two varieties are mentioned by AD. (CM., p. 83) also but the Hetvapahnuti appears to be the innovation of PR.

Next PR. talks of some varieties of Apahnuti consisting of Vākya-bheda, Vākyaikatva, Apahnava-pūrvakatva, Aropa-pūrvakatva, Śābdatva or Ārthatva of the Tādrūpya and Niṣedha and their Vidheyatva or Anuvādyatva etc., which are mentioned by Ruyyaka and AD. In spite of the fact that he also explains some of these varieties with suitable examples, PR. is not in favour of attaching much importance to them as they do not make, according to him, any difference in beauty (RG., p. 367).

PR. now, turns to criticise AD. who accepts Paryastāpahnuti as one of the varieties of Apahnuti. It is defined and illustrated by him in the following verse :—

"अन्यत्र तस्यारोपार्थः पर्यस्तापह्नुतिस्तु सः ।
नायं सुधांशुः किं तर्हि सुधांशुः प्रेयसीमुखम् ॥"

(Kuvalayānanda. p.27)

When some object is negated in order to superimpose it on some different object, Paryastāpahnuti arises. It is not the Moon; the face of the beloved is the Moon. Here PR. states that the contention of AD. is against the general

definition of Apahnuti, not only as it is found in Kāvyaprakāśa but as given by himself. He takes it as an instance of Rūpaka on the authority of Vimarśinī, which, as is seen above, accepts Dṛḍhāropa-rūpaka in "Na viṣaṁ viṣamityāhuḥ" etc. He further states that it ought not to have been given as an example only because it is taken as such by Ratnākara, for, AD.'s own definition of Rūpaka "Bimbāviśiṣṭe Nirdiṣṭe" etc., will have Ativyāpti in this so called Paryastāpahnuti, because in the present case, though the Viṣayin is concealed, the Viṣaya is not concealed.

These views of PR. about the Paryastāpahnuti have been quoted by Viśveśvara with approval (AK., p. 237). Nāgesa tries to vindicate the views of AD. by saying that there is nothing wrong in accepting Apahnuti in the above verse because it will be possible to accept Rūpaka even in "Na idam mukhaṁ, candraḥ" etc., by simply saying that the Viṣaya-niṣedha is intended to Āropa-dārḍhya-sampādana. If Niṣedha-pūrvakāropa is considered to be a source of different Camatkāra resulting in accepting Apahnuti as a separate Alaṅkāra, then, Nāgeśa says, the same can be said in the case of "Nāyaṁ sudhāṁśuḥ" also. He airs similar views in his Uddyota (p. 473), and like Ratnākara accepts Apahnuti in "Na viṣaṁ viṣamityāhuḥ" etc.

Candrikā (p. 633) exposes the fallacy in the argument of Nāgeśa and maintains that "Na idaṁ mukhaṁ, Candraḥ" can never be explained as Rūpaka when there is the explicit negation of Viṣaya in it. Similarly, the Rūpaka, involved in "Sudhāṁśuḥ preyasīmukham" also cannot be denied.

Next PR. explains, rightly, how the verse :—

"त्वदालेख्ये कौतूहलतरलतन्वी विरचिते
विधायैका चक्रं रचयति सुपर्णीसुतमपि ।
अपि स्विद्यत्पाणिस्त्वरितमपमृज्यैतदपरा
करे पौष्पं चापं मकरमुपरिष्टाच्च लिखति" ।। (CM., p. 85),

cannot be taken as an instance of Apahnutidhvani.

According to AD,, there are two Dhvanis in this verse. By arranging the Cakra and Garuḍa it is indicated by the first friend that this is not an ordinary man but 'Viṣṇu'. The second friend indicated that "this cannt be even Viṣṇu, but Manmatha only." Now PR. contends that the painting of the Cakra and Garuḍa can only suggest that this is Viṣṇu but nothing beyond that like "he is not an ordinray person" etc. Therefore, there is no Apahnuti in the first place. The second suggested meaning may be correct but it cannot be taken as Apahnuti. Apahnuti arises, even according to you (AD.) only when there is negation of Prakṛta-viṣaya. Now, Viṣṇu who is negated is not Prakṛta and thus there is no Prakṛta- niṣedha, i.e., Upameya-niṣedha. In this connection, PR. clearly mentions that 'Prakṛta-niṣedha', should be understood, on the authority of Mammaṭa, only as Upameya-niṣedha and thus according to him, Upamānopameya-bhāva is involved in Apahnuti also. He does not seem to be in favour of accepting Adhyavasāna also in Aphanuti, as has been accepted by Vimarśinī.

Nāgeśa tries to vindicate Dīkṣita. He contends that this example of Apahnutidhvani is given by AD. after mentioning the views of Daṇḍin who does not accept Sādṛśya in Apahnuti; and therefore it should be explained in that light only. As has been explained above, he also attempts to prove that even Mammaṭa is not favour of accepting Upamānopameya-bhāva in Apahnuti, as can be judged by his (Mammaṭa's) remarks while explaining Vastumūlakālaṅkāradhvani in 'Keśeṣu bālā', etc.

As is rightly pointed out by Candrikā, (p 640), Nāgeśa's arguments are based on slippery grounds. It can be seen from the examples of Apahnuti given by AD. that he also is in favour of accepting Upamānopameya-bhāva in Apahanuti. This can be proved further by his mention of Daṇḍin's views at the end only as 'Anyadīya-mata'. This reference to

Daṇḍimata ends with the words "साधर्म्यमूला तु अपह्नुतिरिति तेन व्याहृता"(CM., p. 85) The next passage explaining the Apahnutidhvani is given only according to his own view but not that of Daṇḍin. Otherwise AD.'s discussion, without giving an example of Apahnutidhvani acceptable to himself, would be incomplete. Again, it is not correct to understand Mammaṭa in this way when he clearly mentions that Upameya is meant by the word 'Prakṛta' in the definition. His remarks about "Keśeṣu bālā" etc., can be explained as intended to mean that it may be taken as Apahnuti according to some old writers like Daṇḍin. Thus PR.'s criticism of AD's Apahnutidhvani stands unanswered.

It is interesting to note that Ratnākara feels that mere Niṣedha of any thing constitutes Apahnuti (A. Ratnākara.p.43). But as can be seen from the above discussion, PR. is not prepared to accept Apahnuti at the mere mention of Niṣedha unless there is clear Upamānopameya-bhāva involved in it, and thus he gives it a definite shape; ofcourse, based on Mammaṭa and his followers.

Utprekṣā

Mammaṭa defines Utprekṣā in very simple words as "सम्भावनमथोत्प्रेक्षा प्रकृतस्य समेन यत्" and concludes this topic by giving two examples, one for Hetūtprekṣā and the other for Svarūpotprekṣā (KP. pp. 458-9). It is defined by Ruyyaka as "अध्यवसायो व्यापारप्राधान्ये उत्प्रेक्षा" (AS. p. 69), i.e., "Utprekṣā arises where there is Adhyavasāya involved, and importance is given to the Vyāpāra but not to the thing Adhyavasita." After explaining what is meant by the Vyāpāra-prādhānya of Adhyavasāna, Ruyyaka, by dividing it into two varieties, i.e., Siddha and Sādhya, gives the resultant Lakṣaṇa in the following words :—"तदेवमप्रकृतगतगुणक्रियाभिसम्बन्धात् अप्रकृतत्वेन प्रकृतस्य सम्भावनमुत्प्रेक्षा" (AS., p. 72).

Śobhākaramitra feels that the Sambhāvanā is based on Sandeha but not Adhyavasāna and thus he criticises the Lakṣaṇa given by Sarvasva (A. Ratnākara, p. 47).

In reply to this criticism, Jayaratha states that all the cognition other than Niścaya need not necessarily be taken as Saṁśaya only. He maintains that there is a third variety of cognition which is called 'Tarka', being midway between Niścaya and Saṁśaya and the same is given the names like Sambhāvanā, Abhimāna, Utprekṣa, and ūha etc. (Vimarśini, p. 69). He also explains clearly how this Tarka or Sambhāvanā can be called Adhyavasāya, because, Ekatara Pakṣa being given importance in Sambhāvanā, there is clear concealment (Nigaraṇa) of Viṣaya in it, which is the basis of Adhyavasāya. Thus quoting the Saṅgraha-kārikā of Ratnākara, Vimarśinīkāra concludes to say that Ruyyakā's definition is Correct.

The classification of Utprekṣā as given in Sarvasva, is as follows :—"सा च जातिक्रियागुणद्रव्याणामप्रकृतानामध्यवसेयत्वेन चतुर्धा । प्रकृतस्यैतद्भेदयोगेऽपि न वैचित्र्यमिति न ते गणिताः । प्रत्येकञ्च भावाभावाभिमानरूपतया द्वैविध्येऽष्टविधत्वम्, भेदाष्टकस्य च प्रत्येकं निमित्तस्य गुणक्रियारूपत्वे षोडश भेदाः । तेषाञ्च प्रत्येकं हेतुस्वरूपफलोत्प्रेक्षणरूपत्वेन षण्णवतिर्भेदाः । एषा गतिर्वाच्योत्प्रेक्षायाः" (AS. p. 13). After this general classification, Ruyyaka states that Dravya can rarely become the Viṣayin in the Phalotprekṣā and Hetūtprekṣā and therefore the sixteen varieties of the same may be deducted from the total number of ninety-six.[1] Regarding the varieties of the Pratīyamānotpreṣā, Ruyyaka states that all these ninety-six varieties can theoretically be had in this Utprekṣā also. But he adds that the varieties based on the Nimittānupādāna cannot

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1. Here Vimarśini (p. 73) states that Ruyyaka explained the possibility of these sixteen varieties also in his 'Alaṇkārānusāriṇī', a work by Ruyyaka which is lost to us.

(Vimarśinī, p. 73.)

be accepted in Pratīyamānotprekṣā, for, he contends, how can Utprekṣā be maintained in the absence of both the Ivādi-śabdas and the Nimitta. Thus, as Vimarśinī (p.73) mentions on the authority of Alaṅkārānusāriṇī, Pratīyamānotprekṣā has got only forty-eight varieties.

In this context of explaining the numerous varieties of Utprekṣā, Vimarśinī (p. 72) rightly maintains that only the three varieties based on Hetu, Svarūpa and Phala are the life of Utprekṣā, all the other varieties being devoid of any special Camatkāra.

Śobhākaramitra attempts the classification of Utprekṣā from a different direction and he completely ignores the classification based on Jāti etc. : "इयञ्च धर्मी वा धर्म्यन्तरत्वेनोत्प्रेक्ष्यते धर्मो वा धर्मान्तरत्वेनेति प्रथमं द्विभेदा। आद्या शाब्दत्वार्थत्वभेदादारोपस्य द्विविधैव। द्वितीयापि धर्मरूपविषयोपादाने आरोपगर्भा......अनुपादानेन तु अध्यवसायगर्भा, आरोपगर्भे तु भेदत्रये विषयापह्नवानपह्नवाभ्यां द्वैविध्यम्। पुनरपि यथासम्भवं स्वरूपहेतुफलानामुत्प्रेक्षणेन निमित्तस्योपादानानुपादानाभ्यां बहुधा भिद्यते।" (A. Ratnākar. p. 48). At the end he also adds :— "सम्भविनोऽप्यन्यभेदाः वैचित्र्यविशेषाभावान्नेह गणिताः".

PR. defines Utprekṣā, adopting what is best in all the definitions given by his predecessors. तद्भिन्नत्वेन वा प्रमितस्य पदार्थस्य रमणीयतद्वृत्तितत्समानाधिकरणान्यतरतद्धर्मसम्बन्धनिमित्तकं तत्त्वेन तद्वत्त्वेन वा सम्भावनमुत्प्रेक्षा" (RG., p. 347). His definition includes both the Dharmyutprekṣā and Dharmotprekṣā, and thus it can be split into two difinitions. "Utprekṣā (Dharmyutprekṣā) arises when a thing (face etc.) which is cognised as different from another thing (Candrādi) is fancied to be identical with the same (Candrādi) on account of its

1. "कान्त्या चन्द्रं विदुः केचित् सौरभेणाम्बुजं परे।
वक्त्रं तव वयं ब्रूमः तपसैक्यं गतं द्वयम्॥"

Citramīmāṁsā , p. 78.

having the qualities associated with it (Candrādi)." Again "Utprekṣā (Dharmotprekṣā) arises when a thing (Dharmin) which is well-known as not having a particular quality (Dharma) (Moha), etc. is fancied as having the same on account of recognised fact that it has got another quality (Avicāryakāritva) which is usually believed as co-existing with the former (as in the verse "Nidhiṁ lāvaṇyānām" etc.). The word 'Pramitasya' indicates that the 'Sambhāvanā, involved in Utprekṣā, is only Āhārya. After explaining the purpose of the different words in the Lakśaṇa, PR. states that the Dharmyutprekṣā is based on Tādātmya-saṁsarga and Dharmotprekṣā on any other Saṁsarga (RG. p. 356).

Regarding the sub-divisions of Utprekṣā, PR. follows the old writers like Ruyyaka and Śobhākaramitra. He explains some of the varieties of Utprekṣā with the help of suitable illustrations with explanatory comments added to them. He also introduces a new variety of Svarūpotprekṣā called Mālotprekṣā for which he gives the verse :—

"द्विनेत्र इव वासवः करयुगो विवस्वानिव
द्वितीय इव चन्द्रमाः श्रितवपुर्मनोभूरिव ।
नराकृतिरिवाम्बुधिः गुरुरिव क्षमामागतो
नुनो निखिलभूसुरैर्जयति कोऽपि भूमीपतिः ॥"

(RG., p. 383)

as an example. Contrary to the opinion of the Prācīnas, who contend that there can be no Utprekṣā of Dravya as Hetu, PR. cites the following verse as an instance of the same :—

"वराका य राकारमण इति वल्गन्ति सहसा
सरः स्वच्छं मन्ये मिलदमृतमेतन्मखभुजाम् ।
अमुष्मिन् या कापि द्युतिरतिघना भाति मिषता-
मियं नीलच्छायादुपरि निरपायाद् गगनतः ॥"

He adds अत्रामृतसरोरूपत्वेनोत्प्रेक्षिते चन्द्रमसि नीलत्वेनाध्यवसिते कलङ्के उपरि नभोहेतुकत्वमुत्प्रेक्षते । एतेन द्रव्यस्य हेतुत्वेनोत्प्रेक्षणं नास्तीति

प्राचां प्रवाद: निरस्त:" (RG., p. 383). Perhaps this is the reference to Alaṅkārasarvasva. But as seen above, Jayaratha (Vimarśinī p.73) writes that Ruyyaka also is in favour of accepting Dravyahetūtprekṣā.

After giving proper evamples, PR. states, in words almost similar to those of Jayaratha, that the real Camatkāra can be found only in the three varieties of Utprekṣā, Jātyutprekṣā, Hetūtprekṣā, and phalotprekṣā (RG., p. 385-6).

Next PR. Proceeds to examine the important principle involved in Utprekṣā, according to the old rhetoricians, in order to explain his own views at the end. The following sentences and verses are taken as the instances of the different varieties of Utprekṣā both according to old writers and the Navīnas :—'Mukhaṁ-candraṁ-manye' is taken as an example of Dharmisvarūpotprekṣā The following verse is the example for Dharmasvarūpotprekṣā.

अस्यां मुनीनामपि मोहमूहे भृगुर्महान् यत् कुचशैलशीलो ।
नानारदाह्लादि मुखं श्रितोरुर्व्यासो महाभारतसर्गयोग्य: ॥

(Naiṣadhīyacaritam VIII. 94)

"लिम्पतीव तमोऽङ्गानि वर्षतीवाञ्जनं नभ: ।
असत्पुरुषसेवेव दृष्टिर्विफलतां गता ॥"

(Mṛcchakatikam)

is another example for Dharmotprekṣā. The following verse is an instance of Hetūtprekṣā :—

"उन्मेषं यो मम न सहते जातिवैरी निशाया-
मिन्दोरिन्दीवरदलदृशा तस्य सौन्दर्यदर्प: ।
नीत: शान्तिं प्रसभमनया वक्त्रकान्त्येति हर्षात्
लग्ना मन्ये ललिततनु ते पादयो: पद्मलक्ष्मी: ॥

(RG., p. 391)

Again, the following verse is an example of Phalotprekṣā :—

"चोलस्य यद्भीतिपलायितस्य भालत्वचं कण्टकिनो वनान्ता: ।
अद्यापि किं वानुभविष्यतीति व्यपाटयन् द्रष्टुमिवाक्षराणि ॥"

(RG., p. 392)

In all these examples, irrespective of the sub-divisional differences, the Sambhāvanā of the Viṣayin on the Viṣaya, the Prācīnas contend, is effected only through one Sambandha, i.e., Abheda. In the first instance, the Candrābheda on the Mukha is quite clear as can be seen from the Abhedānvaya between these Nāmārthas which is effected according to the rule "नामार्थयोरभेदेनान्वयः". In 'Asyāṁ munīnāmapi mohamūhe' etc., the Moha (Dharma) of the Sages is subjected to the Sambhāvanā on some other quality of the sages themselves, which is not mentioned but only implied (Anupātta). In "Limpatīva tamoṅgāni" etc., it is not possible to accept the Sambhāvanā of Lepanakartṛtva and Varṣaṇa-kartṛtva on Tamas and Nabhas respectively, because such Kartṛtva being the Viśeṣaṇa in Ākhyātārtha and thus Ekadeśa, it cannot have Anvaya with the Tamas etc. It is also not possible to accept Abheda-sambhāvanā of the Lepanādikrtṛ with the Prathamāntārtha because even that Kartṛ being the Viśeṣaṇa, in the Kriyā, it cannot have Ekadeśānvaya. Therefore Tamaḥkartṛkāṅgakarmakavyāpana and Tamaḥkartṛka-nabhaḥ-karmaka-vyāpana are to be taken as the Viṣayas which are subjected to the Sambhāvanā as Tamaḥ-kartṛkāṅga-karmaka-lepana and Nabhaḥ-kartṛkāṅga-karmaka-varṣaṇa by Abheda-sambandha. Here the Viṣayas, i.e., Śyāmīkaraṇatvādi and the Nimitta are not mentioned. This theory gets the approval of Mammaṭa who remarks after citing the above verse as an example of Utprekṣā 'व्यापनादिलेपनादिरूपतया सम्भावितम्' which implies that the Viṣaya is Nigīrṇa here.

In 'Unmeṣaṁ yo mama na sahate' etc., it is not merely the Hetūtprekṣā, in having the Sambhāvanā of the Hetu for the Kārya, i.e., 'Pādalagana', but the natural Pādalagana is being fancied as identical with the Pādalagana which is said to be the Kārya of the Harṣarūpa hetu. Thus there is Abheda-sambandha in the Hetūtprekṣā also. Similarly in "Colasya-yadbhīti-palāyitasya" etc., is not mere Utprekṣā of Lalāṭā-

kṣara-darśana as the Phala, but the Kaṇṭakaja-vi pāṭana is being fancied as identical with Lalāṭākṣara-darśana-phalaka vipāṭana. Thus the Prācīnas maintain Abheda-sambandha in all the cases of Utprekṣā, Svarūpotprekṣā, Hetūtprekṣā and Phalotprekṣā etc.

Now PR. refutes the views of the Prācīnas on the following grounds. He expresses surprise why should such a circumlocutious explanation be adopted to maintain Abheda sambandha in all kinds of Utprekṣā. It has not been enjoined by a Veda-vākya that Abheda is essential for Utprekṣā. He gives us an important suggestion that the definitions of Alaṅkāras being of our own making, they should be formulated in such a way as to suit the general experience and the common impression produced by it (RG., p. 393). Thus there is nothing wrong in accepting according to the impression produced by the verse "Asyāṁ munīnāmapi" etc., that Moha is being fancied in the Munis only by Bheda-sambandha.

In 'Limpatīva tamoṅgāni' the Lepanādi-Kartṛtva is being fancied as associated with the Tamas etc. In order to meet the objections like the Ekadeśānvya, PR. introduces a discussion pertaining to Vyākaraṇa-Śāstra. He says that Kartṛtva which is no other than Anukūla-Vyāpāra is conveyed by the Ākhyāta (Ākhyātārtha) and it will have Anvaya with the Prathamānta viśeṣya, i.e., Tamas or Nabhas by Āśrayatā-saṁsarga resulting in the Śābdabodha "Lepanakartṛtvāśryābhinnaṁ tamaḥ" etc. It may be argued that the Prathamānta-viśeṣyaka Śābdabodha is against the rule 'Bhāvapradhānamākhyātaṁ laid down by Yāska. But PR. understands the above rule to simply mean that the Ākhyāta (i.e., the Tiṅ) is Vyāpārthaka on the analogy of the next sentence of Yāska 'सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि', where the word 'Pradhāna' is used to mean 'Arthaka'. It may be argued that to accept Vyāpāra to have been conveyed by Ākhyāta instead of Dhātu is against the principle guiding the Sakarmakatva of a root, for a Dhātu is believed to be Sakarmaka when the Vyāpāra and Phala expressed by it are associated with

different things, and Akarmaka, when both of them are co-existing in one and the same object. But PR. says that the above rule can be modified in accordance with our theory and thus Sakarmakatva may be defined as 'तिङर्थव्यापारव्यधिकरणफलवाचकत्वम्' ad 'अकर्मकत्व as 'तिङर्थव्यापारसमानाधिकरणफलवाचकत्वम्'.

Now another question arises. In places like Tamo limpati it is accepted that the Vyāpāra, i.e., Kartṛtva will have Anvaya with the Prathamāntārtha by Āśrayatā-saṁbandha resulting in the Śābda-bodha, 'लेपानुकूलव्यापाराश्रय:" or 'लेपानुकूलकर्तृत्वाश्रय: तम:" Now, there are some Kṛt-pratyayas like the Ghañ-pratyaya which also are expressive of Bhāva, i.e., Vyāpāra. Here also we may have to accept that the Vyāpāra will have Anvaya with the Prathamāntārtha by Āśrayatāsambandha and thus such expressions as 'Tamo lepaḥ' in the sense of 'Tamo limpati' may have to be accepted as correct on the analogy of the latter. PR. refutes this argument by applying the rule "Nāmārthayor-abhedānvayaḥ" according to which the Vyāpāra cannot have Anvaya with the Prathamāntārtha, by Āśrayatā sambandha.

As the foregoing discussion shows PR. appears to be in favour of accepting that Vyāpāra, but not the Vyāpārāśraya, is conveyed by the Ākhyāta (Tiṅ). Thus according to this theory, the word 'Kartari' which is taken by Anuvṛtti to the Sūtra "ल: कर्मणि च भावे चाकर्मकेभ्य:" (3.4.69) has to be understood to mean 'Kartṛtve. Now the following objection arises. The word 'Kartari' which gives the meaning of 'Kartṛtve' in "Laḥ karmaṇi ca" etc., should naturally be understood in the same sense in its orginal place also, i.e., in the Sūtra 'कर्तरि कृत्' Thus even the Kṛtpratyayas like 'Ṇvul' and 'Tṛc' etc., will have to mean only the Kartṛtva but not the Kartṛtvāśraya as is desirable. This objection is met by PR. on the following ground. He says that he would favour only the 'Śabdānuvṛtti-pakṣa' but not the 'Arthānuvṛtti' and thus the same word 'kartari' may be understood, in two different ways, in different places, Kartṛtāśraya in "Kartari kṛt' and Kartṛtva in "Laḥ

karmaṇi ca" etc. That 'Kartṛtvāśraya' is to be understood in "Kartari kṛt" is indicated by introducing the separate Adhikārasūtra "भावे" under which the Pratyayas like 'Ghañ' are ordained. If 'Kartari' in 'Kartati kṛt' were to mean Kartṛtva, i.e., Bhāva alone, where is the necessity of having another Sūtra "Bhāve" for Ghañādi-pratyayas ?

PR. puts forth another argument. He is prepared to accept just for the sake of argument that both the Phala and Vyāpāra are conveyed by Dhātu itself and Vyāpārāśraya is conveyd by Tiṅ. But as in the case of "Devadattaḥ pacamāṇaḥ where the Vyāpārāśraya is having Abhedānvaya with the Prathamānta, so also in places like "Devadattaḥ pacati" there is nothing wrong in accepting that the Tiṅartha (i.e.. Vyāpārāśraya) will have Abhedānvaya with the Prathamāntārtha, instead of having Bhedānvaya with the Bhāvanā which is said to be the Dhātvartha. On hearing 'Devadattaḥ pacati', it is the common experience of every hearer that Pākakartṛtva is being expressed (Vidheya) with reference to Devadatta (Uddeśya). Such Uddeśya-Vidheya-bhāva can be clearly understood only when the Tiṅartha has the Abhedānvaya with the Prathamāntārtha but not by accepting its Anvaya with the Dhātvartha. Moreover it is better to follow, as far as possible, the general rule "प्रत्ययार्थं प्रकृत्यर्थो विशेषणम्". This is possible only when the Dhātvartha is accepted as Viśeṣaṇa in the Tiṅartha, but not by accepting Tiṅartha as the Viśeṣaṇa in the Dhātvartha. Thus the saying "Bhāvapradhānamākhyātam" may now be understood to mean that the Ākhyāta, i.e., the Dhātu is Bhāvanārthaka.

Here PR. raises a question. "Is not all this against the accepted theory of Vaiyākaraṇas?" But he declares with great confidence, that Alaṅkāraśāstra is an independent Śāstra and therefore it need not care even if some of its theories go against the theories established by other Śāstras (RG., p. 396).

Coming to the point on hand, PR. states that in 'Limpatīva tamoṅgāni' etc., only Tiṅartha is being subjected to

Śambhāvanā on the Prathamāntārtha either by Bheda-Sambandha or Abheda sambandha as explained above, and there is no point in taking the Dhātvartha as being subjected to Sambhāvanā on the Vyāpāra etc., which is concealed (Nigīrṇa) by it (Lepana). Similarly, in "Unmeṣaṁ yo mama na sahate" etc., Harṣa is fancied as the Hetu of Lagana on the Viṣaya, i.e., Lakṣmi. The Harṣahetūka-Lagana which is identified with the Sāhajikalagana as explained by the Prācīnas, may be the Nimitta in the Hetūtprekṣā, but as far as the identity (Abheda) is concerned it is an instance of only the Atiśayokti. Again, in the verse :

"सैषा स्थली यत्र विचिन्वता त्वां भ्रष्टं मया नूपुरमेकमुर्व्याम् ।
अदृश्यत त्वच्चरणारविन्दविश्लेषदुःखादिव बद्धमौनम् ।।"
(RV. XIII. 23)

'Viśleṣaduḥkha' is being fancied in the Nūpura. In this connection, PR. lays down a general principle and says that whatever is associated with the Ivādi-śabdas, should be taken as the Utprekṣya, and so it is useless to try somehow or other to find out Abheda-sambandha in the Utprekṣāsthala. (RG., p. 398). The same holds good in the case of Phalotprekṣā also in "Colasya yadbhīti-palāyitasya" etc. PR. concludes his criticism of Prācīnas by saying that even AD. who appears to be in favour of accepting the views of the Prācīnas, while remarking that Abheda-sambandha alone should be accepted in Utprekṣā, is wrong. (RG., p. 398).

After criticising the views of the Prācīnas, P.R. proceeds to examine the opinion of the Arvācīnas, as presented by Alaṅkāra-Sarvasvakāra. First he refers to Ruyyaka's definition of Utprekṣā which is consisting of Adhyavasāna and thus involves Abheda, and to some of the examples of Utprekṣā cited by him.

According to Sarvasva the Duḥkha, a Guṇa, is fancied

as the Hetu of the silence of the Nūpura; and the Maunitva which is identified (Adhyavasita) with the Niḥśabdatva of the Nūpura, is the Nimitta for the above Hetūtprekṣā. Again, taking "Limpatīva tamoṅgāni" etc. as an instance of Dharmotprekṣā he says that Vyāpanādi is the Nimitta in the Lepanakriyākartṛtvotprekṣā fancied in the Tamas. All this is self-contradictory, PR. declares. His main objection to Ruyyaka's theory is that it accepts Adhyavasāna in the Utprekṣāsthalas which cannot satisfactorily be shown in the examples given by Ruyyaka himself. In the verse "Saiṣā sthalī" etc., Nūpura is the Viṣaya and the Duḥkha-guṇa is the Viṣayin; but there is no Abhedagarbhādhyavasāna between them, as required according to the definition of Ruyyaka. There may be Adhyavasāya in the Maunāṁśa, according to Ruyyaka's contention, but this being only in the Nimittāṁśa, it cannot justify Ruyyaka's stand that there is Adhyavasāna in Utprekṣā. Moreover, the Adhyavasāna in the Nimittāṁśa being Siddha, it should be even according to Ruyyaka, an instance of Atiśayokti. Similarly, in the verse 'Limpatīva tamoṅgāni' etc., there is no Abhedādhyavasāna between Viṣaya, i.e., Tamas and the Viṣayin, i.e., Lepanakartṛtva. Of course, there is 'अभेदाध्यवसाय' between the Vyāpana which is taken as the Nimitta, and the Lepana but this also being Siddha, can be taken as an instance of Atiśayokti only. If one is to accept Adhyavasānamulatā of an Alaṅkāra simply because there is Adhyavasāna in the Nimittāṁśa, he will have to accept the same in the case of other figures like Upamā also, because even in the place of Upamā as in "Mukhaṁ candra ivāhlādayati", there is Abhedādhyavasāna between the two types of Āhlādakatva as associated with the Mukha and Candra.

It is the case not only in Dharmotprekṣā but in Dharmyutprekṣā also, for, in instances like "Nūnaṁ mukhaṁ candraḥ", we cannot accept Adhyavasāna, when there is explicit mention of Viṣaya. The talk of such differentiation as

Siddhādhyavasāna (where Viṣaya is concealed, Nigīrṇa) and Sadhyādhyavasāna (where it is not concealed) is baseless and in such cases even Rūpaka will have to be accepted as Adhyavasāna-garbha.

Moreover, Adhyavasāna is one of the varieties of Lakṣaṇā and such Lakṣaṇā cannot be accepted in "Mukhaṁ candro nūnam" etc., (where Candratva is Vidheya) according to the well-known rule 'न विधौ परः शब्दार्थः' In such places we derive some Āhārya-bodha based on Saṁsargas like Abheda etc. Thus, there is no point in accepting Adhyavasāna in Utprekṣāsthala.

PR.'s own stand regarding this is as follows:—the Utprekṣā, in the Dharmisvarūpotprekṣā, is based on Abhedasambandha as acceptable to all the rhetoricians, old and modern. The Guṇātmaka-Dharmotprekṣā, in "Asyāṁ munīnāmapi mohamūhe' etc., is based on Bhedasambandha like Āśraya etc., The Kriyā-rūpa-dharma-svarūpotprekṣā in "Limpatīva tamoṅgāni" etc., may be accepted as based on Bhedasambandha or Abheda-sambandha according to the difference of opinion as to the Tiṅartha (whether it is Kartṛtva or Kartṛtvāśraya) as explained above.

"Viśleṣa-duḥkhādiva baddha-maunam" is taken as an instance of Hetūtprekṣā. According to one opinion, 'Hetu' is accepted as Pañcamyartha and the pratyayārtha will have Anvaya with the Prakṛtyartha by Abheda-saṁsarga. Thus the Viṣayin here is "Viśleṣaduḥkhābhinna hetu" which is being fancied on 'Baddhamauna' by Prayojyatāsambandha. Here, there is an Abhedādhyavasāna between the Mauna, caused by grief and Mauna, i.e., Niḥśabdatva, caused by the absence of movement which is, so far, a place of Atiśayokti. This Mauna-adharma is the Nimitta in the above Hetūtprekṣā. According to another opinion Prayojyatva is the Pañcamyartha and the Anvaya between the Prakṛtyartha and Pratyayārtha is to be

effected by Nirūpitatva-sambandha. Now the 'Viśleṣaduḥkha-nirūpita-prayojyatva' is the Viṣayin, and 'Mauna-viśiṣṭa-nūpura' is the Viṣaya and the Utprekṣā is effected through Āśrayatā-sambandha, whereas it is effected by Prayojyatā-sambandha, in the previous case. As before, the Mauna is the Nimitta in this Utprekṣā also. Whether it is by Prayojyatā-sambandha or Āśrayatā-sambandha, the direct connection of the Duḥkhābhinnahetu or 'Dukkha-nirūpita-prayojyatva' is with the Mauna and it is having connection with the Nūpura only indirectly through mauna. Thus, in both the Pakṣas, only the Pañcamyartha is Utprekṣā but not the Prakṛtyartha which is but proper, because the Ivādyartha is having direct Anvaya with the Prakṛtyartha only. The resultant Śābdabodhas according to both these Pakṣas are as follows: "बद्धमौनं (नूपुरं) प्रयोज्यतासम्बन्धेन त्वच्चरणारविन्दवियोगजन्यदुःखाभिन्न-हेतुप्रकारिकायाः सम्भावनाया विषयः" in the first case and "बद्धमौनं (नूपुरं) आश्रयतासम्बन्धेन त्वच्चरणारविन्दवियोगजन्यदुःखनिरूपितप्रयोज्यत्व-प्रकारिकायाः सम्भावनाया विषयः" in the second. Similar procedure is to be followed even when 'Dharma' is given as the Viṣaya (as in 'विश्लेषदुःखादिव मौनमस्य' etc.,) or when the Hetu is Tṛtīyādivibhaktyanta.

Similarly, in places like "Vyapāṭayan draṣṭumivākṣarāṇi" which is given as the instance of Phalotprekṣā, the suffix Tumun expresses Phala and there is Abhedānvaya between the Prakṛtyartha and Prtyayārtha; thus the meaning of 'Draṣṭum' is 'Darśanābhinnaphalam'. The same will have Anvaya with the 'Vanāntāḥ' by Prayojakatā-sambandha; thus the Viṣayin, i.e., 'Darśanābhinnaphala' is fancied on the Viṣaya, i.e., Vanānta. Though this should have direct Anvaya with the Lalāṭatvagvipāṭana only, because the Darśana is said to be the Phala of the Vipāṭana, such Anvaya cannot be accepted here because Ekadeśānvaya is not prohibited and so the Anvaya is said to be only with the Vanāntas through the Tvagvipāṭana. Thus, PR. maintains, different Sambandhas are to be accepted in different varieties of Utprekṣā.

Another main objection in accepting Abheda-Sambandha in all kinds of Utprekṣā is that in such a case, all the Utprekṣās result in Svarūpotprekṣā only with no scope for Hetūtprekṣā and Phalotprekṣā, because according to the theory of Prācīnas Utprekṣā will be of a Kārya, having some Hetu (Hetu-viśeṣaṇakakārya) and of Kāraṇa having some Phala (Phalaviśeṣaṇaka kāraṇa). Viśveśvara quotes the views of PR. about the Sambandha involved in Utprekṣā with approval (AK., pp. 194-95).

Next. PR. lays down an important principle for finding out the particular variety of Utprekṣā. He says that the name of the Utprekṣā is to be determined according to what is Vidheya in a particular example. For instance in "Viśleṣaduḥkhādiva Baddha-maunam" there is the Utprekṣā of both the 'Prakṛtyaṛtha', i.e., Duḥkha and the 'Pratyayārtha', i.e., Hetu, but the 'Pratyayārtha being Pradhāna their Utprekṣā should be named as Hetūtprekṣā only but not as Svarupotprekṣā. The same rule is to be applied to 'Vyapāṭayan draṣṭumivākṣarāṇi' etc.

Next PR. deals with the varieties of Dharma which is the Nimitta of Utprekṣā. The Dharma may be a Sādhāraṇadharma or an Asādhāraṇa-dharma which is turned to be Sādhāraṇadharma by such Upāyas like Rūpaka, Śleṣa, Apahnuti, Bimbapratibimba-bhāva, Upacāra, and Abhedādhyavasāya. He explains all these varieties with the help of suitable examples.

Atiśayokti

Atiśayokti is given, by some old rhetoricians like Bhāmaha (Kavyālaṅkāra. p. 62), a wider scope and it is considered by writers like Rudraṭa (Kāvyālaṅkāra II. 9) to be one of the four principles underlying many of the Alaṅkāras. But its scope has been restricted in course of time (as in the case of Vakrokti) and it is relegated to the position of an alaṅkāra by rhetoricians like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka. Jayaratha explains how it is futile to prove that Atiśayokti is underlying

all the Alaṅkāras (Vimarśinī. pp. 84-85). Atiśayokti is defined by Mammaṭa with the mention of its four sub-divisions :—

"निगीर्याध्यवसानन्तु प्रकृतस्य परेण यत् ।
प्रस्तुतस्य यदन्यत्वं यद्यर्थोक्तौ च कल्पनम् ।
कार्यकारणयोर्यश्च पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययः ।
विज्ञेयातिशयोक्तिः सा......" (KP., p. 491)

In fact he gives four different definitions of the four varieties of Atiśayokti. The introsusception of the Prakṛta (Upameya) and its Adhyavasāna in the form of Para (Upamāna), in other words the presentation of the Upameya only in the form of Upamāna (with no mention of Upameya at all) is an instance of the first variety of Atiśayokti.

Uddyota talks of a Kecinmata according to which the Adhyavasāna of not only Upameya but of any thing Prakṛta in the form of any Aprakṛta (not necessarily Upamāna alone) is the first variety of Atiśayokti (Uddyota. p. 491). It may be a right stand of the commentators but it is against Mammaṭa's statement :— 'उपमानेनान्तर्निगीर्णस्योपमेयस्य यदध्यवसानं सैका ।" (KP., p. 491),

Identifying the relevant object with the non-relevant is the second variety of Atiśayokti. The statement involving "if it were to be so" is the third variety of Atiśayokti whereas the fourth variety consists of the change in the order of the kāraṇa and Kārya. Thus Mammaṭa does not give us any definition which is Anugata to all the four varieties of Atiśayokti, and so it is like giving one name to four different Alaṅkāras.

Ruyyaka's definition of Atiśayokti is as follows :— 'अध्यवसितप्राधान्ये त्वतिशयोक्तिः' He mentions five varieties of this figure; 'Bhede Abhedaḥ', 'Abhede bhedaḥ', 'Sambandhe asambandhaḥ', 'Asambandhe-sambadhaḥ', Kārya-kāraṇa-paurvāparya-vidhvaṁsaśca (AS., p. 83). Thus, omitting

"yadyarthoktau ca kalpanam" of Mammaṭa the later writers include two new varieties 'Sambandhe asambandha' and 'Asambandhe sambandha'.

Alaṅkāraratnākara feels (p. 58) that the fifth variety (Kārya-kāraṇa-paurvāparya-vidhvaṁsa) can be included under 'Asambandhe sambandhaḥ'. But Vimarśinī (p. 84) refutes this contention and establishes this as the fifth variety of Atiśayokti.

"विषयिणा विषयस्य निगरणमतिशयः, तस्योक्तिः' RG., p. 410) is the definition of Atiśayokti as given by PR. Thus he appears to be taking the word 'Atiśaya' as a Yogarūḍha-pada as explained by Nāgeśa. Atiśaya consists of introsusception of the Viṣaya by the Viṣayin and the figure containing such Atiśaya is called Atiśayokti. Evidently, Lakṣaṇā is at work, in the place of Atiśayokti. Here PR. reminds us that the Lakṣyārtha-bodha will be Śakyatāvacchedaka-prakāraka as explained while discussing about the Lakṣaṇā-vṛtti.

The following Ślokas are given as the examples of Atiśayokti :

"कलिन्दगिरिनन्दिनीतटवनान्तरं भासयन्
सदा पथि गतागतक्लमभरं हरन् प्राणिनाम् ।
स्फुरत्कनककान्तिभिर्नवलताभिरावेल्लितो
ममापहरतु श्रमानतितमां तमालद्रुमः ॥"
"नयनानन्दसन्दोहतुन्दिलीकरणक्षमा ।
तिरयत्वाशु सन्तापं कापि कादम्बिनी मम ॥" (RG., pp. 411-12)

The Atiśayokti, in the first verse is named, perhaps for the time by PR., as Sāvayavātiśayokti, because one Nigaraṇa supports the other in it; and the second as Niravayavātiśayokti in the absence of such mutual support of the Nigaraṇas.

Next PR. examines the truth in the general belief as criticised by Prācinas that there is Abheda in Atiśayokti (RG., p 414). He says that it is proper to accept the existence of Abheda in Rūpakasthala where the Viṣaya and Viṣayin are mentioned and their Anvaya is effected by Abheda-saṁsarga. The same cannot be said in the case of Atiśayokti where only the Viṣaya is cognised in the form of Viṣayitāvacchedaka. Therefore the statement 'Abheda-pradhānātiśayokti' may be justified by taking the Viṣayitāvacchedaka itself as Bhedabhāvarūpa.

In this connection, PR. explains the nature of Viṣayitāvacchedaka in different places. At times, the Viṣayitāvacchedaka may be well-known, i.e., really existing, associated with the Dharmas, introduced for the firm establishment of the introsusception (Nigaraṇadārḍhya), commonly applicable to both the Viṣaya and the Viṣayin as in the case of the 'Kalindagirinandinī' etc. Here the Viṣayitāvacchedaka, i.e., 'Tamālatva' is the real one and all the Dharmas like the 'Kalindagirinandinītaṭavanāntara-bhāsana' etc., are applicable to both the Viṣaya, i.e., Viṣṇu and the Viṣayin Tamāla. At times the Viṣayitāvacchedaka may be Aprasiddha and the Dharmas also may be applicable to the Viṣaya only. For this PR. shows the verse : –

"स्मृतापि तरुणातपं करुणया हरन्ती नृणा-
मभङ्गुरतनुत्विषां वलयिता शतैर्विद्युताम् ।
कलिन्दगिरिनन्दिनीतटसुरद्रुमालम्बिनी
मदीयमतिचुम्बिनी भवतु कापि कादम्बिनी ॥"

and another verse as example. Here the Kādambinī which is described as 'Kāpi' is Alaukika and is the creation of the poet. Again the 'Kāruṇya', and 'tāpātapaharaṇa' etc., are properly applicable to the Viṣaya, i.e., Śrīkṛṣṇa only but not to the Kādambinī only on its being Lokottara.

As explained above, in all cases of Atiśayokti there is the cognition of the Viṣaya, only in the form of the Viṣayin, but

not as the 'Viṣayabhinna'. For Example, from the verse "Kalindagirinandinī" etc., we have the cognition of Hari only in Tamāltvarūpa but not in Tamālābhinnatvarūpa. Thus PR. finds fault with the contention of AD. that there are Abheda and Tādrūpya in Atiśayokti.

Here Nāgeśa (GMP; p. 414) tries to justify AD.'s statement by applying PR.'s own justification that Viṣayitāvacchedaka itself is taken as Abheda even by AD. It may be a correct justification, but AD. himself does not seem to have been sharing the same opinion because, as shown by his statement[1], the Abheda and the Tādrūpya which he accepts in Atiśayokti, are of the same nature as in Rūpaka.

Next PR. mentions and illustrates four more varieties of Atiśayokti, i.e., (1) 'Abhede bhedaḥ', (2) 'Asambandhe sambandhaḥ', (3) 'Sambandhe'pysambandhaḥ' and (4) 'Kārya-kāraṇa-paurvāparya-viparyaya'. He further states that according to the Prācīnas, the common definition of Atiśayokti is "Etadbhedapañcakānyatamatvam". He also quotes the views of the followers of Mammaṭa who refuse to accept 'Sambhandhe Asambandha' and 'asambandhe sambandha' as two separate Alaṅkāras, for, as they contend, these two principles which are underlying almost all the Alaṅkāras excepting Svabhāvokti cannot be accepted as pertaining to atiśayokti alone. Therefore they prefer the four varieties mentioned by Mammaṭa.

Next PR. mentions the views of the Navyas. The Navyas contend that Atiśayokti consists of the important principle 'Nigīryādhyavasāna'. In the absence of this main principle, the varieties like 'Bhede abhedaḥ' etc., cannot be taken as the varieties of Atiśayokti. They may be taken as some important

1. "अत्रातिशयोक्तौ रूपकविशेषाणां रूपकेदर्शितानां विधानामिहापि सम्भवोऽस्तीति अतिदेशेन प्रदर्शनार्थम् । तेनाऽत्राप्यभेदातिशयोक्तिस्ताद्रूप्यातिशयोक्तिः इति द्वैविध्यं द्रष्टव्यम् ।"

Kuvalayānanda, p. 39

Alaṅkāras because there is no single Lakṣaṇa which is Anugata to all of them.

Here arises a Pūrvapakṣa based on Ratnākara and Vimarśinī according to which such Nigīryādhyavasāna can be explained in these varieties also. For example, in the place of Bhede abheda, Bheda is being Nigīrṇa by Abheda which is Adhyavasita. The same can be said in other cases also. But the Navyas contend that there is no question of bringing in Nigaraṇa in places like 'Abheda bheda' etc., for there is no Camatkāra unless the Tadrūpavastu is presented as Atadrūpa in other words, the Nigaraṇa being inevitable we do not feel that Nigīryādhyavasāya is specially introduced here. Regarding the Anugatalakṣaṇa, it may be argued that the Bheda-pañcakānyatamatva will be such one. But when there is difference in the Saundarya and Camatkāra, how is it possible to have an Anugatalakṣaṇa to include different Alaṅkāras under one name? Moreover, when there is the possibility of formulating of many Alaṅkāras as possible according to the difference in their beauty where is the need of having one name, the Navyas contend.

Needless to say, PR. identifies himself with the Navyas as can be seen from his definition of Atiśayokti and he appears to be quite justified in doing so.

After criticising the examples of AD. given in Kuvalayānanda, PR. concludes his discussion on Atiśayokti with mentioning and explaining the Atiśayoktidhvani.

As can be seen from the examples of the first variety of Atiśayokti which alone is acceptable to him as Atiśayokti, PR, like Mammaṭa, appears to be in favour of accepting Upamānopameyabhāva underlying this figure of speech also.

Tulyayogitālaṅkāra

Mammaṭa's definition of this figure is as follows :—

"नियतानां सकृद्धर्मः (यदुपादीयते Pradīpa. p. 500) सा पुनस्तुल्ययोगिता" (KP., p. 500); "Tulyayogitā arises when a Dharma is mentioned once as associated with many things, all of them either Prakṛta or Aprakṛta." It is clear that there is Upamānopameya–bhāva implied in Tulyayogitā also as is explained in the case of Dīpaka. (KP., p. 498).

The same is expressed more clearly by Ruyyaka :— "औपम्यस्य गम्यत्वे पदार्थगतत्वेन प्रस्तुतानामप्रस्तुतानां वा समानधर्माभिसम्बन्धे तुल्ययोगिता" (AS. p. 89). The Samānādharma may be either Guṇa or Kriyā "तत्र प्राकरणिकानाम् अप्राकरणिकानां वा अर्थानां समानगुणक्रियासम्बन्धे अन्वितार्था तुल्ययोगिता (Vimarśinī, p. 89). We understand from the remarks of Vimarśinī (p. 90) that some old rhetoricians are in favour of accepting Tulyayogitā even in the absence of Upamānopameya-bhāva implied; and that according to some, Atiśayokti is the supporter (Anuprāṇaka) of this figure. There may be Bimbapratibimba-bhāva and Śuddha-sāmānya-rūpatā in Tulyayogitā also (Vimarśini. p. 91).

Talking of the Upamānopameya-bhāva implied in Tulyayogitā, Śobhākaramitra rightly remarks (A. Ratnākara p. 16), that of the things described as having one Dharma, the well-known one should be taken as the Upamāna and the other as Upameya, and if all of them are of same nature, i.e., either Prasiddha or Aprasiddha, the figure Upameyopamā should be understood as implied.

PR. defines Tulyayogitā in the following words : प्रकृतानामेवाप्रकृतानामेव वा गुणक्रियादिरूपैकधर्मान्वयस्तुल्ययोगिता (RG., p. 423). He also states that the Aupamya is implied in Tulyayogitā because the Samānadharma is mentioned while the Upamāvācaka is not expressed. Thus PR. infers that Sādṛśya is an independent Padārtha (Padārthāntara) according to the Ālaṅkārikas (RG., p. 423) because, if Sādṛśya were to be identical with Samānadharma, it would be improper to call the Aupamya as Gamya while the Samānadharma (Vigalana) is mentioned in the verse :—

"प्रिये विषादं जहिहीति वाचं प्रिये सरागं वदति प्रियायाः ।
वारामुदारा विजगाल धारा विलोचनाभ्यां मनसश्च मानः ॥"

(RG., p. 424)

But he states another view according to which Sādṛśya is identical with Sādhāraṇadharma but only Sādṛṣya-bhāva is different from it and it is the Śakyatāvacchedaka of Ivādipadas. But PR. does not seem to be particular about these different views.

After giving suitable examples, PR. states that the अनेकसम्बद्धधर्म need not be kriyā and guṇa only as was thought by Sarvasvakāra and his follower, Appayadīkṣita. In support of his contention he gives an example where Abhāvarūpadharma is described as associated with many things. That is why he includes the word आदि in the definition by saying Guṇa-kriyādi. He suggests further simplification of the Lakṣaṇa as "(यथाकथञ्चित्) अनेकत्र एकान्वयः" which thus brings "एकस्त्वं दानशीलोसि प्रत्यर्थिषु तथार्थिषु" etc. under Tulyayogitā.

PR. also feels that there is no need of accepting "Hitāhite Vṛttitaulyam" as a separate variety of Tulyayogitā as was accepted by AD. (Kuvalayānanda. p. 47) because, he contends, all the examples of the so-called separate variety can be covered by the first definition which is given earlier as "वर्ण्यानामितरेषां वा धर्मैक्यं तुल्ययोगिता" (p. 46). The line "जगाल मानो हृदयादमुष्याः विलोचनाभ्यामिव वारिधारा" which is generally believed as an instance of Upamā may be taken as an example of Tulyayogitā also, because the two objects Māna and Vāridhārā are described as having connection with one Kriyā, i.e., Galana. Similarly "Candra iva Mukhaṁ sundaram" may be taken as an instance of Dīpaka, because the Saundarya is associated with Mukha (the Prakṛta) and Candra (Aprakṛta). Thus there may be an overlapping of their Lakṣaṇa in Rūpa-

kasthala also. Here PR. states that the Camatkāra alone should be taken as the deciding factor. If it is felt that the Ekadharmānvaya is a source of Camatkāra in a particular place, it should be taken as an instance of Tulyayogitā. Otherwise, Rūpaka or Upamā can be accepted according to the importance of Abheda or Sādṛśya.

"दधीचिबलिकर्णेषु हिमहेमाचलाब्धिषु ।
अदातृत्वमधैर्यञ्च दृष्टे भवति भासते ॥"

is given as an instance of 'Raśanārūpa tulyayogitā' supported by Yathāsaṅkhya. It is called Raśanārūpa because of the cognition "Dahīciriva baliḥ", "Baliriva karṇaḥ" etc. PR introduces a new variety of Tulyayogitā which he calls Kārakatulyayogitā. It arises when one Kāraka is described as associated with many Kriyās as in :—

"वसु दातुं यशो धातुं विधातुमरिमर्दनम् ।
त्रातुञ्च सकलां पृथ्वीमतीव निपुणो भवान् ॥"

He concludes his discussion on this Alaṅkāra after giving an example for 'Tulyayogitādhvani'.

Dīpakālaṅkāra.

It is defined by Mammaṭa in the following words : —

" सकृद्वृत्तिस्तु धर्मस्य प्रकृताप्रकृतात्मनाम् ।
सैव क्रियासु बह्वीषु कारकस्येति दीपकम् ॥" (KP., p. 498)

"The mention, only once, of a Dharma as associated with both the Prakṛta and Aprakṛta is Dīpaka. The connection of one Kāraka with many Kriyās constitutes another variety of Dīpaka." According to him there will be Upamānopameyabhāva between Prākaraṇikāprākaraṇikas.

Alaṅkārasarvasva (p. 91) defines it as "प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतानान्तु दीपकम्," which is to be understood by borrowing some words from the previous Kārikā as "औपम्यस्य गम्यत्वे पदार्थगतत्वेन प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतानां समानधर्माभिसम्बन्धे दीपकम्". PR.'s definition of Dīpaka

is also on the same lines :—"प्रकृताप्रकृतानाञ्चैकसाधारणधर्मान्वयो दीपकम्' ; 'प्राग्वदेवात्राप्यौपम्यस्य गम्यत्वम्" (RG., p. 431), Dīpaka is so named because one Dharma which is mentioned in relation to the Prakṛta, beautifies the Aprakṛta also; or because, it brightens like a lamp, both Prakṛta and Aprakṛta; thus Dehalīdattadīpanyāya is implied in this name.

After citing a few verses as the examples of Dīpaka, PR. gives a verse where two sets of different Kārakas are having Dīpaka separately.

सुजनाः परोपकारं शूराः शस्त्रं धनं कृपणाः ।

कुलवत्यो मन्दाक्षं प्राणात्यय एव मुञ्चन्ति ॥ (RG., p. 432). Here the four Kartṛkārakas (Sujanāḥ etc.) are associated with the Mocanakriyā and thus constitute one Dīpaka. Again the four Karmakārakas (Paropakāram etc.,) also are associated with the same Kriyā and thus constitute another Dīpaka and in both the places the Upamānopameya-bhāva is among the Kartṛkārakas and the Karmakārakas only separately.

Next, he gives a verse as the example of Kāraka-Dīpaka where many Kriyās are associated with one Kāraka :

वसु दातुं यशो धातुं विधातुमरिमर्दनम् ।

त्रातुञ्च मादृशान् राजन् अतीव निपुणो भवान् ॥" (RG., p. 432)

Here Vasudāna and Mādṛśatrāṇa are Prakṛta kriyās, Ari-mardana-vidhānam is an Aprastutakriyā and Yaśodhāna is Ubhayavidha-kriyā and these Kriyās are associated with the Kartṛkāraka, i.e., Bhavān.

Next PR. proceeds to examine the definition given by Mammaṭa. He contends that the second definition of Dīpaka सैव क्रियासु बह्वीषु कारकस्येति दीपकम् (KP., p. 498) is unnecessary because the Kāraka-dīpaka, which is intended to be defined by the above line, can be included by the first definition itself, i. e., "सकृद्वृत्तिस्तु धर्मस्य प्रकृताप्रकृतात्मनाम्", because it is almost the same whether many Kārakas are described as associated

with one Kriyā or many Kriyās as associated with one Kāraka, so far as this definition is concerned. It may be argued that the Prakṛtāprakṛtatva is not applicable to the Kriyās and so the Kriyās having Ekakārakānvaya may be Śuddha-prakṛtas or Śuddhāprakṛtas, and that this has necessitated the mention of the second definition. But this explanation removes the scope for Kārakatulyayogitā. Moreover, it is against the accepted theory of the Ālaṅkārikas which requires the existence of both the Prakṛta and Aprakṛta in Dīpaka. Again, these two varieties would become two entirely different Alaṅkāras having no Anugata-lakṣaṇa.

PR. also finds fault with the example given by Mammaṭa which runs as follows :—

"स्विद्यति कूणति वेल्लति विवलति निमिषति विलोकयति तिर्यक् ।
अन्तर्नन्दति चुम्बितुमिच्छति नवपरिणीता वधूः शयने ॥ "
(KP. p. 499).

Though all the Kriyās are associated with one Kāraka (Vadhūḥ), we do not find any Upamānopameya-bhāva among them (Kriyās) which is the essential underlying principle in Dīpaka and Tulyayogitā. Therefore this verse may be taken as an instance of Samuccaya only. Even if it is insisted that there is Upamānopameya-bhāva among these Kriyās also, PR. maintains, it can be an example of Tulyayogitā only because all these Kriyās are Prakṛtas. The same idea is expressed about this verse by Jayaratha (Vimarśinī. p. 93) also which is evidently followed by PR.

But Nāgeśa in his Uddyota (p. 499), tries to explain that the difference between the two varieties of Dīpaka, mentioned by Mammaṭa, consists in the presence of Upamānopameyabhāva in the first one and its absence in the second. On this ground he criticises the views of PR. and Vimarśinīkāra. But PR's contention that the implied Aupamya is the life of Dīpaka and that there would be no Anugata lakṣaṇa for these two varieties stands unanswered.

Next, after showing some defects in the example of Kāraka-Dīpaka as given by Vimarśinīkāra, PR. proceeds to examine if it is necessary to accept Dīpaka and Tulyayogitā as two different Alaṅkāras. He contends that Dipaka need not be accepted as a separate Alaṅkāra, independent of Tulyayogitā. Alaṅkāra-bheda can generally be accepted only when there is Camatkāra-bheda. The source of Camatkāra in both of these Alaṅkāras being the Sakṛdvṛtti of a Dharma, it is not proper to distinguish one from the other on a slender ground of Prakṛtā prakṛtabheda. If this alone were to be taken as the sound basis of differentiation, the two varieties of Tulyayogitā, one connected with kevala-prakṛtas and the other with the Kevalāprakṛtas, will have to be accepted as two different Alaṅkāras. Such differentiation will have to be effected in many of Alaṅkāras like Śleṣa also. It may be argued, as is done by Ruyyaka (AS., p.91) that real Aupamya is implied in Dīpaka which consists of Prakṛtāprakṛtas, because Upameya is Prakṛta and Upamāna is Aprakṛta and that the Aupamya implied in Tulyayogitā is only Vaivakṣika, because it (Tulyayogitā) consists of either, only Prakṛtas or, only Aprakṛtas with no real scope for Upamānopameya-bhāva. But PR. says that there is no rule that Upamānopameya-bhāva should invariably consist of Prakṛtāprakṛtatva. If this were to be the case, it would have been improper to accept Aupamya in "Khamiva jalaṁ Jalamiva kham", an instance of Upameyopamā, and in Pratīpa. Therefore, it is better to accept Dīpaka as a third variety of Tulyayogitā (RG., p. 437). It is to be noted that PR. closely follows the views of Vimarśinī in not accepting Dīpaka as an independent Alaṅkāra and refuting the Prakṛtāprakṛta-rūpatva as an essential element in Upamānopa meyabhava.

Quoting the views of PR. Viśveśvara says that instead of including Dīpaka in Tulyayogitā, the latter should be included under the former, because Dīpaka is mentioned as an

Alaṅkāra by the sage Bharata (AK., p. 296). Viśveśvara's contention may be the result of his great respect for the sage, but it cannot be said as based on sound reasoning. The name Dīpaka, as explained above, suggests the existence of both the prakṛtas and Aprakṛtas and this cannot be applied to Tulyayogītā which consists of either only the Prakṛtas or Aprakṛtas. But the name Tulyayogitā can be applied to Dīpaka also because it (Tulyayogitā) means the association of the same thing with many. Thus PR.'s contention seems to be correct.

Like Viśvanātha (SD., p. 35) PR. also rejects the threefold division of Dīpaka based on Ādi-madhyāvasāna-gatatva as having no special charm. According to him Mālādīpaka is not Dīpaka because it is one of the varieties of the figure Ekāvalī.

Like Jayaratha, PR. accepts Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva and Śuddha-sāmānya-rūpatva in Dīpaka also and explains them with suitable examples. He concludes his discussion on Dīpaka with the mention of some of the Doṣas pertaining to it.

Prativastūpamā

According to Mammaṭa Prativastūpamā arises when the same Sādhāraṇadharma is expressed twice in two different sentences having Upamānopameya-bhāva : "प्रतिवस्तूपमा तु सा । सामान्यस्य द्विरेकस्य यत्र वाक्यद्वये स्थितिः" (KP., pp. 494-5).

This expression of the Sādhāraṇadharma should be done by employing two different words of the same meaning because the use of the same word is prohibited on account of the Kathita-padatva-doṣa. Pradīpa (p. 495) understands the words 'Dviḥ and 'Dvaye' (in Vākya-dvaye) as Anekopalakṣakas. The etymology of the word is explained by Uddyota (p. 495) as "प्रतिवस्तु प्रतिवाक्यार्थं उपमा समानधर्मोऽस्यामिति व्युत्पत्तेः".

Ruyyaka's definition of Prativastūpamā is as follows :— "वाक्यार्थगतत्वेन सामान्यस्य वाक्यद्वये पृथङ्निर्देशे प्रतिवस्तूपमा" (AS., p.

94). "Prativastūpamā arises when the Sādhāraṇa-dharma associated with two Vākyārthas is separately mentioned in two different sentences."

The difference of Prativastūpamā from other figures is succinctly brought out by Ruyyaka in following words :— "सामान्यधर्मस्येवाद्युपादाने सकृन्निर्देशे उपमा। वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभावेनासकृन्निर्देशेऽपि सैव। इवाद्यनुपादाने सकृन्निर्देशे दीपकतुल्ययोगिते। असकृन्निर्देशे त शुद्धसामान्यरूपत्व बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावो वा। आद्यः प्रकारः प्रतिवस्तूपमा... द्वितीयप्रकाराश्रयणे दृष्टान्तो वक्ष्यते। तदेवं औपम्याश्रयेणैव प्रतिवस्तूपमा।" (AS., p. 95) Thus the mention, twice of the Śādhāraṇadharma in two sentences (by different words) without using the words like 'Iva' etc., is the main principle in Prativastūpamā.

PR.'s definition expresses the same idea in clearer terms :—वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभावापन्नसाधारणधर्मकवाक्यार्थयोरार्थमौपम्यं प्रतिवस्तूपमा (RG., p. 452); "Prativastūpama arises when there is an implied Aupamya between two Vākyārthas with their Sādhāraṇa-dharmas, involved in Vastu-prativastu-bhāva, being expressed by different words." After giving two verses as the example of Prativastūpamā in Sādharmya, he gives two more verses as the instances of Prativastūpamā in Vaidharmya :—

वंशभवो गुणवानपि सङ्गविशेषेण पूज्यते पुरुषः।
न हि तुम्बीफलविकलो वीणादण्डः प्रयाति महिमानम्॥" and

"गीर्भिर्गुरूणां परुषाक्षराभिः तिरस्कृता यान्ति नरा महत्त्वम्।
अलब्धशाणोत्कषणा नृपाणां न जातु मौलौ मणयो वसन्ति॥"

(RG., p. 444)

The process of the cognition of Aupamya in Vaidharmya-sthala, as explained by PR. is as follows. In the verse "Vaṁśa-bhavo guṇavānapi" etc., the second half is given as the Vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta. On the strength of it, we can have Vyati-reka-vyāpti in the Pūrvārdha in a general way with no diffe-

rence to the Viśeṣa like Puruṣa etc., as "यत्र यत्र सङ्गविशेषाभाव: तत्र तत्र पूजाभाव:". Thus the Dṛṣṭānta-dārṣṭāntika-bhāva (Aupamya) between the two Vākyārthas is maintained. Again the above Vyatireka-vyāpti, will, in the next step, result in Anvayavyāpti in a general way as "यत्र यत्र सङ्गविशेष: तत्र तत्रपूजा". Now this general Vyāpti can be applied in Puruṣa-viśeṣa. It is the case not only in the Vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta but also in Anvaya-dṛṣṭānta-sthala of Prativastūpamā like the following verse :—

"आपद्गत: खलु महाशयचक्रवर्ती विस्तारयत्यकृतपूर्वमुदारभावम् ।
कालागुरुर्दहनमध्यगत: समन्तात् लोकोत्तरं परिमलं प्रकटीकरोति ॥

(RG., p. 443)

The Kitchen cannot be taken as Dṛṣṭānta in a Viśeṣa-rūpānumiti like "पर्वत: एतद्वह्निमान्, एतद्धूमात्" etc; similarly the Uttarārdha cannot be taken as the Dṛṣṭānta as long as the Pūrvārdha is understood in a Viśiṣṭa-rūpa (as pertaining to an individual). Therefore it should be first understood in a general way : "आपद्गतमहाशय: उदारभावविस्तारक:, यथा परिमलप्रकटीकर्ता दह्यमानकालागुरु:." Then it will not be improper to understand it in individualistic sense. All this is the procedure when it is felt that there is a kind of Niyama (Vyāpti) in Prativastūpamā-sthala. But it is not necessary when simple Aupamya is taken as the principle underlying this figure as in "भैरभ्रे भासते चन्द्रो भुवि भाति भवान् बुधै:.[1]"

The Upamānopameyabhāva, in the Vyatireka-sthala, PR. explains, is not between the Vākyārthas as directly expressed by them, but as ultimately understood from them. For example, the Upamānopameya-bhāva, in "Vaṁśa-bhavo" is only between Saṅga-viśeṣābhāva-nimittaka-pūjābhāva and Tumbī-phalābhāva-nimittaka-vīṇādaṇḍa-mahimābhāva.

1. All this procedure laid down by PR. has been incorporated, almost verbatim, by Nāgeśa in his Uddyota (p. 496).

AD. gives the following two verses as the examples of Prativastūpamā in Vaidharmya :—

"विद्वानेव विजानाति विद्वज्जनपरिश्रमम् ।
न हि वन्ध्या विजानाति गुर्वीं प्रसववेदनाम् ॥"and
"यदि सन्ति गुणाः पुंसां विकसन्त्येव ते स्वयम् ।
न हि कस्तूरिकामोदः शपथेन विभाव्यते ॥"

(Kuvalayānanda. p. 54).

Here PR. contends that the first verse may somehow be taken as the Vaidharmyodāharaṇa, but not the second one. In this connection, he gives a precise definition of Vaidharmyodāharaṇa. "वैधर्म्योदाहरणं हि प्रस्तुतधर्मिविशेषोपारूढार्थदार्ढ्याय स्वाक्षिप्तस्वव्यतिरेकसमानजातीयस्य धर्म्यन्तरारूढस्याप्रकृतार्थस्य कथनम्" (RG., p. 448). To put in simple words, Vaidharmyodāharaṇa consists in the mention of an Aprakṛtārtha which is, on similar lines (Sajātīya) of the reverse of the Prakṛtārtha. Applying this principle, in the present verse, the opposite of the Prakṛtārtha, i.e., "यदि सन्ति गुणाः पुंसां विकसन्त्येव ते स्वयम्" is " असन्तः गुणाः उपायान्तरेणापि न प्रकाशन्ते" and the second half should be on similar lines. But, as pointed out rightly by PR., the second half expresses the Anurūpārtha only, because it expresses, in purport, that the existing good smell comes out by itself without anybody's help. Thus it is only Sādharmyodāharaṇa but not Vaidharmyodāharaṇa because the meaning of the whole verse is like that of the following slightly modified version which cannot under any circumstances, be called Vaidharmyodāharaṇa.

'सन्तः स्वतः प्रकाशन्ते गुणा न परतो नृणाम् ।
आमोदो न हि कस्तूर्याः शपथेनानुभाव्यते ॥"

(RG., p. 449).

PR. ridicules its acceptanc as Vaidharmyodāharoṇa simply because there is Nañprayoga. It can be so accepted if

the second line is substituted by another line and the verse is read differently—

"यदि सन्ति गुणाः पुंसां विकसन्त्येव ते स्वयम् ।
वाचा वाचस्पतेर्व्योम्नि विलसन्ति न वल्लयः ।।"

(RG., p. 449).

These views of PR. are quoted by Viśveśvara with approval (AK., p. 287). Nāgeśa (Uddyota. p. 447) tries hard to criticise the views of PR. but his arguments, based on far-fetched explanation as they are, do not seem to be convincing.

It is to be noted here that Ratnākara (AR., p. 19) does not accept the verse :

"महीभृतो पुत्रवतोऽपि दृष्टिस्तस्मिन्नपत्ये न जगाम् तृप्तिम् ।
अनन्तपुष्पस्य मधोर्हि चूते द्विरेफमाला सविशेषसङ्गा ।।"

as the instance of Prativastūpamā in Vaidharmya on the similar ground as explained by PR.

PR. lays down a general principle to be observed in all the figures like Prativastūpamā according to which the balance between the two sentences should be well-maintained in all details like the Nāmārthas and the Vibhaktis etc. By applying this test, PR. points out some defects even in the verse of Śrīharṣa (RG., pp. 451-2).

Before concluding his discussion on this figure, PR., like Mammaṭa, mentions Mālārūpa-Prativastūpamā also.

Dṛṣṭānta Alaṅkāra.

It is defined by Mammṭa as "दृष्टान्तः पुनरेतेषां सर्वेषां प्रतिबिम्बनम्" (KP., p. 496). Explained in association with the previous Kārikās, this definition means that "Dṛṣṭānta arises when there is reflection (Pratibimbanam) of all things including the Sādhārṇa-dharma balanced in two Sentences." Pradīpa explains the name of this figure as "दृष्टोऽन्तो निश्चयः उपमानिर्वाहकः अत्रालङ्कारे दृष्टान्तः" (KP., p. 497). This figure also is shown both in Sādharmya and Vaidharmya.

Ruyyaka's definition is also on the same lines : "तस्यापि विम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावतया निर्देशो दृष्टान्तः" (AS., p. 96). This is further explained by him : "तस्यापीति, न केवलमुपमानोपमेययोः । तच्छब्देन सामान्यधर्मः प्रत्यवमृष्टः." Thus the figure Dṛṣṭānta arises when there is Bimba-pratibimbabhāva in Upamāna, Upameya and Sādhāraṇadharma balanced in two sentences.

"प्रकृतवाक्यार्थघटकानामुपमानादीनां साधारणधर्मस्य च बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावे दृष्टान्तः" (RG., p. 452), is the definition given by PR. which is based on that of Mammaṭa.

The difference between this figure and Prativastūpamā consists in having the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva of the Sādhāraṇa-dharma also which is not to be found in the latter. In other words, "although in both, similarity is implied, still in Prativastūpmā the attribute is the same in both the sentences, being only expressed in different words; while in Dṛṣṭānta, the attribute in one sentence is only similar to (and not identical with) the attribute in the second sentence. In Dṛṣṭānta, the two attributes mentioned in two sentences stand in the relation of original and its reflection" (SD., p. 168).

Next PR. examines the views of Jayaratha regarding the differentiating factor between these two figures. Jayaratha (AS., p. 95) draws the following distinction. In Prativastūpamā there is Upamānopameyabhāva between the two Vākyārthas, Prakṛta and Aprakṛta whereas it is absent in Dṛṣṭānta. In this figure, the Aprakṛta is introduced only to elucidate the first Vākyārtha, almost by way of example, with the intention of showing that there is the possibility of another Vākyārtha similar to the present one. This view is strongly criticised by PR. He contends that when parallelism is well-maintained between two sentences in both the cases, there is no point in arguing that there is Upamānopameyabhāva in one case but not in the other. When it is accepted

that the purpose of introducing the second Vākyārtha is to show that there is similar Vākyārtha (एतादृशोऽर्थोऽन्यत्रापि स्थितः) it is tantamount to say that there is Upamānopameya-bhava in Dṛṣṭānta also. Moreover, Jayratha's contention is against the views of Sarvasvakāra who clearly indicates that there is Aupamya in Dṛṣṭānta. Therefore, PR. concludes, the distinction between these two figures is based on the existence of the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in Samānadharma in one case and its absence in the other.

Further, PR. is not in favour of accepting Dṛṣṭānta as an independent Alaṅkāra, because the difference between this figure and Prativastūpamā is based on insufficient ground. They may be accepted as two different varieties of one Alaṅkāra (RG., p. 455).

Viśveśvara, while accepting the point of distinction explained by PR., feels that these two figures should not be taken as two varieties of one Alaṅkāra, only because Upamānopameya-bhāva is common to both of them. He shows another point of distinction. In Prativastūpamā the Aprakṛtavākyārtha helps us in drawing a Vyāpti-jñāna in the Kāryakāraṇabhāva mentioned in the Prakṛta-vākyārtha whereas it is not possible in Dṛṣṭānta. (AK., p. 290).

Perhaps PR. feels that it is not correct to accept that Vyāpti is arrived at with the help of the Aprakṛtavākyārtha, as he clearly explains (RG., p. 445) in Prativastūpamāsthala. Thus he gives an example of Prativastūpamā where there is no possibility of such Vyāptijñāna. Viewed in this light, PR.'s stand seems to be correct.

PR. concludes his discussion on Dṛṣṭānta after showing an example based on Vaidharmya.

Nidarśanālaṅkāra

As defined by Mammaṭa, 'अभवन् वस्तुसम्बन्धः उपमापरिकल्पकः'

(KP., p. 480), "Nidarśanā arises when the Sambandha of two things, which is impossible in natural course, but is effected through implied simile, is described." Pradīpa explains two varieties of Nidarśanā, the one consisting of Avāntara-vākya-bheda and the other without such bheda and it takes the two verses given by Mammaṭa, as the examples of these two varieties. Mammaṭa also mentions Mālārūpa-nidarśanā. He accepts one more variety of Nidarśanā, which is defined as "स्वस्वहेत्वन्वयस्योक्तिः क्रिययैव च सापरा" (KP., p. 483). "The description of the relation between something and its cause, effected only through the Kriyā" is another type of Nidarśanā. It has been named "Sambhavadvastunibandhanā" by Uddyota (p. 483).

According to Ruyyaka's definition, Nidarśanā is as follows : "सम्भवता असम्भवता वा वस्तुसम्बन्धेन गम्यमानं प्रतिबिम्बकरणं निदर्शना" (AS., p. 97); "Nidarśanā consists of the Upamānopa-meya-bhāva implied through the Vastusambandha whether possible or fancied." Thus Ruyyaka unites the two definitions of Mammaṭa and brings them under one definition. Vimarśinī (p. 97) remarks "बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बमिति उपमानोपमेयत्वमित्यर्थः । धर्म-धर्मिणोरभेदोपचारात् । एवञ्चात्र निदर्शनायां सादृश्याविनाभावः ।" There is Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva in this figure also (Vimarśinī. p. 101).

Viśvanātha's (SD., p. 30) definition closely follows that of Ruyyaka. He divides the Asambhavadvastusambandha-nidarśanā into two varieties as Ekavākyagā and Anekavākyagā and this division corresponds to the division by Ruyyaka as Padārtha-vastu and Vākyārtha-vastu (AS., p. 98).

Though there is much difference in the definitions given by the above writers, Mammaṭa lays stress on the Vastu-sambandha whereas the other writers lay stress on the implied Upamānopameya-bhāva.

PR. appears to have been following Mammaṭa, in that he also gives importance to the Sambandha (Abheda) by way of showing it as Vidheya. His definition is as follows : "उपात्तयो-रर्थयोरार्थभेदः औपम्यपर्यवसायी निदर्शना" (RG., p. 456). The implied identity with each-other of two explicitly mentioned things resulting in Aupamya (similarity) is an instance of Nidarśanā. Ārthābheda is explained by PR. as the Abheda cognised from a sentence at the second instance.

After examining the purpose of the different words in the definition, PR. explains the figure with the help of suitable examples. He accepts two main varieties of Nidarśanā, (1) Vākyārtha nidarśanā, and (2) Padārtha nidarśanā, the former being again of two kinds, Ekavākya-gatā and Bhinna-vākya-gatā.

It may be argued that Vākyārtha-nidarśanā and Padārtha nidarśanā, can be explained away as Rūpaka-dhvani and Atiśayokti respectively and that there is no need of accepting them as the two varieties of a separate Alaṅkāra. But PR. maintains that Rūpaka in Vākyārtha-nidarśanā being Guṇībhūta, it cannot be called Rūpaka-dhvani. Moreover, Rūpaka and Atiśayokti consist of Upamānābheda of Upameya whereas in Nidarśanā the abheda is with each other, i.e., Upameyābheda in Upamāna and Upamānābheda in Upameya. Thus the Uddeśya-vidheya-bhāva with reference to abheda in Rūpaka and Atiśayokti is of a fixed order, whereas it is not so in the case of Nidarśanā.

Next PR. repeats his arguments, as put forth in the Rūpaka-prakaraṇa, regarding Ruyyaka's example of Vākyārtha nidarśanā, "Tvatpāda-nakha-ratnānām" etc. He states that it should be taken as an instance of Vākyārtha-rūpaka, unless it is read with some slight modification (RG., p. 463).

It is to be noted that Śobhākaramitra also takes this verse as an example of Vākyārtha-rūpaka (AR., p. 21). Vimarśinīkāra also seems not altogether disinclined to accept Vākyārtha-

rūpaka as can be guessed from his following remarks :—"प्रत-श्चानयोर्वाक्यार्थयो: सामानाधिकरण्यनिर्देशात् श्रौतारोपसद्भावेन वाक्यार्थ-रूपकं यदुक्तं तत्तावदास्ताम् । यत्पुन: प्रतिवस्तूपमोदाहरणत्वमुक्तं तदयुक्तमेव" (Vimarśinī, p. 99).

Next, PR. (RG., p. 464), like Ruyyaka (AS., p. 99) states that in Dṛṣṭānta, the two Vākyārthas are independent whereas in Nidarśanā they are interdependent.

At the end PR. gives two verses as examples of Mālā-Nidarśanā. In the Nirṇaya Sāgar edition, one sentence seems to have been lost before the verse ' Hālāhalaṁ Khalu" etc., which must be 'Mālārūpeṇa nidarśanā yathā'. That is why, the Marathi translation of Rasagaṅgādhara adds such a sentence (RG., Marathi, Part-II, p. 514).

Vyatirekālaṅkāra

Mammaṭa's definition of Vyatirekālaṅkāra is as follows:—"उपमानाद्यदन्यस्य व्यतिरेक: स एव स: ......व्यतिरेक: आधिक्यम्" (KP., p. 502). "The superiority of Upameya to the Upamāna is called Vyatireka." He talks of twenty-four varieties of this figure and at the end mentions Mālāvyatireka also (KP. p. 506).

According to Ruyyaka, the superiority, not only of Upameya but also of Upamāna, constitutes Vyatireka (AS., p. 101). The superiority and inferiority result from the adhika-guṇatva and Nyūna-guṇatva respectively. Vimarśinīkāra (p. 103) maintains that this Vyatireka would ultimately result in Sādṛśya and thus, like Mammaṭa, he also feels that Sādṛśya is the underlying principle in Vyatireka also. Ruyyaka does not mention all the varieties of this figure. which are acceptable to Mammaṭa.

Viśvanātha follows Ruyyaka in defining Vyatireka, and follows Mammaṭa in its subdivisions. As he accepts the

superiority of Upamāna also as the second variety, he has to accept twenty-four more sub-divisions of this variety, bringing the total to forty-eight.

Ratnākara's definition of Vyatireka is somewhat different and on close analysis it appears to be mainly based on the one given by Mammaṭa (AR., p. 27).

PR.'s definition of Vyatireka is based on that of Mammaṭa. It runs thus : "उपमानादुपमेयस्य गुणविशेषणत्वेनोत्कर्षो व्यतिरेकः" (RG., p. 467). The superiority of Upameya over Upamāna on account of Upameya having a superior quality is Vyatireka. The superiority of Upamāna cannot be an instance of Vyatireka because its superiority being real, (because Upamāna is always superior to the Upameya) the description of the same cannot have any special charm.

After giving a suitable example of this figure PR., following the old writers, like Mammaṭa, shows the sub-divisions of the same into twenty-four varieties. In Vyatireka there can be two Vaidharmyas, one resulting in the superiority of Upameya, another resulting in the inferiority of Upamāna. Thus Vyatireka is having four varieties, (1) where both the Vaidharmyas are mentioned, (2) both of them are not mentioned, (3) Upameyotkarṣaka only is mentioned, and (4) Upamānāpakarṣaka alone is mentioned. Each of these four varieties can further be divided into three groups by having Śrauti Upamā, Ārthī Upamā and Ākṣiptopamā, thus increasing the number to twelve. Each of these twelve varieties are further sub-divided as having Śleṣa, and being without it. Thus the total number of the varieties is twenty-four which is acceptable to Mammaṭa also. He next explains some of these varieties with suitable examples.

Evidently PR. is not satisfied with the sub-divisions of the old writers. He says that it is not possible to find suitable examples for the three varieties having Śleṣa when both

the Vaidharmya-Prayojakas are not mentioned (with Upamā Śrauti, or Ārthī, or Ākṣiptā), because, he contends, where to find place for Śleṣa when the Vaidharmya is omitted. In fact, he says, all the varieties of Upamā can be formed in Vyatireka also and so there is no point in restricting the number to twenty-four only.

Now PR. raises a question; how can Vyatireka be called Upamāgarbha when it is directly opposed to it, since it consists of the negation of Sādharmya. He replies that the negation of Sādharmya involved in Vyatireka is only with reference to a particular Guṇa and this negation results in the superiority of the Upameya; yet it cannot be taken as the complete negation of Sādṛśya, because Sādharmya is possible with reference to another Guṇa. If Sādṛśya in general is to be negated, there would be no meaning in negating it with reference to a particular Guṇa only. For example, when one says "Dhanena ayamasmād adhikaḥ", it is generally understood that he is equal to him in learning, beauty and Kula etc. But such Sādṛśya cannot produce the Camatkāra. Thus, Sādṛśya is responsible for calling Vyatireka as Upamāgarbha (RG., p. 471).

Nāgeśa explains the Upamāgarbhatva of Vyatireka in a different way. He does not accept the explanation of PR. He contends that according to what is said by PR., one is to understand that the Sādṛśya in कथमिन्दुरिवाननं त्वदीयं सकलङ्कः स कलङ्कहीनमेतत् (RG., p. 468) is based on Sakalaṅkatva and its negation makes us cognise the Sādṛṣya based on some other Guṇa. But it is contrary to the general experience. Therefore one has to concede that in Vyatirekasthala the Sādṛśya based on some other Dharma is negated by mentioning some Ādhikya or Nyūnatva. Moreover in some places like 'Kathaṁ tulayāmaḥ kalayāpi paṅkajam', the Sādṛśya is completely negated. He also feels that it is wrong to say that when the Sādṛśya with regard to a particular Guṇa is negated, the Sādṛśya based on

other Guṇas is not the source of Camatkāra; because when it is said ' Devadattena sadṛśo Yajñadattaḥ, Dhanamasyādhikam" etc., it is generally experienced that the Sādṛśya based on Vidyā etc., is also charming. Therefore the Upamāgarbhatva of Vyatireka is that, had there not been the description of Nyūnatā or Ādhikya it (the Vyatireka) would have resulted in Sādṛśya, i.e , Upamā. Why even this Upamāgarbhatva is required in Vyatireka ? This is explained by Nāgeśa as being intended to avoid such expressions as ' Kumudādatiricyate mukham" etc. coming under the fold of Vyatireka because there is no question of Aupamya between Kumuda and Mukham (GMP., p. 471-72).

Similar views are expressed by Nāgeśa in Uddyota (p. 504) also. But his arguments about the Sādṛśya being based on other Guṇa (other than the negated one) as advanced in Marmaprakāśa and Uddyota are contradictory. While he criticises PR.'s contention and writes in the former, that there is Camatkāra in such Sādṛśya also, he appears to have been favouring PR's views in the latter (GMP., p. 472 and Uddyota, p. 504).

Nāgeśa's explanation of the Upamāgarbhatva of the Vyatireka may appear to be more satisfactory than that of PR. But it can be found on careful observation that PR's contention is more in keeping with the nature of Vyatireka. As the various definitions of this figure show, its main characteristic principle lies in the establishment of the superiority of the Upameya, but not in the total negation of Sādharmya as is supposed by Nāgeśa. In fact, Nāgeśa himself accepts this as the real nature of Vyatireka when he writes, later on, "उपमानाद्धि उपमेये वर्ण्यमानं वैलक्षण्यमेव गुणाधिक्यकृतं व्यतिरेकः" (GMP., p 476). The Sādharmya-niśedha is taken only as a means to that end Thus the following verse of Kālidāsa would suggest that there is some Sādharmya based on a particular Guṇa though it is negated on the basis of some other Guṇa :

"नागेन्द्रहस्तास्त्वचि कर्कशत्वात् नितान्तशैत्यात् कदलीविशेषाः ।
लब्ध्वापि लोके परिणाहरूपं जातास्तदूर्वोरुपमानबाह्या ॥"

(Kumārasaṁbhava, I. 36).

Here how can the Upamānopameya-bhāva be prevented between the thighs and the elephants' trunk etc., when there is Sādharmya based on Pariṇāha though there is some difference between them on account of some other quality? It is against Upamānopmeya-bhāva to expect complete identity of all the qualities of the Upamāna and Upameya. Therefore it is to be accepted that it is not the negation of the Sādharmya but, the superiority of Upameya that is really intended in all the Vyatireka-sthalas. Thus, only Sādṛśya is ultimately arrived at even in Vyatireka and this view can have the support of Mammaṭa (KP., p. 508) and Vimarśinīkāra (p. 102) who accept Sādṛśya as the ultimate result in Vyatireka. Viewed in this light, PR.'s explanation appears to be quite satisfactory.

Next PR. explains the possibility of some more varieties of Vyatireka on the following ground. In some instances, the express negation of similarity suggests the inferiority of Upamāna and the superiority of the Upameya. Again, the express superiority of Upameya suggests the Sādṛśyābhāva and Upamānāpakarṣa. Similarly, the express Upamānāpakarṣa suggests the Sādṛśyābhāva and Upmeyotkarṣa. Each of these three varieties can have twenty-four sub-divisions which are showed in the case of the first variety. He explains some of these varieties with suitable examples.

He next proceeds to examine the example given by Ruyyaka. As seen above, not only the Upameyotkarṣa but the Upamānotkarṣa (Upameyāpakarṣa) also constitutes Vyatireka according to Ruyyaka. The following verse has been given as the example of the latter.

"क्षीणः क्षीणोऽपि शशी भूयो भूयोऽभिवर्धते नित्यम् ।
विरम प्रसीद सुन्दरि यौवनमनिवर्ति यातं तु ॥"

(AS., p. 102)

Contrary to the views of Mammaṭa (KP., p. 503) and Śobhākaramitra (AR., p. 26) who take the above as the example of Upameyotkarṣa, Jayaratha attempts, in all seriousness, to explain it as an example of Upamānotkarṣa. He explains the verse like this. "The waning moon can wax again. But this wretched youth, once it is lost, it will be lost for ever; therefore do not insist upon nourishing your wounded feelings." But this explanation is not acceptable to PR. He contends that such expressions would produce only an undesirable effect on the mind of the angry damsel as she would feel "why should I barter my self-respect for this fickle youth; let it go. I shall not be reconciled to my unsympathetic lover." Therefore this verse should be understood, PR. contends, in the following manner. The moon is not such a rare thing as to attach so much of importance to her because even if she wanes, she can wax again. But the youth is such a precious thing that once it is lost it is impossible to get it back. Thus this verse can be taken as an example of Upameyotkarṣa only. This explanation has been accepted by Nāgeśa also (Uddyota. p. 503) In support of his explanation PR. gives two more examples where the express Upmeyāpakarṣa results only in the Upameyotkarṣa on consideration of the complete Vākyārtha.

Next, PR. examines the example given by AD. According to AD., the famous verse :—

"रक्तस्त्वं नवपल्लवैरहमपि श्लाघ्यैः प्रियाया गुणैः
त्वामायान्ति शिलीमुखाः स्मरधनुर्मुक्तास्तथा मामपि ।
कान्तापादतलाहतिस्तव मुदे तद्वन्ममाप्यावयोः
सर्वं तुल्यमशोक केवलमहं धात्रा सशोकः कृतः ॥"

(Kuvalayānanda. p.62)

is an example of Upameyāpakarṣa because the hero is described as being Saśoka. But PR. contends, on the authority of Ānandavardhana, that it is not the figure Vyatireka based on the Upameyāpakarṣa, but the negation of Upamālaṅkāra which also is considered at times as the necessary ornament like the removal of an ornament for facilitating amorous sports. Thus he maintains, on the authority of Mammaṭa, that only the Upameyādhikya but not its Nyūnatā constitutes Vyatireka.

Nāgeśa, criticises the views of PR. and Anandavardhana, and tries to explain that there is Upameyāpakarṣa in the above verse and hence Vyatirekālaṅkāra (GMP., p. 477).

Nāgeśa's views as expressed in Marmaprakāśa and Uddyota in this context, are contradictory. In Uddyota (p. 503), he appears to be supporting Mammaṭa's view that Upameyotkarṣa alone constitutes Vyatirekālaṅkāra, and accordingly he explains that there is Upameyotkarṣa in the verse "Raktastvaṁ navapallavaiḥ" etc. But in Marmaprakāśa he seems to support the views of AD. and writes : "उपमानाद्धि उपमेये वर्ण्यमानं वैलक्षण्यमेव गुणाधिक्यकृतं व्यतिरेकः । तच्च क्वचिदुपमेयोत्कर्षपर्यवसायि क्वचिदुपमेयापकर्षपर्यवसायि क्वचित्तदनुभयपर्यवसायि" etc. Accordingly he explains that there is Upameyāpakarṣa (but not Upameyotkarṣa) in the above verse.

As is shown above, PR. is in favour of accepting, on the authority of Mammaṭa, that only the Upmeyādhikya constitutes Vyatirekālaṅkāra. But he states that if it is insisted that Upameyāpakarṣa also constitutes Vyatireka, the following verse may be taken as its example.

"जगत्त्रयत्राणधृतव्रतस्य क्षमातलं केवलमेव रक्षन् ।
कथं समारोहसि हन्त राजन् सहस्रनेत्रस्य तुलां द्विनेत्रः ॥"

(RG., p. 477).

"Though you are inferior to Indra with reference to two Dharmas, you are equal to him in all other respects." This being the purport of the verse, there is a charm in it which is the result of Vyatirekālaṅkāra.

This example is criticised by Viśveśvara (AK., p. 299) on the following ground. According to him Vyatireka arises only when there is scope for Sādṛśya with reference to a particular Dharma, and it is negated. In the above verse, the Sādṛśya-Niṣedha with reference to Sahasra-netratva being real (because there is no similarity between the king and Indra on account of this Sādhāraṇadharma) it cannot be an example of Vyatireka. It may be taken as an example of Vyājastuti only.

But Viśveśvara does not seem to be correct in contending that only a possible Sādṛśya should be negated in Vyatirekālaṅkāra; because in such cases as "कलङ्कविधुरं मुखं कलङ्किना इन्दुना कथं तुलां भजताम्", the Sādṛśya-niṣedha being real so far as the Kalaṅkitā of the Moon is concerned, it would not be an instance of Vyatireka.

PR. next examines the following verse which has been given by AD. as an example of Anubhayaparyavasāyi-vyatireka :—

दृढतरनिबद्धमुष्टेः कोशनिषण्णस्य सहजमलिनस्य ।
कृपणस्य कृपाणस्य च केवलमाकारतो भेदः ॥"

(Kuvalyānanda. p. 63).

Here he asks what is meant by Vyatireka; whether it is Upamānādutkarṣa or Upamānādapakarṣa ? He refutes both the alternatives and takes the verse as an example of Gamyopamā.

PR. appears to have misunderstood the word 'Anubhaya-paryavasāyi' of AD. because AD. explains Vyatireka with the help of three different examples. He writes that the Vyatireka in the verse "पल्लवतः कल्पतरोरेष विशेषः करस्य ते वीर । भूषयति कर्णमेकः परस्तु कर्णं तिरस्कुरुते ॥" results in the superiority of Upameya "उपमेयाधिक्यपर्यवसायी व्यतिरेकः". The Vyatireka in 'Raktastavaṁ navapallavaiḥ' etc., results in its inferiority. And the Vyatireka in the present verse is 'Anubhaya-paryavasāyi.' Evidently 'Anubhayaparyavasāyi' here means that the Vyatireka in the above verse results neither in the superiority of Upameya nor in its inferiority.

Nāgeśa while rightly pointing out this defect in the interpretation of PR. accepts his contention that this is an example of Gamyopamā. But Nāgeśa's attempt to show that the same is the intention of AD. also, does not seem to be correct, because as can be seen from the context, AD. shows this verse only as an example of Vyatireka.

PR. concludes this figure after mentioning that it can be based on other figures like Rūpaka, Ananvaya and Upamā etc., and explaining, like Vimarśinīkāra, how the Sādhāraṇadharma in Vyatireka also may be of three varieties : Anugāmin, Bimba-pratibimba-bhāvāpanna, and Śuddha-sāmānyarūpa.

Sahokti

Mammaṭa defines it as 'स सहोक्तिः सहार्थस्य बलादेकं द्विवाचकम् । एकार्थाभिधायकमपि सहार्थबलाद् यदुभयस्यावगमकं सा सहोक्तिः" (KP., p. 523). 'Ubhayasyāvagamaka' is understood by Pradīpa (p. 523) to mean by Upalakṣaṇā 'Anekārthābhidhāyakam'. 'Ekārthābhidhāyakam' and 'Anekārthābhidhāyakam' are explained as 'Ekavākyārthābhidhāyaka', and 'Anekavākyārthābhidhāyaka'. Thus the Sahokti arises when the sense expressed by a word having Anvaya originally with only one thing, is made to have the same with many by the use of words like 'Saha' etc. Its Anvaya is direct with one thing and indirect (because it is through Artha) with another. This has been clearly explained by Nāgeśa in Uddyota (p. 523) which, as will be seen presently, is influenced by PR's definition.

Ruyyaka gives the following definition : "उपमानोपमेययोरेकस्य प्राधान्यनिर्देशेऽपरस्य सहार्थसम्बन्धे सहोक्तिः"..."उपमानोपमेयत्वञ्चा वैवक्षिकम्" (AS., p. 103). When either of the Upamānopameyas is mentioned as Pradhāna and the other is having Anvaya with the Sahārtha, it is an instance of 'Sahokti'. Further, he states that the Guṇapradhānabhāva is only based on Śabda (the way of expression) but not real. According to Ruyyaka, Sahokti is invariably based on Atiśayokti.

While Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha accept that Sahokti is based on Kāryakāraṇa-paurvāparya-viparyayātmakātiśyokti and Bhedābhedarūpātiśayokti only, Śobhākaramitra accepts it as based on Sambandhe-asambandharūpātiśayokti and Tulyayogitā also (AR., p. 70).

PR's definition is as follows : "गुणप्रधानभावावच्छिन्नसहार्थसम्बन्धः सहोक्तिः" (RG., p. 481). The association with the 'Sahārtha' of Pradhāna and Apradhāna constitutes Sahokti.

Evidently PR.'s definition leans more towards that of Ruyyaka than Mammaṭa's. Following the views of writers like Ruyyaka, first he explains this figure as based on Atiśayokti and illustrates some of the varieties with suitable examples. Next he diverges into a grammatical discussion to explain how Sahokti, like Utprekṣā, can be Gamya also. He contends that the 'Sahayoga' in "Sahayukte'pradhāne" (Aṣṭādhyāyī, 2.3.19), need not necessarily be 'Sahapadayoga'; it can also be Sahapadārthayoga because Pāṇini himself uses Tṛtīyā vibhakti in "वृद्धो यूना तल्लक्षणश्चेदेव विशेषः" (1.2.65), even when there is no 'Saha'. Thus when there is Tṛtīyā vibhakti without the use of 'Saha' it will be an instance of 'Gamya-sahokti'. In this connection, PR. states that as in the case of 'Hetau tṛtīyā', Aprādhānya is expressed by Tṛtīyā in Sahayoga, whether it is Padayoga or Arthayoga, and he finds fault with Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's contention who says in his Prauḍhamanoramā (p. 231) that the word 'Apradhāne' in "Sahayukte'-pradhāne" need not be mentioned; for, as he contends, Tṛtīyā will be effected only on the Apradhāna (like 'Putra' in "Putreṇa saha āgataḥ pitā" etc., but not on 'Pitṛ' which gets Prathamā which is Antaraṅga). Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita appears not to have any objection in accepting Apradhānatva of 'Putra', his only objection is to the use of the word 'Apradhāne' in the Sūtra which has no special purpose to fulfil. But PR. maintains that there is a special purpose in the use of this word, it is intended to say that the Tṛtiyā ordained by this Sūtra expresses Apradhānatva.

Nāgeśa raises four objections against this view of PR. "अप्रधानग्रहणप्रत्याख्यानपरभाष्यविरोधापत्तेः। अप्रधानभृत्यैः सहागतो राजेत्यत्र तृतीयानापत्तेश्च। राज्ञा सह सेना गच्छति इत्यादौ तृतीयापत्तेश्च। अन्तरङ्गत्वस्य दुर्वचनत्वेन तथोक्तेरसाङ्गत्याच्च" (GMP., p. 485).

By his second objection, perhaps Nāgeśa means that it is not possible to have Tṛtīyā in "Apradhānabhṛtyairāgato rājā" because the Apradhānatva which is to be expressed by Tṛtīyā according to PR., is expressed by the word Apradhāna; and it is not possible to have Kārakas once their meaning is expressed by something else, according to the Adhikārasūtra "Anabhihite".

But "Anabhihite" requires that Kāraka should not have been expressed by any Pratyaya etc. (SiddhāntaKaumudī, I. p. 410). but not by some different words. That is why it is not wrong to say "आनयनकर्मभूतं घटमानय" and "छेदनकरणेनासिनाच्छिनत्ति" etc.

By saying "राज्ञा सह सेना गच्छति इत्यादौ तृतीयापत्तेश्च" Nāgeśa means that 'Senā' being Apradhāna as compared with the king, that alone should get Tṛtīyā but not the word Rājan, which is Pradhāna. Here also Nāgeśa does not seem to be correct. The Prādhānya or otherwise in grammar is not based in the social status but only on the Kriyānvaya etc., as in the case of 'Rājapuruṣaḥ gacchati' etc. and so the 'Senā' itself in the above sentence is to be considered Pradhāna.

"अन्तरङ्गत्वस्य दुर्वचत्वेन तथोक्तेरसाङ्गत्याच्च" is a remark referring to PR's words "पुत्रेण सहागतः पिता' इत्यादौ पित्रादिभ्योऽन्तरङ्गत्वात् प्रथमोत्पत्तेरेवौचित्यात्" and this idea is reproduced by PR. from Manoramā. Here the Antaraṅgatva may be Durvaca as contended by Nāgeśa, but "Antaraṅgatvāt" in this context, is to be understood to refer, as rightly explained by Śabdaratna, to the Paribhāṣā "उपपदविभक्तेः कारकविभक्तिर्गरीयसी" : "अन्तरङ्गत्वादिति—प्राचीनैरन्तरङ्गत्वमूलकतयोक्तात् उपपदविभक्तेरिति न्यायादित्यर्थः" (Śabdaratna. p. 231).

Of course, the first objection, Bhāṣyavirodha is the final Brahmāstra of the Vaiyākaraṇas.

In view of these four objections, Nāgeśa discards any reference to the Prādhānya or Aprādhānya in the definition, and states that the definition of Mammaṭa is to be accepted which he adopts in his own words.[1]

It is interesting to note, that Nāgeśa while amplifying Mammaṭa's definition follows PR's views and writes :— "एवञ्च यत्र गुणप्रधानभावावच्छिन्नयोः शब्दार्थमर्यादया एकधर्मसम्बन्धः तत्रायमलङ्कारः" (Uddyota. p. 523). But in Marmaprakāśa he explains Mammaṭa's definition in a different way avoiding reference to Guṇa-pradhāna-bhāva.

According to Sarvasvakāra, the Sahokti is based on two varieties of Atiśayokti, Paurvāparyaviparyaya and Abhedādhyavasāna. But PR. is not prepared to accept that Sahokti is based on the former variety of Atiśayokti. He states that there is no difference in the charm whether we say "तव कोपोऽरि-नाशश्च जायते युगपन्नृप", or "तव कोपोऽरिनाशेन सहैव नृप जायते". There is only Atiśayokti in both the readings. Viśveśvara quotes this view of PR. with approval (AK., p. 331). Next PR. maintains that one need not accept that Sahokti is based on Abhedādhyavasānarūpātiśayokti even. He contends that mere Abhedādhyavasāna does not constitute Atiśayokti unless there is Atiśayokti which consists of Abhedādhyavāsāna between Upamāna and Upameya (but not every Abhedādhyavasāna). Thus there is no Atiśayokti in "गिरिगह्नेऽरिवधूनां दिवसैः सह लोचनानि वर्षन्ति", though there is Abhedādhyavasāna between Varṣaṇa and Varṣāvadācaraṇa and Sahokti based on it. He dispenses with the idea of including this figure in Dīpaka or Tulyayogitā because, he maintains, there is difference in Camatkāra. Viśveśvara is in favour of including it in Dīpaka and Tulyayogitā (AK., p. 331).

At the end PR. like Ruyyaka, mentions Sahokti in Mālārūpa.

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1. "सहोक्तिलक्षणं च यत्रैकस्य शाब्दः क्रियान्वयः अपरस्य सहार्थबलादार्थः सा सहोक्तिरिति काव्यप्रकाशकृतामेवमेवोक्तिः ।" GMP., p. 486.

Vinokti

Regarding the figure Vinokti, PR. has nothing to add to what is already said on it by writers like Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, and Jayaratha, excepting a significant remark that Vinokti has no special charm of its own unless it is combined with other figures; and, that it need not be treated, according to some, as a separate Alaṅkāra (RG., p. 492).

Samāsokti.

"परोक्तिः भेदकैः श्लिष्टैः समासोक्तिः" (KP., p. 476) is the definition of Samāsokti as given by Mammaṭa. It is further explained by him in the following words : "प्रकृतार्थप्रतिपादकवाक्येन श्लिष्टविशेषणमाहात्म्यात् न तु विशेष्यस्य सामर्थ्यादपि यदप्रकृतस्यार्थस्याभिधानं सा समासेन सङ्क्षेपेणार्थद्वयकथनात् समासोक्तिः." Thus Samāsokti consists of the expression of an irrelevant sense (Aprakṛtārtha) by the power of Viśeṣaṇas but not of Viśeṣya, having Śleṣa. This figure is so called because two meanings are expressed by employing same words by Samāsa, i.e., brief expression. Here Pradīpa adds (p. 477-78) श्लिष्टत्वञ्चोपलक्षणम् । औपम्यगर्भहीनामपि सम्भवात् । यथा 'विलिखति कुचौ' इत्यादाविति प्राचीनः पन्थाः" etc. Thus Mammaṭa does not seem to bother himself with deciding whether there is Vyavahārāropa or Aprastuta-svarūpāropa in this figure. Only Uddyota introduces a very long discussion over this point which we shall examine presently.

Ruyyaka's definition of Samāsokti does not talk of Śliṣṭatva of the Viśeṣaṇas, but it only mentions that the similarity of Viśeṣaṇas which suggests the Aprastuta constitutes the figure Samāsokti :—विशेषणानां साम्यादप्रस्तुतस्य गम्यत्वे समासोक्तिः (AS., p. 107). Perhaps he is the first man to raise the question whether there is Vyavahārasamāropa or Rūpasamāropa in Samāsokti and he shows himself in favour of Vyavahārasamāropa. "विशेषणसाम्याद्धि प्रतीयमानमप्रस्तुतं प्रस्तुतावच्छेदकत्वे न प्रतीयते

अवच्छेदकत्वञ्च व्यवहारसमारोप: न तु रूपसमारोप:" (AS. p., 109). According to him Viśeṣaṇa-sāmya may be based on three factors. "ततश्च विशेषणसाम्यं श्लिष्टतया साधारण्येनौपम्यगर्भत्वेन च भावात् त्रिधा भवति" (AS., p. 109). The Vyavahāra-samāropa involved in Samāsokti may be of four kinds. "लौकिके वस्तुनि लौकिकवस्तुव्यवहारसमारोप:, शास्त्रीये वस्तुनि शास्त्रीयवस्तुव्यवहारसमारोप:, लौकिके वा शास्त्रीयवस्तुव्यवहारसमारोप: शास्त्रीये वा लौकिकवस्तुव्यवहार-समारोप: ।" (AS., p. 113).

PR.'s definition of Samāsokti is as follows :— "यत्र प्रस्तुत-धर्मिको व्यवहार: साधारणविशेषणमात्रोपस्थापिताप्रस्तुतधर्मिकव्यवहारा-भेदेन भासते सा समासोक्ति:" (RG., p. 493). "Samāsokti arises when a Vyavahāra having a relevant object as its Dharmin (i.e., connected with a relevant object), is cognised as identical with another Vyavahāra having an irrelevent object as the Dharmin." The same idea is condensed by PR. in the following words, 'साधारणविशेषणमात्रश्रुत्युपस्थापिताप्रकृतधर्मिकव्यवहारत्वम्' (RG., p. 493). The word 'Mātra' in 'Sādhāraṇa viśeṣaṇa mātra' is intended to exclude such instances where the Viśesya also is Śliṣṭa, from the scope of Samāsokti, because such examples, according to PR., are the instances of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani. After explaining the purpose of saying that the Dharmins should be Prastuta and Aprastuta (in the Lakṣaṇā) PR. proceeds to explain the following verse as the example of Samāsokti :—

"विबोधयन् करस्पर्शै: पद्मिनीं मुद्रिताननाम् ।
परिपूर्णानुरागेण प्रातर्जयति भास्कर: ।।" (RG., p. 497)

Now first, he mentions the views of old writers like Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa regarding the mutual connection of the two meanings, conveyed by verses as the above. The verse "Vibodhayan kara-sparśaiḥ" etc. conveys two meanings; one related to the sun and the other to a lover (Nāyaka) pacifying

his beloved. Now it cannot be accepted that the senses (Vākyārthas) are quite independent having no connection with each other, for, in such case it will be against the generally accepted Kāmukatva of the sun, and there will be the Vākyabheda-doṣa also. Therefore they contend that the Aprakṛtavākyārtha cognised by the power of the identity of the adjectives becomes complete by the Ākṣepa of Nāyaka etc., (to express which there are no words in the verse) and the different parts (Avayavas) of the two Vākyārthas will have Tādātmya with each other. Thus Śakti and Ākṣepa are at work, according to these writers, in conveying the two meanings, one Prastuta and the other Aprastuta, in Samāsoktisthala.[1]

While accepting the existence of Tādātmya between the two Vākyārthas, PR. feels that the Aprakṛtārtha is conveyed only by the Vyañjanā-vyāpāra because the Śakti is restricted to the expression of the Prakṛtārtha only. He contends that it is not correct to accept that the 'Cumbana' in ' निशामुखं चुम्बति चन्द्र एष:" is Nāyakākṣepaka because this being common to Putrādi also, it can be the आक्षेपक of Putrādi as well, Therefore, apart from the word 'Cumbati' the feminine in 'Niśā' and masculine in Candra also contribute in suggesting the noncontextual meaning and that is how Samāsokti is considered to be an instance of Guṇībhūta-Vyaṅgya.

Next PR. proceeds to examine the views of Ruyyaka and AD. Ruyyaka is in favour of accepting only the Vyavahāra-samāropa but not Svarūpa-samāropa because it would then be an instance of Rūpaka and not of Samāsokti. But PR. contends that even when accepting Aprakṛta-vyavahāra-samāropa, one

1. The resultant Śābdabodha of the above verse is "हस्तस्पर्शकरणकनायिकाविशेषकर्मकानुनयानुकूलव्यापारवन्नायकाभिन्नः किरणस्पर्शकरणकमुकुलितपद्मिनीकर्मकानुनयानुकूलव्यापाराश्रयो भास्करः।"
—Sarala, p. 499.

has to accept the Rūpa-samāropa (Nāyakādirūpa-samāropa) also because the mere Vyavahāra-samāropa with no reference to the Nāyakādi-Rūpa cannot be charming. Even then, it is not enough to take Nāyakādi as the Viśeṣaṇa in the Vyavahāra, for it will then be a simple Sādṛśya between the Candra and Nāyaka based on the Sādhāraṇa-dharma of doing the same Vyavahāra. This cannot produce the desired result, the Vyavaharābheda intended by the poet by way of employing Śleṣādi.

AD. following the views of Ruyyaka, maintains that there is only Vyavahāra-samāropa but not Svarūpa-samāropa in Samāsokti, where the Aprastuta-vyavahāra is being ascribed to the Prastuta-dharmin. According to him there is no scope for Svarūpasamāropa in the absence of the word expressive of 'Jāra'. PR. refutes his views with the same arguments as were advanced while meeting the arguments of Ruyyaka. He says that though we do not find any expressive word, Jāra is suggested by the Cumbana etc., and the Abheda between the Prakṛta-dharmin and the suggested Jāra can be effected. In this connection he says that AD.'s views would be against the accepted opinion of his own authority, i.e., Ruyyaka and his commentator, who seem to be in favour of accepting Dharmyāropa. He states "अपरित्यक्तस्वरूपयोः निशाशशिनोः नायकतारूपधर्मविशिष्टयोः प्रतीतेः' इति त्वदुपजीव्यग्रन्थविरोधश्च, 'अविनाभावादप्रकृतव्यवहारेणाक्षिप्तेन धर्मिणैव प्रस्तुतो धर्म्यवच्छिद्यते' इति तट्टीकाविरोधश्च" (RG., p. 504)[1].

It is to be noted here, that PR. criticises Ruyyaka for not having accepted the Svarūpāropa in Samāsokti. Now by quoting the same Ruyyaka as the authority in accepting Svarūpāropa he appears to have been suggesting to us that there is inconsistency in Ruyyaka himself who has been accepted as the authority by AD.

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1. However, the actual statement of Vimarśinī (p. 108) is different; only the main idea of the same is reproduced here by PR.

PR. cites the following verse in support of his contention (that there is Rūpasamāropa also in Samāsokti) :

"निर्लक्ष्मीकाभवत्प्राची प्रतीचीं याति भास्करे ।
प्रिये विपक्षरमणीरक्ते का मुदमञ्चति ॥" (RG., p 505)

Here he says that the second half would be meaningless unless there is Nāyakatva-pratīti in the sun. He further argues that there is some Gaurava in accepting Vyavahārasamāropa because the Vyavahāra-samāropa on the Prakṛta-dharmin will be by Bhedasambandha, and on the Prakṛtavyavahāra by Abhedasambandha, thus involving two Sambandhas. Thus he contends by stating his own view that in Samasoktisthala, the Prakṛtavyavahāra which is considered to be identical with the Aprastuta-vyavahāra is cognised on its own Dharmin which is taken as identical with the Dharmin of Aprastuta-vyavahāra; in other words, there is Abheda between the Prastuta-vyavahāra and Aprastutavyavahāra and the Prastuta-viśeṣya and the Aprastuta viśeṣya (RG., p. 506).

PR.'s views are criticised by Nāgeśa who introduces an unusually long discussion both in Marmaprakāśa (p. 495) and Uddyota (pp. 478-79). He tries hard to prove that there is only Vyavahāra-samāropa in Samāsokti though the same may result in Rūpasamāropa ultimately. "एवञ्च वाच्यार्थबोधोत्तरं यदि चन्द्रादौ नायकत्वादिप्रतीतिरपि सादृश्यानुभवसाक्षिकी तदास्त्विति उपपादितमेव प्राक्" (Uddyota, p. 479).

Inspite of all that is written, Nāgeśa's arguments do not seem to be convincing and when he is prepared to accept the Nāyakatvādi-pratīti at the end as shown above, we do not find any strong reason for not accepting it at the beginning itself. It is not known what made him to write 'Vācyārthabodhottaram' etc., when he himself accepts that there is

Vyāñjanā involved in Samāsokti so far as the Aprastuta-vyavhārāropa is concerned : –"समासोक्तिर्गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्येति व्यवहारस्तु प्रकृतव्यवहारेऽप्रकृतव्यवहाराभेदस्य व्यञ्जनया प्रतीतेर्निर्बाध एवेति दिक्" (GMP., p. 497). In places like "Ayamaindrīmukham paśya" etc., it is the common experience to think that the Moon is described as Jāra and Aindrī as the Parakāntā, and judged by this experience PR.'s contention appears to be quite correct.

Viśveśvara also tries to vindicate the views of AD. and Ruyyaka by criticising PR. Referring to his remark "Tvadupajīvya-granthavirodhaśca" he says that when Ruyyaka himself is in favour of accepting Vyavahārasamāropa there is no meaning in citing him as an authority on Svarūpa-samāropa. Ruyyaka's remarks, he contends, may be understood to mean that there may be indirect Svarūpa-samāropa in Samāsoktisthala (AK., p. 260). Thus Viśveśvara also appears to have no objection in accepting Svarūpāropa indirectly. As for his criticism of PR.'s remark, it cannot be said that PR. does not know, having already criticised him, that Ruyyaka is in favour of Vyavahārasamāropa. But as explained above, he only wants to show how Ruyyaka's views are self-contradictory.

Next Viśveśvara (AK., p. 260) tries to show that "Nirlakṣmīkābhavat" etc., is more favourable for accepting Vyavahāra-samāropa than Svarūpāropa, because, he argues, in such case the meaning of the verse will be 'भास्करप्रियेऽन्यरते प्राचीनायिका दूयते" etc., and then the justification by introducing "Priye vipakṣaramaṇī" etc., would be improper because there can be no Sāmarthya-samarthaka-bhāva while there is Abheda between the two ideas.

But this objection does not seem to be quite strong because the first half deals with the special case whereas the second half deals with the generality and a Viśeṣa can be

justified by Sāmānya. Many of the arguments advanced by him are almost similar to those of Nāgeśa, and on the whole even Viśveśvara, like Nageśa, does not seem to have cut much ice in this context.

PR. next proceeds to explain some varieties of Samāsokti. The Viśeṣaṇa-sāmya may be based on Śleṣa or Śuddha-sāmānya and again this may be through Dharmāntara-puraskāra or Kārya-puraskāra. Thus the total number of these varieties rises to four and it will be five including the Saṅkara of the Kārya and Dharmāntara. By saying Śuddhasādhāraṇa-garbha PR. carefully avoids the Aupamyagarbha mentioned by Ruyyaka which he is going to refute.

Next he examines the verse given by Ruyyaka as an example of Samāsokti based on Viśeṣaṇasāmya.

"तन्वी मनोहरा बाला पुष्पाक्षी पुष्पहासिनी ।
विकासमेति सुभगा भवद्दर्शनमात्रतः ॥" (AS., p. 181)

In this verse there is Latāvyavahāra-pratīti and this is made possible, according to Ruyyaka, by the use of the word 'Vikāsa' which is applicable to Latā only. But PR. maintains that this cannot be an instance of Samāsokti at all, but there is only Vyaṅgyarūpaka. In this connection he lays down a principle that Samāsokti can be accepted where the Aprastutasphūrti is based only on the power of Sādhāraṇa Viśeṣaṇas. If this were to be based on Asādhāraṇa Viśeṣaṇa, it will be Rūpaka-dhvani only (RG., p. 509).

He also argues that it is not impossible, as was wrongly thought by Vimarśinīkāra (p. 110) to cite an example where Samāsokti is completely based on Sādhāraṇa-viśeṣaṇas only :

"अन्धेन पापभीरुया सञ्चरता विषमविषयेषु ।
दृढमिह मया गृहीता हिमगिरिशृङ्गादुपागता गङ्गा ॥"
(RG., p. 507).

In this verse there is no reference to Asādhāraṇadharma, yet there is Aprakṛta-vyavahārāropa.

The Viśeṣaṇasāmya in Samāsokti may be based, according to Ruyyaka, on three factors, Śliṣṭatva, Sādhāraṇya and Aupamyagarbhatva. He gives the following verse as an example of Aupamyagarbhatva :—

"दन्तप्रभापुष्पचितापाणिपल्लवशोभिनी ।
केशपाशालिवृन्देन सुवेषा हरिणेक्षणा ॥" AS , p. 110).

He explains the Aupamyagarbhatva in the following manner. Here the words 'Danta-prabhāpuṣpacitā' etc., can be explained as 'Danta-prabhā-sadṛśāni puṣpāṇi' and 'Danta-prabhā, puṣpāṇīva' etc., the first one being appropriate to Latā and the second to the damsel. But the adjective 'Suveṣā' which is applicable to the damsel alone makes us, at the first instance, accept the second meaning only. But after the cognition of the meaning pertaining to the damsel, there would be nothing objectionable in taking the meaning 'Danta-prabhā-sadṛśāni puṣpāṇi' etc., and thus there is Aprakṛta-latā-vyavahāra-samāropa which results in Samāsokti.[1] He further explains that even if the word 'Suveṣā' is substituted by the word Parītā, it can be an example of Samāsokti only, because in the

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1. The reading in the Nirnaya sagar edition of 1947 and the old Kāśī edition which adds 'Na' in "आक्षिप्तायाः लतायाः प्रत्ययात् न तद्व्यवहारसमारोपः" seems to be incorrect and the Sarala also trying to explain this passage with the inclusion of 'Na' is against what is written by Ruyyaka in Alaṅkārasarvasva. PR. also begins his next sentence where he is going to explain Samāsokti in Upamārūpaka-saṁśaya-saṅkara-sthala, with 'Eva', which is the clear indication that his previous quotation also deals with the acceptance of Samāsokti in the above verse according to Ruyyaka (RG., p. 510).

absence of Sādhaka and Bādhaka either for Upamā or Rūpaka there will be only their Saṁśaya-saṅkara and by first having tne Prakṛtārtha foilowing 'Upamā' and having Rūpakārtha afterwards, there will be Aprakṛta-latāvyavahāra-pratīti as explained above, and it will be an instance of Samāsokti. But if by any reason, Rūpaka were to be accepted either in the begining or at the end, the Hariṇekṣaṇā also can be identified with Latā which is Ākṣipta and it will be an instance of Ekadeśavivarti-rūpaka with no need of accepting Samāsokti.

All this is not acceptable to PR. He contends that even if Upamā is accepted in "Danta-prabhā-puṣpacitā" etc., it does not lead to Samāsokti because as in the case of Rūpaka, (where you accepted Ekadeśa-vivartirūpaka) Ekadeśa-vivarti-Upamā also can be had in Hariṇekṣaṇāṁśa with no need of Samāsokti. In this connection, PR. points out the inconsistency[1] on the part of Ruyyaka, who appears, in one place, as not inclined to accept Ekadeśavivarti-upamā and in other place, favouring it. This PR. refutes saying that having thus no independent existence, it cannot be counted as one of the varieties. Thus he maintains that there is no Samāsokti in such places but only Ekadeśavivartirūpaka or Ekadeśvivartyupamā or Ekadeśa-vivarti-saṅkarālaṅkāra (according to some when there is no Sādhaka or Bādhaka) and that it is wrong to accept Upamā-garbhatva in Samāsokti.

Next PR rightly criticises AD. for having accepted Sārūpyamūlā samāsokti in the verse "Purā yatra srotaḥ" etc.

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1. Of course, this has been pointed by Jayaratha himself, but he tries to vindicate Ruyyaka saying that though it is not possible to find a place where the Aupamyārtha-viśeṣaṇas only are the Hetu of Samāsokti, they can be found as such in association of some other factors like Śliṣṭatva etc. (Vimarśinī, p. 111).

He contends that there is no Aprakṛta-vyavahārāropa in the above verse.

PR. seems to be correct because, read in its proper context, this verse does not present to the mind of the reader any Aprastuta-vyavahāra which is to be identified with the Prakṛta-vyavahāra.

Like Ruyyaka, PR. also mentions the four varieties of Samāsokti : "Laukika vyavahāre laukikavyavahārasya samāropaḥ" etc. (AS., pp. 118-20). He concludes this topic after explaining, following Ruyyaka, how many of the Alaṅkāras are based on Samāsokti.

Parikarālaṅkāra.

Parikara is defined by PR. as "विशेषणा नां साभिप्रायत्वं परिकरः" (RG., p. 517) and this definition is almost the same as the one given by his predecessors. He explains this definition in unambiguous terms. Thus, Sābhiprāyatva according to him, is 'प्रकृतार्थोपपादकचमत्कारिव्यङ्ग्यत्वम्" and so he distinguishes this figure from Hetvalaṅkāra where there is no scope for Vyaṅgya. After illustrating this figure with suitable examples, he, like Mammaṭa, raises the question, why this should be treated as an independent figure when it can be explained away as the absence of the blemish Apuṣṭārthatā. This question is met by Mammaṭa (KP., p. 541) and Jayaratha (AS., p. 120) by saying that there should be a number of Viśeṣaṇas in Parikara which alone can produce Camatkāra and one single Viśeṣaṇa can be explained away as the absence of the above Doṣa. But PR. contends that even one Viśeṣaṇa is capable of producing Camatkāra though there may be much of it on the use of many Viśeṣaṇas. The Bahuviśeṣaṇatva theory has been criticised by Pradīpa itself (p. 541).

Next PR. criticises some of the views expressed by AD.

in Kuvalayānanda. AD. as quoted by PR., maintains that the use of even one Viśeṣaṇa at times, will be charming thus constituting Parikara. as in the places of Śleṣa and Yamaka etc., where Apuṣṭārthatva is not considered as Doṣa. In this connection, he cites the verse from Śiśupālavadha as an example :— "क्षितिभृतैव सदैवतका वयं वनवतानवता किमहिद्रुहा" etc.

Now PR. puts two questions—when a man tries to exclude Parikara from Alaṅkāras, because it can be dispensed with as Doṣābhāva, does he recognise the existence of any Camatkāra in the use of a purposeful adjective (Sābhiprāyaviśeṣaṇa) or not. If he were to accept such Camatkāra, he can do so everywhere, whether it is Śleṣādi-sthala or not. If he does not recognise such Camatkāra, he would simply deny it in the Śleṣādi-sthala also and therefore there is no use of bringing in the analogy of Śleṣādi-sthala.

Now he proceeds to distinguish Parikara from Puṣṭhārthatā, the Apuṣṭārthatābhāva. He says that Alaṅkāra and Doṣābhāva are two different things. Alaṅkāra is a thing which is beautiful and is used to embellish something else, (Sundaratve satyupaskārakatvam alaṅkāratvam); and Doṣābhāva is the absence of the loss of Camatkāra (चमत्कारापकर्षकाभावत्वञ्च दोषाभावत्वम्). Thus these are two different Dharmas having quite different scope. Even if such Dharmas are combined in one place they cannot be identical with each other. For example, stupidity is a blemish in a Brāhmin. Vidyā for him is both Doṣābhāva, the absence of stupidity, and a virtue. But we cannot say that Vidyā and the absence of stupidity are identical with each other. Thus he maintains that there is special charm in Parikara which cannot be explained away as mere Doṣābhāva.

It should be noted here that PR.'s only objection to AD.'s views is about the analogy of Śleṣādi-sthala because, AD. also (Kuvalayānanda, pp. 72-73), supports the view

that there can be Camatkāra even when only one Viśeṣaṇa is used.

These views of PR. are quoted by Viśveśvara with approval (AK., p. 353). Here Nāgeśa's criticism of PR. does not seem to be based on clear understanding of his views As explained above, all that PR. wanted to state against the views of AD. is that if one is prepared to accept the existence of Camatkāra on the use of one Viśeṣaṇa, in Śleṣa-sthala etc., he has to accept the same in other places also, and this Camatkāra is what is exactly required for accepting an independent Alaṅkāra. Viewed in this light, all the arguments of Nāgeśa (GMP., p. 520) seem to be beating around the bush.

Perhaps for the first time, PR. mentions four varieties of Parikara Parikara being Vyaṅgyagarbha, the Vyaṅgya can be either Vācyasiddhyaṅga or Vācyopaskāraka and again, it may be Vācyāyamāna (being no more than Vācya) and Tadbhinna, i.e., being more than Vācya (RG., p. 522).

Śleṣa.

According to Mammaṭa Śleṣa is of two kinds, Śabdaśleṣa and Artha-śleṣa and so it is treated by him in two sections under the Śabdālaṅkāras and the Arthālaṅkāras. The definition of Śabda-ślcṣa is :—

"वाच्यभेदेन भिन्ना यद्युगपद् भाषणस्पृश: ।
श्लिष्यन्ति शब्दा: श्लेषोऽसावक्षरादिभिरष्टधा ॥" KP., p. 418)

This he explains in the following words :—

'अर्थभेदेन शब्दभेद इति दर्शने काव्यमार्गे स्वरो न गण्यत इति च नये वाच्यभेदेन भिन्ना अपि शब्दा: युगपदुच्चारणेन श्लिष्यन्ति भिन्नं रूपम् अपह्नुवते स श्लेष: । स च वर्णपदलिङ्गभाषाप्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभक्तिवचनानां भेदादष्टधा" (KP., p. 418). The concealment of the difference of the words, by pronouncing them at the same time though there is the difference on account of the difference of the

meaning expressed, is Śleṣa which is of eight varieties like Varṇa-śleṣa etc. Artha-śleṣa is defined in the following words : "श्लेषः स वाक्य एकस्मिन् यत्रानेकार्थता भवेत्" (KP., p. 476). Mammaṭa criticises those rhetoricians who treat even the Śabda-Śleṣa under the Arthālaṅkāras (KP., p. 423), and this criticism must have been directed against Udbhaṭa and others as explained by P.V. Kane (SD., p. 198), but not Ruyyaka as supposed by Pradīpa (p. 419), because Ruyyaka is later than Mammaṭa (HSP., I. p. 284).

Ruyyaka's definition of Śleṣa is as follows :—"विशेष्यस्यापि साम्ये द्वयोर्वा उपादानेन श्लेषः" (AS., p. 121). Coming as it is after the definition of Samāsokti, "विशेषणानां साम्यादप्रस्तुतस्य गम्यत्वे समासोक्तिः", this should be understood as that 'Śleṣa' arises when a second meaning is conveyed by the similarity of not only Viśeṣaṇas but Viṣeśya also. Further Ruyyaka explains that Śleṣa can be of three varieties. The one, where two contextual meanings are conveyed by Śliṣ ta-padas, the other where two non-contextual senses are expressed, and the third where both contextual and non-contextual meanings are expressed. The first two varieties only can be based on the similarity of both the Viśeṣaṇa and Viśeṣya, and the third is based only on Viśeṣaṇa-sāmya, for if there were to be Viśeṣya-sāmya also, it would be an instance of Arthāntara-dhvani, because the Vācyārtha being restricted by Prakaraṇa etc., the second sense can only be suggested (AS., p. 122).

PR.'s definition of Śleṣa is quite simple and at the same time comprehensive. It runs as follows :—"श्रुत्यैकयाऽनेकार्थप्रतिपादनं श्लेषः" (RG., p. 523). "The expression of many meanings by the same order of words constitutes Śleṣa. First he classifies it into three varieties :

(1) "अनेकशब्दप्रतिभानद्वारा अनेकधर्मपुरस्कारेण अनेकार्थप्रतिपादनम्",
(2) "एकशब्दप्रतिभानद्वारा अनेकधर्मपुरस्कारेणानेकार्थप्रतिपादनम्", and

(3) "एकधर्मपुरस्कारेणानेकार्थप्रतिपादनम्".

These three varieties he calls Sabhaṅga-Śleṣa, Abhaṅga-Śleṣa and Śuddha-Śleṣa respectively. All these varieties are again classified into three varieties as Prakṛtamātrāśrita, Aprakṛtamātrāśrita and Prakṛtāprakṛtāśrita. Like Ruyyaka, he also states that there is no possibility of Viśeṣya being Śliṣṭa in the third variety.

After explaining all these varieties with the help of suitable examples, PR. introduces a discussion about the Bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva of the figure Śleṣa, a discussion which has been engaging the attention of many rhetoricians. Generally, Śleṣālaṅkāra arises only in association with other Alaṅkāras and it does not have an independent existence. In such circumstances, naturally the question arises whether Śleṣa is to be taken as the Bādhaka of other Alaṅkāras, or Bādhya or Saṅkīrṇa. In this connection, PR. first explains the opinion of Udbhaṭa which is mentioned by Ruyyaka also (AS., p. 125). Following the well-known dictum of the Vaiyākaraṇas, "येन नाप्राप्ते यो विधिरारभ्यते स तस्य बाधको भवति", Udbhaṭa feels (KSS., pp. 58-59) that Śleṣa is Bādhaka of all Alaṅkāras because it has no independent scope of its own, being always followed by Tulayayogitā, or Dīpaka, or Upamā, or Rūpaka etc. At times it may appear that there is Upamā etc. in "नदीनां सम्पदं बिभ्रद्राजायं सागरो यथा" etc., but it need not be taken as real Upamā because, like the Śuktikārajata it is only Upamādyābhāsa.

According to some rhetoricians like Mammaṭa (KP., pp. 425-28) the Nyāya, "yena nāprāpte" etc., cannot be applied in the case of Śleṣa because it can be shown to have a place independent of any other Alaṅkāra as in "सर्वदो माधवः पातु यो गङ्गां समदीधरत्" etc. It is also not correct to say that there is mere Upamādipratibhāsa in "नदीनां सम्पदं बिभ्रद्राजायं सागरो यथा", for, even Śabdamātra like Guṇa and Kriyā, is accepted

as the Sādharmya-prayojaka in Upamā and such Śleṣa cannot be said as the Bādhaka of Upamā. On the contrary, one has to accept that Śleṣa itself is Bādhya by Upama because all the places of Pūrṇopamā being occupied by one kind of Śleṣa or the other, it is Niravakāśa and the Nyāya 'Yena nāprāpte. . . .' will have to be applied in its case only. Similarly, in 'Samarārcito'pyamarārcitaḥ' etc., there is only apparent Śleṣa (Ābhāsamāna-Śleṣa) like the second Moon, seen on account of the Timiradoṣa of the eye and so it cannot be accepted as Alaṅkāra, because it is not possible to accept Śleṣābhāsa on the analogy of Virodhābhāsa. Therefore, in such places we have to accept only the Virodhālaṅkāra produced by Śleṣa-Pratibhā (by the cognition of the apparent Śleṣa). Thus, they conclude, the Śleṣa cannot be accepted as Apavādaka though it may be possible to accept Saṅkīrṇatva in some of the Śleṣa-sthalas.

Here there seems a slight confusion on the part of Ruyyaka who does not explain his own opinion while recapitulating the views of old writers (AS., pp. 125-29) But Jayaratha, with his characteristic sagacity, shows that according to Ruyyaka, there is Bādhyabādhakabhāva and Saṅkīrṇatva along with other Alaṅkāras in the case of Śleṣa also (Vimarśinī, p. 129).

PR. also mentions another view according to which there is nothing wrong in accepting that Śleṣa, at times, can be bādhya by other Alaṅkāras. It is generally accepted that only such figures which directly produce some Camatkāra can be called Alaṅkaras in the strict sense of the word, and so a figure which is only helpful to another figure cannot be called Alaṅkāra and given an independent status. Thus even Śleṣa which is introduced as an Upaskāraka of other figures cannot be called with the name of Alaṅkāra and it is Bādhya by another Alaṅkara, which alone will be taken as Alaṅkāra in the particular context according to the dictum "प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति'.

Thus PR. upholds the views of Mammaṭa and his followers against the views of the Audbhaṭas.

Next PR. maintains, on the authority of Dhvanikāra and Mammaṭa, that verses like 'Aviralavigalad-dānodaka'[1] etc., where both the Prakṛtaviśeṣya and the Aprakṛtaviśeṣya are Śliṣṭas, should be accepted as an instance of Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani but not Śleṣālaṅkāra. In this connection, he examines the views of AD. who accepts that the second sense in such places is conveyed by Śakti itself and only Upamānopameya-bhāva between the two senses is suggested. While refuting the views of AD., he repeats almost the same arguments as were advanced when discussing about Śabdaśaktimūladhvani.

Viśveśvara quotes these views of PR. with approval (AK., p. 250).

Against the views of Udbhaṭa who accepts all the varieties of Śleṣa as Arthālaṅkāra only, Mammaṭa says that, by applying the principle of Anvaya-vyatirekabhāva (यत्सत्वे यत्सत्वं यदभावे यदभावः), the Sabhaṅgaśleṣa and Abhaṅgaśleṣa should be accepted as Sabdālaṅkāras only.

Ruyyaka contends that the principle of 'Anvaya-vyatireka-bhāva' is to be applied only while establishing Kāryakāraṇa-bhāva but not Āśrayāśrayibhāva which is to be determined by Tadvṛttitva-jñāna. Thus Sabhaṅgaśleṣa may be accepted as Śabdālaṅkāra because the two senses are resting with two words (one word split into two) like a Jatu-kāṣṭha. But in Abhaṅgaśleṣa, both the senses are expressed by one single word like two fruits hanging from one Vṛnta (stalk) and thus in the absence of two words, it should be accepted as Arthālaṅkāra only (AS., p. 124).

PR. apears to be in favour of accepting the latter view.

1. अविरलविगलद्दानोदकधारासारसिक्तधरणितलः ।
घनदाग्रमहितमूर्तिः जयतितरां सार्वभौमोऽयम् ॥
(RG., p. 530).

He concludes this figure with the following remark based on Daṇḍin's words :—अयञ्चोपमेव स्वतन्त्रोऽपि तत्र तत्र सकलालङ्कारानुग्राहकतया स्थितः सरस्वत्या नवं सौभाग्यमावहन्नानाविधेषु लक्ष्येषु सहृदयैर्विभावनीय इति ।" RG., p. 537).

"श्लेषः सर्वासु पुष्णाति प्रायो वक्रोक्तिषु श्रियम् ।
भिन्नं द्विधा स्वभावोक्तिर्वक्रोक्तिश्चेति वाङ्मयम् ॥"(KD., II-363)

Aprastutapraśaṁsā.

The description of an irrelevent object connected with the relevent object is called Aprastutapraśaṁsā acording to Mammaṭa : "अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा या सा सैव प्रस्तुताश्रया ।"
"अप्राकरणिकस्याभिधानेन प्राकरणिकस्याक्षेपोऽप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा"(KP., p. 483). Mammaṭa's fivefold classification[1] of Aprastutapraśaṁsā is accepted by almost all the rhetoricians.

PR. has nothing to add to the definition given by his predecessors, except saying that 'Praśaṁsā', in 'Aprastutapraśaṁsā' means description but not praising, for, in such case, instances like "धिक् तालस्योन्नततां यस्यच्छायापि नोपकाराय" cannot come under its scope. He defines it thus :—'अप्रस्तुतेन व्यवहारेण सादृश्यादिवक्ष्यमाणप्रकारान्यतमप्रकारेण प्रस्तुतव्यवहारो यत्र प्रशस्यते सा अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा' (RG. p. 537).

While explaining some of its varieties he cites the following verse as an example of Śliṣṭa-viśeṣaṇāprastuta-praśaṁsā.

'नितरां नीचोऽस्मीति त्वं खेदं कूप मा कदापि कृथाः ।
अत्यन्तसरसहृदयो यतः परेषां गुणग्रहीतासि ॥" (RG., p. 538)

In this connection he observes that it is not correct to say like Mammaṭa, that Samāsokti is helpful (Anugrāhikā) to the Aprastutapraśaṁsā in places like the one quoted above, because, as he rightly points out, Samāsokti and Aprastutapraśaṁsā are antagonistic with each other. He also explains such subtleties as the Pratīyamāna-Tāṭasthya and Pratīyamānā-

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1. "कार्ये निमित्ते सामान्ये विशेषे प्रस्तुते सति ।
तदन्यस्य वचस्तुल्ये तुल्यस्येति च पञ्चधा ॥" KP., p. 484.

bheda etc., in Sādṛśya-Mūlāprastuta-praśaṁsā, which are suggested by Ruyyaka (AS., p. 133).

After explaining all the five varieties of Aprastutapraśaṁsā, PR. remarks that this enumeration of the varieties is based on the views of the Prācīnas and that there is the possibility of other varieties also. For instance, he says, there may be one variety where both the Vṛttāntas are relevant. The verse

"मलिनेऽपि रागपूर्णां विकसितवदनामनल्पजल्पेऽपि ।
त्वयि चपलेऽपि च सरसां भ्रमर कथं वा सरोजनीं त्यजसि ।"

(RG., p. 539).

can be taken as an example of the same. For, in the context of Jalakrīḍā, these are the words of a friend of the Nāyikā when the bees and lotus flowers, and the Nāyaka who is unkind to the Nāyikā, are present, and thus both the Vācyārtha and Pratīyamānārtha are Prākaraṇika only. But it may be objected, how can this be called Aprastutapraśaṁsā when the bee etc., also are maintained as relevant to the context? In reply to this PR. says that what is meant by Aprastutārtha here is that which is not mainly intended to be conveyed; thus it may sometimes be quite irrelevant and sometimesre levant also (RG., p. 542). This appears to be the new interpretation given to this word by PR., and it has been quoted by Viśveśvara with approval (AK., pp. 276-77). This explanation makes it possible for PR. to dispense with the 'Prastutāṅkura' which is accepted by Kuvalayānandakāra as a separate Alaṅkāra.

Here Nāgeśa tries to criticise PR. and appears to be in favour of accepting Prastutāṅkura as a separate Alaṅkāra (GMP., p. 543). But it is interesting to note that Nāgeśa himself, following the views of PR., states in Uddyota (p. 490), that Prastutāṅkura need not be accepted as an Alaṅkāra.

Next PR. shows some slight difference in these two places. When Vācya happens to be Atyantāprastuta the

Prastutārtha may be conveyed by Ākṣepa itself and so there is no sufficient scope for Dhvani, but in places where both the senses are Prastuta there is scope for Dhvani. But in the remaining four varieties there is scope for Guṇībhūta-dhvani, because the Prakṛta-kārya etc., is suggested by Aprakṛtakāraṇa etc., through some kind of Ākṣepa only.

PR. now presents a peculiar verse and tries to determine the Alaṅkāra in it :

"आपेदिरेऽम्बरपथं परितः पतङ्गाः भृङ्गा रसालमुकुलानि समाश्रयन्त ।
सङ्कोचमञ्चति सरस्त्वयि दीनदीनो मीनो नु हन्त कतमां गतिमभ्युपैतु ॥"
(RG., p. 543).

Here, if it is considered that the Vṛttānta of a king, in fallen condition, and his dependent is the Prastuta, or such king's Vṛttānta and Sarovṛttānta, both are taken as Prastuta, in either case it can be taken as an instance of Aprastuta-Praśaṁsā. But when it is taken that the Prastuta-saro-vṛttānta is suggestive of Apıastuta-rāja-vṛttānta, what will be the Alaṅkāra in this verse? It cannot be Aprastuta-praśaṁsā because there is the Praśaṁsā of the Prastuta only (i.e. Sarovṛttānta). It cannot be taken as Samāsokti either. For, Samāsokti being mainly dependent on Viśeṣaṇasāmya, it cannot arise in its absence PR. meets this question on the following grounds. He says that Aprastutapraśaṁsā should not be understood as 'Aprastutasya praśaṁsā' but as 'Aprastutena praśaṁsā', and both the Aprastuta and the Prastuta can be either Vācya or Vyaṅgya. Thus in the verse cited above there is the praśaṁsā of the Prastutasarovṛttānta which is Vācya by the Aprastuta Rājavṛttānta which is Vyaṅgya and so it can be taken as an instance of Aprastutapraśaṁsā only but not of Samāsokti.

This is a new interpretation given to the word Aprastuta-Praśaṁsā by PR. But as rightly pointed out by Nāgeśa it does not seem to be quite correct. What is meant by the 'Praśaṁsā'

here ? It cannot be 'praising' (Utkarṣādhāna) for in many places like "Dīgante śrūyante madamalinagaṇḍāḥ karaṭinaḥ" etc., there is no praising of the Prastutārtha by Aprastutārtha as admitted by PR himself.[1] Here 'Tāṭasthya' can be undertood as being free from Āropa and praising. Again it (Praśaṁsā) cannot mean mere 'Pratīti' because in the verse "Āpedirembarapatham" etc., there is no Pratīti of Prastuta by Aprastuta. Therefore, it is better to accept it as an instance of Samāsokti by introducing some modification in its definition (GMP., pp. 544 and 514).

Nāgeśa's argument seems to be convincing. Moreover, PR.'s statement :—"एवञ्च वाच्येन व्यक्तेन वा अप्रस्तुतेन वाच्यं व्यक्तं वा प्रस्तुतं यत्र साहश्याद्यन्यतमप्रकारेण प्रशस्यते सा अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसेति, न तु वाच्यमेव; व्यङ्गयमेवेति (RG., p. 485), runs against his own next statement "किञ्चाप्रस्तुतप्रशंसायां प्रस्तुतं व्यङ्ग्यमिति निर्विवादम्" (RG., p. 546).

Next PR. examines the possibility of including the Sādṛśyamūlāprastutapraśaṁsā under Nigīryādhyavasāyarūpātiśayokti. He says that even if there is the possibility of Nigīryādhyavasāna between Prastutārtha and Aprastutārtha in a few rare cases the same cannot be maintained in many places. Moreover the Prastuta is Lakṣya in Nigīryādhyavāsāna whereas it is Vyaṅgya in Aprastuta-praśaṁsā. Thus it is not possible to include this type of Aprastuta-praśaṁsā in Nigīryādhyavasāna.

At the end PR. mentions the views of some writers who think that Sādṛśyamūlāprastutapraśaṁsā falls strictly under Dhvani and thus being Alaṅkārya cannot be called Alaṅkāra. There is nothing to indicate here that this theory is not acceptable to PR.

Paryāyokta

Paryāyokta arises according to Mammaṭa when some-

1. "यस्मिन् खेलति' 'दिगन्ते श्रूयन्ते' इत्यादौ वाच्यार्थताटस्थ्येनैव व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्रतीतेः सर्वसहृदयसम्मतत्वात् ।" RG., p. 546.

thing is conveyed by some power of word, other than Vācya-vācakabhāva.[1] According to Ruyyaka's definition (गम्यस्यापि भङ्ग्यन्तरेणाभिधानं पर्यायोक्तम्) "the expression by a different mode (turn) of a suggested sense, constitutes Paryāyokta."

Mammaṭa's definition is based on that of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa[2] and it is more comprehensive than the definitions of Ruyyaka and his followers. According to Mammaṭa, the suggested sense and the implied one are practically the same but they present different aspects. But when it is said that the implied sense is expressed by employing a different mode of expression, as is done by Ruyyaka and his followers, the question would naturally arise : how can the same sense be both, the expressed and the suggested, at the same time ? In answer to this question they maintain that a relevant cause may be suggested in Paryāyokta, by expressing the relevant effect, and this restricts the scope of Paryāyokta.

PR. avoids all this trouble by defining Paryāyokta in the following words : –"विवक्षितस्यार्थस्य भङ्ग्यन्तरेण प्रतिपादनं पर्यायोक्तम्" (RG., p. 547). "Paryāyokta consists of conveying the sense in a manner different from the one intended." Further he states that instead of 'Pratipādanam', we can add 'Ākṣepa' in the above definition and thus the definition will be "विवक्षितार्थस्य भङ्ग्यन्तरेणाक्षेपः पर्यायोक्तम्".

As can be seen from his following discussion, PR. is not particular in calling one sense as Vyaṅgya and another as

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1. "पर्यायोक्तं विना वाच्यवाचकत्वेन यद्वचः ।' 'वाच्यवाचकभावव्यतिरिक्तेनाऽवगमनव्यापारेण यत्र प्रतिपादनं तत्र पर्यायेण भङ्ग्यन्तरेण कथनात् पर्यायोक्तम् ।" KP., p. 529.

2 "पर्यायोक्तं यदन्येन प्रकारेणाभिधीयते ।
वाच्यवाचकवृत्तिभ्यां शून्येनावगमात्मना ॥" Udbhaṭa, VI-22.

Vācya and so Nāgeśa's explanation[1] of this definition seems to be reading his own ideas, influenced by AD., in these lines.

PR. gives the following verse as an example of Paryāyokta :—

"त्वां सुन्दरीनिवहनिष्ठुरधैर्यगर्व-
निर्वासनैकचतुरं समरे निरीक्ष्य ।
केषामरिक्षितिभृतां नवराज्यलक्ष्मीः
स्वामिव्रतात्वमपरिस्खलितं चकार ॥"

"अत्र सर्वापि शत्रूणां राज्यसम्पत्त्वां प्राप्तेति विवक्षितोऽर्थः न तद्रूपेणाभिहितः । अपि तु स्खलितपातिव्रत्या बभूवेत्याकारेण ।"

(RG., p. 547).

Here it is to be noted that PR. is careful to write 'Vivakṣitorthaḥ' in general, without any reference to Vyaṅgyatva of the sense.

Before proceeding to criticise the views of AD., PR. clarifies the views of Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and Abhinavagupta on Paryāyokta.

Mammaṭa, like Bhāmaha and others accepted that in Paryāyokta, the Gamyārtha and the Vācyārtha are the same. But, it may be objected, how can a sense be both Vācya and Gamya at the same time? In reply to this, Mammaṭa says that the same sense can be both Vyaṅgya and Vācya by the Prakārabheda, i.e., the difference in the mode of expression.

Ruyyaka also raises a similar doubt and he answers that even a Gamyārtha can be expressed though mentioning the Kārya etc.; in other words, the suggestion of Kāraṇa etc , is effected by mentioning the Kārya etc., and this constitutes Paryāyoktālaṅkāra : "एवञ्च यत्र वाच्योऽर्थः अर्थान्तरं तादृशमेव स्वोप-

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1. केनचिद्रूपेण व्यञ्जनया लभ्यस्यार्थस्य ततोपि चारुतररूपेण यदभिधया प्रतिपादनं तत् पर्यायोक्तमित्यर्थः ।"

GMP., p. 547

स्फारकत्वेनागूरयति तत्र पर्यायोक्तम्" Thus according to Ruyyaka only Rāhuśiraśchedakatva is suggested by describing a peculiar Ratotsava of the ladies of Rāhu in the following verse :—

"चक्राभिघातप्रसभाज्ञयैव चकार यो राहुवधूजनस्य ।
आलिङ्गनोद्दामविलासवन्ध्यं रतोत्सवं चुम्बनमात्रशेषम् ॥"

(AS., p. 135).

and there is no need of accepting Bhagavān also as Vyaṅgya, because he is known by the context; and he is explicitly mentioned by the word 'Yaḥ'. Similarly in :—

"यं प्रेक्ष्य चिररूढापि निवासप्रीतिरुज्झिता ।
मदेनैरावणमुखे मानेन हृदये हरेः ॥"

only Mada-māna-moka is suggested but not the performer (Dharmi) of the Mada-māna-moka. Thus according to Ruyyaka, the word 'Paryāyokta' may be explained as 'Paryāyeṇa uktam iva', that, which appears as though expressed through Kārya etc., which is tantamount to say inferred (Ākṣipta).

Abhinvagupta explains this word differently. According to him 'Paryāyokta' means "पर्यायेण वाच्यातिरिक्तप्रकारेण व्यङ्ग्येनोपलक्षितम् उक्तं अभिहितं पर्यायोक्तम्" (KP.. p. 529).[1] Thus it means the expression of a Vācyārtha assocciated with Vyaṅgyārtha. PR. now explains, (RG., pp. 549-50), why it should be understood in the above sense only. If the word 'Paryāya' were to be understood as 'Prakārāntara' (different manner), then "दशवदननिधनकारी दाशरथिः पुण्डरीकाक्षः' etc., will have to be taken as an instance of Paryāyokta because Rāma is expressed in a different manner as 'Daśa-vadana-nidhanakārī' etc.

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1. This is only an Arthatonuvada. The actual words of Abhinava are : "पर्यायेण प्रकारान्तरेणावगमात्मना व्यङ्ग्येनोपलक्षितं सद्यदभिधीयते तदभिधीयमानमुक्तमेव सत् पर्यायोक्तम् ।"

(Locana, p. 118.)

After stating the views of these writers PR. proceeds to examine the views of AD. who defines and illustrates Paryāyokta in the following verse :

"पर्यायोक्तन्तु गम्यस्य वचो भङ्ग्यन्तराश्रयम् ।
नमस्तस्मै कृतौ येन मुधा राहुवधूकुचौ ॥" (Kuvalayānanda, p. 87)

He further explains that in 'Namastasmai' etc., the word 'Vāsudeva' who is suggested through his own peculiar qualities, is expressed in a different form as a person making Rāhu's wives' breasts as useless.

Here PR. rightly observes that Rāhu-vadhū-kuca-vaiyarthya-kāritva suggests only Rāhu-śiraścheda-kāritva but not the Asādhāraṇadharmas like the Bhagavad-Vāsudevatva. If it were to be considered as Vyaṅgya, responsible for calling this Paryāyokta, one has to accept the same figure in :

"नमो राहुशिरश्छेदकारिणे दुःखहारिणे"

also because as contended by AD. this also suggests Bhagavad-Vāsudevatva. Again, in "राहुस्त्रीकुचनैष्फल्यकारिणे हरये नमः" one has to accept that the Paryāyokta is based on the suggested sense Rahu-śiraśchedakāritva but not on Vāsudevatva etc., because it is explicitly mentioned by the word 'Haraye'. He also refutes the views of AD. expressed about the verse 'Cakrābhighāta-prasabhājñayā' etc. There he contends that if Rāhu-śirarcheda were to be taken as the Vyaṅgya, it will be an instance of Prastutāṅkura only but not Paryāyokta, and the latter arises only when Hari is considered to have been suggested with his Asādhāraṇa-rūpa. But PR. maintains that it can be taken as an instance of Paryāyokta only when the Rāhu-śiraścheda is taken as the suggested sense It cannot be named as Prastutāṅkura, for, in such a case there will be no scope for Paryāyokta. Bhagavadrūpāvagamana being without any charm cannot be called as the suggested sense. Thus on the authority of old writers like Mammaṭa and Abhinavagupta, PR. maintains that the cognition of Rāhu-

śiraścheda-kāritva only, should be taken as the basis for Paryāyokta.

Here Nāgeśa (GMP., pp. 552-53) Viśveśvara (AK., p. 344), and the author of Alaṅkāracandrikā (Kuvalayānanda, p. 90) try to vindicate the views of AD. by criticising PR. Whatever the merits and demerits of these arguments and counter-arguments may be, one thing appears to be in favour of PR. For the figure Paryāyokta, it is not sufficient if something is suggested by something expressed. Both the expressed and the suggested should be one and the same This is indicated by the very name of figure. The etymological explanation of this word by Abhinavagupta appears far-fetched. In simple direct words, it should be understood as 'पर्यायेण उक्त पर्यायोक्तम्' and this means 'the sense that is expressed in a different manner'; in other words, 'the Vyaṅgyārtha that is expressed in a different manner is to be called Paryāyokta'. This can be employed to mean the figure also by understanding it as "पर्यायोक्तम् अस्यास्तीति पर्यायोक्त:" by applying 'अर्शआदिभ्योऽच्". Mammaṭa has explained that the main principle in Paryāyokta is, that the same sense which is intended to be suggested should be expressed also in a different Bhaṅgī. Otherwise, mere suggestion of something may fall under the scope of Samāsokti or Prastutāṅkura of AD. or Aprastutapraśaṁsā as critically suggested by Nāgeśa (GMP., p. 554). It can be seen that the definitions of all the writers, as shown above, conform to this principle. But while explaining the meaning of this definition, many of them, excepting Mammaṭa and PR., lose sight of the same and drift to another direction. Viewed in this light, the fallacy of AD.'s explanation of the sentence "Namastasmai" etc., will be clear. According to him, Bhagavadvāsudevatva etc. is the suggested sense and it has no relation to the sense expressed (Rāhu-vadhū-kuca-mudhā-kāritva) and such being the case, it is not clear how AD. or his protagonists can apply his own definition 'पर्यायोक्तं तु गम्यस्य वचो भङ्ग्यन्तराश्रयम्" etc.,

to this example. That is why PR. insists that Rāhu-śiraścheda alone should be taken as the suggested intended sense. If AD. and his followers feel that this would then fall under the scope of Prastutāṅkura, they should not accept this as a separate Alaṅkāra.

Ruyyaka also restricts the scope of this figure to Kārya-kāraṇabhāva as seen above, which appears to be quite unnecessary. He was forced to do so because of the definition given by him. But PR. gives it a wider scope by giving a comprehensive definition which is perhaps suggested to him by putting Mammaṭa's definition and his example together, for, if any Kāryakaraṇa-bhāva etc., were to be added, Mammaṭa's example "Yaṁ prekṣya cirarūḍhāpi" etc., would be out of the scope of Paryāyokta. This properly comes under PR.'s definition "विवक्षितार्थस्य भङ्ग्यन्तरेण प्रतिपादनम्" etc.

Next PR. criticises the views of Vimarsinīkāra who accepts that the difference between Paryāyokta and Aprastutapraśaṁsā is based also on the two types of Lakṣaṇā involved in them. There is no scope for Lakṣaṇā, he declares, in these two places, in the absence of Vācyārthānupapatti.

It should be noted here that Vimarśinīkāra himself is against accepting Lakṣaṇā in these places, but as can be seen from the following passage, only Ruyyaka appears to be in favour of accepting these two types of Lakṣaṇās and Vimarśinīkāra has simply explained Ruyyaka's opinion :—एवञ्च यत्र वाच्योऽर्थोऽर्थान्तरं तादृशमेव स्वोपस्कारकत्वेनागूरयति तत्र पर्यायोक्तम् । यत्र पुनः स्वात्मानमेव अप्रस्तुतत्वात् प्रस्तुतमर्थान्तरं प्रति समर्पयति तत्राप्रस्तुतप्रशंसेति निर्णयः" (AS., p. 136). This passage cannot be dispensed with by declaring it, as was done by PR., as being intended to mean "तस्मात् पर्यायोक्ते वाच्यस्य प्राधान्यम्; अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसायान्तु नेति तन्मूलग्रन्थस्य

तात्पर्यम्", (RG., p. 555). For, while reproducing the opinion of old writers, Ruyyaka writes :—"तथा हि—पर्यायोक्ता ...... नन्वयादौ वस्तुमात्रं गम्यमानं वाच्योपस्कारकत्वेन 'स्वसिद्धये पराक्षेपः परार्थं स्वसमर्पणम्' इति यथायोगं द्विविधया भङ्ग्या प्रतिपादितं तैः ।"(AS., p. 4).

If it is to be explained away as the opinion of old rhetoricians reproduced by Ruyyaka, but not of Ruyyaka himself, even then Vimarśinīkāra also is against accepting Lakṣaṇā because in the same context he writes :—'इदं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्—अत्र हि लक्षणाया एव हि नावकाशः........ग्रन्थकृता पुनरेतच्चिरन्तनमतानुवादपरतयोक्तम् । अस्माभिस्तु प्रसङ्गाद् वस्तु पर्यालोचितमित्यलं बहुना" (Vimarśinī, p. 6).

PR. passes a significant remark that the principle of Dhvani is not unknown even to the oldest writers like Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa etc., because they had made the extensive use of the same though not using the word Dhvani, in Samāsokti, Vyājastuti, Aprastutapraśaṁsā and Paryāya etc. Of course this reminds us of the opening sentence in Alaṅkārasarvasva (AS. pp. 3-4).

There may be three varieties in Paryāyokta according to PR.—कारणेन वाच्येन कार्यस्य गम्यत्वं, कार्येण कारणस्य, सम्बन्धिमात्रेण सम्बन्धिमात्रस्य च". In fact, he says, there may be innumerable varieties of Paryāyokta because one can employ hundreds of ways to express the same idea as in the case of 'अयं देशोऽलङ्कर्तव्यः, पवित्रीकर्तव्यः, प्रकाशनीयः, etc., to mean "इह भवद्भिः आगन्तव्यम्."

Vyājastuti

This is defined by PR. in the following words :—"आमुखप्रतीताभ्यां निन्दास्तुतिभ्यां स्तुतिनिन्दयोः क्रमेण पर्यवसानं व्याजस्तुतिः" (RG., p. 557). "When praise or censure are suggested by the apparent censure and praise respectively this is an instance of

Vyājastuti." Like Ruyyaka (AS., p. 143) and Pradīpakāra (p. 522), PR. states that the same word Vyājastuti should be understood to include both these varieties by taking it as Tṛtīyā-Tatpuruṣa, (Vyājena stutiḥ) and Karmadhārayasamāsa (Vyāja-rūpā stutiḥ). Thus by using the word 'Dvayoḥ' he indicates that these are, in fact, two different Alaṅkāras having no connection with each other excepting that they are given the same name, which also, as seen above, is to be understood differently. This point has been made clear by Jayaratha. (Vimarśinī, p. 143).

After explaining this figure with suitable examples, PR. states how this figure can be combined with other figures also. In this connection, he cites a beautiful verse where Samāsokti aids the censure which in its turn results in Stuti :—

"देव त्वां परितः स्तुवन्तु कवयो लोभेन किं तावता
स्तव्यस्त्वं भवितासि यस्य तरुणश्चापप्रतापोधुना ।
क्रोडान्तः कुरुतेतरां वसुमतीमाशाः समालिङ्गति
द्यां चुम्बत्यमरावतीं च सहसा गच्छत्यगम्यामपि ।।"

(RG., pp. 558-59).

Here the Cāpapratāpa is cognised as the place of Vīṭa-vyavahāra, by Samāsokti, and thus the Nindā in its turn results in Praise. Thus PR. maintains, that Nindā, whether it is directly expressed or conveyed through some other means (indirectly, by Samāsokti etc.), can be the basis of Stuti and thus constitutes Vyājastuti. This enables him like Locanakāra (p. 129), to accept Vyājastuti in the following verse, against the views of Ruyyaka (AS,. p. 144) and Vimarśinīkāra (p. 144) who think that by mentioning the word 'Kīrtiḥ' at the end, the scope even for apparent Nindā is removed. But PR. maintains that even at the mention of the word 'Kīrtiḥ', there is no objection for accepting Samāsokti which indicates Nindā at the first instance, to be

cleared off ultimately.

"किं वृत्तान्तैः परगृहगतैः किन्तु नाहं समर्थः
तूष्णीं स्थातुं प्रकृतिमुखरो दाक्षिणात्यस्वभावः ।
देशे देशे विपणिषु तथा चत्वरे पानगोष्ठ्यां
उन्मत्तेव भ्रमति भवतो वल्लभा देव कीर्तिः ॥"
(Locana, p. 129)

Next PR. explains that all the old writers are unanimous in thinking that in these two types of Vyājastuti, the object of censure and praise goes to the same person or thing that is first censured. Same is the case in the second type of Vyājastuti also. Thus, he does not agree with AD. who accepts Vyājastuti even when the censure and praise are directed against different objects as in the following verse.

"कस्त्वं वानर रामराजभवने लेखार्थसंवाहको
यातः कुत्र पुरागतः स हनुमान् निर्दग्धलङ्कापुरः ।
बद्धो राक्षससूनुनेति कपिभिः संताडितो भर्त्सितः
स व्रीडात्तपराभवो वनमृगः कुत्रेति न ज्ञायते ।"
(Kuvalayānanda, p. 92)

Here the censure of Hanumān results in the praise of other Vānaras and this, according to AD. forms an example of Vyājastuti. But PR. is in favour of bringing such instances under the scope of Dhvani but not under Vyājastuti which would be against the accepted views of the old writers.

Inspite of what is written by Nāgeśa (GMP., p. 562) in support of AD., PR.'s contention appears to be correct. Apart from its having the support of the old writers, it would appear to be more natural if only the same person is censured or praised in order to be praised or censured indirectly. Otherwise such places of Atiśayokti like "अन्यदेवास्य गाम्भीर्यमन्यद्धैर्यं महीपतेः" etc., where somebody is highly praised, may have to be taken as

the examples of Vyājastuti also, for there is an indirect censure of others. AD. appears to have been guided by the well-known 'Na hi nindā-nyāya' ('न हि निन्दा निन्द्यं निन्दितुं प्रवर्तते अपि तु स्तुत्यं स्तोतुम्') applied in Śāstras in accepting the Vyadhikaraṇanindā-stutis also as constituting Vyājastuti.

Viśveśvara also is in favour of accepting only Sāmānādhikaraṇya of the Stuti and Nindā and explains away the examples, similar to the one given by AD., as the instances of Aprastutapraśaṁsā only (AK., pp. 328-29).

AD. gives the following verse as the example of Vyājastuti :—

"अर्धं दानववैरिणा गिरिजयाप्यर्धं शिवस्याहृतं
देवेत्थं जगतीतले स्मरहराभावे समुन्मीलति ।
गङ्गासागरमम्बरं शशिकला नागाधिपः क्ष्मातलं
सर्वज्ञत्वमधीश्वरत्वमगमत्त्वां माञ्च भिक्षाटनम् ।।"

(Kuvalayānanda, p. 91)

But PR. interprets this verse in such a way that it cannot be taken as the example af Vyājastuti, but Nāgeśa's interpretation (GMP, p. 563) makes it suitable for being the same. In the absence of definite Prakaraṇa, much depends upon interpretation and one need not be so critical of the other in such places, when there is no important principle involved.

Ākṣepālaṅkāra

PR. talks of five differe it views of the old rhetoricians on Ākṣepa without mentioning any of his own; and he explains all of them with suitable examples. Of the five definitions PR. appears to be in favour of accepting the fifth one as can be seen from his opinion expressed about the Dhvanikāra's example of Niṣedhadhvani. The fifth definition is as follows :—"निषेधमात्रमाक्षेपः""""तच्च व्यङ्ग्यार्थे सति सम्भवतीति स व्यङ्ग्यो निषेधः सर्वोप्या-

क्षेपालङ्कार:" (RG., p. 567). Thus any Niṣedha made in view of suggesting something is Ākṣepa. Only by accepting this definition, is it possible to justify the stand of Dhvanikāra who takes the following verse as an example of Ākṣepadhvani, which cannot be taken as such according to Ruyyaka's definition, in the absence of Niṣedhābhāsa.

"स वक्तुमखिलान् शक्तो हयग्रीवाश्रितान् गुणान् ।
योऽम्बुकुम्भैः परिच्छेदं ज्ञातुं शक्तो महोदधेः ।।"

(Dhvanyāloka, p. 266)

This verse suggests that there is nobody to count the virtues of Hayagrīva, and this negation is followed by another Vyaṅgyārtha that his virtues are endless (GMP., p. 569).

Here PR. takes Ruyyaka to task for having stated that there is no Niṣedhābhāsa as stipulated by himself. He says that it is not correct to criticise the views of the great writers like Dhvanikāra without showing proper reasons or a higher authority, on the basis of one's own statement. He boldly asserts that one is not obliged to follow anybody's views in preference to the views of the old writers, unless there is proper justification to do so. In this connection, PR. pays highest tribute to Dhvanikāra as the establisher of the system of poetics (RG., p. 569).

This shows the great respect that PR. had for convention, having at the same time, a real catholicity of outlook to accept anything new if it is substantiated by proper reasons.

PR. ends this topic with the criticism of AD.'s explanation of the example "नरेन्द्रमौले न वयं राजसन्देशहारिणः" (Kuvalayānanda, p. 97). This again is based on the way in which the verse is interpreted, as can be seen from the one given by PR, and the other by Nāgeśa (GMP., pp 569-70), and Alaṅkāracandrikā (Kuvalayānanda, p. 97).

Virodhālaṅkāra

It is defined by Mammaṭa in the following words :— "विरोधः सोऽविरोधेऽपि विरुद्धत्वेन यद् वचः ।" 'वस्तुवृत्तेनाऽविरोधेऽपि विरुद्धयोरिव यदभिधानं स विरोधः' (KP., p. 576). "The description of the apparent contradiction which is not really existing, constitutes Virodhālaṅkāra." It is classified into ten varieties :—

"जातिश्चतुर्भिर्जात्याद्यैर्विरुद्धा स्याद् गुणैस्त्रिभिः ।
क्रिया द्वाभ्यामथ द्रव्यं द्रव्येणैवेति ते दश ।।"
(KP., p, 516)

Ruyyaka while defining this figure as "विरुद्धाभासत्वं विरोधः" (AS., p. 154) closely follows Mammaṭa in its classification etc.

PR. defines this figure in clear-cut terms :—'एकाधिकरण-सम्बद्धत्वेन प्रतिपादितयोरर्थयोः भासमानैकाधिकरणासम्बद्धत्वम् एकाधिकरणा-सम्बद्धत्वभानं वा विरोधः ।" 'यद्वा एकाधिकरणासम्बद्धत्वेन प्रसिद्धयोरेकाधि-करणसम्बद्धत्वेन प्रतिपादनम् ।" (RG., p. 571). "When two things associated in one place are cognised as not so associated, or such cognition, constitutes Virodha." Such cognition may be an illusion even, which does not fall under Virodhālaṅkāra and so PR. gives another definition with the words "Yadvā Ekādhikaraṇāsambaddhatvena" etc.; thus the description of the existence on one thing (place) of two things which are well-known as not co-existing, constitutes Virodhābhāsa.[1]

He further explains that if the Virodha is to be repelled by Bādhajñāna it will be considered as Doṣa, and it can be

1. This definition with the following differentiation of Doṣa and Alaṅkāra, is reproduced almost verbatim by Nāgeśa in Uddyota (Uddyota, p. 517).

Alaṅkāra only when it is not so Bādhya. And if there is Kāryakāraṇabhāva-jñāna involved in the Virodha, it will be an instance of Vibhāvanā. Like Mammaṭa and his followers, PR. mentions, at the first instance, all the ten varieties based on Jātyādivirodha. But after giving some examples for the above varieties, he remarks pertinently that 'Jātyādi' should be understood to mean 'Upalakṣaṇa-mātra' so that such instances as "यः किल बालकोऽपि पुराणपुरुषः', 'विशुद्धमूर्तिरपि नीलाम्बुदनिभः,' 'जगद्धितकृदपि जगदहितकृत्,' 'अगोद्धारकोऽपि नागोद्धारकः" etc. can be included under Virodhābhāsālaṅkāra. He also remarks that there is no special charm in the varieties based on Jātyādi and so Virodha ultimately should be accepted as consisting of only two varieties : Śuddhatva-mūla (as "बालकोपि पुराणपुरुषः" etc.,) and Śleṣamūlaka (as 'जगद्धितकृदपि जगदहितकृत्" RG., p. 573). Similar opinion has been expressed by Jayaratha while commenting on the words of Ruyyaka 'Diṅmātreṇa' (Vimarśinī, p. 155).

Next PR. explains the views of the old writers and new writers in the Virodhasthala connected with Śleṣa. According to the former, the Virodha is Śābda when words like 'Api' are used and it is Ārtha in their absence. On hearing phrases like 'Suptopi prabuddhaḥ' etc., the hearer understands both the meanings, at the first instance, conveyed by these two words, the Śayitatva and Jāgaritatva. But he will also cognise, because of the association of Apiśabda and the Pratidvandvitāsambandhajñāna, that there is Virodha between the two senses. Thus, as a result of this Virodha-jñāna he cannot have the Abheda-jñāna between Śayita and Jāgarita. Now he will have the Anvayabodha produced by the second Śakti between Śayita and Jñānavān (second sense of 'Prabuddha'). Thus the Virodhajñāna that is produced at the beginning will be losing

its basis and thrown into background. But, being the object of the poet's interest, (Kavisāṁraṁbhagocaratayā), this Virodha itself is the source of Camatkāra, and therefore is called Alaṅkāra.

According to the Navyas, there can be scope for Virodhābhāsa only when there are two meanings conveyed. Of the two meanings, the first meaning is Virodhollāsaka and when the second sense is being cognised, the first sense also will follow it by some kind of Abhedādhyavasāya based on Śleṣa. Thus the first sense (Viruddhārtha) is not completely thrown into the background and it will be flickering there along with the second meaning, like a half-dead being, and that is how it is able to produce Camatkāra. Otherwise where is the scope for Camatkāra if this were to be completely thrown into the background ? Needless to add, PR. would naturally like to identify himself with Navyas.

Now, being Navyatara, Nāgeśa takes one step further and says (GMP., pp. 574-75) that when 'Api' etc. are used, both the meanings will be expressed at the same time and the Viruddhārtha will appear as Viśeṣaṇa in the Yogyārtha and thus the Bodha in 'Supto'pi Prabuddhaḥ' will be 'Svāpaviruddha-jāgaraṇābhinna-viśiṣṭajñānāśrayaḥ' etc. Therefore, according to Nāgeśa, there is no question of the Viruddhārtha being even half dead. The same Bodha can be had even where there is no use of 'Api' etc., with the only difference that this is brought about by Vyañjanā. Viśveśvara also expresses similar views about the Viruddhārthānvaya (AK., pp. 325-26).

Next PR. raises an objection in accepting Virodha in 'Kusumāni śarāḥ', 'Candro vāḍavaḥ' etc., because it would strictly fall under the scope of Rūpaka only because there is śaratvādyāropa. Otherwise even 'Mukhaṁ candraḥ' etc., will have to be taken as the instance of Virodha only.

In reply to this objection he says, that in determining an Alaṅkāra in a particular place, the Camatkāra should be taken as the criterion. Thus, if Virodha is found as the source of Camatkāra in a particular place, it should be accepted as Alaṅkāra there and if Abheda is found as such, it should be accepted as Rūpaka. The context etc., also is to be taken as the guiding principle. Thus, if it is intended to describe that a particular city is wonderful then such sentences as 'Yatra nārīṇāṁ mukhaṁ candraḥ' etc., may be taken as the instance of Virodha even. These views of PR. have been repeated with approval by both Nāgeśa (Uddyota, p. 517), and Viśveśvara (AK., p. 326).

Vibhāvanā

PR.'s definition of Vibhāvanā closely followes the one given by old writers like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka.

"कारणव्यतिरेकसामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिपाद्यमाना कार्योत्पत्तिर्विभावना"

(RG., p. 578).

"The description of the Kārya even in the absence of Kāraṇa constitutes Vibhāvanā." The apparent contradiction is set at rest by inferring the existence of another Kāraṇa. The following verse is given as the example of Vibhāvanā :

"विनैव शस्त्रं हृदयानि यूनां विवेकभाजामपि दारयन्त्य: ।
अनन्तमायामयवल्गुलीला जयन्ति नीलाम्बुदलायताक्ष्य: ।।"

(RG., p. 578)

Here the effect Dāraṇa is described as produced even without its well-known cause, Śastra. But the contradiction is removed by taking the Kāminīvilāsas as the cause. Here it may be argued that the Dāraṇa produced by Śastra is quite different from the Dāraṇa produced by Kāminīvilāsa, for which Śastra can never be the cause, and so there is no question of the absense of the Kāraṇa. In reply to this argument, PR. says it

is true that Dvidhākaraṇa is the Mukhya dāraṇa and the Pīḍāviśeṣa is Gauṇa. But their difference is concealed by Abhedādhyavasāna based on Sādṛśya, and thus even Śastra is conceived as the Kāraṇa of the Piḍāvīśeṣa. Thus PR. says, like Jayaratha (Vimarśinī, p. 159), that in all places of Vibhāvanā, there will be Abhedādhyavasānarūpātiśayokti in the Kāryāṁśa as its supporter.

In differentiating this figure from Virodha, PR. follows Ruyyaka (AS., p. 157). Virodha consists of two Virodhins of equal importance whereas in Vibhāvanā, the Kāryāṁśa is Bādhya by its Virodhin Kāraṇābhāva, but it is not its Bādhaka because the Kāryāṁśa is Kalpita and the Kāraṇābhāvāṁśa is the real one. In support of this he quotes the following Kārikā which is quoted by Vimarśinī (p. 157).

"कारणस्य निषेधेन बाध्यमानः फलोदयः ।
विभावनायामायाति विरोधोऽन्योन्यबाधनम् ।।"

As was seen above, Atiśayokti is considered to be the supporter of Vibhāvanā. But PR. cites an example of Vibhāvanā, where there is no scope for Adhyavasāna-mūlātiśayokti :—

"निरुपादानसम्भारमभित्तावेव तन्वते ।
जगच्चित्रं नमस्तस्मै कलाश्लाघ्याय शूलिने ।।" (RG., p. 580)

Here incidentally, he proves rightly the existence of Vibhāvanā against the views of Vimarśinīkāra (p. 159) (who does not accept it in the above verse), on the strength of the Citratvarūpaṇa of the 'Jagat'. On the basis of such examples PR. declares that there is no need of accepting Atiśayokti alone as the basis of Vibhāvanā; and that, only the Āhāryābheda-buddhi is its supporter. Thus it may be Atiśayokti in some places and Rūpaka in others which support Vibhāvanā.

Next PR. tries to criticise AD. for having accepted six

varieties of Vibhāvanā with so much of difference among them, and without giving a general definition applicable to all the varieties. At last, he is prepared to accept these varieties after putting them under a different Śastric garment (by defining them differently). First he gives a general definition of Vibhāvanā 'कारणं विना कार्यजन्म'. This he divides into two groups, Śābdī and Ārthī, each of which is further divided into three groups, thus comprising all the six varieties mentioned by AD. All that PR. did here was to give systematic definitions to these varieties, which do not overlap each other. PR. also, like Ruyyaka (AS., p. 159), divides Vibhāvanā into two varieties, Uktanimittā and Anuktanimittā. After explaining these two varieties with examples, he criticises the views of Ruyyaka and Vimarśinīkāra who accept the second Pāda of the following verse as an example of Ukta-nimittā Vibhāvanā :—

"असम्भृतं मण्डनमङ्गयष्टेरनासवाख्यं करणं मदस्य ।
कामस्य पुष्पव्यतिरिक्तमस्त्रं बाल्यात् परं साथ वयः प्रपेदे ॥"

(Kumārasambhava, I-31).

In this verse, after denying the Āsava, the well-known cause of Mada, the youth is described as the same and so, it constitutes, according to Ruyyaka, Ukta-nimittā Vibhāvanā. But PR. maintains that Vibhāvanā being a figure consisting of a flash of Virodha, it cannot be accepted in its absence. Now Mada is as much an effect (Kārya) of Yauvana as it is of Āsava and so even if the latter is said to be nonexisting there is no Virodha because the Mada can be produced by Yauvana which is clearly mentioned. Thus it can be an instance of Pratīyamānotprekṣā but not of Vibhāvanā.

But PR.'s arguments do not seem to be unquestionable, because, the same explanation as given by him in the case of 'Dāraṇa' in 'Vinaiva śastram' etc., may be applied in this case also. Śiroghūrṇanādika can be taken as the mukhyamada produced by madirā and Ākūṇita-vīkṣaṇādi as the Gauṇamada

produced by Yauvana. The Vibhāvanā may be explained as based on the Abhedādhyavasāna between these two types of Madas.

Viśveśvara also expresses similar views and concludes by saying that it is better, not to accept Uktanimittā Vibhāvanā and if it is accepted, to include this verse also under the same. (AK., p. 314).

The description of the existence of a Kārya by mentioning Kāraṇābhāva in general terms, such as 'Akāraṇam' and 'Vinā kāraṇam' etc., does not constitute Vibhāvanā because in that case, examples like "लुब्धकधीवरपिशुना निष्कारणवैरिणो भवन्ति" etc., will have to be accepted as the instances of Vibhāvanā. Therefore, PR. states that negation of Kāraṇa should not be in general terms but it (Niṣidhyamānakāraṇa) should be mentioned as a particular Kāraṇa (well-known as the Kāraṇa) of the particular Kārya involved in Āropa. Thus the Ativyāpti not only in "लुब्धकधीवरपिशुना" etc., but in places like "खला विनैव परार्धं भवन्ति खलु वैरिणः" etc., also is averted.

Viśveśvara says that this amplification as suggested by PR. is not acceptable to old writers, because, if this amplification were to be accepted, the verse 'Nirupādāna' etc. cannot be taken as an example of Vibhāvanā, because the Citratvāvacchinnakāryatā is not 'Upādānāsambhāratvāvacchinnakāraṇatā-nirūpita', but only Maṣitva-haritālatvādyavacchinna-kāraṇatānirūpita' (AK., p. 315).

But this objection seems to be weak. Because in the above verse, the absence of particular Kāraṇas like 'Maṣī' etc., is mentioned by the word, 'Nirupādānasambhāra' (because 'Sambhāra' means only Maṣī etc.,) and 'Abhittau', (because, 'Bhitti' also is the Asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa of Citra).

Viśeṣokti.

Viśeṣokti, is defined by PR. as "प्रसिद्धकारणकलापसामानाधिकरण्येन वर्ण्यमाना कार्यानुत्पत्तिर्विशेषोक्तिः" (RG., p. 586). 'Viśeṣokti

consists in the non-production of Kārya even when the required Kāraṇas are existing." This definition closely follows the one given by the old rhetoricians like Mammaṭa (KP., p. 512). Like Ruyyaka (AS., p. 161), PR. also classified it into two varieties, Uktanimittā and Anuktanimittā and feels that the third variety, 'Acintyanimittā' mentioned by Mammaṭa, can be included in Anuktanimittā itself.

Next he states that according to some writers, Kāryānutpatti is the Bādhaka of Kāraṇa-samavadhāna. But he maintains that actually, Kāraṇa-samavadhāna is the Bādhaka of Kāryānutpatti. He gives the following reasons. The following verses are taken by the old writers as the example of Viśeṣokti :—

"कर्पूर इव दग्धोपि शक्तिमान्यो जने जने ।
नमोस्त्ववार्यवीर्याय तस्मै मकरकेतवे ॥"
"स एकस्त्रीणि जयति जगन्ति कुसुमायुधः ।
हरतापि तनुं यस्य शम्भुना न बलं हृतम् ॥"

Here the Kāraṇa, the Kāma-śarīra-nāśa cannot be Bādhya because it is established by Pramāṇa like the Purāṇas; and it is the general feeling that "how could the Śakti and Bala survive even when the body is lost?" but not "how was the body lost when there are the Śakti and Bala." Therefore Kāryānutpatti is the Bādhya of Kāraṇasamavadhāna.

This view of PR. is against the opinion of Ruyyaka who writes :—"एवं विशेषोक्तौ कार्याभावेन कारणसत्ताया एव बाध्यमानत्व-मुन्नेयम्" (AS., p. 158). But Jayaratha is in favour of reading this sentence as "एवं विशेषोक्तौ कारणसत्तया कार्याभावस्यैव बाध्यमानत्व-मुन्नेयम्" (Vimarśinī, p. 158). Jayaratha thinks that the above sentence of Ruyyaka must have been wrongly written by the scribes, because, he contends, it is against the views of Rājānaka Tilaka which are generally followed by Ruyyaka (Vimarśinī, p. 158). Thus PR. repeats the views of Vimarśinīkāra.

Next PR states that Vibhāvanā is Śābda when the absence of the cause is directly expressed. Similarly, Viśeṣokti is Śābda when the absence of effect is directly expressed. Otherwise they are Ārtha. The same idea is expressed by Ruyyaka in different words (AS., p. 161). Thus, like Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha, PR. also explains that there is the Saṅkara of Vibhāvanā and Viśeṣokti, both of them Ārtha, in the famous verse "Yaḥ kaumāraharaḥ" etc. He adds that this is the reason why Mammaṭa (KP., p. 12) says that there is no clear Alaṅkāra in this verse.

Like Ruyyaka, Vimarśinīkāra and others, PR. takes phrases like 'द्यूतं हि नाम पुरुषस्यासिंहासनं राज्यम्' as the instances of Rūpaka, and he specially calls it Dṛḍharūpaka but not Viśeṣokti. According to him, the same Dṛḍha-Rūpaka is to be accepted in "धर्मो वपुष्मान् भुवि कार्तवीर्यः" etc., where there is Guṇādhikya-kalpanā. These views are repeated by Nāgeśa in Uddyota (p. 513).

Asaṅgatyalaṅkāra

PR. defines Asaṅgatyalaṅkāra as "विरुद्धत्वेनापाततो भासमानहेतुकार्ययोः वैयधिकरण्यमसङ्गतिः" (RG., p. 590). "The absence of co-existence between Kāraṇa and Kārya which is apparently incongruous constitutes Asaṅgati. This definition is similar to the one given by old writers like Mammaṭa. He explains it with two examples, one consisting of Śuddhāsaṅgati and the other Śleṣopabṛṁhita.

While Ruyyaka and others take Atiśayokti as the supporter in the Kāryāṁśa, PR. maintains that it is supported by Abhedādhyavasāna which need not necessarily be Atiśayokti.

It is to be noted that Ruyyaka did not clearly state that Atiśayokti is the basis of this figure. While explaining its

example "Sā bālā vayam apragalbhamanasaḥ" etc., he simply writes 'अत्र बाल्यनिमित्तमप्रगल्भवचनत्वमन्यदन्यच्च स्मरनिमित्तकमित्यनयोरभेदाध्यवसाय:" (AS., p. 164). But it is Jayaratha who writes a sentence similar to the one quoted by PR. (Vimarśinī, p. 164).

Next PR. proceeds to distinguish it from Virodhālaṅkāra. Vimarśinīkāra (p. 164) feels that the difference between the figure Virodha and Asaṅgati consists in that in the former, there is Virodha in the co-existence of two things in one object (Adhikaraṇa) whereas in the latter it is in the existence of two things in two different objects. PR. does not accept it and he therefore contends that there is incongruous co-existence of two things in Asaṅgati because Kāryatāvacchedakadharma and Kāraṇavaiyadhikaraṇya are described here as co-existing in one Kārya. But this objection seems to be far-fetched. Such Virodha as explained by PR. may be there. But it is not so prominently recognised unless one applies his Śāstric eye to look into it. The difference according to PR. is that in Virodhālaṅkāra, the Virodha is cognised even without examining the Utpatti, whereas it is cognised in Asaṅgati only after examining Utpatti. In other words, there is Kāryakāraṇabhāva clearly involved in Asaṅgati and it is not the case with Virodha (RG., p. 593).

Viśveśvara objects to this distinction saying that there is Tāpotpattivimarśa in the verse—

"किसलयकरचरणापि खलु कुवलयनयना मृगाङ्कवदनापि ।
अहह नवचम्पकाङ्गी तथापि तापयत्याश्चर्यम् ॥"

which is an instance of Virodhābhāsa. (AK., p. 368).

Perhaps in view of such probable objections, PR. draws another line of distinction between these two figures. He says that the word 'Hetukāryayoḥ' in the definition of Asaṅgati should be taken to mean any things which are Samānādhika

raṇa. Thus the definition will be "समानाधिकरणत्वेन प्रसिद्धयोर्द्वयोः वैयधिकरण्येनोपनिबन्धने असङ्गतिः" and the definition of Virodha will be "व्यधिकरणत्वेन प्रसिद्धयोः समानाधिकरणत्वेनोपनिबन्धने विरोधालङ्कारः" (RG., p. 593). Thus the difference between the two is quite clear. This modified definition of Asaṅgati makes it possible to include "नेत्रं निरञ्जनं तस्याः शून्यास्तु वयमद्भुतम्" etc., (where there is no Kāryakāraṇabhāva) under Asaṅgati. But it is interesting to note that this ultimate differentiation introduced by PR. results in the one cited by Vimarśinīkāra, which he criticises earlier.

PR. concludes this figure with the criticism of AD. who accepts two more varieties[1] of Asaṅgati, which can be included, as PR. contends, in the so-called first variety[2] of Asaṅgati and Vibhāvanā respectively. The same opinion has been expressed by Viśveśvara also (AK., pp. 368-69).

Nāgeśa tries to criticise PR. in Gurumarmaprakāśa, but in Uddyota (p 553) he simply quotes these views and the second definition given by PR. without criticising them.

Viṣamālaṅkāra

According to Mammaṭa, Viṣama is of four varieties :

"क्वचिद्यदतिवैधर्म्यान्न श्लेषो घटनामियात् ।
कर्तुः क्रियाफलावाप्तिः नैवानर्थश्च यद्भवेत् ॥
गुणक्रियाभ्यां कार्यस्य कारणस्य गुणक्रिये ।
क्रमेण च विरुद्धे यत् स एष विषमो मतः ॥"

(KP., p. 556)

In the first variety, there will be association of two extremely opposite things. In the second variety the doer of one

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1. "अन्यत्र करणीयस्य ततोऽन्यत्र कृतिश्च सा"
and "अन्यत् कर्तुं प्रवृत्तस्य तद्विरुद्धकृतिस्तथा ॥"

Kuvalayānada, p. 103.

2. विरुद्धं भिन्नदेशत्वं कार्यहेत्वोरसङ्गतिः ।"

Kuvalyānanda, p. 102.

action for some result, not only does not get the desired result, but on the contrary, gets some undesirable result also. In the third and the fourth, the Guṇa and Kriyā of Kārya are against those of the Kāraṇa.

Ruyyaka also gives almost similar definition with slight variance in the number of varieties.

"विरूपकार्यानर्थयोरुत्पत्तिर्विरूपसङ्घटना च विषमम् ।"

(AS., p. 165)

PR. gives a very brief definition of Viṣama : 'अननुरूपसंसर्गो विषमः" (RG., p. 596). In this figure also the Abhedādhyavasāna is explained as the supporter and Virodha is Paripoṣaka. But unlike his predecessors PR. gives numerous varieties of Viṣama. 'Saṁsarga' in the definition is of two kinds, Utpattilakṣaṇa and Saṁyogādilakṣaṇa. Any Ananurūpatva in these two kinds of Saṁsarga constitutes Viṣama. First it is of three kinds : (1) इष्टकार्यानुत्पत्तिः, (2) अनिष्टकार्योत्पत्तिः, (3) इष्टकार्यानुत्पत्तिसहितानिष्टकार्योत्पत्तिः. इष्टानुत्पत्ति is of four varieties. (1) आत्मसुखसाधनवस्त्वप्राप्तिः (2) आत्मदुःखसाधनवस्तुप्राप्तिः (3) परदुःखसाधनवस्त्वप्रापणम् and (4) परसुखसाधनवस्तुप्राप्तिः. Aniṣṭotpatti is of three varieties : (1) स्वस्य दुःखसाधनवस्तुप्राप्तिः (2) परस्य सुखसाधनवस्तुप्राप्तिः (3) and परस्य दुःखसाधनवस्तुनाशः.

The number of these seven varieties further increases by the Saṁsṛṣṭi of the first four varieties with the latter three varieties : After explaining some of these varieties with suitable illustrations, PR. remarks that all these twelve varieties are closely interrelated with Viṣādālaṅkāra.

Next, he rightly points out that one of the definitions of AD. does not convey the intended meaning due to the wrong construction of the sentence and two of his examples also are defective, one grammatically, and the other by giving more sense than required. Nāgeśa's attempt to vindicate AD. (GMP., p. 602) does not seem to be successful.

As an example of "संयोगादिलक्षणसंसर्गाननुरूपत्व, PR. cites the following verse :

"वनान्तः खेलन्ती शशकशिशुमालोक्य चकिता
भुजप्रान्तं भर्तुः श्रयति भयहर्तुः सपदि या ।
अहो सीता सेयं शिव शिव परीता श्रुतिचल-
त्करोटीकोटीभिः वसति खलु रक्षोयुवतिभिः ।।"

(RG., p. 603)

Here Sāmānādhikaraṇya-saṁsarga between Sītā and Rākṣasīs is Ananurūpa which constitutes Viṣama.

Now PR raises a question. Mere mention of a worldly thing cannot be called Alaṅkāra, because only such things which are not found in the world and are created by the imagination of the poet, constitute Alaṅkāra. Now, how can Viṣamālaṅkāra be accepted in the above verse and other verses of the same type, when there is nothing new excepting the mention of the worldly known things ? While accepting this objection, PR. gives another example.

"क्व सा कुसुमसाराङ्गी सीता चन्द्रकलोपमा ।
क्व रक्षखदिराङ्गारमध्यसंवासवैशसम् ।।"

(RG., p. 604)

Here the Sāmānādhikaraṇya of Sītā and Rākṣasīs might be well-known, but the Saṁsarga of Kusumasāra and Khadirāṅgāra is the mental creation of the poet only, and so it can be taken as an instance of Viṣama.

Here Viśveśvara rightly states that the Sambandhānupapatti of Śukti and Muktā etc., as described in

"क्व शुक्तयः क्व वा मुक्ता क्व पङ्कः क्व च पङ्कजम् ।
क्व मृगः क्व च कस्तूरी धिग्विधातुर्विदग्धताम् ।।"

(RG., p. 603)

is being pointed out by the poet only, and it is not known to the world, though their Sambandha is known to them. Thus there is nothing wrong in giving "Kva śuktayaḥ" etc., as the example of Viṣama (AK., pp. 374-75).

Samālaṅkāra

The direct opposite to Viṣama is Sama and it is defined by PR. as 'अनुरूपसंसर्गः समम्' (RG., p. 604). As in the case of Viṣama, 'Saṁsarga' is described as of two kinds, Utpattilakṣaṇa and Saṁyogādilakṣaṇa, in this figure also. The Anurūpatva of the Utpattilakṣaṇa-saṁsarga is based on three factors : (1) कारणात् स्वसमानगुणकार्योत्पत्तिः, (2) यादृशगुणकवस्तुसंसर्गः तादृशगुणोत्पत्तिः (3) and कारणात् वाञ्छितेष्टप्राप्तिः. After explaining the first two varieties with suitable examples, he gives the following verse as the example of the third variety :—

"नितरां धनमाप्तुमर्थिभिः क्षितिप त्वां समुपास्य यत्नतः ।
निधनं समलम्भि तावकी खलु सेवा जनवाञ्छितप्रदा ॥"
(RG., p. 605).

Here there is a pun in the word Nidhana to mean Adhikadhana and Maraṇa. If the fiirst sense is taken, it will be an instance of Sama. It may be taken as an instance of Viṣama if the word is understood in the second sense. But PR. rightly observes that there is full scope for Vyājastuti in this verse by taking the second sense and Viṣama will be ousted by it (RG., p. 605).

Now he criticises AD. for having accepted Viṣama in a verse of similar nature, because Vyājastuti makes Viṣama as completely groundless, as explained above. Nāgeśa's attempt to justify AD. (by saying "विषमावस्फूर्तिपूर्वकनिन्दायां पर्यवसानम्" (GMP., p. 606) does not seem to be correct, because in such case the Parisphūrti of many Alaṅkāras will have to be explained in almost all Alaṅkāras.

Like many of his predecessors, PR. also classifies Saṁyogādi-lakṣaṇānurūpatā into two varieties, Śtuti-paryavsāyinī and Nindāparyavasāyinī. Thus all the three main varieties of Viṣama are to be found in Sama also (RG., p. 608).

Ruyyaka and Vimarśinīkāra are not in favour of accepting the first two varieties because there is no charm in the description of Kāraṇāt-kāryotpatti and Prayatnāt-phalasiddhi which are quite natural in the world (AS., p. 167). But PR. maintains that the charm in the first two varietes of Sama consists in the description of Anurūpatā between Kārya and Kāraṇa by securing Dharmaikya with the help of Śleṣa etc., and in the description of the really Aniṣṭa as Iṣṭa with the help of the same (Śleṣādi). The examples cited by PR. justify his stand (RG., pp. 604-5).

Vicitrālaṅkāra

Mammaṭa does not mention Vicitra as a separate Alaṅkāra and Nāgeśa says (Uddyota, p. 558) that it comes under the fold of Viṣamālaṅkāra itself. According to Ruyyaka (AS., p. 168) Vicitra consits in the effort for a contrary result. Jayaratha states that Ruyyaka is the first man to define Vicitrālaṅkāra (Vimarśinī., p. 169).

PR.'s definition of Vicitra is as follws :—इष्टसिद्धयर्थमिष्टै-षिणां क्रियमाणमिष्टविपरीताचरणं विचित्रम्'' (RG., p. 608). "To do something of opposite effect with the hope of getting the desired result is Vicitra". This kind of behaviour indicates some innocence or illusion on the part of the agent. A man in such mental state may indulge in an adverse or unfavourable action. Such adverse action has been included in the above definition. To include the unfavourable action also, PR. proposes to add the word Ananukūla in the place of Viparīta in the definition and he gives two examples suitable to these two varietes.

The difference between Vicitra and Viṣama as explained by Ruyyaka is like this. In Vicitra, there is, first the cognition of Kāraṇaniṣedha and then the cognition of the Kārya-vaiparītya whereas in Viṣama there is, first the cognition of Vaiparītya and latter that of Niṣedha (AS., p. 168).

In this connection Jayaratha says that there is great difference between these two figures, because, in Viṣama the opposite result is produced on its own accord whereas in Vicitra a person tries to produce an opposite effect; and that Ruyyaka, while writing as quoted above, wanted to show another difference also (Vimarśinī, p. 169).

PR. also shows the same difference as explained by Jayaratha (RG., p. 610).

Adhikālaṅkāra

While closely following the definition given by his predecessors, PR. stresses on the point that this Ādhikya should be the poetical creation. "आधाराधेययोरन्यतरस्यातिविस्तृतत्वसिद्धिफलकमितरस्यातिन्यूनत्वकल्पनमधिकम्" (RG., p. 610). "When the container or the contained is described as very big resulting in the smallness of the other, this is Adhikālaṅkara." While explaining this figure with suitable examples, PR. mentions Śṛṅkhalārūpādhārādhikālaṅkāra where two Ādhāras are mentioned one after another. He does not accept the example[1] given by Ruyyaka because, he contends, the Ādhikya is real in the case of the 'Ākāśa' described as the Ādhāra of many things (RG., p. 611).

Viśveśvara (AK., p. 380) tries to defend Ruyyaka's example saying that the Ākaśa as the Ādhāra of all the mountains etc. in a peculiar relation, is the poet's own imagination and so can be taken as the example of Adhika. But Viśveśvara's statement does not answer the objection raised by PR. because, whatever may be Vṛttiniyāmaka-sambandha, the Ākāśa is well-known as the Ādhāra of all things which is accepted as a fact by all.

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1. द्यौरत्र क्वचिदाश्रिता प्रविततं पातालमत्र क्वचित्
क्वाप्यत्रैव धरा धराधरजलाधारावधिर्वर्तते ।
स्फीतस्फीतमहो नभः कियदिदं यस्येत्थमेवंविधैः
दूरे पूरणमस्तु शून्यमिति यन्नामापि नाऽस्तं गतम् ।। AS., p. 169.

That it should be based on poet's own description has been accepted by Nāgeśa also (Uddyota, p. 559).

Anyonyālaṅkāra

It is defined by Mammaṭa as "क्रियया तु परस्परं वस्तुनोर्जननेऽन्योन्यम्" (KP., p. 547). "To embellish each other by same Kriyā is Anyonya" as explained by Pradīpa (p. 547).

The mutual embellishment may be not only through Kriyā, but Guṇa also; so PR. defines it in the following words :—"द्वयोरन्योन्येनान्योन्यस्य विशेषाधानमन्योन्यम्, विशेषश्च क्रियादिरूप:" (RG., p. 612). After explaining it with suitable illustrations he proceeds to examine the example given by AD. and the passage explaining it. AD. cites the following verse as an example of Anyonya :

"यथोर्ध्वाक्ष: पिबत्युम्बु पथिको विरलाङ्गुलि: ।
तथा प्रपापालिकापि धारा वितनुते तनुम् ।।"

(Kuvalayānanda, p. 114)

PR. takes AD. to task for the loose use of the word 'Sva' while explaining the verse and his objection appears to be quite correct in view of the ruling given by Mammaṭa (KP., p. 310). PR. also contends that the Dhārātanūkaraṇa is helpful to the Prapāpālikā herself and the Aṅgulī-viralīkaraṇa is helpful to the traveller, though there is help to the other party also. Thus there is complete mutual help (unmixed with his or her own help) and so it cannot be taken as the example of Anyonya. Viśveśvara quotes this view of PR. with approval (AK., p. 361).

Viśeṣālaṅkāra.

In defining Viśeṣa, PR. closely follows his predecessors like Mammaṭa. He defines it :—

"प्रसिद्धमाश्रयं विना आधेयं वर्ण्यमानमेको विशेषप्रकार: । यच्चैकमाधेयं परिमितयत्किञ्चिदाधारगतमपि युगपदनेकाधारगततया वर्ण्यते सोऽपरो विशेष-

प्रकारः। यच्च किञ्चित्कार्यमारभमाणस्य असम्भाविताशक्यवस्त्वन्तरनिर्वर्तनं स तृतीयो विशेषप्रकारः। एवञ्चैतदन्यतमत्वं विशेषालङ्कारसामान्यलक्षणम् (RG., p.614). "The description of the existence of the contained without the container is one variety of Viśeṣa. The existence of one Ādheya on many Adhāras at one time is the second variety. The fulfilment of an impossible work by a man attempting to do some other work is the third variety." Thus, as rightly observed by Jayaratha (Vimarśinī, p. 172), instead of calling them as different varieties, they should be called different Alaṅkāras in the absence of Anugatalakṣaṇa (uniform definition). That is why PR. adds "एतदन्यतमत्वं विशेषालङ्कारसामान्यलक्षणम्". Again he classified the first variety into two kinds, the description of the Ādheya as existing without Ādhāra, and as existing on a different Ādhāra.

After explaining these varieties with illustrations, he proceeds to examine if there is Ativyāpti of the definition of the third variety in the following verse :—

"लोभाद्वराटिकानां विक्रेतुं तक्रमनिशमटन्त्या।
लब्धो गोपकिशोर्या मध्येरथ्यं महेन्द्रनीलमणिः॥" (RG., p. 615)

where the cowherdess, trying to earn a few cowries, is described as having come across an unbelievable gain, the gain of Mahendra-Nīlamaṇi. In order to avoid Ativyāpti in this verse which is considered to be an instance of the Śaṅkara of Praharṣaṇa and Viṣama, PR. says that Tadabheddāhyavasāna-nibandhanatva is to be added as the Viśeṣaṇa of Aśakyavastvantara-Nirvartana. In other words, the attempt at doing some work and the achievement of the impossible result should be taken as identical with each other in Viśeṣālaṅkāra. Now it can be seen, there is no such Abhedādhyavasāna between the Takra-vikraya and Indranīlamaṇi-prāpti.

In the absence of a common definition (Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) as seen above, it does not appear to be correct to take this third variety as one of the varieties of Viṣeṣa. Therefore PR.

expresses himself to be in favour of accepting it as an independent Alaṅkāra.

Next he criticises the examples given by AD. and the one given by himself earlier. In places like "येन दृष्टोऽसि देव त्वं तेन दृष्टो हुताशनः" or "तेन दृष्टा वसुन्धरा" etc., there is no scope for Viśeṣa because there is no impossibility, and so it has to be accepted as Nidarśanā. The same Nidarśanā may be accepted even in "येन दृष्टोसि देव त्वं तेन दृष्टः सुरेश्वरः', 'त्वां पश्यता मया लब्धं कल्पवृक्षनिरीक्षणम्" (Kuvalayānanda, p. 116), and in 'Kodaṇḍacyuta' etc. (RG., p. 615), when there is not much difference. Therefore PR. gives the following verse which cannot be explained away as an instance of Nidarśanā :—

"किं नाम तेन न कृतं सुकृतं पुरारे
दासीकृता न खलु का भुवनेषु लक्ष्मीः ।
भोगा न के बुभुजिरे विबुधैरलभ्या
येनार्चितोऽसि करुणाकर हेलयापि ।।" (RG., p. 617)

Here there is described the Aśakyakaraṇa of Trivargaprāpti which is an instance of Viśeṣa. Now the Abhedādhyavasāna-nibandhanatva need not be added and Saṅkara of Viśeṣa also may be accepted in Lobhādvarāṭikānām" etc.

Vyāghātālaṅkāra.

PR. defines Vyāghāta in the following words :—"यत्र ह्येकेन कर्त्रा येन कारणेन कार्यं किञ्चिन्निष्पादितं निष्पिपादयिषितं वा तदन्येन कर्त्रा तेनैव कारणेन तद्विरुद्धकार्यस्य निष्पादनेन निष्पिपादयिषया वा व्याहन्यते स व्याघातः" (RG., p. 617).

There are two varieties of Vyāghāta mixed in the above definition. If something that is accomplished by a man by certain means, is undone with the same means by another man, it is the first variety of Vyāghāta. If a certain thing intended to be accomplished by a man with certain means, is undone by another man with the intention of accomplishing something

else with the same means, it is the instance of the second variety of Vyāghāta.

Only the first variety is mentioned by Mammaṭa perhaps for the first time, while both the varieties are mentioned by Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha. Nāgeśa adds this second variety with the same example as given by PR in his Uddyota (p. 576).

Ruyyaka rightly observes[1] that Vyāghāta is the Nimitta of Vyatireka. But Vimarśinīkāra[2] takes it otherwise and states that Vyatireka is the Nimitta of Vyāghāta. But PR. correctly states that Vyatireka results from Vyāghāta (RG., p. 617). In fact he is in favour of accepting Vyatireka only, in all places of Vyāghāta without giving independent status to the latter. He indicates that excepting the fact that it is accepted as an independent figure by old writers, there is no justification in mentioning this Alaṅkāra. He concludes the Virodhamūlālaṅkāras with this figure.

Kāraṇamālā.

PR. defines Kārṇaṇamālā in the following words :—"सैव शृङ्खला[3] आनुगुण्यस्य कार्यकारणभावरूपत्वे कारणमाला" (RG., p 621).

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1. सोऽपि व्यतिरेकनिमित्तत्वेनात्रोक्तः । विरूपाक्षस्येति वामलोचना इति च व्यति (प्रक?) रेकगर्भाविव वाचकौ । जयिनीरिति व्यतिरेकोक्तिः ।
AS., p. 175.
2. अनेनाऽस्य व्यतिरेकं विना उत्थानमेव न स्यादिति सूचितम् ।... अतश्चास्य सर्वात्मना व्यतिरेको निमित्तत्वं यायात् ।
Vimarśinī, p. 175.
3. Before proceeding to mention the Śṛṅkhalāmūlālaṅkāras, PR. (RG., p. 620) explains what is meant by Sṛṅkhalā : "पङ्क्तिरूपेण निबद्धानामर्थानां पूर्वपूर्वस्योत्तरोत्तरस्मिन् उत्तरोत्तरस्य वा पूर्वपूर्वस्मिन् संसृष्टत्वं शृङ्खला." "Of the things mentioned in a line (an order) the connection of the previous one with the following, or the vice versa is called Sṛṅkhalā, i.e., Chain.

"Kāraṇamālā arises if the Ānuguṇya (congruity) involved in Sṛṅkhlā consists of Kāryakāraṇa-bhāva." Further, he states: "तत्र पूर्वं पूर्वं कारणं परं परं कार्यमित्येका । पूर्वं पूर्वं कार्यं परं परं कारण-मित्यपरा". In the first variety, each succeeding object is described as the result of each preceding cause; and in the second variety, each preceding result is described as produced by each succeeding cause. In mentioning these two varieties, PR. follows Jayaratha who writes:—

> "क्वचिद्विपर्ययेणापि भवति । यथा—
> माणो गुणेहि जाअइ गुणा वि जाअंते सुअणसेवाइ ।
> विमलेण सुअअप्पसरेण सुअणवइ इट्टाणं ॥"
>
> (Vimarśinī, p. 177)

After explaining these two varieties with suitable examples, PR. rightly observes that "in this figure we should preserve symmetry, if strikingness is to be produced. If we begin with the express mention of something as a cause, then we must speak of the cause of that thing and so on. Or we must speak of the effect of that thing as the cause of something else and so on. Or if we begin with the express mention of something as an effect, we must speak of that effect as due to something else and so on." And the same word which is first used whether as Kāraṇopasthāpaka or Kāryopasthāpaka should be repeated. Otherwise it will be an instance of Bhagnakrama-doṣa. In the absence of the observance of the above principle, which is essential for beauty, the following verse which is given as an example of Kāraṇamālā by old writers like Mammaṭa (KP., p.546) and Ruyyaka (AS., p. 147) loses its real charm:

> "जितेन्द्रियत्वं विनयस्य कारणं गुणप्रकर्षो विनयादवाप्यते ।
> गुणाधिके पुंसि जनोऽनुरज्यते जनानुरागप्रभवा हि सम्पदः ॥"

PR. further adds that in such places as Kāraṇamālā one need not hesitate for fear of Kathitapadatva-doṣa to repeat the same word. On the contrary, if a different word is used to convey the same meaning, it would appear as if some new thing is expressed, just like an actor in a different guise, and the cognition of the intended meaning will be delayed.

It may be argued that when both the words convey the same meaning where is the scope for any material difference ? In reply to this, he explains that the function of a word does not cease by merely expressing the sense but the cognition of the word also continues to exist along with the cognition of its sense. The same idea is expressed by the saying "न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते". The truth in this saying is clear when we keenly observe the difference in the effect that is produced when the same word is repeated and when it is changed, in verses like the oft-quoted one :

"उदेति सविता ताम्रः ताम्र एवास्तमेति च ।
सम्पत्तौ च विपत्तौ च महतामेकरूपता ।।"

If it is read by substituting the second 'Tāmraḥ' by 'Raktaḥ' it would naturally appear (as rightly explained by Mammaṭa, KP., p. 318), at the first instance, as though some new idea is expressed. In view of this difference in the effect, PR. maintains that even Śabda will have to be accepted as cognised as the Viśeṣaṇa in the Śakyārtha and that the Śabda-vyutpatti is to be accepted in accordance with the above cognition. "एवञ्च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभिन्नस्यापि शब्दस्य यदि शक्यविशेषणत्वं वैलक्षण्यान्यथानुपपत्त्यानुभवबलेन च सिद्धं तदा तदनुगुणैव व्युत्पत्तिः शब्दानां कल्प्यते । सा च वृत्तिसम्बन्धेनार्थविशिष्टशाब्दज्ञानत्वेन शब्दविशिष्टार्थोपस्थितित्वेन च सामान्यकार्यकारणभावरूपा" (RG., p. 623).

Here "Vṛttisambandhena" is to be understood to mean Abhidhādi-Vṛttisambandha but not Vartamānatā as is wrongly explained by Saralā (RG., p. 623).

Thus PR. lays particular stress on maintaining the symmetry and on the repetition of the Kāryakāraṇādivācaka-padas in Kāraṇamālā.

Ekāvalī

This is defined by PR. as "सैव श्रृङ्खला संसर्गस्य विशेष्यविशेषण-

भावरूपत्वे एकावली" (RG., p.624). "If the Saṁsarga involved in Śṛṅkhalā is Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāvarūpa it will be an instance of Ekāvalī." First he classifies it into two varieties : "सा च पूर्वपूर्वस्योत्तरोत्तरं प्रति विशेष्यत्वे विशेषणत्वे चेति द्विधा". In the first variety each preceding object is described as the Viśeṣya of each following object. In the second variety, each preceding object is described as the Viśeṣaṇa of each following object. The first variety is further classified into two varieties based on the positivity and negativity of the statement, that is, in the first variety each preceding thing is affirmed by the following Viśeṣaṇa and in the second, it is denied by the same. Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka accept only the first variety (पूर्वपूर्वस्योत्तरोत्तरं प्रति विशेष्यत्वम्) with its two sub-divisions, but not the second one (पूर्वपूर्वस्योत्तरोत्तरं प्रति विशेषणत्वम्) which appears to have been included by PR. himself.

After explaining these varieties with suitable examples, PR states that Mālādīpaka should not be misunderstood as a variety of Dīpaka as was done by Mammaṭa (KP., p. 500) because there is no Sādṛśya in it, which is the important element in Dīpaka.

As is rightly pointed out by Nāgeśa (GMP., p. 625), AD. also does not seem to be accepting Mālādīpaka as a variety of Dīpaka and so PR is not justified in criticising him.

PR.'s definition of Apohakatva constituting the second variety of the first Ekāvalī is criticised by Viśveśvara. The definition, "स्वव्यतिरेकेण विशेष्यतावच्छेदकव्यतिरेकबुद्धिजनकत्वमपोहकत्वम्," he contends, cannot be applied in the case of the verses like the following, which are accepted as the instances of Ekāvalī.

"न तज्जलं यन्न सुचारुपङ्कजं न पङ्कजं तद्यदलीनषट्पदम् ।
न षट्पदोऽसौ कलगुञ्जितो न यो न गुञ्जितं तन्न जहार यन्मनः ॥"
(AK., p.384).

Here Jalatvābhāva in the absence of Paṅkajas is not intended to be conveyed; because Paṅkajāyoga-vyatireka alone is intended to be expressed.

Sārālaṅkāra

It is defined by PR. as "सैव संसर्गस्योत्कृष्टापकृष्टभावरूपत्वे सारः" (RG., p.626). "Sāra arises when the Śṛṅkhalā consists of Utkṛṣṭāpakṛṣṭa-bhāva among the preceding and the following things." Old writers like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka define this figure as consisting of the superiority of each following thing over the preceding one. But PR. accepts another variety also which, he says, is the inferiority of each following thing to the preceding one. "तत्रापि पूर्वपूर्वापेक्षया उत्तरोत्तरस्योत्कर्षाभ्यां द्वैविध्यम्" (RG., p.626). But the name of the figure, 'Sāra', does not justify the acceptance of this second variety unless one is prepared to explain the superiority in the reverse order.

Further he states that according to some writers, this figure can be Ekaviṣaya and Anekaviṣaya. When it is Ekaviṣaya, the Utkarṣa of the following things is to be described as based on Avasthābheda. Jayaratha (Vimarśinī, p.179) appears to be the first man to accept this Ekaviṣayatva.

PR. says that there is no charm of Śṛṅkhalā in Ekaviṣaya-Sāra and therefore he wants that this should be given a different definition so as to include both the varieties, Śṛṅkhalā-mūla (Anekaviṣaya) and Svatantra (Ekaviṣaya). Accordingly he gives a modified definition. "गुणस्वरूपाभ्यां पूर्वपूर्ववैशिष्ट्ये सारः, स च क्वचिच्छृङ्खलानुप्राणितः, क्वचित् स्वतन्त्र इति अनेकविषयमेकविषयत्वं च सुस्थम्" (RG., p. 627).

He concludes this figure by stating that the Śṛṅkhalā, like Virodha, Abheda and Sādharmya, being the underlying principle of many Alaṅkāras, should not be considered as an independent Alaṅkāra. Of course, he is repeating here, in his

own words, the views of Jayaratha (Vimarśinī, p. 176), expressed by him under the figure Kāraṇamālā.

Kāvyaliṅgālaṅkāra

Kāvyaliṅga is defined by the predecessors of PR. in similar terms :—

"काव्यलिङ्गं हेतोर्वाक्यपदार्थता" (KP., p. 527).

"हेतोर्वाक्यपदार्थता काव्यलिङ्गम्" (AS., p. 181).

The expression of Hetu by a Pada or Vākya constitutes Kāvyaliṅga.

PR. gives a perfect Lakṣaṇa avoiding scope for Ativyāpti : "अनुमितिकरणत्वेन सामान्यविशेषभावाभ्यां चानालिङ्गितः प्रकृतार्थोपपादकत्वेन विवक्षितोऽर्थः काव्यलिङ्गम्" (RG., p. 628). "Kāvyaliṅga arises when something is expressed with an intention of justifying the contextual meaning." The first two words in the definition are used to avoid Ativyāpti in Anumāna and Arthāntaranyāsa. He also makes it clear that there is scope for Kāvyaliṅga only when the Hetu is implied without being mentioned in words like Pañcamyanta.

Next, he introduces new innovations into Kāvyaliṅga by classifying it into many varieties, not mentioned by his predecessors.

First he classifies Kāvyaliṅga into two groups, Subantārtha and Tiṅantārtha. The first variety is of two kinds : Śabdāntarārtha-viśeṣitarūpa and Śuddhaika-subantārtha-rūpa. The first of these two sub-varieties is again of two kinds, Vākyārthaviśeṣita and Subantārtha-mātra-viśeṣita. Thus Subantārtha-kāvyaliṅga is of three kinds. Tiṅantārtha is also of two kinds, Vākyārtha-viśeṣita and Subantārtha-mātra-viśeṣita. Śuddhaika-Tiṅantārtharūpa is not possible in the case of Tiṅantārtha because Tiṅartha (Kriyā) is invariably to be associated with

some Kāraka or other. Though introducing so many varieties, PR. is not at all specially interested in them or even in the main varieties of Padagatatva and Vākyagatatva as is evident from his following remark : "एते च भेदाः प्राचीनकल्पितपदार्थवाक्यार्थभेदद्वयवच्चातुर्यमात्रेण कल्पिताः न तु वैचित्र्यविशेषेण" (RG., p. 630). He explains some of these varieties with suitable examples, like the following :—

"विनिन्द्यान्युन्मत्तैरपि च परिहार्याणि पतितैः
अवाच्यानि व्रात्यैः सपुलकमुपास्यानि पिशुनैः ।
हरन्ती लोकानामनवरतमेनांसि कियतां
कदाप्यश्रान्ता त्वं जगति पुनरेका विजयसे ।।" (RG., p. 629).

Viśveśvara criticises PR., saying that this example is against his earlier declaration that the Hetu in Kāvyaliṅga should not be expressed in words, for in the above verse, the word 'Harantī', being a Śatṛpratyayānta is expressive of Hetu as in places like 'Harim paśyan mucyate' etc. (AK., p. 336). But Viśveśvara's objection is based on the assumption that the Śatṛ-pratyaya in 'Harantī' is by the Pāṇini Sūtra 'लक्षणहेत्वोः क्रियायाः'. But PR. might be of the opinion that it is by the Sāmānya sūtra "लटः शतृशानचावप्रथमासमानाधिकरणे." Moreover, PR explains the Kāvyaliṅga, in this verse, as based mainly on the word Aśrāntā, in which case Viśveśvara's objection is baseless.

Next PR. proceeds to distinguish this figure from Anumāna. He accepts that there is some kind of Anumiti in Kāvyaliṅga also but it does not come under Anumānālaṅkāra on the following grounds. Anumāna arises only when it is the intention of the poet to produce such Anumitijñāna with the help of a Hetu. But in Kāvyaliṅga, the poet does not want to produce such Anumiti, though the reader incidentally gets it. Moreover, in Anumānālaṅkāra there will be introduced another

person by the poet who has to get the Anumiti from the Hetu being described. But in Kāvyaliṅga such Anumiti is derived by the reader himself. In view of this differentiation, PR. suggests that "Kāvya-vyāpāra-gocaratva" should be added as the Viśeṣaṇa of Anumiti in the definition of Anumāna to avoid Ativyāpti in Kāvyaliṅga.

Viśveśvara tries to prove that there is no scope for Anumāna in Kāvyaliṅga, because the Upapādaka in this figure is being introduced just to remove the doubt about the Prāmāṇya of the Sādhyajñāna arrived at through another Pramāṇa; and there is no scope for Anumiti in such case, for it arises only when there is Vyāptijñāna supported by Avyabhicaritatva-jñāna, but Upapādaka-hetu fulfils its work even in the absence of such Vyāptijñāna etc. He further states that Anumiti alone but not Parāmarśa (Anumāna) is the Alaṅkāra; and Anumiti cannot be produced when the Sādhya is known through different Pramāṇa In such case there is no scope for Anumiti at all in Kāvyaliṅga. (AK., pp. 339-340).

Even if there is scope for Anumiti in Kāvyaliṅgasthala, the arguments, especially the second one, advanced by PR. to differentiate Kāvyaliṅga from Anumiti seems to be sound.

Next PR. criticises AD.'s definition of Kāvyaliṅgālaṅkāra : "समर्थनीयस्यार्थस्य काव्यलिङ्गं समर्थकम्" (Kuvalayānanda, p. 127), saying that it will have Ativyāpti in Arthāntaranyāsa unless the Viśeṣaṇa 'Sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāvānāliṅgitatva' is added in the definition.

But this criticism is unfounded. As rightly pointed out by Nāgeśa (p. 632), AD. himself writes later on :—"किन्तु समर्थ्य-समर्थकयोः सामान्यविशेषसम्बन्धे अर्थान्तरन्यासः । तदितरसम्बन्धे काव्यलिङ्ग-मित्येव व्यवस्थावधारणीया" (Kuvalyānanda, p. 133).

PR.'s criticism of Ruyyaka's example of Kāvyaliṅga also, "Yattvannetra-samāna-kānti" etc., seems to be unreasonable.

As rightly pointed out by Viśveśvara (AK., p. 340), such Anumāna can be explained in PR.'s own example; because in every Kāvyaliṅga there will be Gamyānumāna invariably (GMP., p. 633).

Now PR. mentions the views of some writers who do not accept Kāvyaliṅga as an Alaṅkāra. The Hetu-hetumadbhāva in Kāvyaliṅga being a real thing, there is nothing to be created by the poet, or any Camatkāra in it and so it cannot be accepted as a separate Alaṅkāra. Even if there is some Camatkāra in places of Kāvyaliṅga, it is only due to other figures like Śleṣa but not this figure. Therefore, they contend that Kāvyaliṅga can be explained away as the absence of Nirhetu-rūpa-doṣa

It is not clearly known who are the writers who accept it as Doṣābhāvarūpa. But Jayaratha (Vimarśinī, pp. 182-84) is firm in his opinion that Kāvyaliṅga is not an Alaṅkāra and it may be explained away as Anumānālaṅkāra. PR., while accepting that it is not an independent Alaṅkāra, like Jayaratha, appears to be more in favour of taking it as Doṣābhāvarūpa than Anumānāntargata.

Viśveśvara (AK., p. 340) feels that the opinion of PR. is to be rejected because, he maintains, there is Camatkāra in Kāvyaliṅga also. The arguments based on Camatkāra-janakatva or otherwise are too abstract to help us to arrive at any definite conclusion. But one thing can be said in favour of PR. This figure is not mentioned by ancient writers like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin etc.

But on close observation PR. does not appear to be in favour of discarding Kāvyaliṅga altogether, because while criticising the definition of Arthāntaranyāsa of Ruyyaka, he writes: "'कारणेन कार्यस्य कार्येण वा कार्यस्य समर्थनम्' इत्यादि भेदद्वयमर्थान्तरन्यास-स्यालङ्कारसर्वस्वकारो न्यरूपयत् तन्न । तस्य काव्यलिङ्गविषयत्वात् । अन्यथा 'वपुःप्रादुर्भावात्' इति सकलालङ्कारिकसिद्धं काव्यलिङ्गोदाहरणमसङ्गतं

स्यात्" (RG., p. 638).

If he were to be against Kāvyaliṅga, he would have defined it on the lines followed by Ruyyaka.

Arthāntaranyāsālaṅkāra

Arthāntaranyāsa consists of the justification of one Vākyārtha by the other. It is defined by Mammaṭa in the following words :—

"सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा तदन्येन समर्थ्यते ।

यत्र सोऽर्थान्तरन्यासः साधर्म्येणेतरेण वा ॥" (KP., p. 514)

"When a general statement is justified by a particular statement or vice versa, by Sādharmya or Vaidharmya, it will be an instance of Arthāntaranyāsa."

Ruyyaka includes Kārya and Kāraṇa also in his definition "सामान्यविशेषकार्यकारणभावाभ्यां निर्दिष्टप्रकृतसमर्थनमर्थान्तरन्यासः" (AS., p. 193). By introducing Sādharmya and Vaidharmya he raises the number of the varieties of this figure to eight.

PR.'s definition is based on Mammaṭa's :—"सामान्येन विशेषस्य विशेषेण सामान्यस्य वा यत् समर्थनं तदर्थान्तरन्यासः ।" "तच्च तावत् साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां द्विविधम् ।" (RG., p. 634).

He also states that unlike 'Kāvyaliṅga' which can be only Ārtha, Arthāntaranyāsa may be either Śābda or Ārtha (in the absence of words like 'Hi', 'Yat' etc.) (RG., p. 634).

After explaining it with suitable examples, PR. maintains that this cannot be included under Anumāna, because, as he indicates, the same arguments as shown while differentiating Kāvyaliṅga from Anumāna can be applied here also (GMP., p. 637). It cannot be included under Udāharaṇālaṅkāra even, because there is the use of words like 'Iva' etc. in Udāharaṇa, which is not found in Arthāntaranyāsa. Moreover, in Udāha

raṇa there is Viśeṣatva only in Anuvādyāṁśa but not in the Vidheyāṁśa whereas both of them are having Viśeṣatva in Arthāntaranyāsa. For example, the following verse is taken as an instance of Udāharaṇa :—

"उपकारमेव कुरुते विपद्गतः सद्गुणो नितराम् ।
मूर्च्छां गतो मृतो वा निदर्शनं पारदोऽत्र रसः ॥"

and the same verse with the change of "मूर्च्छां गतो मृतो वा रोगानपहरति पारदः सकलान्", will be an instance of Arthāntaranyāsa. In Udāharaṇa, 'Upakārakaraṇam' is applicable to both Sadguṇa and Pārada whereas in the latter, Upakārakaraṇa is applicable to Sadguṇa and Rogāpaharaṇa is applicable to Pārada. Even if one thinks that this slight difference does not require it to be accepted as an independent figure, he cannot dispense with Arthāntaranyāsa because Udāharaṇa is not accepted by old rhetoricians who include it under Upamā.

According to PR., even if something does not require justification, it may be justified just to make the sense clear. Thus he is not prepared to agree with Jayaratha who states that Arthāntaranyāsa arises only when the Sāmānya requires justification by introducing Viśeṣa; otherwise, its introduction being for clear understanding, it will be an instance of Udāharaṇa only. Therefore he maintains that what is explained by him above should be taken as the point of difference between these two figures.

Ruyyaka's contention that "Kāryena kāraṇa-samarthanam' or 'Kāraṇena kārya-samarthanam' also come under Arthāntaranyāsa, is not accepted by PR. because they come under the purview of Kāvyaliṅga. Of course, this is repetition of what is said by Jayaratha himself : "कार्यकारणभावाश्रयस्य भेद-द्वयस्य काव्यलिङ्गत्वं ग्रन्थकृदेव वक्ष्यतीति सामान्यविशेषभावाश्रयमेव

भेदद्वयमाश्रयणीयम्" (Vimarśini, p. 139). In fact Ruyyaka himself realises this point and writes (AS., p. 186) under Anumānālaṅkāra that the inclusion of Kāryakāraṇabhāva in Arthāntaranyāsa is based on the definition of Kāvyaliṅga by old writers like Udbhaṭa[1] who accept only Padārtha-hetuka-Kāvyaliṅga.

In Arthāntaranyāsa, Prakṛta may be supported by Aprakṛta or by Prakṛta. But PR. says that it is possible at times that Aprakṛta is justified by Prakṛta but, he adds, even that Aprakṛta would turn into Prakṛta at the end, and this he explains with a proper example.

In verses like, 'Anantaratna-prabhavasya' etc., AD. accepts a figure called Vikasvara which arises through Upamā or Arthāntara etc. But PR. states that it can be explained away as the Saṁsṛṣṭi of Upamā etc., or Arthāntaranyāsa etc., as the case may be. Nāgeśa contends that there is nothing wrong in accepting Vikasvara as an Alaṅkāra because there is Camatkāra based on Śṛṅkhalā :—"शृङ्खलाकृतचमत्कारस्याधिकस्य सत्त्वात् चिन्त्यमिदम्" (GMP., p. 639).

It is interesting to note that the same Nāgeśa refutes the Vikasvarālaṅkāra in Uddyota (p. 516) : "अनन्तरत्नप्रभवस्य...... इत्यत्र द्वयोरप्यर्थान्तरन्यासयोः संसृष्ट्यादि बोध्यम् । एतेन 'यस्मिन् विशेषसामान्यविशेषाः स विकस्वरः, यथानन्तेति' इति विकस्वरालङ्कारोऽयं पृथगित्यपास्तम्" He refutes Udāharaṇa also in Uddyota (p. 516).

Viśveśvara also follows the views of PR. in not accepting Vikasvara (AK., p. 320).

Anumānālaṅkāra.

Anumāna is defined by Mammaṭa as "अनुमानं तदुक्तं

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1. श्रुतमेकं यदन्यत्र स्मृतेरनुभवस्य वा ।
हेतुतां प्रतिपद्येते काव्यलिङ्गं तदुच्यते ।।" KASS. VI-7.

यत्साध्यसाधनयोर्वचः" (KP., p. 538). The mention of Sādhya and Sādhana constitutes Anumāna.

PR.'s definition of Anumāna is "अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम्." This definition is identical with the definition given by the Naiyāyikas in works like Tarkasaṅgraha (p. 67).

Following is the theory of the Naiyāyikas. By often seeing the smoke invariably in association with fire, one gets the Vyāpti-jñāna that wherever there is smoke there should be fire (यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निः). When the same man happens to see a column of smoke rising from a mountain he is immediately reminded of his Vyāpti-jñāna which leads to the cognition "this mountain has got Dhūma which is the Vyāpya of the fire," (Vahnivyāpya-dhūmavān ayam parvataḥ) and this cognition is called Parāmarśa-jñāna. This again leads to the Anumitijñāna that this mountain has fire (Parvato vahnimān). Thus according to the Naiyāyikas the cognition 'Parvato vahnimān' is technically called Anumiti and the Vyāpti-jñāna, i.e., 'Yatra dhūmastatrāgniḥ' is 'Anumāna'. There is difference of opinion as to the nature of the Anumiti-karaṇa. Old Naiyāyikas think that the Liṅga which is cognised as Sādhya-vyāpya, is the Anumiti-karaṇa. But Navyas like Viśvanātha Pañcānana (Muktāvali, p. 286) accept that the cognition of such Liṅga is the Anumiti-karaṇa.

As rightly pointed out by P.V. Kane (SD., p. 227) this word 'Anumāna' is used loosely by the rhetoricians. All the rhetoricians like Mammaṭa appear to have been using this to mean the Anumiti itself as can be seen from their examples.

But PR. at the beginning, attempts to use and explain this word strictly in the sense accepted by Naiyāyikas and show the different views as to the nature of Anumiti-karaṇa. "तस्याश्च करणं व्याप्तिप्रकारकलिङ्गनिश्चय इत्येके । व्याप्यत्वेन निश्चीयमानं

लिङ्गमित्यपरे" (RG., p. 640). In order to distinguish it from the dry Anumāna of the Naiyāyikas, he states that the poetical Anumāna should contain some Camatkāra.

Like Ruyyaka (AS., p. 185), he also accepts that Anumāna may either be Śuddha or Rūpakānuprāṇita and explains both the varieties with suitable illustrations. In this connection, he says that words like 'Manye', Śaṅke etc., express Anumāna when there are Liṅga and Liṅgin, and that they will be Utprekṣāvācakas where there is the existence of the Nimittas like Sādṛśya. Accordingly, Anumānālaṅkāra is Vācya where there is the use of words like 'Manye' etc. It is 'Lakṣya' where the words like 'Vakti' 'Kathayati' etc., are used as in 'तस्मिन् मणिव्रातमहान्धकारे'[1] etc. But in the absence of these two types of words, the Sādhya helps to deduce the Anumiti and so in such cases, the Anumāna is Pratīyamāna. When even the Sādhya is not mentioned but only guessed with the help of Liṅga, it will be an instance of Anumānadhvani.

In view of this classification, PR. modifies his previous definition and states that Anumiti itself is Anumāna. This view is followed by Viśveśvara also. Thus the word Anumāna is to be explained not as "अनुमीयते अनेनेति अनुमानम्" but as 'Anumitiḥ Anumānam', taking it as 'भावे ल्युट्'.

Yathāsaṅkhyālaṅkāra.

PR. has nothing to add to what is already said by his predecessors about Yathāsaṅkhya. Kuntaka has already

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1. तस्मिन् मणिव्रातमहान्धकारे पुरे विशालोपविधानदक्षे ।
सद्यो वियुक्ता दिवसावसानं कोकाः सशोकाः कथयन्ति नित्यम् ॥"
RG., p. 640.

discussed[1] at length how Yathāsaṅkhya with least charm of its own cannot be named Alaṅkāra at all. That is why Jayaratha[2] also is not particular in accepting it as an Alaṅkāra. Apart from the fact that there is no Camatkāra in this figure, it can be explained, according to Jayaratha, as the absence of the blemish Apakrama. If this were to be a figure, the Pāṇinisūtra "तूदीशलातुरवर्मतीकूचवाराड्ढक्छण्ढञ्यकः" (4.3.94) will have to be taken as an instance of this figure (Vimarśinī, p. 188). This view has been endorsed by PR. and the figure Yathāsaṅkhya otherwise known as Kramālaṅkāra by Vāmanīyas is not accepted by him as an Alaṅkāra.

But as Nāgeśa rightly remarks, there is some strikingness in referring, in the same verse, to many things again in the same order in which they have been once mentioned and so it should be given the position of a figure (Uddyota, p. 514) Perhaps this consideration weighed with PR. who without expressing it as his own opinion, states it under the name of Navyas.

Before proceeding to examine whether Yathāsaṅkhya can be called Alaṅkāra, PR. states the views of some scholars as to the principle according to which the things mentioned in one set are associated with things mentioned in another set in the same order. Some scholars think that Yogyatājñāna is the guiding principle in it because in the verse :

"वृन्दापितृगहनचरौ कुसुमायुधजननहननशक्तिधरौ ।
अरिशूललाञ्छितकरौ भीतिं मे हरिहरौ हरताम् ॥" (RG. p 643)

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1. There must have been a long discussion about this point by Kuntaka but we see only the repetition of Bhāmaha's words, and a sentence in refutation of the same in the extant Vakroktijīvita. (Hindi Vakroktijīvita, p. 479 and Vakroktijīvitam, p. 220).
2. एतच्च वक्रोक्तिजीवितकृता सप्रपञ्चमुक्तमित्यस्माभिरिह नापास्तम् । ग्रन्थकृता पुनरेतदुद्भटमतानुयायितया लक्षितम् ।"
Vimarśinī, p. 18:

Vṛndāvana-caratva can be associated with Hari, and Pitṛgahanacaratva with Hara only, and it is inappropriate to have different association. Thus, the principle of propriety is responsible for Yathāsaṅkhyānvaya. But it is not acceptable to another set of scholars. If Yogyatā-jñāna were to be the guiding principle, there can be no question of accepting Kramabhaṅga as a Doṣa. For, even when it is said "कीर्तिप्रतापौ भातस्ते सूर्यचन्द्रमसाविव", one can associate, in view of the Yogyatā-jñāna, Kīrti with Candra and Pratāpa with Sūrya though mentioned in different order. Thus where is the loss even if there is Kramabhaṅga? Therefore, they accept that the cognition of the number of things mentioned in each set is responsible for Yathāsaṅkhyānvaya. According to this principle, one will find Anvaya at the first instance between Kīrti and Sūrya etc., (in Kīrti-pratāpau) which is incorrect. This makes us accept Krama-bhaṅga as a Doṣa. By mentioning this view at the end, PR. appears to be in favour of the same.

But Viśveśvara thinks that Yogyatājñāna alone is the Anvaya-niyāmaka. If number of the things were to be responsible, he contends, such Kramikānvaya may be had from expressions like : 'देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोरजावयो धनम्' and 'भवानीभवयोर्गणेशस्कन्दौ तनयौ' etc. To avoid Kramikānvaya in such places, one has to accept Yogyatājñāna also as its cause; and therefore it is better to accept Yogyatājñāna alone without adding another principle Saṅkhyā-jñāna. Even now, Kramabhaṅga can be accepted as Doṣa (AK. p. 318), because it hinders the Āsatti-jñāna responsible for Anvayajñāna. Viśveśvara's arguments appear to be convincing.

Paryāyālaṅkāra.

It is defined by PR. as : "क्रमेणानेकाधिकरणमेकमाधेयमेकः पर्यायः। क्रमेणानेकाधेयकमेकमधिकरणमपरः" (RG., p. 645). "There are two different kinds of Paryāya; one, where an Ādheya is described as residing on many Ādharas in succession, and the

other, where many Ādheyas are described as resting in succession on one Ādhāra." PR.'s definition is based on the one, given by his predecessors. After explaining the purpose of the words constituting the definition, he gives suitable examples.

PR. maintains that this figure arises when one Sambandha is described as existing after the loss of the previous Sambandha. On the basis of this principle, he criticises the view of AD. who gives the following verse as an example of Vikāsa-Paryāya, a variety of Paryāya :—

"बिम्बोष्ठ एव रागस्ते तन्वि पूर्वमदृश्यत ।
अधुना मृगशावाक्षि हृदयेप्येष दृश्यते ॥" (RG., p. 647)

Here Rāga is described as existing in Hṛdaya even while it is there on Bimboṣṭha. Therefore it cannot be an instance of Paryāya according to PR. who tries to prove that writers like Mammaṭa also are in favour of his views, as can be judged from their examples. But it should be noted here that the same verse 'Bimboṣṭha eva' etc., is given along with other verses as an example of Paryāya, by Mammaṭa also. This might have been added in Kāvyaprakāśa by later writers or it must have somehow escaped the notice of PR.

Basing on the fact that it is given by Mammaṭa also, Nāgeśa criticises the view of PR. and says that there is no need of qualifying Krama involved in Paryāyokta (Uddyota, p. p. 537). But the very name of the figure 'Paryāya' which means 'alternation' appears to be in favour of PR.'s views.

In verses like the following one, the figure cannot be explained as Paryāya or Sāra. Therefore some critics[1] as quoted by PR. are in favour of accepting Śuddha-Kramālaṅkāra and PR. himself does not seem to have any objection to it :

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1. Śobhākara mitra must be one of the Ālaṅkārikas referred to by PR. here. He accepts Kramālaṅkāra. But Jayaratha criticises him for accepting Kramālaṅkāra, without mentioning his name as is usual with him. (Vimarśini, p. 190).

"पूर्वं नयनयोर्लग्ना ततो मग्ना मनस्यभूत् ।
अथ सैव प्रियस्यासीत् सर्ववेदनगोचरा ।। (RG., p. 647)

In conclusion, PR. maintains that the presentation of one thing as residing on many places in succession, or that of many things residing successively in one place must be poetical in order to constitute Paryāya. Therefore 'Purā yatra srotaḥ' (Uttararāmacaritam) etc. and "यत्र पूर्वं घटस्तत्राधुना पटः" cannot be taken as the example of Paryāya in the absence of poetical beauty.

Parivṛttyalaṅkāra.

It is defined by PR. in these words: "परकीययत्किञ्चिद्वस्त्वादानविशिष्टं परस्मै स्वकीययत्किञ्चिद्वस्तुसमर्पणं परिवृत्तिः" (RG., p. 648). "The exchange of things between two persons constitutes Parivṛtti."

It is of two kinds, Sama-Parivṛtti and Viṣama-Parivṛtti. Sama-Parivṛtti is of two kinds; Parivṛtti of things of high quality and of lower quality. Viṣama-Parivṛtti is of two kinds, exchange of things of lower quality with those of high quality and vice versa. Thus Parivṛtti is of four varieties.

Pradīpa (p. 525), mentions only three varieties of Parivṛtti. It does not classify the Sama-Parivṛtti into two varieties as is done by PR. and it seems to be justified in doing so because Uttamatva and Nyūnatva are the relative qualities and they can be talked of only when there are two types of things. This is possible only in Viṣama-Parivṛtti because there is difference in the quality of the thing taken and the thing given. In Sama-Parivṛtti both the things being of equal quality where is the question of Uttamatva and Nyūnatva? Ruyyaka also mentions only three varieties of Parivṛtti (AS., p. 191).

After explaining these varieties with proper illustrations, PR. states that this Dānādāna-vyavahāra should be poet's own

creation; because the real Vyavahāra is devoid of charm and loses Alaṅkāratva.

He also states that not leaving something, but giving something while receiving something from others, is involved in Parivṛtti. Therefore he finds fault with Ruyyaka who contends that Parivṛtti consists of leaving something and taking another. Therefore his example of Parivṛtti :

किमित्यपास्याभरणानि यौवने धृतं त्वया वार्धकशोभि वल्कलम् ।
वद प्रदोषे स्फुटचन्द्रतारका विभावरी यद्यरुणाय कल्पते ।।"

(Kumārasambhava, V. 44)

also is wrong. Thus PR. supports the views of Mammaṭa (KP. p. 525) who, as can be seen from his examples of Parivṛtti and from Pradīpa, thinks that there should be Dāna and Ādāna in this figure.

Parisaṅkhyālaṅkāra

'Parisaṅkhyā' is a technical word used by Mīmāṁsakas. According to them Vidhi is of three kinds, Apūrvavidhi, Niyamavidhi and Parisaṅkhyāvidhi. This is explained in a Kārikā of Kumārilabhaṭṭa which PR. also quotes :

"विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्तौ नियमः पाक्षिके सति ।
तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्तौ परिसङ्ख्येति गीयते ।।"

Apūrvavidhi is a Vidhi of something which is not known through any other means, and is ordained for the first time by the Śāstra. "यजेत स्वर्गकामः" etc., come under this category, because that 'Yāga' as a means for attaining Svarga is not known previously. "व्रीहीनवहन्ति" etc., come under Niyamavidhi. This Vidhi is not intended to ordain Avaghāta for the purpose of Vaituṣya (chaffing) because it is to be inevitably done for preparing a Puroḍāśa required for Yāga. But it may be produced by some other means like Nakhavidalana

(splitting the husk with nails also) in which case there is no scope for Avahanana. Now the Avahanana-vidhi is intended to say that the Vaituṣya should be effected through Avahanana only; so it is called Niyamavidhi. Such statements as 'Pañca pañca-nakhā bhakṣyāḥ' come under Parisaṅkhyāvidhi. This Vidhi need not be introduced just for the sake of Pañcanakha-bhakṣaṇa, because it is there even without this Vidhi, brought about by the natural desire of the eater. Therefore the real purpose of this Vidhi is to say that Apañcanakhas should not be eaten. Thus there is much difference according to the Mīmāṁsakas between the Niyamavidhi and the Parisaṅkhyā-vidhi (Mīmāṁsānyāyaprakāśa, pp. 46-47).

As in the case of 'Anumāna', this word also is used by Ālaṅkārikas loosely to mean both Niyamavidhi and Parisaṅkh-yāvidhi. It is the case with Vaiyākaraṇas also as explained by PR. Thus they define the figure Parisaṅkhyā accordingly.

It is defined by PR. as "सामान्यतः प्राप्तस्यार्थस्य कस्माच्चिद् विशेषाद् व्यावृत्तिः परिसङ्ख्या" (RG., p. 650). He closely follows the writers like Mammaṭa (KP., p. 544), in defining this figure. "To exclude a thing from the scope of something mentioned in general, on account of some peculiar reason, constitutes Pari-saṅkhyā." In Parisaṅkhyā, two principles are involved; (1) to exclude something from one's scope, and (2) to restrict it to something. "Pañca pañca-nakhā bhakṣyāḥ" etc., are intended to exclude Apañcanakhas from the scope of Bhakṣaṇa which is restricted to Pañcanakhas only. The definitions of Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and PR. incorporated the first principle (Anyāpoha) whereas Ruyyaka's definition incorporates the Niyamana (restriction) (AS., p. 193).

It is of two kinds, Śuddhā and Praśnapūrvikā, each of which is again of two kinds : Ārthī and Śābdī. He explains these varieties with examples like the following verse :—

"सेवायां यदि साभिलाषमसि रे लक्ष्मीपतिः सेव्यतां
चिन्तायामसि सस्पृहं यदि चिरं चक्रायुधश्चिन्त्यताम् ।
आलापं यदि कांक्षसे मधुरिपोर्गाथा तदालप्यतां
स्वापं वाञ्छसि चेन्निरर्गलसुखे चेतः सखे सुप्यताम् ।।"

(RG., p. 651).

Next PR. proceeds to state the views of writers who accept Parisaṅkhyā as Alaṅkāra only when it is Ārthī but not Śābdī and those who are inclined to give it the status of an Alaṅkāra only when the Itaravyāvṛtti involved in it, is poetical. Thus, according to these writers, only such passages as "यस्मिन् शासति वसुमतीपाकशासने महानसेषु सन्तापः, शरधिहृदयेषु सशल्यता" etc. come under this figure, and so there may be Parisaṅkhyā in "Sevāyāṁ yadi sābhilāṣam" etc., but it cannot be called Parisaṅkhyālaṅkāra. Similarly "किं तीर्थं हरिपादपद्मभजनं किं रत्नमच्छा मतिः" etc. (RG., p. 652), is an instance of Dṛḍhāroparūpaka only. Otherwise "न विषं विषमित्याहुर्ब्रह्मस्वं विषमुच्यते" etc., also will have to be accepted as an example of Parisaṅkhyālaṅkāra. This view appears to be acceptable to PR. himself.

Arthāpatti

It is not mentioned as a separate Alaṅkāra by old writers including Mammaṭa. It is defined and explained by Ruyyaka and Jayaratha and PR. develops it further by adding a few varieties, though his main definition etc., are based on Sarvasva. Arriving at a fact with the help of another according to the well known maxim Daṇḍāpūpikānyāya, gives rise to the figure Arthāpatti. When it is said that the mice have done away with the stick on which the cakes were arranged, it goes without saying that they swallowed the cakes also. Similarly in Arthāpatti, a fact is deduced from another by the similarity of the principle involved. This is the definition of Arthāpatti according to Ruyyaka (AS., pp. 196-97).

The definition of PR. also closely follows it. "केनचिदर्थेन तुल्यन्यायत्वाद् अर्थान्तरस्यापत्तिरर्थापत्तिः" (RG., p. 653). 'Nyāya' he

explains as 'Kāraṇa'. He classifies it into twenty-four varieties which are not found in the works of his predecessors (RG , p. 653). He also introduces such innovations as Sādṛśya between the Āpādaka and Āpādyamāna and Mālārūpatā etc. After giving a few suitable examples of some varieties, he introduces a discussion in order to explain the distinct scope for Arthāpatti.

Arthāpattī is one of the Pramāṇas accepted by Mīmāṁsakas and Vedāntins (Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p. 269). According to them, an inevitable conclusion, arrived at about something from another, constitutes Arthāpatti as in "पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते". In this example, the cognition of Pīnatva leads us to inevitable conclusion that Devadatta is eating during the night. Now PR. explains that the Arthāpatti of the Ālaṅkārikas differs from that of the Mīmāṁsakas in that there is no incongruity in the Āpādakārtha even without the Āpādyārtha.

It cannot be included in Anumāna because there is no Vyāpti between them. It cannot be included under Yadyarthātiśayokti either, because it leads to Viparītārtha in the case of both the facts (by indicating impossibility) whereas in Arthāpatti the Āpādaka is existing.

Further, PR. states that it can be counted as Alaṅkāra, only when the Āpādya happens to be the beautiful creation of the poet. Otherwise, coming under Kaimutikanyāya as it is, it can not be called Alaṅkāra.

He criticises the definition of AD. "कैमुत्येनार्थसंसिद्धिः काव्यार्थापत्तिरिष्यते". He says that it can be applied only in the case of Nyūnārthāpatti but not Adhikārthāpatti because Kaimutyanyāya is based on the inferiority of the Āpādyā as in the famous saying "महागजाः पलायन्ते मशकानान्तु का कथा" etc. But, Alaṅkāracandrikā (p. 127) strongly defends AD. and maintains that some of the examples given by PR. can be included under Yadyarthātiśayokti. The same views are repeated by Nāgeśa

both in Gurumarmaprakāśa (p. 657) and Uddyota (p. 540). They appear to be in favour of including the conclusion of Sama and Adhika under some different Alaṅkāras like Yadyarthātiśayokti, and accepting only the conclusion of the Nyūna as an instance of Arthāpatti simply to justify the application of the Kaimutyanyāya. But PR.'s definition seems to be correct because when there is a common principle (deducing something from another) underlying all these varieties, it is better and correct to bring all of them under one figure.

Vikalpālaṅkāra

This figure is introduced by Ruyyaka for the first time (AS., p. 200). It is defined thus :—"तुल्यबलविरोधे विकल्पः, विरुद्धयोस्तुल्यप्रमाणविशिष्टत्वात्तुल्यबलयोः एकत्र युगपत् प्रवृत्तौ विरुद्धत्वादेव यौगपद्यासम्भवे विकल्पः". When two mutually opposed things of equal importance based on equal Pramāṇa, are to be given place on one object, they can be given so only alternatively because co-existence between them is not possible." According to Ruyyaka, Alaṅkāratva of Vikalpa is based on the underlying Upamā (AS., p. 198).

PR. closely follows Ruyyaka in defining and explaining Vikalpa : "विरुद्धयोः पाक्षिकी प्राप्तिः विकल्पः" (RG., p. 657). He also maintains that its beauty is based on the implied Aupamya. But he finds the example "Bhaktiprahvavilokanapraṇayinī[1]" etc., given by Ruyyaka, as improper.

Ruyyaka thinks that there is Vaikalpikatva between the eyes and the body of Lord Viṣṇu in removing the affliction of

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1, भक्तिप्रह्वविलोकनप्रणयिनी नीलोत्पलस्पर्धिनी
ध्यानालम्बनतां समाधिनिरतैर्नीते हितप्राप्तये ।
लावण्यस्य महानिधी रसिकतां लक्ष्मीदृशोस्तन्वती
युष्माकं कुरुतां भवार्तिशमनं नेत्रे तनुर्वा हरेः ॥" AS.. p. 199.

Saṁsāra. PR. contends, rightly, that according to Ruyyaka's own definition Vikalpa arises only when there is Virodha between two things. Now, there is no Virodha between the eyes and the body so far as the Ārtiśamana is concerned and so it cannot be taken as an example of Vikalpa. Therefore he explains it as an instance of Śleṣamūlopamā, taking 'Vā' in the sence of 'Iva'.

But as the composition of the verse indicates, the poet does not seem to be interested in having Upamā in it by understanding 'Vā' as 'Iva'. All he wants to show here is that the same adjectives can be applied to both, the body and the eyes Therefore it may be taken as an instance of Śleṣamūlopamādhvani or Śleṣamūla-samuccayadhvani.

Samuccayālaṅkāra

According to Mammaṭa "Samuccaya arises, when, notwithstanding the existence of one cause sufficient to produce an effect, some more causes crop up together; and when two Guṇas, two Kriyās, or Guṇas and Kriyās are described as heaped up together (in one Kāraṇa)" (KP., p. 534).

PR. includes all these varieties of Samuccaya in a brief definition and while analysing this definition, explains in logically set words, all the varieties mentioned by his predecessors. His general definition of Samuccaya is "युगपत्पदार्थानामन्वयः समुच्चयः" (RG., p. 660). This comprehensive definition makes it possible to treat Samuccaya under one head without the need of calling it as Prathama-Samuccaya and Dvitīya-Samuccaya etc., as was indicated by some of his predecessors and expressly done by some (like Vidyānātha.). Next, he classifies it into two groups, one having Dharmibheda, another Dharmaikya. The second is sub-divided into two groups; one where there is Dharmyanvaya by any relation other than Kāraṇatva, the second where there is Dharmyanvaya by

Kāraṇatā-sambandha. Thus the last-mentioned variety corresponds to the first variety of Mammaṭa and the second one of Ruyyaka. But instead of calling like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka that there is the Yoga of Sad, Asad or Sadasad in this variety, PR. writes : "तृतीयो रमणीयानामरमणीयानां रमणीयारमणीयानां समन्वय:" (RG., p. 661).

The first two varieties mentioned by PR., where the Samanvaya of Guṇas, Kriyās and Guṇakriyās is explained as existing, correspond to the second variety of Mammaṭa and first variety of Ruyyaka. These writers also talk of (KP., p. 536 and AS., p. 201) Bhinnādhikaraṇatva and Abhinnādhikaraṇatva which are mentioned by PR. as Dharmibheda and Dharmyabheda.

PR. differentiates the third variety of this figure from Samādhyalaṅkāra on the following ground. In Samādhi, when some Kārya is about to be produced by one Kāraṇa, another Kāraṇa also appears unexpectedly (by Kākatālīya-nyāya) and causes some improvement in the Kārya. But in Samuccaya, many Kāraṇas throng together (by Khalekapota-nyāya) to produce one Kārya without any special improvement or facility. Of course, this difference has been explained by Ruyyaka and Jayaratha (AS., pp. 202-3).

After explaining these varieties with suitable illustrations, PR. refutes the criticism of Śobhākaramitra (A. Ratnākara, p. 155) who maintains that the varieties based on Sadyoga etc., should not be counted, because, Sadyoga and Asadyoga come under the purview of Sama whereas the Sadasadyoga comes under Viṣama. PR. justifies the above classification on the following ground. He cites the following verse, as an example of Ramaṇīyānāṁ-Samuccaya :—

"समुत्पत्तिः पद्मारमणपदपद्मामलनखा-
न्निवासः कन्दर्पप्रतिभटजटाजूटभवने ।
अथायं व्यासङ्गः पतितजननिस्तारणविधेः
न कस्मादुत्कर्षः तव जननि जागर्ति जगतः ॥" (RG., p. 662)

Here the main intention of the poet is to describe that all the three things, Haricaraṇa-nakha-sambhūti etc., are equally increasing the greatness of Gaṅgā. He never intends to say that the combination of all these qualities is proper. Therefore there is no question of accepting Samālaṅkāra and avoiding Samuccaya in this verse. By showing similar arguments, PR. proves how it is inevitable to accept Samuccaya in Aramaṇīya-Samuccaya and Ramaṇīyāramaṇīya-Samuccaya also. Thus he supports the views of writers like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka. This justification of PR. is repeated by Nāgeśa in Uddyota (p. 534) without mentioning the source.

Samādhyalaṅkāra

PR. has nothing to add to what is already said about this figure by his predecessors excepting the addition of the 'Sāṅgatāsiddhi' to the 'Kāryasiddhi', i.e., Kāryasiddhi and Sāṅgakāryasiddhi.

Pratyanīkālaṅkāra

It is defined by PR. as "प्रतिपक्षसम्बन्धिनस्तिरस्कृतिः प्रत्यनीकम्" (RG., p. 665). "Pratyanīka consists in defeating the person or thing connected with the enemy."

The word Pratyanīka is explained by Mammaṭa and other rhetoricians as "अनीकस्य प्रतिनिधिः प्रत्यनीकम्", i.e., the representative of the army. Thus according to them when a weak person is not able to attack the army of the enemy, he will attack instead, the representative of the same who is weaker than himself. This is what is meant by 'Pratyanīka'. The

figure also is called so on account of its similarity with Pratyanīka. This idea is clearly brought out by Ekāvalī in the following words :—

"अनीकं सैन्यं तस्य प्रतिनिधिः प्रत्यनीकम् । तत्सादृश्यादलङ्कारोऽपि प्रत्यनीकमिति व्यपदेशमलभत । यथा अनीकमभिभवितुमनीश्वरेण केनापि तत्प्रतिनिधिभूतमन्यद् व्यामोहादभिभूयते तथाऽत्र बलवति परिपन्थिनि तदीयमल्पबलं कोऽपि परिमन्थयतीत्यर्थः ।" (Ekāvalī, p. 316).

But there is one defect in the above explanation. According to it, the weak person has to attack not the strong person, but his army. When he (the weak person) attacks some representative of the army (who is weaker than himself) instead of attacking the army, the greatness should directly go to the army but not to the king or such person who is intended to be described. His greatness results only indirectly. But as the examples given by these writers go to prove, the weak person is to attack the strong antagonist himself but not his army. In the verse "Yasya kiñcidapakartum"[1] etc., Rāhu is described as troubling the Moon instead of Śrīkṛṣṇa, but not instead of Śrīkṛṣṇa's army or any of his supporters. PR. realises this fallacy in the explanation of the old writers and explains this word in a different way (RG., p. 665). According to him Pratyanīka is an Avyayībhāva in the sense of Anīka-sadṛśa. He meets the possible grammatical objection in the following manner. According to the Pāṇinisūtra "अव्ययं विभक्ति" etc. (2.1.6), the Avyayībhāva can be had only in the sense of Sādṛśya but not Sadṛśa, because in Sadṛśa the Sādṛśya becomes Apradhāna. But PR. says that the Avyayībhāva in Sādṛśyārtha is ordained by including in the above Sutra, the word Yathā (i.e., by saying

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. "यस्य किञ्चिदपकर्तुमक्षमः कायनिग्रहगृहीतविग्रहः ।
कान्तवक्त्रसदृशाकृतिं कृती राहुरिन्दुमधुनापि बाधते ।"

AS., p. 207.

that there will be Avyayībhāva in Yathārtha; and Sādṛśya is one of the Yathārthas). And therefore, where is the need of including the Sādṛśya also in the above Sūtra separately ? This indicates that Avyayībhāva can be had even when Sādṛśya is Apradhāna as in the sense of Sadṛśa. Thus, there is nothing wrong in understanding the word Pratyanīka as Anīka-sadṛśa. Generally a person uses his army to vanquish his enemy. But if he is not able to send his army, he may trouble the deputy of the opponent Thus this troubling of the opponent's deputy is like sending the army. Therefore, this is called Pratyanīka. The figure containing such description also is named Pratyanīka. This explanation of PR. is quite different from the one given by his predecessors, and it avoids the fallacy in their explanations.

But even while accepting this new explanation, PR. could have taken the word Prati in Pratyanīka to mean Pratinidhi itself with no need of far-fetched explanation of Sādṛśyārtha. Accordingly the word Pratyanīka could mean Pratinidhi of the army. That is, according to his own theory, the troubling of the enemy's deputy is adopted by the weak, as a substitute to the army. Thus Pratyanīka, according to the old writers, is the substitute (person) for the strong opponent's army and according to PR. it is the substitute (action) for the army of the weak person himself.

After explaining this with suitable examples, PR. maintains that this figure need not be accepted as an independent figure because it comes under the purview of Hetūtprekṣā, at times Śābda and at times Ārtha.

AD. cites the following verse as an example of Pratyanīka :—

"मम रूपकीर्तिमहरद् भुवि यस्तदनुप्रविष्टहृदयेयमिति ।
त्वयि मत्सरादिव निरस्तदयः सुतरां क्षिणोति खलु तां मदनः ॥"

(Kuvalayānanda, p. 126)

But PR. contends that this verse strictly falls under the scope of Utprekṣā because both the Hetvaṁśa and Utprekṣāṁśa are clearly expressed in words. But if the principle of Pratyanīka is accepted, there is nothing wrong in accepting it here also along with Utprekṣā because there is the element of Pratyanīka, clearly discernible in this verse. Alaṅkāracandrikā is of the above opinion, and as rightly pointed out by Saralā (p. 667), Nāgeśa repeats the views of Candrikākāra.

Pratīpālaṅkāra

PR. defines five kinds of Pratīpa. The reversal of the well-known Upamānopameya-bhāva constitutes the first variety. To maintain Sādṛśya by way of citing a second object similar to either Upamāna or Upameya in order to repeat the sense of peerlessness constitutes the second and third varieties. To question the very purpose of the existence of Upamāna, constitutes the fourth variety whereas the negation of Sādṛśya forms the fifth one (RG., pp. 667-68). The first and fourth varieties are mentioned by Mammaṭa (KP., p.566-67) and Ruyyaka (AS., pp. 207-210) and the second and third varieties are indicated. But the fifth one is added by PR. taking it perhaps from Kuvalayānanda (p. 13).

PR. illustrates all these varieties with suitable examples. But he is not in favour of accepting this as an independent figure. He thinks that the first three varieties can be included under Upamālaṅkāra, because there is the Niṣpatti of the Sādṛśya and charm. Similarly, the fourth variety can be included in Ākṣepālaṅkāra and the fifth one in Anuktadharma-Vyatireka. Moreover, if the Upamānopameya-tiraskāra is to be accepted as a separate Alaṅkāra, their Puraskāra also will have to be accepted as another Alaṅkāra. And in the absence of an Anugatalakṣaṇa, all these five varieties are to be taken as five independent Alaṅkāras. Therefore, PR. contends, all these varieties can be included in different Alaṅkāras.

Nāgeśa, following Alaṅkāracandrikā (p. 13), states that some Anugatalaksaṇa can be given (GMP., p. 671). But what PR. contends is that even if there is slight difference, it need not be treated as an independent Alaṅkāra, because it can be taken as one of the varieties of the already existing Alaṅkāras. But to a man of expansionistic outlook, these arguments may not be appealing.

Prauḍhokti.

This figure is not found in old works like Kāvyaprakāśa and Alaṅkārasarvasva etc. It is defined in Kuvalayānanda (p. 135), as :—

"प्रौढोक्तिरुत्कर्षाहेतौ तद्धेतुत्वप्रकल्पनम् ।
केशाः कलिन्दजातीरतमालस्तोममेचकाः ॥"
"तमालगतनैल्यातिशयाहेतौ यमुनातटरोहत्वे तद्धेतुत्वपरिकल्पनम् ।"

PR. defines this figure as "कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे किञ्चिद्धर्मकृतातिशय-प्रतिपिपादयिषया प्रसिद्धतद्धर्मवता संसर्गस्योद्भावनं प्रौढोक्तिः" (RG., p. 671); "the description of association of something with another well-known as having a particular quality, in order to maintain the greatness of the first thing due to having such quality is Prauḍhokti." This Saṁsarga may be real or imaginary, direct or indirect. Further PR. states that Prauḍhokti can be taken as an Alaṅkāra only when such Atiśaya produced by the association with another thing is suggested.

After illustrating this figure with suitable examples, PR. maintains that there is no need of accepting Mithyādhyavasiti as a separate Alaṅkāra in the verse :—

"शशशृङ्गधनुर्लसत्कराः गगनाम्भोरुहमालिकाधराः ।
तनयैः सह भाविजन्मनां तव खेलन्ति नरेन्द्र वैरिणः ॥" (RG., p.673)

because it can be explained as an instance of Prauḍhokti itself. If Mithyādhyavasiti is to be accepted in such places, one has to accept Satyādhyavasiti also in :

हरिश्चन्द्रेण संज्ञप्ता: प्रगीता धर्मसूनुना ।
खेलन्ति निगमोत्सङ्गे मातर्गङ्गे गुणास्तव ।।"

(RG., p. 673).

Here Nāgeśa reproduces the views of Alaṅkāracandrikā and says that Mithyādhyavasiti should be accepted as a separate Alaṅkāra.[1] It is quite interesting to note that the same Nāgeśa favours the inclusion of Prauḍhokti and Mithyādhyavasiti in Atiśayokti in his Uddyota (p 544).

Lalitālaṅkāra

Lalitālaṅkāra is not mentioned by old writers like Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and even Śobhākara. It has been defined in Kuvalayānanda as :—"वर्ण्ये: स्याद् वर्ण्यवृत्तान्तप्रतिबिम्बस्य वर्णनम् । ललितं निर्गते नीरे सेतुमेषा चिकीर्षति ।।" (p. 137). AD. explains at great length, how it is inevitable to accept this figure because it cannot be included in any other figure (Kuvalayānanda, pp. 137-38).

PR.'s definition of this figure is as follows :—"प्रकृतधर्मिणि प्रकृतव्यवहारानुल्लेखेन निरूप्यमाणोऽप्रकृतव्यवहारसम्बन्धो ललितालङ्कार:" (RG., p. 674). "Lalita arises when a relevant object is described as connected with the conduct (Vyavahāra) of the irrelevant object without the explicit mention of the Prakṛtavyavahāra." Ativyāpti in Nidarśanā is avoided by the word

1 (a) चिन्त्यमिदम् । मिथ्यात्वकल्पनकृतचमत्कारस्यानपह्नवनीयत्वेन पृथगलङ्कारतासिद्धेः । किञ्च कविप्रतिभामात्रकल्पिता: अर्थाः काव्येऽलङ्कारपदभाज इति तव सिद्धान्ततत्सत्यत्वप्रतीत्यर्थं कल्पितस्याप्यर्थस्य तत्कल्पितत्वाभावेन शब्दमात्रादलङ्कारत्वासम्भवादिति दिक् । (GMP., p. 674).

(b) एतेन प्रौढोक्त्यैव गतार्थतामाचक्षाणा: निरस्ता वेदितव्याः । न च मिथ्याध्यवसितेरलङ्कारत्वे 'हरिश्चन्द्रेण……' इत्यादौ हरिश्चन्द्रादिसम्बन्धाद् गुणानां सत्यताप्रतीतेः सत्याध्यवसितिरपि तथा स्यादिति वाच्यम् । सत्यताप्रतीत्यर्थं कस्याप्यर्थस्य कविप्रतिभाकल्पिताभावेन शब्दमात्रेणालङ्कारताया असम्भवात् । कविप्रतिभामात्रकल्पिता अर्थाः काव्ये अलङ्कारपदास्पदमिति विषमालङ्कारप्रकरणे त्वयैवाभिधानात् ।

(A. Candrikā, p 137).

These passages clearly show how Nāgeśa reproduces the views of others including their phrases.

'प्रकृतव्यवहारानुल्लेखेन' because in Nidarśanā, the Prakṛtavyavahāra also is mentioned. In the case of Aprastutapraśaṁsā, there will be no mention of Prakṛtadharmin; thus this figure differs from it.

After giving suitable examples, PR. also explains how this figure differs from Atiśayokti, Aprastutapraśaṁsā and Nidarśanā. Kālidāsa's verse—

क्व सूर्यप्रभवो वंशः क्व चाल्पविषया मतिः ।
तितीर्षुर्दुस्तरं मोहादुडुपेनास्मि सागरम् ॥" (RV., I. 2).

is to be taken as an instance of Lalita because there is in it, the Aprakṛta-sāgara-taraṇa-sambandha ascribed on the Prakṛta-dharmin, i.e., the poet, without mentioning the Prakṛtavyavahāra, Sūryavaṁśavarṇana. But this verse has been taken as an instance of Nidarśanā by Mammaṭa (KP., p. 480) which must apparently be incorrect.

But PR. also puts forth some arguments under the heading 'Anye tu'[1] according to which 'Lalita' need not be accepted as a separate Alaṅkāra. He maintains that all the Alaṅkāras can generally be either Śrautas or Ārthas; and the Śrautālaṅkāras should not be considered as different from the Arthālaṅkāras when the general definition is equally applicable to both. Coming to the present figure, he says that this comes under Ārthī-vākyārtha-nidarśanā because Vākyārthanidarśanā consists in the Abhedāropa of the two Vyavahāras understood through the Abheda-pratipādana of two Dharmins having such Vyavahāradvaya. This definition is applied in the present figure also because there is no such rule that the Prakṛtavyavahāra should be explicitly mentioned but not understood. The only difference is that this may be called Ārthīnidarśanā. If one is

1. It is quite evident from the remarks made by PR. under Nidarśanā (ललितालङ्कारनिराकरणावसर एवैतद्वक्तव्यमुपपादयिष्यामः), and by the way in which he concludes this figure, that he also is not in favour of accepting Lalitālaṅkāra (RG., p. 463).

to accept Lalita as an independent Alaṅkāra on the basis of a slight difference, Luptopamā also may have to be accepted as different from Upamā.

Now another question arises. On the same analogy, Atiśayokti will have to be accepted as Rūpaka because here also it may be argued that it is Śrautarūpaka when both the Viṣaya and Viṣayin are mentioned and Ārtharūpaka when Viṣayin alone is mentioned (but not Atiśayokti). In reply to this PR. says that Rūpaka arises when Viṣaya also is mentioned in its Viṣayatāvacchedakarūpa as clearly as Viṣayin itself. In other words, in Rūpaka, the Viṣaya (Mukha) is cognised in its own form (Mukhatva). In Atiśayokti, there may be the cognition of the Viṣaya (Mukha) but it is only in the form of Viṣayin (Candratvarūpa). Thus there is wide difference between Rūpaka and Atiśayokti and such difference cannot be shown in the case of Nidarśanā and Lalita.

In fact he is not particular in maintaining that there is real difference between even Rūpaka and Atiśayokti, and so he quotes the views of some Navyas who do not have any objection in accepting Nigīryādhyavsānātiśayokti as one variety of Rūpaka. Even Apahnuti is one of the varieties of Rūpaka according to them. Thus PR. maintains that Mammṭa is perfectly correct in quoting, 'Kva sūrya-prabhavo vaṁśaḥ' etc., as an example of Nidarśanā. He concludes this figure with the criticism of AD.'s example for Lalita which he (PR) explains correctly as an instance of Padārtha-nidarśanopabṛṁhita-Paryāyokta.

Nāgeśa also refutes Lalita as a separate Alaṅkāra by repeating almost all the arguments of PR. (Uddyota, p. 481).

Viśveśvara, after elaborately explaining the views of AD. regarding Lalitālaṅkāra, quotes the views of PR. including

his contention that even Atiśayokti and Apahnuti may be included in Rūpaka, with approval. (AK., pp. 265-68).

Praharṣaṇālaṅkāra

This figure also is not mentioned by writers like Mammṭa, Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha. Even PR. has nothing to add to what is already said over this figure by Jayaratha, Jayadeva and AD. except criticising the example given by AD.

AD. gives the following verse as an example of the second variety of Praharṣaṇa which he defines as:—

"वाञ्छितादधिकार्थस्य संसिद्धिश्च प्रहर्षणम् ।"

"चातकस्त्रिचतुरान् पयःकणान् याचते जलधरं पिपासया ।
सोऽपि पूरयति विश्वमम्भसा हन्त हन्त महतामुदारता ।।"

(Kuvalayānanda, p. 140).

Here PR. contends that it is not enough if more than what is desired is given, but it should be the source of more pleasure to the receiver; and here there is no reason for the Cātaka to revel when the whole world is filled with water unless it gets more water for itself. Thus it cannot be an instance of Praharṣaṇa according to him.

Nāgeśa (GMP., p. 682), following Alaṅkāracandrikā (p. 140), tries to support AD. saying that this verse is intended to suggest the Aprakṛta-yācaka-vṛttānta and a Yācaka will naturally be overwhelmed with joy when he gets more wealth. But if we take this Anyāpadeśa further, even Yācaka would not feel happy if the whole world gets wealth when he begs for his own benefit.

Viṣādanālaṅkāra.

This figure also is not mentioned by old writers. PR,'s definition is the same as the one given by Jayadeva (Kuvalayānanda, p. 141) "अभीष्टार्थविरुद्धलाभो विषादनम्" (RG., p 682).

At times this figure may be associated with Viṣamālaṅ-

kāra. Therefore, PR shows such places where Viṣādana can have independent existence. When there is only the desire for achieving something but no effort is made and an adverse result is achieved, it will be an instance of Viṣādana unmixed with Viṣama. This is illustrated with the following verse :—

"स्वस्वव्यापृतिमग्नमानसतया मत्तो निवृत्ते जने
चञ्चूकोटिनिराकृतार्गल इतो यास्याम्यहं पञ्जरात् ।
एवं कीरवरे मनोरथमयं पीयूषमास्वादय-
त्यन्तः संप्रविवेश वारणकराकारः फणिग्रामणीः ॥" (RG., p. 682).

Here even before the effort, the adverse result has taken place and so it is an instance of Viṣādana independent of Viṣama.

Similarly, when some effort is put forth for achieving the desired object, and some adverse result is produced not by this effort, but by some other cause, this also is an instance of Viṣādana independent of Viṣama; "यत्र चेष्टार्थं प्रयुक्तेऽपि कारणे तस्मान्न विरुद्धार्थलाभः अपि तु स्वकारणवशात् स च विविक्तो विषयः[1]". This has been illustrated with the help of the following example:—

"चेलाञ्चलेनाननशीतरश्मिं संवृण्वतीनां हरिदृश्वरीणाम् ।
गोपाङ्गनानां स्मरजातकम्पादकाण्डसम्पातमियाय नीवी ॥(RG., p. 683).

Here the Viruddhārtha (Nīvīskhalana) is produced by a cause other than what is attempted by the Gopāṅganās, i.e., by the Sāttvika-kampādi. Therefore it can not be taken as an

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1. The passage "यत्र चेष्टार्थं प्रयुक्तेऽपि कारणे" etc. is wrongly understood and explained by Saralā. "इष्टार्थं प्रयुक्तात् कारणात् न विरुद्धार्थलाभः अपि तु विरुद्धार्थलाभोपयुक्तकारणादेव तत्र न विषादनमित्यर्थः" (Saralā, p. 682). Needless to add, it is against the construction of the above sentence of PR. and his explanation of the verse 'Celāñcalenānana-śītraśmiṁ' etc.

instance of Viṣama and so here is Viṣādana independent of Viṣama.

When an adverse result is produced from a cause tried for producing the desired object, this will be an instance of the mixture of Viṣama and Viṣādana; Viṣama as far as the incongruous association of such Viruddhārtha and the Kāraṇa is concerned, and Viṣādana, in that an undesired adverse result is produced. Thus PR. shows how Viṣādana can be independent of Viṣama, and at times mixed with it.

Ullāsālaṅkāra.

This figure is not to be found in the works of older writers. PR. has nothing to add to what is written by Jayadeva and AD. (Kuvalayānanda, pp. 141-42) excepting a brief remark at the end "काव्यलिङ्गेन गतार्थोऽयं नालङ्कारान्तरत्वभूमिमारोढ़ुमर्हतीत्येके । लौकिकार्थमयत्वादनलङ्कार एव इत्यपरे" (RG., p. 685). That this is Kāvyaliṅgāntargata is mentioned by Uddyota (p. 554) also.

PR., as a man laying stress on Camatkāra, must be favouring the second view.

Avajñālaṅkāra.

After explaining this figure also on the same lines as in Kuvalayānanda (p. 143), PR. distinguishes it from Atadguṇa saying that in the latter the same Guṇa of something is described as not being taken by another thing, whereas in the former it is described that some object is not able to produce a Guṇa, similar to its own, on the other object. He concludes this figure with the remark "विशेषोक्त्यैव गतार्थत्वात् अवज्ञा नालङ्कारान्तरमित्यपि वदन्ति" (RG., p. 686). Nāgeśa accepts this view in Uddyota (p. 558).

Anujñālaṅkāra.

The definition of this figure also is based on Kuvalayā-

nanda (p. 144) : "उत्कटगुणविशेषलालसया दोषत्वेन प्रसिद्धस्यापि वस्तुनः प्रार्थनमनुज्ञा" (RG., p. 687).

Nāgeśa is in favour of accepting this as one of the varieties of Viśeṣālaṅkāra (Uddyota, p. 572).

Tiraskārālaṅkāra.

This figure is evidently invented by PR. himself as the reversal of the figure Anujñā He criticised AD. for not defining this figure, which he contends, ought to have occurred to his mind as a figure opposite to Anujñā.

He defines and illustrates it in the following words :—

"दोषविशेषानुबन्धाद् गुणत्वेन प्रसिद्धस्यापि द्वेषस्तिरस्कारः । यथा—

"श्रियो मे मा सन्तु क्षणमपि च माद्यद्गजघटा-
मदभ्राम्यद्भृङ्गावलिमधुरसङ्गीतसुभगाः ।
निमग्नानां यासु द्रविणरसपर्याकुलहृदां
सपर्यासौकर्यं हरिचरणयोरस्तमयते ।।" (RG., p. 687)

Next, in order to justify the possibility of these two figures, Anujñā and Tiraskāra, PR. explains how even a thing well-known as bad, may be aspired on account of a particular virtue and how a good thing may be despised on account of some defect, depending upon the taste of the person concerned and the peculiar circumstances.

Nāgeśa accepts it as one of the varieties of Viṣamālaṅkāra; "एवं गुणे दोषं दृष्ट्वा तदभ्यर्थनायामप्ययम्" (Uddyota, p. 572). Here, 'तदनभ्यर्थनायाम्' is the correct reading.

Leśālaṅkāra.

This also is not defined by many old writers like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka. It is found mentioned in Kāvyādarśa (II. 265-272), but in a different comprehensive sense.

While defining this, PR. closely follows Jayadeva and Kuvalayānanda (p. 144); "गुणस्यानिष्टसाधनतया दोषत्वेन दोषस्येष्टसाध-

नतया गुणत्वेन च वर्णनं लेशः" (RG., p. 690). "To describe Guṇa as a Doṣa because it is the cause of trouble (Aniṣṭa) and Doṣa as Guṇa because it is the source of Good, constitutes Leśālaṅkāra." It can not be included under Vyājastuti, because it does not invariably lead to praise or censure in all cases. Even if there is Vyājastuti in some places of Leśa, it should be taken as an instance of their Saṁsṛṣṭi, because they are having their own independent places.

Nāgeśa includes (Uddyota, p. 572) this figure also under Viśeṣālaṅkāra. But only because some of these figures are not defined by some writers like Mammuṭa, one need not include them under one Alaṅkāra or the other without giving proper justification for doing so; because one has to see if the general definition of the particular figure under which all these figures are intended to be grouped, is applicable to all of them also. Viewed in this light, Nāgeśa appears in many cases, to be giving an arbitrary decision about the inclusion of these Alaṅkāras under other Alaṅkāras. For example, we do not find any general definition of Viśeṣālaṅkāra applicable to the figure Leśa. To take 'Anyatamatva' as the general definition is misleading as pointed out by PR. in various places.

Tadguṇālaṅkāra.

PR. has nothing new to say about this figure and he closely follows his predecessors like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka; 'स्वगुणत्यागपूर्वकं स्वसन्निहितवस्त्वन्तरसम्बन्धिगुणग्रहणं तद्गुणः" (RG , p. 692). "When a thing gives up its own natural Guṇa and takes the Guṇa of another thing with which it comes into contact, it is an instance of Tadguṇa." After explaining the difference between this figure and Ullāsa, he proceeds to deal with Atadguṇa.

Atadguṇa.

PR defines it as the reversal of Tadguṇa, i.e., when a

thing does not assume the qualities of another thing even when there is possibility for the same, it is an instance of Atadguṇa : "तद्विरर्थयोऽतद्गुणः" (RG., p. 693).

This is perfectly in agreement with the definition given by writers like Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and others. Here also, he introduces some innovations like Śābdatva and Ārthatva etc., and illustrates them with examples.

Here PR quotes the views of Sarvasvakāra, according to which the Atadguṇa is of two varieties on the basis of the Utkṛṣṭatva and Samatva of the thing from which another is described as not taking the Guṇa. "अत्र गुणाग्राहकापेक्षया सन्निहितस्य गुणवतः उत्कृष्टत्वसमत्वाभ्यां द्वैविध्यम् इति सर्वस्वकारः." But in the Alaṅkārasarvasva available to us, there is no such statement classifying 'Atadguṇa' into these two varieties. Ruyyaka (AS., pp. 214-15), like Mammaṭa (KP., p. 574), appears to be classifying Atadguṇa as explained by Vimarśinī into two varieties on the basis of the Prakṛtatva or otherwise of the thing which is to supply the Guṇa to the Prakṛtavastu.

Ruyyaka maintains that this figure cannot be included under Viśeṣokti because there is no Kāryakāraṇabhāva intended to be conveyed : "कार्यकारणभावस्य चात्राविवक्षणात् न विषमालङ्कारः" (AS., p. 215). (Here the word Viṣamālaṅkāraḥ is corrected as 'Viśeṣoktyalaṅkāraḥ' by Jayaratha (Vimarśini, p. 215) because there is no scope for Viṣama even if the Kāryakāraṇabhāva is intended)

Jayaratha feels that Ruyyaka's statement is based only on the writings of old writers, and that it can be included under Viśeṣoktyalaṅkāra as explained by the author of Alaṅkārasāra (Vimarśinī, p. 215). PR. also appears to be in favour of including this figure under Viśeṣokti only (RG., p. 693).

Mīlitālaṅkāra.

While following his predecessors like Mammaṭa and

Ruyyaka, PR. gives a clear-cut definition of Mīlita : "स्फुटमुपलभ्यमानस्य कस्यचिद् वस्तुनो लिङ्गैः अतिसाम्याद् भिन्नत्वेनागृह्यमाणानां वस्त्वन्तरलिङ्गानां स्वकारणाननुमापकत्वं मीलितम्" (RG., p. 694). "When the existence of a thing is not indicated by its qualities (which should have been helpful in its recognition) because they are not cognised separately from the qualities of another thing clearly perceived, it is an instance of Mīlita." This is reproduced verbatim by Nāgeśa in Uddyota (p. 561). This definition is put in a Kārikā also by PR. (RG., p. 694).

He also classifies the Liṅga of the Pratyakṣavastu as Sāhajika and Āgantuka with suitable illustrations.

Sāmānya.

The definition of Sāmānya given by PR. is as follows :— "प्रत्यक्षविषयस्यापि वस्तुनो बलवत्सजातीयग्रहणकृतं तद्भिन्नत्वेनाग्रहणं सामान्यम्" (RG., p. 695). When a thing though being perceived, is not distinguished from a similar object which is more powerful and is also being perceived (Balavat-sajātīyagrahaṇa-kṛtam), Sāmānya arises.

The following verse is given as an example of Sāmānya:—

"यस्मिन् हिमानीनिकरावदाते चन्द्रांशुकैवल्यमिव प्रयाते ।
पुच्छाश्रयाभ्यां विकला इवाद्रौ चरन्ति राकासु चिरं चमर्यः ॥"

(RG., p. 695).

Here the tails of camarīs and the mountain Himavān are described as not distinguishable from the Moon though they also are seen alongwith the moonlight.

But according to this definition of PR. there is no clear difference between Mīlita and Sāmānya; because as is seen above, when it is said that the objects are not seen differently from the moonlight, it means that they are completely covered

by it The same thing is in the case of Mīlita also because by the natural ruddyness of the lips, the Tāmbūla is completely covered not to be seen separately. If it is argued that the tail etc., are seen but not identified as separate from the Moon, the same can be said in the case of Tāmbūlarāga etc.

The difference between these figures may be like this. In Mīlita, the Guṇin is described as concealed through the concealment of the Guṇa, whereas in Sāmānya, the Guṇin is directly concealed by some other object. But this difference is not so clear as the one explained by writers like Ruyyaka (AS., pp. 210-11) and Jayaratha. According to them, in Mīlita the object itself is completely concealed with no recognition of its separate existence. But in Sāmānya, the object is recognised as a separate individual but as belonging to the other Jāti. Perhaps PR. also realises the importance of this view and states the same under the heading 'Kecit tu' (RG., p. 696).

After explaining how it is not possible to combine all the three figures Mīlita, Sāmānya, and Tadguṇa under one Alaṅkāra, because there is difference in Camatkāra, PR. proceeds to examine the claims of Unmīlita and Viśeṣaka as separate Alaṅkāras. According to AD., the undoing (reversal) of Mīlita and Sāmānya is called Unmīlita and Viśeṣaka respectively. (Kuvalayānanda, p. 153). But PR. says that there is no need of accepting these two Alaṅkāras because they can be explained away by Anumānālaṅkāra. But as rightly pointed out by Alaṅkāracandrikā (p. 153) there is peculiar charm in the recognition of the Bheda and Vaijātya which are originally concealed by some reason and so they deserve to be accepted as separate alaṅkāras.

Next PR. criticises the contention of AD. that there is Unmīlita when the Abheda resulting from Tadguṇa is undone asin the following verse :—

नृत्यद्भर्गाट्टहासप्रसरसहचरैस्तावकीनैर्यशोभि-
र्धावल्यं नीयमाने त्रिजगति परितः श्रीनृसिंहक्षितीन्द्र ।
नेदृग्यद्येष नाभीकमलपरिमलप्रौढिमासादयिष्य-
द्देवानां नाभविष्यत्कथमपि कमलाकामुकस्य प्रबोधः ॥"

(Kuvalayānanda, p. 154).

But PR. rightly contends that unless it is described that the white colour of Viṣṇu is removed and his natural colour is restored, it cannot be said that the Tadguṇa is undone by merely mentioning the recognition of Viṣṇu.

Nāgeśa (GMP., p. 699), repeating the arguments of Alaṅkāracandrikā (p. 254) tries to support AD. saying that it is not his intention to say that there is no Tadguṇa in this verse. All he wanted to say is that when there is scope for Bhedānadhyavasāya, Bhedādhyavasāya is produced by some other reason. But judged from his explanation of Unmīlita and Viśeṣaka as the Pratidvandvins of Mīlita and Sāmānya, AD.[1] appears to be having in mind that Unmīlita can be Pratidvandvin of Tadguṇa also in which case PR.'s criticism appears to be perfectly correct.

Mammaṭa gives the following verse as an example of Sāmānya :—

"वेत्रत्वचा तुल्यरुचां वधूनां कर्णाग्रतो गण्डतलागतानि ।
भृङ्गाः सहेलं यदि नापतिष्यन् को वेदयिष्यन्नवचम्पकानि ॥"

(KP., p. 569)

He further remarks that though the Campakas are ultimately distinguished from the cheeks on account of the Bhṛṅ-

1. "मीलितन्यायेन भेदानध्यवसाये प्राप्ते कुतोऽपि हेतोः भेदस्फूर्तौ मीलित-प्रतिद्वन्द्वि उन्मीलितम्...तत्प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विशेषकः । . . . तद्गुणरीत्यापि भेदानध्यवसायप्राप्तौ उन्मीलितं दृश्यते ।"

Kuvalayānanda, p. 153.

gapatana, the original Abhedagrahaṇa persists and so this should be treated as an example of Sāmānya. In this connection, PR. points out, rightly, that the ultimate cognition only should be taken as the deciding factor and Camatkāraka, and so it should not be taken as the example of Sāmānya; otherwise one will have to accept Upamā in Vyatireka, though it is ultimately negated.

Uttarālaṅkāra.

This is defined by Mammaṭa in following words :—

"उत्तरश्रुतिमात्रतः । प्रश्नस्योन्नयनं यत्र क्रियते तत्र वा सति ।
असकृद्यदसम्भाव्यमुत्तरं स्यात्तदुत्तरम् ॥" (KP., p. 549)

Thus Uttara is of two kinds. One; where the question is guessed on hearing the reply, and the other where there are many replies of strange nature to many questions. About the second variety, Mammaṭa says that there would be no charm if there is only one question and one reply. The definition of Ruyyaka closely follows Mammaṭa's definition.

While Ruyyaka defines it on the lines of Mammaṭa's definition, Jayaratha interprets it in a different way. He appears to understand the word 'Uttarāt praśnonnayanam' meaning that the reply should give scope to raise a question (but not that the question is guessed by the reply). In this first variety also, Jayaratha maintains, there should be a succession of answers and questions as in the second variety. (Vimarśinī, p. 216).

Even in the second variety, Jayaratha feels, it is not enough if questions and answers are mentioned one after another, because, as he indicates, there is no real Asambhāvyatva of the reply. Thus according to this interpretation, both the examples given by Ruyyaka do not serve the purpose.

He says that these examples are based on those given by old writers and cannot be taken as correct examples, and that this led some writers like Alaṅkārasārakāra to refuse this figure. But Jayaratha (Vimarśinī, p. 216) maintains that there is nothing wrong with the definitions, and so Uttarālaṅkāra is to be accepted as a separate Alaṅkāra but with different examples. According to him the following verses are to be cited as the example of these two Uttaras respectively :—

"भिक्षो कन्था श्लथा किं, ननु शफरवधे जालिकैषाऽत्सि मत्स्यान्
मध्ये मद्यावदंशं पिबसि मधु समं वेश्यया यासि वेश्याम् ।
हत्वाऽरीन् किं करिष्ये कति तव रिपवः सन्धिभेत्तास्मि येषां
चोरस्त्वं द्यूतहेतोः कथमसि कितवो येन भिक्षुर्नमस्ते ॥"

"पुंसः सम्बोधनं किं विदधति करिणां के रुचोऽग्नेर्भिषक्किं
का शून्या ते रिपूणां नरवर नरकं कोवधीत् क्रीडनं किम् ।
के वा वर्षासु न स्युः तृणमिव हरिणा किं नखाग्रैर्विभिन्नं
विन्ध्याद्रौ पर्यटन् को विघटयति तरून्नर्मदावारिपूरः ॥"

(Vimarśinī, pp. 216-17).

Here in the first example, the replies 'Nanu śapharavadhe' etc., give scope for questions like 'Atsi matsyān' etc., and in the second verse 'Naramadā-vāri-pūraḥ' is given as the reply of all the above questions. According to this interpretation there is no scope for Ativyāpti of Uttara in figures like Anumāna and Kāvyaliṅga.

Following is the definition of Uttara given by PR. "प्रश्नप्रतिबन्धकज्ञानविषयीभूतोऽर्थं उत्तरम्" (RG., p. 700). By Praśna he means Jijñāsā (desire to know) but not question. Thus the object of the cognition which removes the Jijñāsā constitutes Uttara. In other words the reply which removes the desire to know something, is called Uttara.

After explaining at length how a thing known in its

generality can be an object of Jijñāsā in its particularity, PR. classifies it into two varieties (following Mammaṭa and other old writers), Unnīta-praśna and Nibaddha-praśna, and illustrates them with suitable examples.

He further classifies this figure into eight varieties. Each of the two varieties mentioned above are of four kinds on the basis of (1) Sābhiprāyatva of the question, or (2) of the reply, or (3) of both, or (4) of none. He illustrates some of the above varieties.

Next PR. quotes the views of Vimarśinī under the heading 'Atrāhuḥ'. While he appears not to have any objection for accepting the views of Vimarśinī, he states that even according to the previous interpretation of this figure, it is not necessary that there should be Asakṛdupādāna in all cases of Uttara. If there is implied some special meaning either in the Praśna or the Uttara, which itself is a source of Camatkāra, we can accept the figure even when there is no Asakṛdupādāna. But if there is no such implied meaning, Asakṛdupādāna is required. He does not have any objection if it is thought that there is Camatkāra in the inference of the question itself even when there is no Asakṛdupādāna.

Next he introduces further innovations into this figure. Thus, the Uttara may be included in the verse itself or may not be included. Again, when it is included, it may be expressed by the same sentence along with the question or in a different sentence. Again, in both of these varieties mentioned first, only one word or sentence may constitute the reply or it may have to be repeated. There may be one reply (included in one word) for many questions. There may be possibility of other differences also.

He tries to explain these varieties with suitable illustra-

tions, but unfortunately for the students of Sanskrit poetics even the first example is available only in an incomplete form :—

"किं कुर्वते दरिद्राः कासारवती धरा मनोज्ञतरा ।
को पावनस्त्रिलोक्यां ....[1] (RG., p. 705).

Rasagaṅgādhara Ends With Second Ānana :

What must be the remaining part of this great work of PR. has remained only a of matter of surmise. Saralā (p. 705) contends that he must have written, or must have intended to write, the Doṣa-Prakaraṇa also, and that, had it been completed, the works of even great poets like Śriharṣa would appear full of many defects.

As pointed out in the second chapter, it is a debatable point whether PR. had written three more Ānanas or not. We do not have anything, excepting the name Ānana, to prove that he has written five Ānanas, but even this need not be taken, as pointed out earlier, to be a strong ground for such argument.

The following statements of PR. in different places, may be cited in support of the five-Ānana theory according to which PR. discussed or might have planned to discuss these topics in the unfinished or lost chapters of his work.

1. While talking about the Svaśabdavācyatā of Rasa etc., PR. remarks : —"व्यङ्ग्यस्य वाच्यीकरणे सामान्यतो वमनाख्यदोषस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् ।" (RG., p. 62)

2. At the end of the first chapter, PR. states :— "एवमेषां रसादीनां प्राधान्येन ('Na' appears superfluous) निरूपितान्युदाहरणानि । गुणीभावे तु वक्ष्यन्ते नामानि च ।" (RG., p. 134)

1. In the manuscript No. D.D. 12922 of Madras Oriental M.M. Library, the gap is filled with the line : "गुरुपदभाग्यासुदे तोयम्".

3. Again in Utprekṣā-prakaraṇa, PR. declares : "न च वैयाकरणमतविरोधो दूषणमिति वाच्यम् । स्वतन्त्रत्वेनालङ्कारिकतन्त्रस्य तद्विरोधस्यादूषणत्वात् । प्रपञ्चयिष्यते चैतदधिकमुपरिष्टादिति प्रकृतमनुसरामः ।" (RG., p. 396).

But all the above statements cannot be taken as a proof that the original work might have been consisting of five chapters unfinished, or lost to us. As for the second statement, it does not present much difficulty. While discussing about Alaṅkāras, PR. closely follows, with slight change here and there, the order that was adopted by Ruyyaka in Alaṅkārasarvasva. He might have naturally discussed, at the end of the second chapter, which should be strictly called "Uttarānana", about the figures Rasavat, Preyas, Ūrjasvin and Samāhita etc. and this he refers to, saying "गुणीभावे तु वक्ष्यन्ते नामानि च".

In the same context, he might have again explained some defects pertaining not only to Rasas, but any Vyaṅgyārtha in general, and mentioned 'Vamana-Doṣa' which he refers to here, saying "व्यङ्ग्यस्य वाच्यीकरणे सामान्यतो वमनाख्यदोषस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्". In fact, it is not a subject requiring long discussion and it must have been disposed of in one or two sentences by PR., as was done in one or two other places like :—कथमपि वाच्यवृत्त्यनालिङ्गितस्यैव व्यङ्ग्यस्य चमत्कारित्वेनालङ्कारिकैः स्वीकारात्" (RG., p. 13).

The third statement also cannot be taken as a proof to establish, as was thought by Candrikā (p. 684), that PR. was intent upon devoting one full chapter to explain the Siddhāntas acceptable to Ālaṅkārikas. All that PR. might have intended to say here is that Ālaṅkārikas also can have their own views, which may be against the well-established theories of other Śāstras, which he would explain wherever there would arise such opportunity. For example, he states under Tulyayogitālaṅkāra that Sādṛśya is Padārthāntara according to Ālaṅkārikas also :—

ग्रत एवालङ्कारिकाणामपि सादृश्यं पदार्थान्तरं न तु साधारणधर्मरूपमिति विज्ञायते" (RG., p, 423).

Therefore we may presume that only a few pages (leaves) of the second chapter must have been lost to us and that PR. might have originally written only two chapters naming them 'Pūrvam Ānanam' and "Uttaram Ānanam" on the basis of the concept of Ardhanārīśvara.

Chapter Seventh

CONCLUSION.

As the foregoing pages go to prove, PR.'s contribution to Sanskrit poetics is of considerable value. His great erudition, scholastic exposition, and his inimitable capacity to put things in clear perspective, had certainly won for him a very high place among Ālaṅkārikas, next only to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

Inspite of his modesty with which he indicates that his main intention is only to put the old theories in proper order (RG., p. 3), the importance of his own contribution on many topics is not negligible. We may enumerate many of his original views on different topics, with which, only a writer of high order can be accredited. The definition of Kāvya, the assertion of the supremacy of Pratibhā, four-fold classification of Kāvya, the new Rasa theory, the new turn that is given to the conception of Guṇas, rather two sets of Guṇas, the sound arguments that have been advanced while explaining the Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani, the discussions about Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā, the definite shape and scope that is given and shown to many Alaṅkāras; these, to mention a few, are some of the important points on which Paṇḍitarāja throws ample light for the first time.

Though being a great writer of original thinking, he never hesitates to offer his unstinting praise to the old writers like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. Besides paying verbal tribute to these writers, he declares in one place,

that the views of the old writers should be carefully followed as long as there is no serious inconvenience in doing so, and that none has the right to transgress the rules laid down by these writers (RG., p. 569).

But this great respect for the old writers never stands in his way while deciding a point of dispute. Such places are not wanting where he criticises the views of even these writers, on the basis of strong arguments, and thus he shows the dispassionate approach required of a great literary critic.

PR.'s great skill in very effectively putting forth subtle arguments, at times bordering on hair-splitting, is well-known. But he knows how to advance simple but convincing arguments also on different occasions, by which the opponent hinself will be forced to concede to his point. We come across many such arguments which are highly pleasing and convincing. Let us here pick up one such argument. Under Atiśayokti, in the context of criticising AD.'s views who accepts Sambandhātiśayokti instead of Gamyotprekṣā in "सौधाग्राणि पुरस्यास्य स्पृशन्ति विधुमण्डलम्", PR. puts a simple straight question, "what would be the figure in this line, if the particle 'Iva' is added after 'Spṛśanti' ?" The opponent has to say that it would be an instance of Utprekṣā. Now PR. explains, that, in the absence of 'Iva', it should then, naturally be an instance of Gamyotprekṣā (RG., p. 420).

It is true we get all the above things and such many more from PR.'s fertile brain, but that is not all. He has another important contribution to make and it is this. With the firm establishment of Dhvani-theory in the hands of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, it has almost become an unquestionable fact that a Kāvya has no claim to be called by that name, unless it has got Dhvani. While Ānandavardhana is content by giving importance to any Dhvani in

general, (whether it is Vastu or Alaṅkāra or Rasa), Abhinavagupta (Locana, p. 85) comes out with a firm assertion that Rasa alone is the important element in poetry and thus completes the import of Rasa-theory from Nāṭyaśāstra (H.A.B., p. 441) into the sphere of Śravya-kāvya also; and he had his own followers in writers like Viśvanātha (SD., p. 5).

PR.'s critical mind, though realising the importance of Dhvani and Rasa, could not accept the supreme importance given to them, in a Śravya-kāvya also, so as to make it not worth the name in their absence, and his definition of Kāvya, in fact the whole Rasagaṅgādhara, is an unproclaimed revolt against the unquestioned supremacy given to Dhvani and especially to Rasa.

PR. appears to be corect in holding such views. One can understand if such supremacy to Rasa is given in a drama where it is possible and also easier to hold the whole audience under an emotional grip with the aids like the four-fold Abhinaya. The same thing cannot be said in Śravya-kāvya, and therefore, while giving a proper place to Rasa in it, it should be shown its own limitations to get adjusted with other Vyaṅgyas and also with Vācya. For instance, in a long poem like Raghuvaṁśa, some verses like "Vāgarthāviva Saṁpṛktau" (I. 1) etc., may be explained as having some Deva-viṣayaka-rati etc., but what about many other verses like छायामण्डल-लक्ष्येण तमदृश्या किल स्वयम् । पद्मा पद्मातपत्रेण भेजे साम्राज्यदीक्षितम् ॥" (RV. IV. 2). It is idle to try to advance some far-fetched explanations that such verses aid in the realisation of the main Rasa of the Mahākāvya. In such case, how are the rhetoricians justified in examining the verses separating them off from the Mahākāvya? Even if one is prepared to accept such arguments that these verses can be examined both

separately and collectively, what about the simple verse with no place in a Mahākāvya. Let us take PR.'s own verse :—

> "कुस्तुम्भरी समायाति तिन्त्रिण्या मन्त्रिणा सह ।
> पलायध्वं पलायध्वं रे रे शाकविडम्बकाः ॥" (PKS., p. 136)

In this verse we can not explain any Rasa or Bhāva satisfactorily and one has to accept that Camatkāra, however simple or short-lived it may be, is resulting from Vācyārtha only. It would be a ridiculous attempt to explain Vīra, or Raudra or even Hāsya in it. All these considerations must have weighed with PR. who defines any sentence, which is the source of supernatural joy (not necessarily containing Rasa), as a Kāvya (RG., p. 4). Thus, according to him, Ramaṇīyatā, otherwise known as 'Camatkāra' whether it results from Rasa, or any other Vyaṅgya or even Vācyārtha, is the soul of poetry. This is the explicit negation of the implicit supremacy not only of Rasa but also of Dhvani in the sphere of poetry. This position of PR. is clearly indicated by S. N. Dasgupta in his work on Indian Art (Fundamentals of Indian Art, pp. 1-2). "Jagannātha, ... introduced the use of the term 'Ramaṇīya' in the sense of beautiful and defined literature as that which brought out the sense of the beautiful in a fit consonance of words and their meaning. ......he distinguished it from the traditional sentiment known as 'Rasa' which is supposed to be aesthetic pleasure derived from literary and other types of art of creation and communication. He says, there may be many kinds of literary composition which can just give a mild excitation of the mind without inducing the deeper emotions or 'Rasa'. This enjoyment may have the touch of the beautiful but is different from the emotion or 'Rasa' in the technical sense." This is really a strange position, hardly expected of an author of a "Rasagaṅgādhara", but it is there clearly indicated.

This attitude of PR. is again indicated by the importance that he attaches to the Alaṅkāras. Though named 'Rasagaṅgādhara', a large portion of this work deals with Alaṅkāras. This is a deliberate attempt at reviving the importance of Alaṅkāras, lost in the hands of old writers like Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa, who treated them only as the Upaskārakas of Rasa. No doubt, some of his predecessors like Ruyyaka and Jayaratha tried to restore the Alaṅkāras to their lost glory by way of writing works exclusively dealing with Alaṅkāras (it is immatarial whether they are original works or are in the form of commentaries), but they could not go against the well-established views of older writers like Dhvanikāra and Mammaṭa, and repeated the same views as expressed by them about the position of Alaṅkāras. Thus we find Jayaratha stating : "काव्यात्मनो व्यङ्ग्यस्य रसादेरेव तदलङ्कार्यत्वम्, किं पुनस्तस्य शब्दमुखेनोपस्कारका: शब्दालङ्कारा: अर्थमुखेन त्वर्थालङ्कारा:."

(Vimarśinī, p. 234).

But PR. declares (RG., p. 226) in unambiguous terms that not only Rasa but any Vyaṅgya and even Vācya can be the Alaṅkārya of Alaṅkāras. He does not have any objection in giving self-importance (स्वात्ममात्रविश्रान्तता) to the Alaṅkāras by applying the Peṭikābharaṇa-nyāya etc., though, in such case, they might not technically be called Alaṅkāras (RG., p. 228). Thus the significance of Alaṅkāras undergoes a vast change in the hands of PR. only in accordance with his concept of the important element in Kāvya. According to him 'Ramaṇīyatā' or "Camatkāra" is the important factor which raises any piece of literary composition to the position of a Kāvya, and the Alaṅkāra which itself is the source of Camatkāra, can have anything as its Alaṅkārya so long as the existence of Camatkāra is unaffected.

We can understand the great importance given to Camatkāra in a literary composition by PR. by examining his views about the Uttama-kāvya according to his classification. He feels it is the lack of the sense of discrimination on the part of old writers like Mammaṭa, to group up all the Kāvyas, having Alaṅkāras, irrespective of some of their being Guṇībhūtavyaṅgyas, under Adhama (RG., p. 24). This position assigned to the Alaṅkāras clearly indicates the great importance attached by RG. to the element of Camatkāra in a Kāvya.

Again in another context he indicates the importance of this element indirectly. He could have directly asserted in defiance of the views of the old writers, that not only Rasa or Dhvani but anything which is the source of Camatkāra, can constitute a Kāvya; but he was prevented from doing so more on account of the popularity of the views of those writers, than his respect for them. Therefore he chose a different method to explain his theory by way of criticising the definition of Kāvya given by Viśvanātha, whose views he never quotes for the second time, in the course of his whole work. There, he declares that nobody can deny the Kāvyatva of such works, where only some Alaṅkāras or Vastu are given importance. He also explains how it is idle to bring in the connection of Rasa in all places even where there is no possibility.

"यत्तु रसवदेव काव्यमिति साहित्यदर्पणे निर्णीतं तन्न । वस्त्वलङ्कारप्रधानानां काव्यानामकाव्यत्वापत्तेः । न चेष्टापत्तिः, महाकविसम्प्रदायस्याकुलीभावप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च जलप्रवाहवेगनिपतनोत्पतनभ्रमणानि कविभिर्वर्णितानि कपिबालादिविलसितानि च । न च तत्रापि यथाकथञ्चित् परम्परया रसस्पर्शोऽस्त्येवेति वाच्यम् । ईदृशरसस्पर्शस्य 'गौश्चलति' 'मृगो धावति' इत्यादावतिप्रसक्तत्वेनाप्रयोजकत्वात् ।" (RG., p. 9).

It is clear from the close examination of this statement

that it contains an implied attack not only on the importance of Rasa but also that of Dhvani.

Thus we find PR. laying stress on the principle of Camatkāra, and declaring on many occasions (RG., p. 7) that it is the soul of poetry and it is undoubtedly starting of a new school in the history of poetics in opposition to Dhvani theory. This school we may call as Ramaṇīyatā-school or Camatkāra-school and this concept of Camatkāra, like that of Aucitya, is all-comprehensive and is of wider significance. This school enunciated by PR. might not have found any followers in its theoretical aspect, more on account of the cessation of the critical activity after him in the sphere of Sanskrit Poetics, than of the non-popularity of this school. But it should be noted to the credit of PR. that his theory has got a great following not only in ancient times, but even today in its practical aspect. Thus the very important contribution of PR. to Sanskrit Poetics, lies in his unique attempt at bringing in a happy synthesis among the different schools, such as Dhvani school, Alaṅkāra school and Rīti school etc., under the pleasant banner of 'Ramaṇīyatā', otherwise known as 'Camatkāra'.

APPENDIX

A few topics touched by PR. in a passing reference.

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PR. leaves out certain topics undiscussed, because he does not find any points of controversy about them. For example, he proceeds with the theories of Rasa under the assumption that the Dhvani-theory has been fully established by his predecessors and so there is nothing to add to it from his side except some minor adjustments in the varieties of Dhvani etc., which he makes in proper places. Same is the case with Doṣas also. A few topics he touches in a passing reference, his views about which, we shall try to know in the following pages.

PURPOSE OF KĀVYA

PR. incidentally refers to the things said to be the Prayojanas of Kāvya, by his predecessors :—

"कीर्तिपरमाह्लादगुरुराजदेवताप्रसादाद्यनेकप्रयोजनकस्य काव्यस्य"

(RG., p. 4).

It is evident from the above sentence, that PR. does not think, like some other rhetoricians,[1] that Kāvya is intended

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1. "काव्यं कुर्वीत कीर्तये' काव्यस्यानेकगुणत्वेऽपि कीर्तेरेव ग्रहणं प्राधान्यख्यापनार्थम् ।" Commentary on Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra, p. 3.

"इह तावत् काव्यस्यानेकप्रयोजनजनकत्वेऽपि रससंवेदनजन्यं सुखमेव मुख्यं प्रयोजनम् ।" Rasapradīpa, p.3

"काव्यमानन्दाय यशसे कान्तातुल्यतयोपदेशाय च...। धनमनैकान्तिकं, व्यवहारकौशलं शास्त्रेभ्योऽपि, अनर्थनिवारणं प्रकारान्तरेणापीति न काव्यप्रयोजनतयाऽस्माभिरुक्तम् ।"

Kāvyānuśāsanam of Hemacandra, p. 5.

exclusively for Ānanda, or Kīrti or such other thing. Like Mammaṭa and others, he is inclined to accept as many Prayojanas as possible.

RĪTĪS AND VṚTTIS

As Dr. Raghavan rightly points out,[1] the concepts of Rīti and Vṛtti in Sanskrit Poetics, have undergone many changes. The Rīti which had its origin in geographical difference of taste and assumed such names as Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī, Pāñcālī, Lāṭī, Āvantī, Māgadhī etc., in the hands of different authors in different periods, has been explained by Kuntaka as a peculiar mode of expression, peculiar with each poet. Its difference, according to some, is based on the difference of the theme.[2]

"वैदर्भीपाञ्चाल्यौ प्रेयसि करुणे भयानकाद्भुतयोः ।
लाटीया गौडीये रौद्रे कुर्याद्यथौचित्यम् ॥"

But it is to be noted that in spite of the new turn given by Kuntaka, the old concept of Rīti, enunciated by writers like Daṇḍin, and Vāmana (of course shorn of its geographical prejudice), persists even today and thus, there may be nothing wrong if we understand 'Rīti' both in the general sense, as explained by Kuntaka and the special or narrow sense, given by the older writers.

The concept of Vṛtti which was borrowed from the Nāṭya, had undergone many changes and ultimately two sets of Vṛttis came to be recognised, one set comprising of Kaiśikī, Ārabhaṭī, Sāttvatī and Bhāratī which are called Arthavṛttis, and the other comprising of Paruṣā, Upanāgarikā and Grāmyā etc., called Śabda-vṛttis.[3] The so-called Śabda-vṛttis are finally equated by Mammaṭa with the well-known Rītis; Upanāgarikā

1. Some concepts of Alaṅkāraśāstra, pp. 130-193.
2. Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṅkāra, XV-20
3. Some concepts of Alaṅkāra Śāstra, p. 187.

with Vaidarbhī, Paruṣā with Guaḍī and Komalā (or Gramyā) with Pāñcālī,[1] Thus by the time of Mammaṭa, the apparent difference between the Rītis and the (Śabda) Vṛttis is lost, and they came to be identified with each other.

PR. endorses this equation effected by Mammaṭa and uses the word 'Vṛtti' instead of 'Rīti' while talking about the Vaidarbhī Rīti incidentally, in the context of explaining the employment of different letters etc , suitable for the suggestion of different Rasas. He writes : "इत्थमेते प्रसङ्गतो मधुररसाभिव्यञ्जिकायां रचनायां संक्षेपेण निरूपिता दोषाः ।

एभिर्विशेषविषयैः सामान्यैरपि च दूषणै रहिता ।
माधुर्यभारभङ्गुरसुन्दरपदवर्णविन्यासा ॥
व्युत्पत्तिमुद्गिरन्ती निर्मातुर्या प्रसादयुता ।
तां विबुधा वैदर्भीं वदन्ति वृत्तिं गृहीतपरिपाकाम् ॥

अस्याश्च रीतेर्निर्माणे कविना नितरामवहितेन भाव्यम् । अन्यथा तु परिपाकभङ्गः स्यात् ।" (RG., pp. 90-91).

It is not clear whether he is quoting some old Kārikās or gives his own. Any way, by using both the words 'Vṛtti' and 'Rīti', as synonyms he indicates that there is no difference between them. We do not have any proof in Rasagaṅgādhara, whether he accepts the other Vṛttis like Kaiśikī etc., which are accepted by writers like Vidyānātha.

AUCITYA

As explained in the second chapter, the concept of Aucitya is given great importance in Alaṅkāraśāstra While quoting the well-known Kārikā from Dhvanyāloka (p 330) (अनौचित्यादृते नान्यद्रसभङ्गस्य कारणम् । औचित्योपनिबन्धस्तु रसस्योपनिषत्परा ॥),

1. Some Concepts of Alaṅkāraśāstra, p. 188.

PR. also expatiates upon the Aucitya (RG., pp. 64-65). In fact, Aucitya is the guiding principle in determining the Virodha or otherwise among Rasas, in deciding the Rasābhāsa, etc. Thus PR., like many of his predecessors, explains elaborately how one Rasa is antagonistic to another, how two Virodhi Rasas are neutralised by intercepting them with a third Rasa, and many such other points.

Perhaps keeping the famous statement :

"अथवा प्रतिपक्षस्य वर्णयित्वा गुणान् बहून् ।
तज्जयान्नायकोत्कर्षवर्णनञ्च धिनोति नः ॥"

in view, PR. maintains that too much of reliance on the above principle is not desirable, for, even the description of the destruction of such great opponent by the hero of a present context may be taken as an accidental occurrence, without resulting in the greatness of the latter, unless his own greatness is specifically described. In this connection, he gives the example of a hunter who may kill a great king by shooting him with an arrow smeared with poison; yet cannot be called a great man : "एवं हि सति महाराजं कमपि विषशरक्षेपमात्रेण व्यापादितवतो वराकस्य शबरस्येव प्रकृतस्य नायकस्य न कोप्युत्कर्षः स्यादिति ।"

(RG., p. 64)

Like Ānandavardhana (Dhvanyāloka, pp. 332-33), who deprecates too much of indulgence on the part of some poets in depicting Saṁbhoga-Śṛṅgāra, PR. also finds fault with Jayadeva etc. (by etc., he perhaps means Kālidāsa) for this over-indulgence. Regarding a few other points of Aucitya to be observed by the poets, PR. adopts the views of some old writers like Rudraṭa (of course without mentioning their names). Thus he writes :—

"तथा विद्यावयोवर्णाश्रमतपोभिरुत्कृष्टैः स्वतोऽपकृष्टेषु न सबहुमानेन

वचसा व्यवहर्तव्यम् । व्यवहर्तव्यश्चापकृष्टैरुत्कृष्टेषु । तत्रापि तत्रभवन् भगवन्नित्यादिभिः सम्बोधनैः मुनिगुरुदेवताप्रभृतय एव न राजादयः, जात्योत्तमैर्द्विजैरेव नाधमैः शूद्रादिभिः, परमेश्वरेत्यादिसम्बोधनैश्चक्रवर्तिन एव न मुनिप्रभृतयः सम्बोध्याः।"

(RG., p. 65).

This statement reminds us of the following Kārikās of Rudraṭa :—

वक्ता त्रिधा प्रकृत्या नियतं स्यादधममध्यमोत्तमया ।
तत्र च कश्चित् किञ्चिन्नैवार्हति पदमुदाहर्तुम् ॥
तत्रभवन्भगवन्निति नार्हत्यधमो गरीयसो वक्तुम् ।
भट्टारकेति च पुनः नैवैतानुत्तमप्रकृतिः ॥
तत्रभवन् भगवन्निति नैवार्हत्युत्तमोऽपि राजानम् ।
वक्तुं नापि कथञ्चित् मुनिमपि परमेश्वरेति ॥

(K. Alaṅkāra, VI. 18-20).

Coming to Rasādyābhāsa, we find that PR.'s concept of 'Ābhāsa' like that of his predecessors, is guided by the principle of Aucitya. He first defines it as "अनुचितविभावालम्बनत्वं रसाभासत्वम्" (RG. p. 119). But after raising an objection that this definition does not include such Rasābhāsas where there is no impropriety in Vibhāvas, he states :

"तस्मादनौचित्येन रत्यादिविशेषणीयः ।" (RG., p. 119).

Thus the desirable definition would be "अनुचितप्रवृत्त्याधिकत्वं रसाभासत्वम्" as explained by Saralā (p. 119), which is more simple than the one given by Nāgeśa : "तथा चानुचितविभावालम्बनकरतित्वं तत्त्वं ज्ञेयम्" (GMP. p. 119), and this includes, as PR. explains, all kinds of Ābhāsas.

Now PR. raises a question whether 'Rasābhāsa' can be called 'Rasa' at all. In answer to this, he mentions one view

that Rasābhāsa cannot be 'Rasa', just as the Hetvābhāsa can not be Hetu and is in fact opposite to 'Hetu'. According to a second view, though called 'Ābhāsa', Rasābhāsa' does not lose its 'Rasatva' just as a deformed animal is not deprived of its individualistic trait ('Aśvatva' etc.). "तत्र रसाद्याभासत्वं रसत्वादिना न समानाधिकरणम् । निर्मलस्यैव रसादित्वात् । हेत्वाभासत्वमिव हेतुत्वेनेत्येके । नह्यनुचितत्वेनात्महानिः, अपि तु सदोषत्वादाभासव्यवहारः अश्वाभासादिव्यवहारवत् इत्यपरे ।" (RG., pp. 119-120).

Needless to add, by mentioning it at the end, PR. appears to be in favour of accepting the Niṣpatti or otherwise (of Rasa) as the deciding factor in some cases. That is why he explains in a different context, how Anaucitya hinders the realisation of Rasa by hampering Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa.

"क्रोधस्य च लोकभस्मीकरणपटोः दिनरात्रिव्यत्ययाद्यनेकाश्चर्यकारिणो दिव्येष्विवादिव्येषु । आलम्बनगताराध्यत्वस्यानुभावगतमिथ्यात्वस्य च प्रतीत्या रसानुल्लासापत्तेः । न च साधारणीकरणादाराध्यत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । यत्र सहृदयानां रसोद्बोधः प्रमाणसिद्धः तत्रैव साधारणीकरणस्य कल्पनात् । अन्यथा स्वमातृविषयकस्वपितृरतिवर्णनेऽपि सहृदयस्य रसोद्बोधापत्तेः ।" (RG., p 65).

Thus PR. appears to be in favour of accepting Rasābhāsa (because we find him generally identifying himself with Navyas) in the verse :

"ध्यानम्राश्चलिताश्चैव स्फारिताः परमाकुलाः ।
पाण्डुपुत्रेषु पाञ्चाल्याः पतन्ति प्रथमा दृशः ॥"

(RG., p. 122).

where there is no full realisation of Rasa, though there is no question of Anaucitya in this case; and this view appears to be correct. Thus the eighth canto of Kumārasaṁbhava may be a place of Rasābhāsa to many of us (Indians), because the

Anaucitya involved in this description hampers Rasa-niṣpatti; but it can be a source of Rasa for a foreigner. But it should be noted, that excepting a few places like the above verse, the Anaucitya can be relied upon as the deciding factor in many cases of Rasābhāsa, and therefore PR. is right in laying emphasis on this principle while talking about the Ābhāsas of Hāsya etc. (RG., pp. 122-23).

Thus we find PR. throwing light on many important topics, on some directly and on others indirectly.

यत्कृपालेशसंसर्गाद् ग्रन्थोऽयं रचितो मया ।
तस्यैव जानकीजानेः पदयोरयमर्प्यते ॥

देवतानुग्रहः पित्रोस्तपश्चाचार्यसत्कृपा ।
कर्तास्मद्ग्रन्थजातस्य करणं केवलं वयम् ॥

GLOSSARY OF SOME TECHNICAL WORDS AND SANSKRIT PHRASES

akhaṇḍopādhi	an attribute which does not need another definitive expression for its understanding and which is connected with its substratum by a direct relation, *svarūpa-saṁbandha.*
akṣasaṅghātāṅkitatva	being marked with a group of *akṣas*, i.e., thorn-like points and also senses.
ajahallakṣaṇā	secondary sense which does not completely exclude its primary sense.
agrāmyatā	absence of vulgarity; refinement.
aṅga	an accessory, a part.
aṅgin	the principal; the whole.
ajñāna	ignorance.
ativyāpti	fallacy of Too Wide; over-applicability.
atyantatiraskṛtavācya	an expressed sense completely lost or concealed in the suggested sense. The suggested sense which completely conceals the expressed sense.
adbhutarasa	wonderment as a sentiment.
adṛṣṭa	the unseen cause; the effect of the good or bad (unseen) deeds of earlier births.
adhama	of low type.
adhyavasāna	complete concealment of an object (*viṣaya*) by another object (*viṣayin*) superimposed.
adhyavasāya	same as above.
adhyavasita	the object (*viṣayin*) superimposed on something (*viṣaya*) in such a way that it (*viṣaya*) is completely concealed.

analaṅkārabhūta-rūpaka	metaphor which is not a figure.
anirvacanīya	inexplicable; undefinable.
anirvacanīyakhyāti	apprehension of a thing (like the serpent on a rope) which cannot be described either as existing or non-existing (of Advaitins)
anihnuta	not concealed.
auukartṛ	imitator.
anukārya	that which is imitated.
anukāryānukartṛ-bhāva	imitator imitated relationship.
anugama	easy applicability (of a definition); Comprehensiveness.
anugāmitā	being applicable to both the *upamāna* and the *upameya*.
anugāmidharma	one common characteristic expressed by one word as applicable to both *upamāna* and *upmeya*.
anubhava	experience.
anubhāvas	emotional reactions. The external manifestations of emotions.
anumāṇa	inference.
anumānavādin	one who accepts inference (in the place of dhvani).
anumāpaka	that which helps the inference.
anumīyamana	that which is inferred.
anumeyānumāpa-kabhāva	inferred-inferring relationship.
anumeyatā	capability to be inferred.
anuyogin	the place of similarity; in "the face is like the moon" the *upameya*, i.e., the face is *anuyogin* and the moon is *pratiyogin*. Therefore the *sādṛśya* (similarity) here is said to be *mukhānuyogika* and *candrapratiyogika*.

anuraṇanadhvani	resonance-like suggestion.
anuvyavasāya-jñāna	after-cognition.
anaucitya	impropriety.
antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti	the mode of the internal organ.
antarbhāva	inclusion.
anyathākhyāti	appearance of a recollected object, like the serpent, on an object like a rope which is just perceived as merely 'it'. This is accepted by Naiyāyikas and Prābhākaras with slight difference.
anya-śabda-sannidhi	proximity of another word.
anyasadṛśavya-vaccheda	exclusion or negation of anything else similar.
anyonyāśraya	fallacy of circular definition. Interdependence.
anvayānupapatti	discrepancy in the direct construing.
anvitābhidhānavāda	the theory that the unitary sense of a sentence arises directly from the collection of the words.
aparāṅga	accessory to something else.
apuṣṭārtha	a literary defect where additional charm is not produced in the meaning by the words used in a sentence; Verbosity.
apuṣṭārthatā	being *apuṣṭārtha*.
apuṣṭārthatābhāva	absence of verbosity.
aprakṛtārtha	irrelevant meaning.
abhidhā	significative power of a word conveying the primary sense.
abhidhā-puccha	a tail of the primary sense.
abhidhāniyamana	restriction to the *abhidhā*, the significative power.

abhidhāmūlaka-śābdabodha	the understanding of the meaning of a sentence based on *abhidhā*.
abhidhaya	primary sense; meaning.
abhinaya	action in a play etc; gesture.
abhivyakti	appearance (of a thing which was latent).
abhihitānvayavāda	the theory that the unitary sense of a sentence arises indirectly through the recollection of the meanings of the individual words.
abhedādhyavasāna	deliberate imposition or conception of non-difference.
abhedādhyavasāya	same as abhedādhyavasāna above.
abhyāsa	constant practice (of writing poetry)
amarṣa	indignation.
artha	(i) sense; meaning; significance; connotation. (2) a purpose to be served.
arthavyakti	quick expression of the meaning; the description of the unique features of a thing.
arthaśaktimūlā dhvani	suggestion based on the literal meaning.
arthāntarasaṅkramita-vācya	a literal meaning retained in the suggested meaning; the suggested meaning retaining the literal meaning.
arthāpatti	postulation of a fact.
alaṅkāra	a figure of speech; ornament.
alaṅkārabhūta-rūpaka	ametaphor which is used as a figure.
alaṅkārya	that which is to be made beautiful by a figure.
alaukika	extraordinary; transcendental; super-normal.
alaukika-camatkāra	extraordinary striking effect.

alaukika-pratyakṣa	super-normal perception.
alpatva	being trifle or small.
avacchedaka	delimiting; distinguishing.
avivakṣita-vācya	that where the literal import is not intended.
avyāpti	fallacy of Too Narrow; partial applicability.
avyāpya-vṛtti	(conjunction) which subsists in two things but does not cover completely any one of them.
aślīla	vulgar; repugnant.
asambhava	fallacy of non-esse or non-sequitur; total non-applicability.
asaṁlakṣya-krama-dhvani	suggested content of undiscovered sequentiality.
asādhāraṇatva	being not common; extraordinariness.
ahaṅkāra	ego.
ahantva	'I' ness.
ākāṅkṣā	the syntactic expectancy.
ākṣepa	deducing.
ākhyāta	a verb; termination added to a root to form a verb.
ākhyātārtha	the meaning conveyed by an *ākhyāta*.
ācāra	performance; behaviour.
Ātman	soul; essence; life; entity; spirit.
ādhāra	substratum; base; locus.
ādhikya	superiority; being in excess.
ādheya	the contained.
ānanda-svabhāva	that which is bliss itself.
āptatva	trustworthyness.
āropa	superimposition.
ārtha	connected with the meaning; known indirectly.
ārthī bhāvanā	the effort for the achievement of some result.

ālambana vibhāva	the objects of emotion such as the hero and the heroine.
āśraya	same as *ādhāra* above.
āsvādana	enjoyment.
āhārya-jñāna	a deliberate cognition (of an object though it does not exist).
itara-vyāvṛtti	negation of, or distinguishing from others.
idaṁkārāspada	that which is subjected to 'this'ness.
iṣuvaddīrgha-vyāpāra	a prolongated function as that of an arrow.
uktārthopa-pādānapara	intended to justify a statement made.
uttama	excellent (*kāvya*).
uttamaprakṛti	of refined nature.
uttamottama	the most excellent (*kāvya*)
uttejaka	exciting; stimulating (in suppression of an obstacle).
utpatti	birth; appearance.
utsāha	highspiritedness; energy.
udāratā	an arrangement of harsh letters; refinement; absence of vulgarity.
uddīpana vibhāva	the exciting causes such as the spring, moon-light etc.
uddeśya	the subject about which something is predicated or postulated.
uddeśyatāvac-chedaka	the delimiting factor in an *uddeśya*.
udbuddhamātra-sthāyi	the *sthāyibhāva* which is just kindled.
udbodhaka	that which brings out a latent thing.
upacaritadharma	an ascribed characteristic.
upacāra	metaphorical identification; secondary function of a word; ascription.
upamarda	suppression
upamāna	standard of comparison,

upamāna-vācaka	the word denoting similarity.
upamānāntara-niṣedha	negation of any other *upamāna.*
upamānotkarṣa	the superiority of the *upamāna.*
upameya	the object compared.
upameyotkarṣa	the superiority of *upameya.*
upalakṣaṇa	synecdoche; pointer, the act of implying any analogous object where only one is specified.
upaskāraka	ornamental; decorative.
upādānakāraṇa	a material cause.
upādhi	(1)an adventitious circumstance, extraneous condition; (2) an attribute like *ākāśatva* which cannot be called *jāti* because the object *ākāśa*, associated with it is only one while *jāti* requires that the objects should be many, e.g., many *ghaṭas* are associated with the *ghaṭatvajāti.*
ubhayaniṣṭha	connected with, or existing in, both.
ubhayavādins	those who accept both.
ekadeśa	one part.
ekapadopāttatva	being conveyed by one and the same word.
ojas	(1) abundance of compounds; (2) close construction of words.
auciti	decorum; propriety; rightness; aptness; congruity.
aucitya	same as *auciti* above.
aupacārika	based on *upacāra.*
aupacārika-prayoga	usage based on metaphorical identification.
aupādhika-bheda	difference caused by the adventitious circumstances; incidental.
aupādhika	caused by adventitious circumstnces.
kaṭākṣa	sidelong looks; sportive glance.
kavinibaddha-vaktṛ	speaker introduced by the poet.

kavipraudhokti-nispanna	created only by the ornate expression of the poet; invented by the imagination of the poet.
kavisamaya-virodha	incongruity with the poetical convention.
kānti	(1) a unique charm in the words used; (2) overflowing *rasa*.
kāraṇa	a cause
kārya	effect; product.
kāraṇatāvacce-daka	the factor or the characteristic which delimits the cause-hood.
kevala-śabda-rūpa	that which is only in the form of a word.
kevala-śliṣṭa-paramparita	the simple metaphorical chain based on double-meaning words.
kevala-samudāya-śakti	the *śakti* of only the whole (word); see *śakti* (1).
krodha	anger.
guṇa	(1) quality like the red colour etc., (2) poetical excellence like *prasāda* etc.
guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya	poetry containing subordinated suggested sense.
gurūpadeśa-śravaṇa	listening to the advice of the teacher.
gauṇa prayoga	same as '*aupacārika prayoga*' above.
gauṇī	based on, or connected with, a similar quality.
gauravadoṣa	the defect of cumbrousness.
grahītṛ-bheda	difference of the cognising persons.
ghrāṇa	the sense of smell.
cakṣuḥ-saṁyukta	that which is in contact with the eyes.
candana-sparśa	the touch of the sandal paste.
camatkāra	strikingness; the striking effect.
camatkāra-jñāna-tāvacchedaka	the factor or the characteristic delimiting the *camatkāra* productiveness.
carvaṇa	enjoyment; testing.
cārutva	artistic excellence; beauty.
citta	mind.

Cidrūpa	nothing but Knowledge or Consciousness.
ceṣṭā	the movement of the limbs and etc.
janyatva	being a product.
jāti	universal.
jñāna	knowledge; cognition.
jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti	the relation (contact) based on the knowledge of something which is always connected with the object of cognition, e.g., as soon as one sees a rose-flower he gets the knowledge : "there is a fragrant rose".
jñāna-viṣaya	the object of a cognition.
jñānarūpa-pratyāsatti	same as '*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*'.
jñāpya	that which is indicated or is made known.
tadvattājñāna	the cognition 'it has got that'.
tādātmya	identity.
tātparya	the purport; implication; intent; gist; content; the intention of the speaker,
tātparya-nirṇaya	deciding the *tātparya.*
tātparyānupapatti	incogruity with *tātparya.*
tamoguṇa	one of the three components of the Prakṛti which represents whatever is coarse or heavy.
tārkika	well-versed in *tarkaśāstra* (logic).
tulya-prādhānya	equal importance.
tṛtīyasadṛśa-vyavaccheda	exclusion or negation of a third similar object.
tṛṣṇā-kṣaya	desirelessness.
triguṇātmakatva	consisting of three *guṇas, sattva, rajas* and *tamas.*
dṛśyakāvya	a drama.
doṣābhāva	absence of defects.
druti	melting.
dvitīyasadṛśa-vyavaccheda	exclusion or negation of a second similar object.

dharma	characteristic; a special quality; common attribute.
dharmabheda	difference of a *dharma*.
dharmalopa	dropping of a *dharma*.
dharmaikya	identity of a *dharma*.
dhārāvāhika jñāna	a prolongated cognition.
dhvani	the function of suggestion; suggestive expression or meaning; suggested content; poetry with principal suggestion; suggestivity of expression in poetry; words and imports pregnant with suggestivity.
nakha-kṣata	nail-impressions on the bosoms of the ladies caused by their lovers.
naṭa	an actor
nāṭya	dance; a drama.
nānārtha śabda	homonym; word connoting more than one meaning.
nāmārtha	the meaning of a noun.
nigiraṇa	devouring; concealment.
nimittakāraṇa	cause in general; an occasioning cause.
nimittānupādāna	non-mention of the cause.
nirupamatva	peerlessness
nirūpitatva-sambandha	the relation of being governed.
nirvikalpaka-jñāna	indeterminate cognition.
nirveda	detachment.
niṣedha	prohibition; negation.
nṛtyatprāyatva	jumping and dancing as it were.
padārtha	word-import; word-meaning.
padārthopasthiti	occurring of the word-meaning in the mind.
padavṛtti	the function of a *pada*.
para-gatatva	being associated with others.
parabrahmāsvāda	experiencing the Supreme Being.

parokṣa-jñāna	non-sensual knowledge; mediate cognition.
paśvabhāva-rūpa	being other than an animal.
pāka-rasa	culinary taste.
puṁścalī	an unchaste woman.
Purāṇa-śravaṇa	listening to the Purāṇas.
puṣṭārthatā	having well-beautified meaning.
peṭikābharaṇanyāya	the analogy of an ornament kept in the jewel-box.
paunaruktya	repetition.
prakaraṇa	the context of situation.
prakṛtārtha	contextual meaning
Prakṛti	(1) nature of a person or a being; (2) the Primordial Nature; (3) origin.
prakṛti-rasa	the *rasa* (sentiment) which is the origin of all the other *rasas*.
prakṛtopayoga	to be useful to a thing or a subject on hand.
pratibhā	genius; creative power; imagination; vision.
pratiyogin	see *anuyogin* above.
pratīti	apprehension.
pratīyamāna	implied.
pratyakṣa	direct perception.
pratyeka-paryāpta	complete in, or completely associated with, each one of the two things.
prathamārtha-pratīti	apprehension of the first meaning.
pradhāna	important; superior.
pramā	valid knowledge.
pramāṇa	instrument of knowledge; an authority.
prayojaka	responsible; a cause.
prayojakatva	being prayojaka.
pralaya-payodhi	ocean at the time of world-destruction.
pravatsyatpatikā	one whose husband is going to be away on an exile.

prasāda	perspicuity; lucidity; clarity.
prasiddhi	conventional usage; known usage.
prākarṇikārtha-jñāna	apprehension of the contextual meaning.
prātibhāsika	apparent; illusory.
bādha	contradiction.
bādha-niścaya	definite knowledge of contradiction.
bādha-buddhi-prati-bandhakatāvac-chedaaka	the factor delimiting the obstructibility by the contradicting knowledge.
bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva	contradictor-contradicted relationship.
bimba-pratibimba-bhāva	image-reflection relationship; when there are two different ideas, one relating to the *upamāna* and the other to the *upameya*, but they are treated alike by reason of their close resemblance though they are conveyed by two different words, this kind of balancing of ideas is called *bimba-pratibimba-bhāva.*
bībhatsa	'disgust' as a sentiment
bodhakatva	being a denoter.
bodhyatva	denotedness.
bodhya-bodhaka-bhāva	denoter-denoted relationship.
Brahmākārā vṛtti	the mental mode having the Supreme Being as the object of contemplation and so assuming the form of the Supreme Being.
Brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa-nyāya	the analogy of a Brahmin who has embraced Buddhism yet still called "Brahmin-Buddhist monk".
bhaya	fear.
bhayānaka	fear, 'terror' as sentiment.
bhāktatva	being connected with the secondary significative power of a word; see *aupacārika.*
bhāva	emotion.

bhāvakatva	the power of universalisation (in the poetic language).
bhāvanā	aesthetic contemplation.
bhāva-śabalatā	admixture of emotions.
bhāva-śānti	gradual disappeareoce of the emotion.
bhāvasandhi	conjunction of two emotions.
bhāvodaya	appearance of the emotion.
bhūtatva	to have special qualities cognised by the external senses.
bheda-ghaṭita-sādṛśya	the similarity associated with difference.
bhojakatva	the power (in poetic language) by which the sthāyi-bhāva reaches its climax and is enjoyed by the spectator.
bhrāntijñāna	invalid knowledge; error.
mada-māna-moka	removal of the intoxication and haughtiness.
mañjūṣādigatālaṅkāra	an ornament in a jewel-box etc.
madhyama	ordinary; of middle class type.
mūrta	a tangible substance.
mādhurya	sweetness; suavity.
mānasabodha	mental cognition.
mālārūpa śliṣṭa-paramparita	garland-like interconnected *rūpaka*.
mithyā	non-real; apparent; illusory.
mithyā-jñāna	non-real cognition.
mūḍhatva	foolishness.
mūrtatva	being a tangible substance.
yathārtha-jñāna	an apprehension which accords with the object apprehended; valid knowledge.
yadyarthakalpitātiśayokti	the figure *atiśayokti* (hyperbole) based on assumption 'if it were to be so'.
yādṛcchika	made or created by one's will
yādṛcchikābhidheya	the meaning given by one's will.

yukta	one who attained yogic powers, and can have knowledge of all things and of all times.
yuñjāna	one who is on the road for attaining yogic powers. This yogin requires the help of meditation before he gets the knowledge of the things of all times.
yoga	derivation (of the meaning).
yogarūḍha	derivative-conventional.
yogarūḍhi	derivative-conventional expressive power.
yogaja-pratyāsatti	the relation (contact with objects) caused by yogic powers.
yogyatā-jñāna	recognition of the logical consistency.
yaugika-rūḍha	that which could be taken either as derivative or conventional.
yaugika	derivative.
racanā	composition; arrangement.
rajatatva-jñāna	knowledge of silverhood.
rajoguṇa	one of the three components of the Prakṛti (of the Sāṅkhyas) which represents whatever is active.
rati	love.
ratotsava	amorous sport.
rasa	sentiment.
rasana	aesthetic enjoyment.
rasābhāsa	semblance of sentiment.
rasībhāva	turning into a sentiment.
rīti	style; manner.
rūḍhi	power of the word to express the conventional meaning.
raudra	the terrible; anger as a sentiment.
lakṣaṇa	definition; theory; defining feature.
lakṣaṇaśāstra	the science laying rules.

lakṣaṇā	the function of a word expressive of the secondary meaning.
lakṣaṇāmūla	based on *lakṣaṇā*.
lakṣya	(1) a secondary meaning; (2) that which is defined.
lakṣyamāṇārtha	the secondary meaning conveyed by a word through the function *lakṣaṇā*.
lākṣaṇika prayoga	the secondary usage; usage in a secondary sense.
lāghava	easiness; lack of cumbersomeness.
liṅga	the *probans* in inference (2) an indication taken from another word.
liṅgin	the *probandum* of an inference.
lokavyavahāra	the behaviour of the world; that which is prevailing in the world.
lokottara	extraordinary; super-normal.
laukika	mundane.
laukikapratyakṣa	sense-perception.
laukikavastu	a thing of this world; not extra-ordinary.
vakrokti	artistic turn of speech; evasive speech; indirect denotation.
vastu	idea; subject; theme.
vastu-dhvani	suggestion of an idea or of a fact.
vastu-prativastu-bhāva	the object counter-object relationship. This exists when the idea is the same but is conveyed by two different words with reference to the *upamāna* and the *upameya*.
vākya	a sentence.
vākyānvaya	meaning construing of a sentence.
vākyārtha	purport of a sentence; sentence-meaning.
vācaka	the denoter; a word.
vācakatva	the power of denotation.
vācakaluptā	(*upamā*) with the denoting word missing.
vācya	the denoted meaning.
vācyasiddhyaṅga	(the suggested sense) which is subordinate to denoted sense being its justifier.

vācyārtha	the expressed literal or denoted sense; explicit primary and conventional meaning.
vācyārthābhedā nvaya	connection with the denoted meaning with non-difference or identity.
vāpīsnāna	bath in a pond.
vikaṭatva	to be uneven and harsh.
vikāsa	expansion.
vidheya	predicate; idea to be predicated.
viparīta-lakṣaṇā	*lakṣaṇā* indicative of contrariety.
vipralambha-śṛṅgāra	the sentiment of love in separation.
viprayoga	dissociation.
vibhāva	stimulus and stimuli provided by characters and excitants.
virodhitā	opposition; animosity.
virodhin	opposite; reverse.
vivecaka	one who distinguishes; a man of discerning mind.
vivakṣā	intent; intention of communication.
vivakṣitānyapara-vācya	an expressed meaning with extended signification; intended but further extending literal meaning.
viśiṣṭabuddhi	the cognition of the association; cognition of something as associated with something else.
viśiṣṭāropa	the superimposition of something which is associated with something else.
viśeṣa	speciality; peculiarity.
viśeṣaṇa-dala	the word used as an adjective.
viśeṣaṇa-sāmya	similarity of the adjectives.
viśeṣya-dala	the word used as a substantive.
viṣaya	object; content; that which is compared with another; that on which something else is superimposed.
viṣayatāsambandha	the relation of being *viṣaya*.

visaṁvādi-bhrama	an error which does not produce correct result.
vistāra	spreading.
vismaya	wonder.
vṛtti	procedure; function of a word.
vaidharmyodāharaṇa	negative example.
vaiṣayikānanda	pleasure of worldly enjoyments.
vyakti	(1) grammatical gender (2) individual.
vyaṅgyapradhāna	having the suggested meaning as important.
vyañjakatva	suggestiveness or suggestivity; extended signification; suggestivity and meaningfulness.
vyadhikaraṇa	that which has a different substratum.
vyabhicāradoṣa	the fallacy of undistributed middle.
vyabhicāribhāva	passing mood.
vyavahāra	behaviour; action.
vyāpāra	function or power of a word.
vyāpti	concomitance.
vyāpti-jñāna	the knowledge of the concomitance.
vyāsakta	separately associated with more than one.
vyutpatti	learning.
śakti	(1) significative power convention in coveying a sense. (2) same as *pratibhā*.
śaktigraha	the cognition of the denoting power.
śabda	sound; word; language.
śābda jñāna	the knowledge produced by the *śabda*.
śābdabodha	understanding of the meaning of a sentence.
śābdī bhāvanā	persuasion for the performance of an action implied in a sentence.
śāstravirodha	non-conformity with the *śāstra*.
śukti-rajata	silver on a shell.
śuktitva	shell-hood.

śuddha-caitanya-rūpa	of the nature of Pure Consciousness.
śṛṅgāra	the erotic sentiment.
śoka	sorrow.
śaithilya	looseness in construction of a sentence.
śravya-kāvya	a poetic work which can only be heard.
śrauta	directly mentioned in words.
śleṣa	(1) smoothness of a sentence; (2) orderly arrangement of the ideas
ṣaṣthī-vibhakti	genitive case.
saṅkara	merging or inter-mingling of figures. mingled figure.
saṅghaṭanā	stylistic structure.
saṁyoga	conjunction; association.
saṁlakṣya-krama	of marked sequentiality.
saṁsṛṣṭi	co-existence or collocation of figures.
saṁnidhi	vicinity.
saṁvādi-bhrama	the error which produces correct result.
saṁvid	consciousness.
saṁvid-viśrānti	resting in one's own consciousness.
saṁśaya-jñāna	doubt.
saṁsarga	mutual association of word-meanings.
saṁsarga-maryādā	the law of association by which a sentence conveys the connected meaning; mutual expectancy.
saṁskāra	the latent impression on the mind produced by the earlier experiences of this birth or of previous births.
sattvaguṇa	one of the three components of Prakṛti which represents whatever is finer and light.
satsaṅga	association with the good people.
sandigdhaprā-dhānya	that the importance of which is doubtful.
sannidhi	contiguity (of the words); proximity.

saptapadī	walking seven steps (of the couple in a marriage ceremony).
samatā	(1) maintenance of the style; (2) maintenance of the ideas as they are started.
samarthaka	that which supports or justifies.
samavāya-sambandha	inherence; intimate connection of inseparables.
sama-vyāpti	the concomitance in which the *probans* and *probandum* can interchange their positions alternatively.
samādhi	systematic use of looseness and tightness in the word-arrangement; careful examination of an idea whether it is a new one or a familiar one.
samānādhikaraṇa	having same substratum; connected with one and the same object.
samudāyāvayava-śakti-saṅkara	an admixture of the collective power and that of the component parts (in a word).
samūhālambana-jñāna	a collective cognition.
sambandha	connection; relationship.
sambandhin	that which is connected.
sambhavadvastu nibandhanā	based on a possible idea.
saṁbhoga	amorous enjoyment.
sarogatva	being in a pond and also having diseases.
savikalpaka-jñāna	determinate knowledge.
sahakārikāraṇa	auxiliary cause.
sahaja	natural; inborn.
sahārtha	the meaning 'together'.
sahṛdaya	perceptive or sympathetic critic; responsive reader; man of taste.
sādṛśya-jñāna	recognition of the similarity.
sādharmyodāharaṇa	positive example.

sādhāraṇīkaraṇa	universalisation.
sādhya	to be established or achieved
sādhyavasāna	intro-susceptive; having deliberately conceived identity.
sāmagrī	required accessories.
sāmarthya	power of implication; capacity.
sāmājika	spectator.
sāmānādhikaraṇya	to have the same locus.
sāmānya	the universal; same as 'jāti'.
sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti	the relation based on the knowledge of sāmānya, i.e., a common attribute.
sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāva	universal-particular relationship.
sāropā	super-imponent.
sāttvika-bhāvas	emotional effects seen on the person
sāhacarya	companionship.
siddha	already existing or achieved.
sukumāratā	absence of harshness; to be consisting of soft letters.
sukhākāra	of the form of pleasure.
sukhāvacchedaka	that which delimits pleasure; pleasant.
sevā	service, constant application of oneself to something.
saurabha	fragrance.
sthāyibhāva	abiding emotion.
sthairya	firmness.
smṛti	recollection.
svagatatva	being associated with oneself.
svataḥsambhavi	naturally existing; inherent.
svapna-turagādi	horses etc., seen in a dream.
svapratiyogikā-bheda	the non-difference which is governed by oneself.
Svarūpānanda	the Bliss which is not different from one's own self.

svavaicitryamātra-viśrānta	which results in its own beauty.
svaśabdābhidhāna	denoting by using its own name.
svānuyogikābheda	the non-difference governed by oneself.
svātmahitākaraṇa	not to be engaged in benefitting himself.
hālāhalasadṛśatva-prakāraka jñāna	cognition that it is like the poison hālāhala.
hāsya	laughter.

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21.	Citramīmāṁsā	Appayya Dīkṣita.	Nirnayasagar Press, 1941.
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23.	Comparative Aesthetics, Vol. I.	Dr. K.C. Pande	Chaukhamba, 1959.
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25	Candrikā (Commentary on Rasagaṅgādhara), Part II.	Madan Mohan Jha	See book No. 84.
26.	Candrikā (Commentary on the first Ānana of Rasagaṅgā-dhara)	Badarinath Jha.	See book No. 83.
27.	'Candrikā', Hindi Translation	Madan mohan Jhā	See Books Nos. 83 & 84.
28.	Candrāloka	Jayadeva	
29.	Dhvanyāloka with Locana, Bālapriyā etc.	Ānanda Vardhana	Chaukhamba, 1940.
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32.	Ekāvalī, with Taralā.	Vidyādhara	Government Central Book Depot, Bombay, 1903.
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34.	Gurumarmaprakāśa	Nāgeśa.	See Books Nos. 81 & 82.
35.	Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit.	Kuppusvami Sastri	K.S.S. Research Institute, Mylepore, Madras, 1945

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36.	(Hindi) Kāmasūtra	Vātsyāyana	Chaukhamba Press, 1964.
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38.	History of Sanskrit Poetics	P.V. Kane	Motilal Banarasidas, 1961.
39.	History of Sanskrit Poetics	S.K. De	Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay Calcutta, 1906.
40.	Hindi Abhinavabhāratī		Hindi Department, University of Delhi, 1960.
41.	Hindi Rasagaṅgādhara (Hindi Translation), 3 Volumes	Purushottam Sharma Chaturvedi	Nagari Pracharini Sabha.
42.	Jagannātha Paṇḍita	V.A. Ramasvamisastry	Annamalai University, 1942.
43.	Kāvyādarśa, with Hindi and Sanskrit Commentaries, 'Prakāśa'	Daṇḍin	Chaukhamba, 1958.
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47.	Kāvyālaṅkāra.	Rudraṭa	Nirnayasagar Press, 1928.

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48.	Kāvyamīmāṁsā, with Hindi Translation etc.	Rajaśekhara	Bihar Rashtrabhasha Parishad, Patna, 1954.
49.	Kāvyānuśāsanam, with Tilaka.	Vāgbhaṭa	Nirnayasagar Press, 1915.
53.	Kāvyānuśāsanam	Hemacandra	—Do— 1934.
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57.	Kāvyapradīpa (printed with Kāvyaprakāśa)	Govinda Ṭhakkura	Anandashrama Press, Poona.
58.	Literary Criticism in Sanskrit and English.	D.S.Sarma	K.S.S. Research Institute, Mylapore, Madras, 1950.
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60.	Lalitavistara	Ed. by Rajendralal Mitra	Calcutta, 1877.
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74.	Paribhāṣenduśekhara, with Bhairava's Commentary	Nāgeśa	Tara Press, (old) Kasi.
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82.	Rasagaṅgādhara, edited by Mahamahopadhyaya Gangadhara Sastri	Paṇḍitarāja	Benaras Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1903.
83.	Rasagaṅgādhara, with 'Candrikā', Part I	Paṇḍitarāja.	Chaukhamba Press, 1964.

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84.	Rasagaṅgādhara, with 'Candrikā' Part II.	Paṇḍitarāja	Chaukhamba Press, 1957.
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86.	Rasagaṅgādhara	Marathi Translation by R.B.Athavale	Tilak Maharastra Vidyapitha, Poona, 1965.
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91.	Rasagaṅgādharamu. (Telugu Translation)		Andhra Pradesh Sahitya Academy, 1963.
92.	Śabdavyāpāra-Vicāra	Mammaṭa.	Nirnayasagar Press, 1916.
93.	Sāhityadarpaṇam I, II, and X with notes by P.V. Kane	Viśvanātha	Oriental Book Agency, Poona 1951.
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99.	Saralā, (Commentary on Rasagaṅgādhara)		See book No. 81
100.	Saṅketa (Commentary on Kāvyaprakāśa)	Māṇikya Candra	Anandasrama Press, Poona. 1921.
101.	Tarkasaṅgraha	Annaṁbhaṭṭa	Published with the following Commentary.
102.	Tarkasaṅgraha-Sarvasvam	K. Sri Rama Sastry of Telani (A.P.)	Published by the Author. 1924.
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106.	The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure	P.Pañcapageśa Śāstry.	Annamalai University, 1940.
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108.	Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra.	Vāgbhaṭa	Chaukhamba, 1957.
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110.	Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghu-mañjūṣā, with Ratnaprabhā.	Nāgeśa	Chaukhamba Press, 1963.
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112.	Vṛttivārttikam	Appayya Dīkṣita	Nirnayasagar Press, 1940.
113.	Vyaktiviveka, with Hindi and Sanskrit Commentaries	Mahimabhaṭṭa	Chaukhamba, 1964.
114.	Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya.	Patañjali	Nirnayasagar Press, 1951.
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116.	Vimarśinī.	Jayaratha	Published with Alaṅkārasarvasva,
117.	Vakroktijīvitam.	Kuntaka	K.L. Mukhopadhyaya Calcutta, 1961.

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118.	Vakroktijīvitam. (Hindi Translation by Viśveśvara)	Kuntaka	Atmaram and Sons, Delhi, 1955.
119.	Vedāntaparibhāṣā with Sīkhāmaṇi and Maṇiprabhā	Dharmarajādhvarīndra.	Khemraja Sri Krisnadas, Bombay, 1938.
120.	Vikramāṅkadevacarita		Sanskrit Sahitya Research Committee, 1958.

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